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ABSTRACT 
This study is anchored on the premise that contemporary international relations has been 
characterised by the expansion and growing importance of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) whose power and influence have had concomitant ramifications for national 
sovereignty and autochthonous socio-economic arrangements.  Through their expansion and 
operations in host countries, MNCs are imbricated in activities or processes that may 
exacerbate socio-political traumas and development pathologies on one hand, and those that 
may facilitate transformative change on the other.  In mineral-rich but conflict-prone 
environments, MNCs are directly or invariably drawn into conflicts in which access to natural 
resources is germane to attaining/sustaining the corporate objective of profit maximisation.  
To unpack these issues, the study uses a  triangulation – natural resources, profit and peace – 
to interrogate the roles of MNCs in conflicts and the peace process in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) – a country whose ‘biography’ is steeped in conflict. 
 
The study relies on data gathered from three (3) focus group discussions (comprising 30 
participants, mainly Congolese expatriates in South Africa), 71 in-depth interviews and 150 
questionnaires administered in the DRC.  Research findings suggest that MNCs in conflict 
zones such as the DRC are confronted with a choice: to engage in activities that exacerbate 
conflicts or contribute to peace processes.  Corporate complicity in conflicts, which takes the 
form of illicit resource exploitation and the provision of financial assistance and logistical 
support to warring parties, lubricates war economies.  By contrast, corporate actors make 
positive contributions in conflict settings through social responsibility projects and 
humanitarian programmes.  Therefore, MNCs can be parties in conflict even as they can be 
agents of peace. 
 
MNCs – as powerful economic actors – are influential host environments, especially in weak 
states.  State deflation gives corporations comparative advantage in the public sphere, thus 
making their activities – whether positive or negative – extremely significant.  The DRC case 
shows that MNCs shape conflicts in terms of intensity, technological sophistication, 
longevity and the prospects for their attenuation.  However, the study also reveals the 
potentialities of MNCs to contribute to peace, development and prosperity in host 
environments.  Hence, the utility of mainstreaming corporate peacebuilding into business 
activities in conflict zones. 
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Finally, the study – drawing from the findings – makes recommendations that address the 
deleterious consequences of the intricate connections of natural resources, business and 
conflicts.  These recommendations relate to the reconstruction or restructuring of the state in 
Africa to make it developmental, with a view to mobilising its natural resources for national 
prosperity; and the consolidation of effective natural resource management and good 
political/economic governance, with an eye on issues such as anti-corruption, transparency in 
the extractive industry, and environmental sustainability.  The study also recommends the 
emplacement of sub-regional mechanisms to bolster national capacities for combating illicit 
resource exploitation and trafficking; the creation of effective international certification 
schemes to regulate mineral exploitation and trade; and the development of a Pan-African 
regime for regulating corporate behaviour vis-à-vis conflict-sensitivity and the role of 
business in peacebuilding and development processes.  Collectively, these recommendations 
not only offer roadmaps for resource-rich countries plagued by, or emerging from, conflicts, 
and those striving to circumvent the slide into the vortex of resource-related political 
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1.1 Introduction/Background to the study 
Since the end of the Second World War no aspect of international 
political economy has generated more controversy than the global 
expansion of multinational corporations (Gilpin, 1987: 231). 
 
In the immediate post-Second World War period (precisely in 1949), the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) noted in an Advisory Opinion that “the progressive increase in the collective 
activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane 
by certain entities which are not States” (quoted in Hernández, 2011: 142).  These “entities 
which are not States”, are referred to as non-state actors.  The post-World War II 
international system has been characterised by the emergence and ascendance of non-state 
actors whose power and influence have had concomitant ramifications for national 
sovereignty.  In fact, the dramatic rise in the number and types of non-states actors since 1945 
seemingly confines the ICJ’s observation in 1949 to the level of an understatement.  As 
Noortmann (2002: 36) posits, the “Court’s observation … pales into insignificance in view of 
the contemporary development, known as globalisation.  The rise and proliferation of non-
state actors have developed beyond the Court’s imagination” [Emphasis in original]. 
 
Post-World War II developments have underpinned the ascendance and phenomenal 
influence of non-state actors.  These developments include the end of the Cold War, 
increasing global interconnectedness (that is, globalisation), the revolution in transport, 
information and communication technologies and the emergence of a plethora of issues that 
transcend state-centric jurisdictions, which necessitate collective action or the pluralist-
interdependent approach to their management.  The proliferation of non-state actors and their 
involvement in the management of transnational issues at the global level have given birth to 
2 
the idea of “global governance, which is no longer a matter solely administered and managed 
by states” (Noortmann, 2002: 36) [Emphasis in original].  In this way, non-state actors have 
stepped into domains that hitherto constituted the exclusive preserve of states thereby – 
depending on an observer’s perspective – circumventing, undermining, eroding, or 
transforming national sovereignty.  Although states remain the principal actors in 
international relations, the dramatic rise and influence of non-state actors have challenged 
dominant state-centric discourse and praxis. 
 
At the level of analysis, the roles of non-state actors in the international system have 
engendered the rethinking of issues, approaches and theories that inform and underscore the 
structure and process of contemporary international relations and global politics.  At the level 
of praxis, they are reshaping aspects of interstate and intergovernmental relations, including 
the management of transnational issues and global problems.  Nonetheless, it is apt to add 
that states are not the only entities that are affected by the phenomenal rise and importance of 
non-state actors.  This post-World War II phenomenon has important repercussions for 
citizens (whose daily lives are affected by the activities of non-state actors), groups, 
communities and the very ecology that sustains humanity. 
 
Besides individuals (primarily those with international profile), non-state actors include local 
and international non-governmental organisations, transnational criminal networks, terrorist 
networks, liberation movements, religious networks and multinational corporations (MNCs1).  
Goldstein (2004: 12) argues that “[m]ost important among these private actors are MNCs.”  
Giddens (1990: 71) highlights the importance of MNCs in the international system to wit: “If 
                                                            
1 Multinational corporations are also referred to as global corporations (GCs), multinational companies (MNCs), 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), transnational companies (TNCs), transnational corporations (TNCs), or 
transnational enterprises (TNEs).  They are also referred to simply as “multinationals” in international political 
economy narratives.  This study uses MNCs for the sake of consistency.  A subsequent section in this chapter 
(see “Clarification of key concepts”) provides definitions of MNCs. 
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nation-states are the principal ‘actors’ within the global political order, corporations are the 
dominant agents within the world economy.”  In explicating their dominance in the global 
political economy, Giddens (1990: 71) notes that MNCs “wield immense economic power, 
and have the capacity to influence political policies in their home bases and elsewhere.  The 
biggest transnational companies … have budgets larger than those of all but a few nations.”  
It is instructive to consider a few examples, based on economic statistics, which illustrate 
Giddens’ point. 
 
For instance, in 2000 twenty-nine MNCs made the list of the world’s one hundred largest 
economies (Goodwin, 2005: 135).2  In 2006, the revenues of each of the top ten MNCs “were 
over $168 billion, more than the gross domestic product (GDP) of at least 140 countries” 
(Spero and Hart, 2010: 132).3  Like Giddens, other scholars (Gilpin, 1987: 231; Kowaleski 
1981) unpack the dominance and the comparative strategic advantage of MNCs vis-à-vis 
states with reference to the reality that many MNCs possess resources far in excess of most 
countries.4  This reality makes MNCs “the world’s most powerful economic actors” 
(Goodwin, 2005: 135). 
 
                                                            
2 Goodwin obtained this data from a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  For details, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2000. World Investment 
Report, 2000. New York: United Nations. 
3 An example, that illustrates this point, is instructive here.  In 2006, Walmart (a United States multinational 
retail corporation) generated revenues in excess of US$350 billion, which “were larger than the GDP of all but 
the 21 largest national economies and well ahead of Denmark, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Poland” (Spero and 
Hart, 2010: 132). 
4 This fact, however, does not mean that MNCs are more important actors than states or that MNCs will 
supplant states as the principal actors in the international system.  Certain attributes of states, which MNCs do 
not possess, underpin the primacy of states in the system.  Giddens (1990: 71) puts this point in perspective by 
aptly asserting that “there are some key respects in which [MNCs’] power cannot rival that of states – especially 
important here are the factors of territoriality and control of the means of violence… All modern states have a 
more or less successful monopoly of control of the means of violence within their own territories.  No matter 
how great their economic power, industrial corporations are not military organisations (as some of them were 
during the colonial period), and they cannot establish themselves as political/legal entities which rule a given 
territorial area.” 
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However, other factors – besides economic power – make MNCs influential actors in the 
international political economy.  Roach (2005: 19) aptly notes that “[w]ithin the nations in 
which they operate, large corporations exert political influence to obtain subsidies, reduce 
their tax burdens, and shape regulations.”  Moreover, MNCs shape the lives of people within 
nations in compelling ways, especially in the areas of production of goods and provision of 
services, infrastructure, technology, cultural tastes and preferences, and lifestyles in general.  
In almost subtle and imperceptible ways, MNCs may influence people in terms of what they 
eat or wear, and how they live, work and play.  These everyday aspects of life demonstrate 
the profound impact that MNCs have on states and people.  Against this backdrop, Roach 
(2005: 19) posits that the modern MNC “is an economic, political, environmental, and 
cultural force that is unavoidable in today’s globalized world.” 
 
Apart from their economic clout and impact within states, one reality that typifies the 
ascendance and growing importance of MNCs or “leviathans” – as Chandler and Mazlish 
(2005)5 call them – is their global expansion since the end of World War II but remarkably in 
the 1990s with much of this expansion taking place in the Third World.  For example, a 
report by UNCTAD highlighted the significant growth of MNCs from 35,000 in 1990 to 
65,000 in the year 2000 (in Roach, 2005: 24).  The report also noted that between 1990 and 
2002 this growth was especially dramatic in developing countries where number of MNCs 
increased by 258 percent compared to 63 percent in developed countries (in Roach, 2005: 
24).  In the absence of current statistics, further evidence of this growth was that by the year 
2006, “there were 78,000 MNCs with 780,000 overseas affiliates” (Spero and Hart, 2010: 
129). 
 
                                                            
5 Chandler and Mazlish’s use of the term “leviathans”, which conjures up images of a colossal, enormous, 
gargantuan, gigantic or monstrous entity, speaks to the phenomenal influence of MNCs in the international 
political economy. 
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Several factors account for the phenomenal expansion of MNCs in developing regions.  For 
instance, many countries in the developing world offer generous tax concessions or 
incentives in order to attract FDIs, and MNCs generally take advantage of such provisions.  
In addition, relatively low costs of factors of production in developing countries is a 
significant pull factor, which underpins MNC investment in these countries.  Of these factors 
of production, low labour costs is a preeminent consideration for MNCs as it enables them to 
pay considerably lower wages (when compared to the wage structures in the developed 
world) and, in the process, to maximise profit.  The search for new markets also drives 
investment by MNCs in developing countries, given the large populations and consequently, 
large market potential, which corporations strive to tap into.  In many ways, conditions in 
developing countries offer prospects for higher returns on investment for MNCs, for whom 
profit maximisation is an overarching objective.   In the context of this study, a factor that 
also underpins MNCs’ expansion is the availability of natural resources in developing 
countries.  The presence of strategic minerals has drawn MNCs into developing regions 
including conflict-prone countries or conflict zones. 
 
Some MNCs operate in zones of conflict to access natural resources, strategic assets and 
larger markets for the purpose of maximising their commercial interest (Kanagaretnam and 
Brown, 2006: 2).  However, the presence of MNCs in conflict zones is not without 
repercussions.  For instance, “recent history of several conflicts has shown that access to 
lucrative economic resources with the active participation of MNCs has played an important 
role in fomenting and sustaining conflicts” (Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006: 1).  This reality 
has engendered academic interest in the analysis of the nexus between MNCs and the 
dialectics of conflict.  There is, for example, burgeoning scholarly analyses of MNCs’ roles 
in “resource wars” and conflicts (in general) in states such as Algeria, Angola, Burma 
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(Myanmar), Colombia, Indonesia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan (Berman, 
2000; Campbell, 2002; Banfield, Haufler and Lilly, 2003; Guenther, 2005; Richani, 2005; 
Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006; Patey, 2006a).  While some analyses examine the roles of 
MNCs in initiating and sustaining conflict, others focus on corporate initiatives that promote 
peacebuilding in zones of conflict.  This study on the nexus between MNCs and conflicts in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) [DR Congo or the Congo hereafter] is located 
in the context of this emergent, empirical tradition. 
 
The scramble for the DRC’s vast mineral resources has been a major factor in the 
perpetuation of the conflicts in the country.  Specifically, the First Congo War (1996-1997), 
which culminated in the ouster of late President Mobutu Sese Seko and the Second Congo 
War (1998-2003), which involved a number of foreign armies, rebel groups, grassroots 
militias and businesses, highlighted the resource dimensions of conflicts.  The Second Congo 
War was unique for a number of reasons.  It was characterised by complexities hitherto 
unseen in African conflicts, drawing in as many as nine national armies and several 
profiteering networks at some point.  The complexities associated with the war engendered 
references to it as “Africa’s First World War” (Taylor, 2003: 45) and “Africa’s Continental 
War” (Weiss, 2000: 4).  As this study shows, of striking importance were the roles of natural 
resources and corporate actors in the conflict.  The scramble for DR Congo’s mineral wealth 
on the part of neighbouring states, government officials, rebel/militia leaders, MNCs and 
other profiteering networks created a “war economy” and brought the economic dimensions 
of the war to the fore. 
 
Besides proven and unsubstantiated reports of MNCs’ complicity in DR Congo’s conflict, no 
attempt has been made to analyse systematically the context-specific roles of corporate actors 
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in the conflict.6  Besides the “naming and shaming” tactics of advocacy groups and United 
Nations (UN) censure, reports of corporate complicity in the DRC’s conflict have – to borrow 
Patey’s (2006a: 11) expression – been locked to “simplistic notions of profit maximisation”, 
clearly begging salient questions that could offer insights into the nexus between MNCs and 
conflict.  What factors underpinned the involvement of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts?  What 
roles did MNCs play in the conflicts?  What was/were the impact(s) of their involvement?  
Did MNCs play any roles in support of conflict attenuation?  If yes, what were these roles 
and why?  What conclusion(s) do MNCs’ involvement in the DRC engender regarding the 
role of natural resources in fragile and conflict-prone environments? 
 
These questions constitute the focal points of this study in its examination of the roles of 
MNCs – “leviathans” – in an environment that ostensibly does not constrict their 
opportunities for enrichment.  In formulating responses to these questions, this study 
examines the behaviour of selected MNCs in the DRC’s extractive/mineral sector.  The 
significance of analysing MNCs in the extractive sector is predicated on the centrality of 
natural resources to the DRC’s conflicts, of which the exploitation of minerals such as 
columbite and tantalite (known as coltan), diamonds, gold and wolframite has been a major 
factor in conflict perpetuation.7 
 
                                                            
6 Although international non-governmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth (FoE), Enough Project, 
Global Witness, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Oxfam have, at various times, indicted MNCs for their 
complicity in the exploitation of the DRC’s resources, the United Nations’ indictment of MNCs operating in the 
DRC has been particularly scathing, especially from the perspective of corporate actors.  As of 2002, the Panel 
of Experts, established by the United Nations in 2000 to study the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural 
resources, had published three reports – followed by a supplementary report in 2003 – accusing eighty-five 
MNCs of breaching ethical guidelines by facilitating the plunder of the country’s mineral wealth (Carroll, 2002; 
Kern, 2006). 
7 Coltan is a rare, valuable mineral used in the production of cell phones, pagers, digital versatile/video disk 
(DVD) players, computer chips, night vision goggles, fibre optics, jet engines, space aeronautics and nuclear 
reactors.  The DRC has eighty (80) percent of the world’s coltan reserves (Vesperini, 2001; Ross, 2005).  
Importantly, the international scramble for scarce resources, coltan in particular, has been a crucial factor in the 
perpetuation of the conflict in the DRC. 
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The outline above presupposes an interconnectedness between natural resources, the 
activities of resource extractors/traders and the consequent transformational processes that 
characterise conflicts.  This interconnectedness underscores the use of a triangulation – 
natural resources, profit, and peace – and its linkage with conflict transformation in this 
study’s title as well as in its primary objective, which is explicated later in this chapter. 
 
As noted earlier, burgeoning analyses of corporate-conflict dynamics examine the potentially 
ambivalent roles that MNCs play in conflict – as catalysts for conflict perpetuation or as 
peacebuilders.  Although it is possible to conceptualise corporate behaviour along these two 
broad roles, MNCs’ actions in each category are by no means homogenous; they vary and are 
shaped by conflict dynamics.  This study on corporations in conflict zones captures and 
unpacks this intricate reality of corporate behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, the study emphasizes the idea that intervening variables in conflict situations, 
including the actions or inactions of belligerents and profiteering networks, determine the 
trajectory of conflicts.  Importantly, the roles of corporations in zones of conflict constitute a 
decisive intervening variable that defines the nature, tortuousness and outcome of conflicts.  
However, this is by no means a linear or unidirectional linkage, as the dynamics of conflict 
determine the risks to and role of corporations.  In other words, corporate behaviour 
influences and is influenced by the ebbs and flows (or cyclical patterns) of conflict. 
 
Given that MNCs are important, powerful non-state actors with considerable leverage (that is 
enhanced by weak state capacity/inertia), they wield enormous influence that could sustain 
conflict or that could be channelled constructively towards building peace.  Hence, this study 
9 
examines the strategic behaviour of resource-extracting and resource-trading MNCs in the 
DRC during the conflict and post-conflict epochs. 
 
Arising from this background, this study seeks to develop a framework for understanding 
corporate behaviour in zones of conflict through the examination of the roles of MNCs in the 
DRC.  This analysis of the strategic behaviour and roles of “leviathans” in the DRC during 
conflict epochs characterised by state deflation and government inertia is intended to make a 
scholarly contribution to the understanding of the political economy of (resource-based) 
conflicts. 
 
1.2 Research hypothesis 
This study’s hypothesis is that the interplay of corporate objectives and the operational 
context (that is, the local, national and international environments) underpins the strategic 
behaviours of multinational corporations in conflict zones. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
The main objective of this study is to examine the role of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts and 
peacebuilding process.  Specifically, the study’s core objectives are as follows: 
(i) To examine the underlying causalities in and motivations for MNCs’ 
involvement in the DRC’s conflicts and conflict transformation process. 
(ii) To interrogate the strategic behaviour(s) and involvement of MNCs in the 
DRC’s conflicts and conflict transformation process in the context of state 
deflation and government inertia. 
(iii) To examine the impact of corporate actors’ roles on conflict dynamics and 
prospects for positive transformative change. 
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(iv) To assess the perils and promise of corporate peacebuilding against the 
backdrop of the “business case” for corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 
1.4 Research questions 
This study poses and seeks to address the following questions: 
(i) What context-specific variables undergirded the strategic behaviour of MNCs in 
the DRC’s conflict zones? 
(ii) What were the specific roles of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts and conflict 
transformation or peacebuilding process? 
(iii) What impacts did corporate behaviour have on the DRC’s conflicts and 
peacebuilding process? 
(iv) What conclusions do MNCs’ roles in the DRC’s public sphere engender 
regarding the perils and promise of corporate peacebuilding especially in the 
emerging post-conflict epoch? 
 
In grappling with these key questions, this study seeks to underscore the rethinking of two 
paradigms that inform research and practice in the domain of peace and conflict.  In other 
words, the paradigms relate to theory and praxis.  One is the orthodox conflict analysis 
paradigm, which focuses essentially on armed groups or warring parties.  The second is the 
formal governmental peace process paradigm that emphasises the role of state actors but 
largely ignores powerful non-state actors whose actions in conflict zones shape the dialectics 
of conflicts.  In addressing these questions, this study emphasises the instrumentality of a 
holistic framework that encapsulates the motivations, strategic interests and multifarious roles 
of key and powerful non-state actors in conflict zones. 
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1.5 Significance of the study 
The impact of a company on conflict has been under-researched 
and largely ignored (Banfield, Haufler and Lilly, 2003: 17). 
 
…only a limited number of studies have focused on explaining 
TNCs’ behaviour in general and very few have looked specifically 
at their role in conflict zones (Rieth and Zimmer, 2004: 10). 
 
There has been considerable scholarly inquiry into the phenomenal expansion, role and 
powerful influences of MNCs in the global political economy.  International relations 
scholars have also given extensive attention to MNCs’ operations and their impacts in 
developing countries.  For example, scholars have explored the nexus between MNCs’ 
operations and environmental/ecological problems (for example, oil spillage and gas flaring), 
between MNCs’ operations and human rights violations (Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta, for example) and between the security-seeking activities of MNCs and 
militarisation/small arms proliferation.  It is also worth noting that scholarly works – albeit 
limited but growing – have addressed the causes and dynamics of conflicts in the DRC, the 
involvement of foreign forces, and the tortuous peace process. 
 
However, there is a dearth of systematic analyses of the role of the private sector or 
multinationals in the country’s conflicts and peace process.  In fact, there is a stupefying 
paucity of literature on the role of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts and peace process.  This is in 
contradistinction to novel attempts by scholars to explore the strategic behaviour of MNCs 
vis-à-vis the conflicts in the Sudan (Khartoum) and in Colombia, for example.  These 
scholarly attempts are described as novel in the sense that academics have “largely ignored 
the public role of private actors, especially the involvement of TNCs in conflict zones” (Rieth 
and Zimmer, 2004: 2).  This point is relevant to the DRC’s context. 
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The increasing realisation that important and powerful non-state actors such as MNCs and 
local profiteering networks wield enormous clout that could shape the dynamics of conflicts 
in pursuit of their strategic interests has not been reflected in the scholarly analyses of the 
DRC’s conflicts.  Beyond claims and counter-claims of corporate complicity in conflicts, 
there is a need for systematic or empirical analyses of MNCs’ strategic behaviour in the DRC 
with reference to the conflict cycle and the peace process.  From a social sciences 
perspective, it is important to interrogate the “why” question in relation to corporate actors’ 
involvement in the DRC’s public sphere.  Therefore, this study addresses an extant gap in the 
research.  By examining the motivations and roles of profit-seeking non-state actors in the 
DRC’s zones of conflict, this study seeks to add to the literature on the political economy of 
war.  At the level of praxis, this study makes policy recommendations that seek to stimulate 
effective natural resource governance in the DRC while providing lessons for other resource-
rich but conflict-prone environments. 
 
1.6 Methodology and research design 
The nature of this study necessitated a combination of research methods and approaches.  
Therefore, this study adopted the mixed methods approach, encapsulating historical and 
qualitative approaches, with tangential use of quantitative analysis (where necessary) to 
illuminate the research data.8  The historical approach entails the “systematic collection of 
data which is preceded by the objective evaluation of information related to past events so as 
to test hypotheses in regards to their causes and effects in order to be able to explain the 
present trends and have focus on the future” (Busha and Harter, 1980: 90).  This approach 
enhances the understanding of current trends and enables prognostication or analytical 
projection of social phenomena through incursion into historical trajectories.  The 
                                                            
8 The quantitative aspect of this study involved the use of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for 
capturing and analysing/cross tabulating a number of variables in the research (data collection) instrument. 
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examination and interpretation of evidence and the drawing of logical conclusions thereof are 
integral to historical research (Hancock and Algozzine, 2006: 80).  With reference to this 
study, the utility of the historical approach lies in its centrality to understanding the historical 
basis of the crisis in the DRC. 
 
The study also utilised the exploratory and inductive qualitative method in view of the nature 
of the research.  The qualitative approach enables researchers “to explore and discover issues 
and problems” about phenomena in their “natural” setting in a way that generates “rich data” 
(Domegan and Fleming, 2007: 24).  It entails studying “things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people 
bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 3).  The strengths of this method are that it allows 
for the exploration of convoluted phenomena in a holistic fashion, reduces the tendency by 
researchers to impose their assumptions or biases, and conclusions result from the data – thus 
obviating a priori conclusions (Wiersma, 1995: 211-212).  In this way, data and meaning 
emerge “organically” from the context being studied (McMillan and Schumacher, 1993: 
479). 
 
It is instructive to note that qualitative “methods are appropriate when the phenomena under 
study are complex, are social in nature, and do not lend themselves to quantification” 
(Liebscher, 1998: 669).  Qualitative research is essentially exploratory and involves methods 
of data collection that are non-quantitative or non-numerical (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 32-
48).  The qualitative method captures the intricacies of social life and “treats actions as part 
of holistic social process and context, rather than as something that can be extracted and 
studied in isolation” (Payne and Payne, 2004: 176). 
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The qualitative method lends itself to the investigation of complex social phenomena without 
predetermining or delimiting the paths that such investigation should follow.  Further, the 
utility of the qualitative method lies in its unassailable explanatory power and in providing 
detailed information on the subject matter of research, thus providing in-depth understanding 
of human/organisational behaviour and of social interactions as well as the rationale for such 
interactions.  Against this backdrop, the qualitative method is appropriate in the context of the 
complexities associated with the subject matter of this study: corporate behaviour in zones of 
conflict.  The qualitative method also informed the modes of data collection as discussed 
below. 
 
1.6.1 Data collection techniques 
Data for this study was generated through primary and secondary sources. 
 
Primary sources 
The primary sources of data for this study included focus group discussions, personal in-
depth interviews, and a semi-structured questionnaire. 
 
Focus group discussions: Focus groups are of immense utility in the collection of qualitative 
data, as they allow participants – in the course of interactions with one another – to articulate 
ideas and arguments that might not emerge through personal interviews or questionnaires.  To 
be most effective, it is necessary for a focus group to be small and to include individuals from 
different fields or “walks of life” (Fontana and Frey, 1994: 364-365), if the subject matter of 
the study permits. 
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For this study, three focus group discussions were conducted in 2012 with Congolese 
expatriates in three South African cities of Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria.9  Each focus 
group comprised ten members drawn from different “walks of life” – academics, artisans, 
businesspersons, civil society actors, medical professionals and refugees.  Three research 
assistants – one in each city – offered help in terms of locating and inviting participants to the 
sessions and moderating the discussions.  The researcher tape recorded the sessions and 
subsequently transcribed them.  Importantly, the focus group discussions enabled the 
researcher to clarify issues that emerged from completed questionnaires. 
 
Interviews: The interview technique allows each participant “to reveal motivations, beliefs, 
attitudes and feelings on a topic” (Domegan and Fleming, 2007: 172).  This technique, a one-
on-one interaction between the researcher and the participants, enables the researcher to 
obtain first-hand information and clarify positions on a complex subject in social science 
research.  Moreover, it allows for a broader and deeper exploration of specific aspects of 
issues in ways that a focus group discussion or a questionnaire may not normally do.  The use 
of interviews also mitigates the problems of limited administration/application, low response 
rate and limited opportunity to clarify issues/views associated with the use of the 
questionnaire method (Kumar, 2005: 114). 
 
The use of a detailed interview technique elicited incisive and illuminating responses from 
interviewees.  The researcher conducted 71 in-depth interviews with individuals whose grasp 
                                                            
9 Focus group discussions were not held in the DRC because of the sensitive nature of the research, which 
touched on illicit behaviour by actors involved in the DRC’s conflicts.  Therefore, the researcher had to be 
circumspect about exposing participants (and possibly their families) to risks in the DRC.  Such danger was not 
readily palpable in South Africa (where focus group discussions were held), as Congolese migrants – albeit in 
small groups and intimate settings – were more inclined to share their views on issues back home. 
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of the study’s subject matter varied and ranged from marginal and average to profound.10   
Interviewees included persons with affiliations to MNCs (that is, those who worked with 
comptoirs [mineral trading houses] and former employees of companies) as well as current 
and former government officials (in the Presidency, Ministries, and the military).  The 
researcher also interviewed academics, civil society activists, journalists, community and 
youth leaders (whose communities have been impacted by the activities of MNCs) as well as 
individuals involved in the DRC’s informal economy. 
 
In-depth interviews took a number of forms, which were determined by exigencies during 
fieldwork in the DRC.  55 face-to-face interviews were conducted with the majority of 
interviewees.  In addition, the researcher utilised the novel approach of e-interviews (that is, 
electronic interviews) where conflict and insecurity prevented him from travelling to some 
areas in the DRC.  13 e-interviews were conducted via SkypeTM, a voice over internet 
protocol and instant messaging platform.  The same rationale for the use of e-interviews also 
informed the utilisation of telephonic interviews, three of which were conducted. 
 
Given the ethical imperatives of anonymity and confidentiality, and especially the sensitive 
nature of the study, the researcher made commitments to participants (some of whom are 
persons in high profile positions) to use pseudonyms/codes in the presentation of participants’ 
                                                            
10 The number of interviews conducted fell short of the desired threshold of 100 or 120, based on the 
expectation that at least 20 persons would be interviewed in each of the six stakeholder constituencies described 
in this section.  It is imperative to state the reason for this shortfall.  During fieldwork in the DRC, some 
individuals with knowledge of the research issues declined to participate in the study unless they were paid.  In 
one instance that I found to be most bewildering, a professor had agreed to be interviewed but changed his mind 
while I was on the way to the appointment.  The professor insisted on being paid US$200 for granting an 
interview!  He told me tersely on the telephone: “If you have $200, you can come; if you don’t have it, don’t 
come.”  Having exhausted my fieldwork budget (and depleted my personal savings while in the DRC), I could 
not interview the professor, whom I gathered had considerable knowledge of DR Congo’s mining sector.  
Thoroughly agitated, I complained bitterly to one of my research assistants about this incident (in particular) and 
(in general) about participants’ predilection for wanting to be paid for participating in a study that potentially 
benefits Congolese, their communities and the country at large.  Interestingly, when I raised the ethical issues 
and consequences associated with this situation, my research assistant informed me that this was a norm in the 
country and that he could even arrange for me to obtain an official letter addressed to my University indicating 
that I had to pay the study participants. 
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views.  Therefore, this study uses two or three letters of the alphabet to represent each 
interviewee (where it is reasonably safe to do so) and refrains from doing so altogether where 
other persons could decipher a participant’s identity from the initials by virtue of the 
participant’s stakeholder affiliation, position or the office that he or she holds. 
 
Questionnaires: Questionnaires allow researchers to gather data from a much larger number 
of participants than interviews do.  Kumar (2005: 127) posits that the choice of interviews or 
questionnaires is determined by at least three criteria: the “nature of the investigation” (that 
is, the sensitive nature of issues involved); the “geographical distribution of the study 
population”; and the “type of study population.”  An aspect of this study (the involvement of 
actors in the DRC’s conflicts) is of a sensitive nature.  In addition, the study participants are 
located in different parts of the DRC, a considerably large country.  These conditions 
necessitated the use of questionnaires for collecting data. 
 
The questionnaire was semi-structured, comprising closed-ended and open-ended questions.  
The open-ended questions offered participants the opportunity to clarify or comment on 
quantitative or ordinal variables.  In terms of its overview, the questionnaire sought to elicit 
answers to research questions based on respondents’ knowledge or awareness, views and 
perceptions on the involvement of corporate actors in conflicts and the peacebuilding process 
as well as the significance or impacts of such involvement by corporate actors.  The 
questionnaire was prepared in two languages – English and French – to cater to the linguistic 
profile of participants who comprised both Congolese and non-Congolese.11 
 
                                                            
11 The researcher did this in deference to suggestions made by research assistants prior to fieldwork in the DRC. 
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Using a combination of purposive (expert) and snowball sampling methods12, the researcher 
administered more than 350 questionnaires in the DRC, of which only 150 were returned.13  
The researcher subsequently enlisted the assistance of a qualified (that is, certified) translator 
to translate questionnaires that were completed in French into English.  All 150 
questionnaires were carefully examined, checked for reliability and validity, and later 
captured using SPSS. 
 
The three techniques (focus group discussions, interviews, and questionnaires) generated rich 
data that contributed towards addressing the research questions.  However, it is instructive to 
note that participants’ views were complementary and contradictory to varying degrees.  This 
is not surprising, as the issues around the theme of the study were intricate, controversial and 
likely to evoke emotive responses.  Careful analyses and juxtapositions of data obtained from 
focus group discussions, interviews, questionnaires and a rigorous review of information 
presented in secondary sources led to the formulation of the study’s main premises, 





                                                            
12 The nature of the research, which required participants to provide information based on knowledge, expertise, 
or experiences vis-à-vis the activities of MNCs in the DRC, necessitated the choice of purposive (expert) and 
snowball sampling methods. 
13 The reason for the low response rate was the same as given in footnote 10 (supra, page 16).  The vast majority 
of potential respondents to the questionnaire, just like some interviewees, demanded money before completing 
the survey instrument.  The average “asking price” for completing the questionnaire was US$20 or US$50, 
depending on the “status” and “knowledge” of the respondent.  In most cases, I protested that I was just a 
student, but respondents reminded me that I was conducting research on natural resources and that I was visiting 
from South Africa, the country of gold.  I was surprised that most of the study participants thought that I had a 
financial chest/kitty from which I could dole out cash.  I was also intrigued by the general preference for the US 
dollar as opposed to the Congolese Franc.  (One of my research assistants told me that most Congolese were 
accustomed to using the US dollar and could tell if a dollar note was counterfeit, but they might not be able to 
do the same in respect of the Congolese Franc.) 
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Secondary sources 
The main sources of secondary data for this study comprised books, journal articles, 
magazines, newspapers, government legislations/reports, company reports, UN reports and 
the internet. (The internet served as an invaluable source of information for the study given 
the contemporary nature of the subject matter of the study and the typically dramatic manner 
in which events unfold in the DRC).  These secondary sources provided extensive 
bibliographic and contextual information that complemented the primary sources of data, thus 
illuminating the study. 
 
1.6.2 Data analysis 
Data obtained from primary and secondary sources were assessed through content analysis, 
which Stone, Dunphy, Smith and Ogilvie (1966: 5) define as “any technique for making 
inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text.”  
This technique entails summarising and reliance on “the scientific method (including 
attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, 
replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited [to] … the context in which the 
messages are created or presented” (Neuendorf, 2002: 10).  It entails “interpreting people’s 
attitudes, values, and behaviour” as conveyed in variety of textual forms (Shuker, 1999: 316); 
or as Neuman (2000: 292) puts it, the “gathering and analyzing [of] the content of the text: 
language, words, phrases, themes and symbols.”  Essentially, content analysis is about “the 
systematic analysis of communications content” (Hansen et al., 1998: 91).  The analysis of 
information conveyed in various forms enables the researcher to situate data in the research 
context.  A key to doing this is to delineate the object of inquiry (Altheide, 1996: 14), and to 
situate the data in the context of the main aspects of the study. 
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Applying this technique, the researcher carefully analysed respondents’ views and 
methodically isolated relevant/specific content from diverse data generated during fieldwork.  
The study’s hypothesis and research questions served as “operational sign posts” for 
delineating the contours of the analysis, which was done in the context of MNCs’ strategic 
behaviour(s) in an ambience characterised by state deflation and government inertia.  The 
researcher took care to isolate information that underscored broad conceptual/thematic and 
relational issues.  Respondents’ views were coded into specific content categories (for 
example, corporate social responsibility, corporate complicity, corporate peacebuilding, state 
deflation/failure, and local/international environmental activism), which were relevant to the 
study’s objectives.  Moreover, the relationships between these content categories were 
analysed in order to show the perceptions of corporate behaviour.  In summary, this study 
synthesized data gathered from both primary and secondary sources in order to provide a 
holistic analysis of MNCs’ roles in the DRC’s conflicts and peace process. 
 
1.7 Scope of the study 
This study explicated the roles of corporate actors in the DRC’s conflict and peacebuilding 
process through the examination of the strategic behaviour of selected MNCs as reflected in 
respondents’ views.14  It was impossible for the study to analyse all MNCs with connections 
to the DRC.  Furthermore, in discussing corporate behaviour, the study refrained from linking 
each corporation with a specific act of illegality, except where such information was already 
in the public domain (for example, presented in secondary sources).  This was necessary in 
order to forestall any potential recriminations and legal issues. 
 
                                                            
14 The selected MNCs are Afrimex, Amalgamated Metal Corporation, America Mineral Fields (now Adastra 
Minerals), American Diamond Buyers, Anglo-American PLC, Anvil Mining, Banro Corporation, Barrick Gold 
Corporation, Cabot Corporation, Cogecom Coltan Trading Company, De Beers, Tenke Mining Company, and 
Thailand Smelting and Refining Co., Ltd (THAISARCO). 
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In terms of timeline, this study interrogated the underlying motivations, strategic interests and 
character of corporate behaviour in the DRC during the epoch characterised by the eruption 
and continuation of conflicts in the country.  The study’s timeline is divided into primary and 
secondary periods.  The primary period that the study focused on was between 1996 and 
2006, which, arguably, was the most traumatic in the recent history of the DRC.  During this 
period, the country was plagued by what has been labelled “Africa’s First World War”, and 
subsequent localised conflicts in eastern DRC.  This period, therefore, was most amenable to 
the analysis of corporate behaviour during conflict, including the role of MNCs in the process 
of conflict reduction.  The secondary period was the post-2006 epoch, which has been 
marked by efforts to build peace and rebuild the country along the “cinq chantiers” (that is, 
five pillars) of reconstruction.  This era was relevant for unpacking corporate initiatives that 
facilitated or undermined peacebuilding in the country. 
 
1.8 Limitations 
A study of this nature is – expectedly – fraught with limitations.  The researcher 
acknowledges the possibility of bias on the part of the study participants, especially 
employees of MNCs and their cohorts/beneficiaries as well as those who might be opposed to 
them.  This possibility has an implication for objectivity.  In order to address this challenge 
and mitigate its effect as well as to ensure objectivity, the researcher undertook a careful 
analysis and juxtaposition of respondents’ views as outlined in the data analysis section of 
this chapter. 
 
Moreover, the celerity at which developments unfold in the DRC presents a formidable 
challenge in time-limited research of this nature.  Indeed, almost all published works on the 
DRC crisis “risk” being overtaken by new/unforeseen realities within a relatively short time.  
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This thesis may also suffer the same fate, even before its completion, or while it is being 
examined or by the time other readers peruse it.  In addition to the fluidity and 
unpredictability of events in the DRC, developments in the country often defy common and 
established logic in conflict analysis.  Against this backdrop, there is the potential danger that 
certain (unpredictable/unforeseen) developments in the DRC vis-à-vis the study’s 
arguments/findings may confound future readers, or even place some of the study’s 
recommendations in the realm of obsolescence. 
 
Finally, a personally disconcerting limitation – in relation to data collection in the DRC – was 
participants’ insistence on being paid as a precondition for participating in the study.15  The 
researcher was unable to oblige this demand by participants.  Hence, some prospective 
respondents declined or withdrew from participation in the study.  Regrettably, a few of the 
respondents in this category – based on information supplied by research assistants – had 
extensive knowledge of the key issues that this study explored.  Nonetheless, it can be safely 
assumed that their non-participation has not substantively undermined the study and its 
findings. 
 
1.9 Conceptual clarification of key words 
This study – in its title and through its chapters – utilised certain concepts/terms or key 
words, which this section defines, conceptualises and operationalises in the context of this 
study.  These key words are natural resources, multinational corporations, conflict, conflict 
minerals and peace.  This section does not explicate conflict transformation, as it is discussed 
extensively in Chapter Four.16 
 
                                                            
15 I have captured this limitation in some detail earlier (in the section on data collection techniques).  See 
footnotes 10 and 13 (supra, pages 16 and 18). 
16 See sections 4.2 and 4.3 of Chapter Four. 
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1.9.1 Natural resources 
Natural resources, also called minerals, are raw materials that are generally regarded as “gifts 
of nature”, that is, they are “present without human intervention”, and are “differentiated 
from several other resources such as physical, human and social and institutional capital” 
(Basedau, 2005: 7).  A crucial attribute of natural resources is their economic value.  The 
World Trade Organization (2010: 46) defines natural resources as “stocks of materials that 
exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically useful in production or 
consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing”. In other 
words, these naturally occurring substances, found in the earth’s ecology, support life on 
earth and help to meet people’s needs. 
 
Natural resources are generally classified into two: renewable and non-renewable resources.  
Renewable resources refer to those substances that can be replenished, although they can be 
depleted.  Examples include sunlight, trees, water and wood.  Non-renewable resources (also 
called exhaustible resources) are those that cannot be replenished once they are depleted; in 
other words, they “exist in finite quantities, so every unit consumed today reduces the amount 
available for future consumption” (World Trade Organization, 2010: 47).  Examples include 
fossil fuels and mineral deposits such as, inter alia, coal, cobalt, columbite-tantalite (coltan), 
copper, crude oil, diamonds, gold, natural gas, platinum, tin, uranium and zinc.  These 
resources have high economic value, as they are used in the production of heavy machinery, 
jewellery, medicines, electronic gadgets, and nuclear weapons.  This study conceptualises 
“natural resources” with reference to these substances with high economic value.  It utilises 
the nomenclatures natural resources, resources and minerals interchangeably. 
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1.9.2 Multinational corporations17 
It is difficult to define an MNC or a TNC.  A small company may operate in “garages” or 
open several shops in a few geographically contiguous or non-contiguous countries.  Does its 
mere presence in several countries qualify it as an MNC or a TNC?  On the other hand, a 
large company may not operate in several countries but have affiliates or subsidiaries in a few 
countries.  Does this company qualify as an MNC or a TNC?  How many assets should a 
company control in or across states for it to qualify as an MNC or a TNC?  The answers to 
these questions vary.  Thus, variations in company attributes make it difficult to define 
MNCs/TNCs.18  A survey of the literature reveals definitional imprecision and contending 
explanations.  However, this study adopts a simple, operational or working definition of 
MNCs, drawing from a comparison of a few common definitions. 
 
Spero and Hart (2010: 128) posit that a company “is not really multinational if it just engages 
in overseas trade or serves as a contractor to foreign firms.”  The authors provide a list of 
criteria that determine the “degree of multinationality of a specific firm” (Spero and Hart, 
2010: 128).  A company is deemed to be “multinational” if: 
(i) it has “many foreign affiliates or subsidiaries in foreign countries”; 
(ii) it operates “in a wide variety of countries around the globe”; 
                                                            
17 See footnote 1 for other terms that are used to describe MNCs (supra, page 2).  The variations in 
nomenclatures used to describe these economic entities point to nuanced differences in terms of the character of 
these entities. 
18 There is a slight difference between a traditional MNC and a TNC.  Generally, an MNC identifies with a 
particular “home country” and its global operations may be co-ordinated from a centralised office (headquarters) 
in that “home country”.  On the other hand, a TNC does not identify itself with a particular “home country” but 
spreads its operations across the world in a bid to “achieve high levels of global integration, while 
simultaneously sustaining high levels of local responsiveness” (Hislop, 2009: 64).  For a TNC, “there is only 
one economic unit, the world” (Drucker, 1997: 167).  Schermerhorn (2009: 141, 387) defines a TNC as a firm 
that “tries to operate without a strong national identity”; it is “an MNC that operates worldwide on a borderless 
basis.”  While an MNC is attached to a state as its “home”, the world is a TNC’s “home”.  Schermerhorn (2009: 
387) cites Nestlé as a good example of a TNC, whose products across countries hardly evokes the thought of a 
“registered Swiss company” as the manufacturer. 
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(iii) its “proportion of assets, revenues, or profits accounted for by overseas operations 
relative to total assets, revenues, or profits is high”; 
(iv) its “employees, stockholders, owners, and managers are from many different 
countries”; and  
(v) its “overseas operations are much more ambitious than just sales offices, including a 
full range of manufacturing and research and development activities” (Spero and 
Hart, 2010: 128). 
 
Spero and Hart (2010: 176) add that  
a firm can come to resemble a multinational corporation by 
negotiating international cooperation agreements (ICAs) with firms 
in other countries, instead of engaging in foreign direct investment.  
So the most important prerequisite for calling a firm multinational 
is no longer the ownership of overseas assets but rather direct 
participation in overseas value-added activities. 
 
Most definitions of MNCs/TNCs reflect these criteria.  For instance, Dunning (1992: 3) 
defines an MNC as “an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and that 
owns or controls value-added activities in more than one country.”  UNCTAD defines a TNC 
as “an entity composed of a parent enterprise that controls the assets of entities in countries 
other than its home country plus the foreign affiliates of that parent enterprise” (Roach, 2005: 
24).  Similarly, Wilkins (2005: 45) defines MNCs as firms that operate across political 
boundaries in that they extend themselves over borders to do business outside the countries 
where they are headquartered.  Goldstein (2004: 366) defines them as “companies based in 
one state with affiliated branches or subsidiaries operating in other states” (Goldstein 2004: 
366).  Other scholars (Buckley and Casson 1976: 1; Hood and Young 1979: 1) also define 
MNCs as economic entities that own, operate and control income-generating assets in more 
than one state. 
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This study adopts an operational definition, which views an MNC as an economic entity that 
is headquartered in a state but operates through affiliates/subsidiaries and controls income-
generating assets in many countries.19  MNCs operate in various sectors such as automobile, 
banking/finance/insurance, computer/information technologies, fast food, insurance, 
manufacturing, mining, pharmaceuticals, retail business, telecommunications, and services 
and tourism.  Table 1.1 below provides a few examples of MNCs and their sectors. 
 
Table 1.1: Examples of MNCs and their sectors of operations 
Sector Multinational Corporation 
Automobile General Motors, Honda Motor Company, Hyundai 
Motor Company, Nissan Motor Company Limited, 
Toyota Motor Corporation. 
Banking/Finance and 
Auditing/Insurance 
Accenture, Allianz, American International Group, 
Barclays PLC, Citigroup, Ernst & Young, HSBC, 
ING Group, KPMG, Procter & Gamble, Standard 
Bank, Standard Chartered PLC. 
Computer/Information/Communications 
Technologies 
Cannon, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, LG, 
Microsoft, Motorola, Samsung Electronics, Sony 
Corporation. 
Fast Food McDonald’s Corporation. 
Manufacturing and Household Items Cadbury, Coca-Cola, General Electric, SABMiller, 
Unilever. 
Mining/Mineral/Oil Exploration and 
Trade 
Anglo-American PLC, Banro Corporation, Barrick 
Gold Corporation, BHP Billiton, Cabot 
Corporation, Chevron Corporation, 
ConocoPhillips, De Beers,  ExxonMobil, Royal 
Dutch Shell. 
Pharmaceuticals Bayer, Glaxo Smith Kline, Pfizer. 
Retail Business Carrefour, Walmart. 
Telecommunications Etisalat, Mobile Telecommunications Network 
(MTN), Vodafone. 
Services and Tourism DHL, FedEx Express, Marriot Corporation. 
 
Source: Compiled by the researcher. 
 
                                                            
19 This study uses the conventional term, MNCs; references to TNCs are as contained in the sources consulted. 
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In view of this study’s subject matter, it focuses primarily on MNCs in the natural resources 
or mining (also called extractives) sector.  MNCs in this sector are divided into two 
categories: resource-extracting corporations and mineral-trading companies.  Resource 
extracting companies are those that engage in exploration and exploitation of natural 




Conflict of one sort or another is a recurring aspect of human and social relations.  This is 
understandable, given the differences in values, attitudes, interests, orientations and goals of 
persons, groups and nation-states.  Conflicts result from the clash of values between 
individuals, groups, or states.  The inability of persons, groups or nation-states to reconcile 
their differences or the clash of values – in essence, their incompatibility – is the underlying 
basis of all conflicts.  Thus, conflicts are indicative of a breakdown in interpersonal, inter-
group, and inter-state relations.  Conflict is characterised by “interaction at a level more 
intense than that of competition” (Schelling, 1980: 201).  More often than not, the 
irreconcilability of divergent objectives or positions leads to frustration or aggression, which 
in turn manifests in or leads ultimately (but not always or necessarily) to violence or war – an 
extreme form of conflict (Schelling, 1980: 201). 
 
Conflict ranges from intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group to national and international 
levels.  In this study, however, conflict is contextualised within the wider societal perspective 
and, as such, its definition spans the group-international levels.  It is instructive to note that 
“differences”, “actor perceptions” and actor expectations are common to all conflicts 
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regardless of their levels or the number of actors.  These elements are a commonality in 
several definitions of conflict. 
 
For example, Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994: 5) highlight the idea of divergence as a 
fundamental element of conflict in their definition: “[c]onflict means perceived divergence of 
interest, or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously.”  
Similarly, Burton (1988: 11) posits that “conflict describes a relationship in which each party 
perceives the other’s goals, values, interests or behaviour as antithetical to its own.”  Glasl’s 
(1994: 14-15) definition, which also foregrounds “actor perceptions”, sees conflict as “an 
interaction between actors … in which at least one actor experiences differences in 
thinking/conception/perception and/or feeling and/or desire in relation to the other actor 
(actors), such that realization is hampered by another actor (the other actors)”.  Actor 
expectations may also engender conflict.  According to Ropers (1995: 2-3), conflict “is a 
difference of interests as perceived by at least one party in an area of joint social interaction, 
resulting in a situation where the aspirations of the various parties cannot be realized to an 
equal extent.” 
 
These definitions allude to the variables that characterise conflict: actors, relationship, and 
differences or incompatibility of values and positions.  In addition, parties in conflict have 
definite objectives, which they seek to achieve.  This idea is a fundamental rationale for 
conflict and it is integral to the understanding of conflict, especially in the societal context 
(that is, intergroup and interstate levels).  Accordingly, conflict – as utilised in this study – 
refers to an interaction, a clash or struggle between at least two actors arising from the 
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incompatibility of values, ideas, preferences, and goals in which one actor seeks to neutralise, 
defeat or eliminate the other for the purpose of attaining (a) defined objective(s).20 
 
With reference to social conflict, the actors use a combination of means including propaganda 
and violence to defeat the opponent and to achieve their aims.  The goals, which a party seeks 
to achieve, could be tangible (such as the acquisition of territory or natural resources) or 
intangible (such as control, domination or prestige).  This study utilises conflict with 
reference to organised violence, that is, armed conflict.  The use of lethal weapons is a 
distinctive feature of this type of conflict.  Throughout history, organised violence – the 
dominant form in which social conflict is manifested – has been known to unleash a plethora 
of deleterious consequences ranging from colossal losses of lives and the destruction of 
infrastructure to extensive human displacement (in the form of  refugee flows), psychological 
trauma, and social dislocation. 
 
1.9.4 Conflict minerals 
Conflict minerals, also referred to as conflict resources or “blood minerals”, are natural 
resources that are extracted in conflict zones and which play a role in conflict dynamics.  
They are sometimes referred to as “blood minerals” because of the human death toll that 
accompanies the militarised extraction of these resources in conflict zones.  Global Witness 
(2012: i. d.) describes conflict minerals as natural resources “used by armed groups to fund 
violence and insurrection.”  However, national armies (including those of invading countries) 
                                                            
20 Although this study examines a conflict that has been destructive, it should be noted that conflict is not 
necessarily a negative dynamic for it can engender positive changes and development in a relationship or in a 
system.  For instance, Anstey (1993: 17) argues that conflict can be healthy, as it “energises the problem-solving 
capacities of people, stimulates new ways of interacting, and promotes the engagement of parties around issues 
that might otherwise have been ignored or dealt with in a hostile manner.”  However, it is important to add that 
conflict serves this “constructive” end only if it is handled properly, lest it engenders the negative consequences 
often associated with it.  Having said that, “[s]ocial scientists are divided on the question of whether social 
conflict should be regarded as something rational, constructive, and socially functional or something irrational, 
pathological, and socially dysfunctional” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981: 187). 
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may also use revenue derived from the sale of these resources to fund their war efforts.  
Global Witness (2012: i. d.) identifies four main natural resources that are being extracted 
from the DRC and which fit this definition: tin (cassiterite); tungsten (wolframite); tantalum 
(coltan); and gold.21  Collectively, these four natural resources are called “3TG minerals”.  
Rising prices for each of these minerals in international markets gave “armed groups in the 
eastern Congo all the more incentive to target or keep hold of the mines” (Global Witness, 
2012: i. d.).  Illicit exploitation and trade in these minerals, which have the electronics and 
high technology industries as their main destinations, provide armed groups – national 
armies, rebel movements, and militias – with financial resources that enable them to sustain 
their war operations.  The complicity of profiteering networks in the DRC conflicts is 




In everyday usage, peace refers to the absence of war or violence.  In peace and conflict 
studies however, the conception of peace, as “the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds” 
(Galtung, 1996: 9) is generally assumed to be flawed.  This conception is indicative of 
negative peace – a context that may mask fundamental problems that place societies on a 
precipice.  For example, in the absence of war, economic and social systems may unleash 
dehumanising impacts on people – a condition that Assefa (1993: 3) describes as “killing 
                                                            
21 These minerals are used in the manufacturing of mobile phones, laptops, and other electronic gadgets.  For 
example, “[t]in is used as a solder in circuit boards; tantalum goes into capacitors, small components used to 
store electricity; tungsten is used in the vibrating function of mobile phones; gold is also used by the electronics 
industry – as a coating for wires” (Global Witness, 2012: i. d.). 
22 The high-tech and electronics industries, mainly companies based in Asia, Europe and North America, are the 
main users of these minerals, which are sourced from the DRC thus implicating them in the country’s conflicts.  
A key intervention to address the phenomenon of “conflict minerals” was the enactment of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United States (US).  Section 1502 of the Act requires 
“companies to disclose their use of Congolese conflict minerals” and empowers the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission to provide oversight which ensures that US companies do not source minerals from conflict zones 
in the DRC (Global Witness, 2012: i. d.). 
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people without the use of the gun”.  Negative peace relates more or less to what is described 
in common parlance as “peace of the graveyard” – an illusory sense of peace. 
 
By contrast, positive peace refers to “a cooperative system beyond ‘passive peaceful 
coexistence’” (Galtung, 1996: 61).  Positive peace implies the “creation of “social 
relationships that contribute to mutual well-being and human flourishing”; it entails 
“conditions in which people can realize their potential” (Miall, 2011: 2078).  Integral to this 
conception of peace are freedom from oppression, gender equality, respect for human rights, 
and “the creation of positive associations and healing of social injustices” (Miall, 2011: 
2080).  Positive peace addresses the relational aspects of human existence, with strong 
emphasis on the promotion of humane values (which may not appeal to scholars and 
adherents of realpolitik).  This is the sense in which peace is conceptualised and 
operationalised in this study.  Assefa (1993: 4, 17, 48) identifies three broad elements of this 
conception of peace: the constructive transformation of conflictual relations into cooperative 
relationships; reconciliation that culminates in healthy interdependent relationships; and 
justice.  It cannot be gainsaid that these elements are important in sustaining peace in stable 
societies.  More importantly, they are crucial to building peace in societies torn apart by, or 
recovering from conflict.  In sum, these elements are embedded in the conflict transformation 
approach that this study applies to its explication of the DRC’s conflicts and peacebuilding 
process. 
 
1.10 Structure of the study 
This study is organised into eight chapters.  Chapter One is an introduction to the study.  It 
provides a general background and an overview of the study.  The chapter includes an outline 
of the research problem, a statement of the research hypothesis, objectives of the study, and 
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research questions.  It also explicates the significance of the study, the study’s methodology 
and research design, its scope as well as its methodological and practical limitations.  Finally, 
the preceding section clarified key concepts/terms/words used in this study. 
 
Chapter Two undertakes a review and comparison of literature on the nexus between natural 
resources and conflicts through an interrogation of the ‘resource curse’ thesis.  It examines 
the contending narratives that corroborate and rebut the thesis.  The chapter probes the 
potential and actual impacts of resource endowment, exploitation and trade on conflict.  The 
essence is to engage critically with extant literature on the correlation between natural 
resources and conflicts.  In doing so, the chapter foregrounds the intervening variables in the 
resource-conflict nexus.  The analysis in Chapter Two underscores a nuanced understanding 
of the resource-conflict link and provides a contextual framework for unpacking MNCs’ 
connections to natural resources and conflicts. 
 
Chapter Three discusses theoretical and analytical perspectives on conflict and MNCs.  It 
examines the liberal and radical/dependency paradigms on MNCs, especially their arguments 
on the roles and impacts of MNCs in host environments.  The premises and conclusions of 
the liberal and radical schools provide broad analytical parameters for understanding MNCs’ 
roles in the public sphere, especially in conflict zones.  The chapter examines the main trends 
of corporate behaviour in conflict environments, highlighting implications of the behavioural 
forms.  It notes that the significance of corporate actions in conflict zones is their conflict 
transformation potential. 
 
Chapter Four analyses conflict transformation, which encapsulates the dialectics of conflict, 
to show the nexus between corporate actions and the trajectories of conflicts and prospects 
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for peace.  While corporate behaviour shapes conflict dynamics in host environments, the 
corporate governance regime in host countries (among other factors) influences corporate 
behaviour itself.  In line with this realisation, the chapter discusses the dominant corporate 
governance regime types, namely the contractarian and communitarian paradigms, and their 
implications for MNCs’ public roles.  This study’s theoretical framework is situated in the 
discussion of corporate governance regimes in the fourth chapter. 
 
Chapter Five is an overview of the DRC, the study’s location.  It presents the country’s 
history and highlights its geo-strategic importance in central Africa.  The chapter also 
provides a sketch of the DRC’s vast mineral wealth, which gives the country the label of 
‘scandale géologique’ (that is, geological scandal).  Furthermore, Chapter Five discusses the 
role of enormous resource endowment and the scramble for the DRC’s minerals in the 
country’s postcolonial traumas, especially in the context of the First and Second Congo Wars.  
It examines the imbrication of natural resources in the conflicts and the creation of a war 
economy in the process.  In doing so, the chapter illustrates the link between natural 
resources and conflict dynamics, especially in terms of conflict perpetuation and the 
prospects for transformative change. 
 
Chapter Six provides broad explications of corporate behaviour in the DRC.  As a prelude to 
interrogating the strategic behaviour of corporate actors, it presents the profiles of selected 
MNCs with reference to their home countries, their main activities in the minerals sector and 
connections to the DRC.  In addition, the chapter analyses a key international response to an 
aspect of corporate behaviour, namely the UN investigation of actors’ involvement in the 
DRC’s conflict zones.  It discusses the forms of corporate behaviour and teases out the 
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contextual factors that underpinned each form of behaviour thus explicating the study’s 
hypothesis. 
 
Chapter Seven undertakes a statistical presentation and analysis of data obtained from the 
study’s location.  It discusses the roles of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts and peacebuilding 
process from respondents’ perspectives.  In doing so, the chapter contextualizes the activities 
of MNCs in DRC against the backdrop of the typology of corporate behaviour in conflict 
zones.  It also discusses the issues that emerge from the review of literature, theoretical 
frameworks, paradigmatic perspectives and survey findings.  Based on research findings, the 
chapter makes analytical deductions and presents a prognosis on corporate behaviour in the 
emerging post-conflict epoch in the DRC. 
 
Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter.  It presents a summary of the study and draws 
logical conclusions from research findings.  The conclusions engender salient 
recommendations on natural resource management and corporate governance in the DRC.  
Beyond the DRC, the recommendations seek to inform public policy choices and practices in 
resource-rich countries plagued by or emerging from conflict and in those striving to 










LITERATURE REVIEW: INTERROGATING THE INTERFACE BETWEEN 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT 
2.1 Introduction 
As noted in the preceding chapter, this study explores the role of resource-seeking 
corporations in conflict zones, using the DRC as a case study.  The study’s focal point of 
analysis underscores the connections between natural resources, business and conflict.  
Although the literature on conflict is expanding, the role of big business in conflict (including 
the peacebuilding process) has been largely ignored until recently.  However, the reality of 
corporate actors’ complicity in conflict has engendered scholarly inquiries into the nexus 
between business and conflict.  Burgeoning analyses of the corporate-conflict nexus highlight 
the economic dimension of war.  Across the world, there are conflicts in which natural 
resources have played prominent roles.  Conflicts in which resources play key role often draw 
in profiteering networks whose activities deliberately or inadvertently complicate, exacerbate 
and perpetuate such conflicts. 
 
The centrality of resource-extraction and commodification in the sustenance of conflicts 
partly informs the contested ‘resource curse’ thesis.  Moreover, corporate behaviour in 
resource-bearing but conflict-prone areas potentially reinforces the argument for or against 
the notion of ‘resource curse’.  Therefore, the roles of corporations in zones of conflict 
feature prominently in the ‘resource curse’ discourse in particular and in the analyses of the 
political economy of war in general.  However, in order to understand the interface of natural 
resources, business and conflict, it is necessary to tease out the intricate connections between 




2.2 Review and comparison of relevant literature 
Arising from the background presented above, the central focus of this chapter is to review 
and compare literature on the interface between natural resources and conflict.  Specifically, 
the chapter interrogates the ‘resource curse’ thesis by engaging with the arguments that either 
underpin, modify or refute the thesis.  The intention here is not to align this study with or 
against scholarly arguments on the ‘resource curse’ thesis, but to tease out aspects of the 
debate that furnish insights into the nexus between natural resources and conflict.  The 
analysis that follows seeks to show the dynamic and intricate link between natural resources 
and conflict.  Thus, the aim of this review is to advance an explanatory framework that 
engenders a nuanced understanding of the intricate relationship between the natural resources 
and conflicts. 
 
2.2.1 The ‘resource curse’ manacle: the nexus between natural resources and conflict 
One of the most puzzling and perplexing discoveries of modern 
scholarship is a paradoxical phenomenon referred to as the 
resource curse (Duruigbo, 2005: 5). 
 
 
The link between natural resources and conflict is probably as old 
as human settlement (Alao, 2007: 1). 
 
Since the late 1990s, there has been a growth in the literature focusing on the ‘resource curse’ 
syndrome.  The ‘resource curse’ thesis is located in the body of political and economic 
literature that explores the link between natural resource endowment and social and economic 
development.23  Specifically, the thesis posits that a negative relationship exists between 
resource abundance and social, political and economic development.   
                                                            
23 For a survey of studies on the resource curse, see Rosser (2006a, 2006b).  Kolstad and Wiig (2009) provide an 
effulgent description of the political economy models on the resource curse. 
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Prior to the popularisation of the ‘resource curse’ thesis, “the conventional wisdom 
concerning the relationship between natural resource abundance and development was that 
the former was advantageous for the latter” (Rosser, 2006a: 7).  Higgins (1968: 222) had 
argued that the “possession of a sizable and diversified natural resource endowment [was] a 
major advantage to any country embarking upon a period of rapid economic growth.”  In the 
1970s and 1980s, the overarching view in the literature was that diversified natural resource 
endowment engendered rapid economic growth.  Citing Australia, Britain and the United 
States as examples, neoliberal scholars and development economists such as Drake (1972), 
Krueger (1980), and Balassa (1980) argued that resource abundance could enhance a 
country’s transition from underdevelopment to industrial development (Rosser, 2006a: 7).24  
This argument was predicated on the logic that natural resources provided “domestic markets 
and investible funds” necessary for industrial development (Balassa, 1980: 2).  The dominant 
view at the time was that resource abundance had stimulated economic development in the 
advanced countries and that a similar scenario was expected to unfold in resource-rich, less 
developed countries.  However, empirical evidence in several resource-rich developing 
countries belied this argument. 
 
As Rosser (2006: 7) notes, since the late 1980s a sizable literature has challenged the 
conventional wisdom of the 1970s and 1980s.  The compelling evidence – anchored 
substantially on case studies from Africa – suggested that natural resource abundance was a 
curse for developing countries.  Maconachie and Binns (2007: 104) contend that “[g]rowing 
evidence suggests that many African countries with significant natural wealth have actually 
                                                            
24 This researcher is of the view that a note of caution is apposite here: it is reductionist and simplistic to 
attribute the industrial development of these centres exclusively to the possession of natural resources.  Other 
factors such as human capital formation and investment in science and technology are equally relevant.  It 
should be borne in mind that the development of former colonial powers or metropoles also derived partly from 
the exploitation of territories in the Global South. 
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reaped limited rewards, instead experiencing underdevelopment, corruption, political 
instability, and in some cases, violent conflict.”  Scholars cite resource-rich countries such as 
Angola, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone as examples to 
buttress this position. 
 
These contending views on the nexus between natural resource endowment and development 
have engendered robust scholarly debate by economists, political scientists and policy makers 
(Bulte and Brunnschweiler, 2012).  This debate has spawned a vast body of literature on the 
‘resource curse’ thesis.  The literature encompasses “a plethora of perspectives on the 
resource curse” (Rajan, 2011: 618) even as it highlights “important areas of disagreement and 
fragmentation within the research community” (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009: 4).  An examination 
of the literature suggests that certain broad scholarly positions encapsulate the various 
narratives and reflect the contentions around the subject.  For example, the literature shows 
that there is some scepticism over the existence of the ‘resource curse’.  Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2008) proffer cross-country evidence to substantiate their claim that the ‘resource 
curse’ is a “red herring”.  Yet amidst doubts over the existence of this phenomenon, 
“empirical evidence provides some of the strongest support” for the prevalence of the 
‘resource curse’ (Duruigbo, 2005: 7). 
 
At this juncture, it is instructive to note that the literature on the ‘resource curse’ phenomenon 
consists of three strands that enhance the understanding of the pathologies ascribed to it.  The 
first strand examines the relationship between abundant natural resource endowment and 
economic performance.  In the second component are analyses that focus on the relationship 
between mineral resource wealth and political regimes.  The third strand explores the 
interface between natural resource abundance and (civil) conflict (Rosser, 2006a: 8).  
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Scholarly works on the ‘resource curse’ generally fit into one component, or two, or at times, 
all three strands. 
 
Initial attempts to explain the ‘resource curse’ syndrome interrogated the impact of natural 
resource wealth on a state’s economic performance.  Ross (1999: 297) argues that “states 
with abundant natural resource wealth perform less well than their resource-poor 
counterparts”, but adds that “there is little agreement on why this occurs”.  Ross’ argument is 
based on the empirical evidence that resource-rich African countries (which are exporters of 
primary commodities) have lagged behind resource-poor countries in East Asia and Latin 
America in terms of economic growth.  For example, natural resource-poor countries such as 
Singapore and South Korea have outperformed resource-rich countries in Africa.  Ross 
(1999: 300) refers to a 1984 study of thirty African countries, which found a negative 
correlation between economic performance and mineral exports. 
 
Similarly, a study sponsored by the World Bank during the 1973-1982 boom years noted that 
mineral-exporting countries “performed less well than their resource-poor counterparts” 
(Ross, 1999: 300).25  This outcome is attributed to economic and political variables.  On the 
economic front, factors such as “a decline in the terms of trade for primary commodities, the 
instability of international commodity markets, [and] the poor economic linkages between 
resource and nonresource sectors” (Ross, 1999: 298) impede economic growth in resource-
rich African countries.  Besides economics, political explanations of the ‘resource curse’ are 
located in variables such as poor governance, weak state institutions, and the pernicious 
influence of elite or interest groups.  A combination of these economic and political variables 
                                                            
25 Several studies, using datasets from various countries, found that resource-rich countries experienced, in some 
cases, negative growth and/or slower growth rates than their resource-poor counterparts.  For details of these 
findings, see Nankani (1980), Wheeler (1984), Alan Gelb and associates (1988), Auty (1993), and Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003). 
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makes it difficult for countries to earn considerable revenue from their mineral wealth and 
undermines their ability to provide public goods.  The net effect is that natural resource 
abundance does not stimulate or contribute to economic growth and development. 
 
Using large datasets obtained from a diverse group of resource-rich countries, Sachs and 
Warner (1997) as well as Leite and Weidman (1999) confirm the negative correlation 
between enormous natural resource endowment and economic performance.  Sachs and 
Warner’s (1997) study uses data from ninety-five countries and covers a twenty-year period 
(1970-90).26  As Sachs and Warner (1997: 3) fittingly note, the “negative association between 
resource abundance and growth in recent decades certainly poses a conceptual puzzle. After 
all, natural resources increase wealth and purchasing power over imports, so that resource 
abundance might be expected to raise an economy’s investment and growth rates as well.”  
This expectation remains largely unfulfilled, especially in resource-rich less, developed 
countries (LDCs).  In many economies, resource abundance has led to the concentration of 
labour and capital in natural resources rather than manufacturing or service sectors.  A 
shrinkage of the secondary (that is manufacturing) and tertiary (service) sectors as a result of 
natural resource abundance results in “socially inefficient decline in growth” (Sachs and 
Warner, 1997: 7) even as governments concentrate on resource rents which may be 
inadequate, or embezzled. 
 
Leite and Weidman’s (1999) study extends Sachs and Warner’s by using a simple analytical 
model which illustrates the linkages between natural resources, corruption and economic 
growth.  Moreover, Leite and Weidman (1999) distinguish between the direct and indirect 
effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth.  Direct effects relate to the 
                                                            
26 It is apt to note here that Sachs and Warner’s study showed that the negative relationship between natural 
resource abundance and economic growth was statistically significant even after controlling for intervening 
variables such as per capita income, investment rates and trade policy. 
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negative implications which natural resource boom may have for non-resource sectors (such 
as alluded to above).  Indirect effects pertain to occurrences such as rent-seeking, poor 
institution building and corruption.  As cases from several African countries demonstrate, 
“windfall gains” from the natural resource boom may precipitate and entrench rent-seeking 
behaviour, engender pervasive corruption and “may cause a ‘feeding frenzy’ in which 
competing groups fight for the natural resource rents thereby inefficiently exhausting the 
public good” (Leite and Weidman, 1999: 9).  Where rent-seeking behaviour is prevalent, 
there is no incentive for public officials to invest in “growth-supporting public goods” (Leite 
and Weidman, 1999: 9).  This scenario may lead to slower, or in fact, negative economic 
growth with little or no prospect for economic development. 
 
As noted earlier, analyses of the ‘resource curse’ have also focused on the relationship 
between natural resource wealth and political regimes.  In this regard, a number of scholarly 
works suggest that there is a direct relationship between natural resource abundance and low 
levels of democracy (Rosser, 2006a: 10).   For example, Wantchekon (1999, in Rosser, 
2006a: 10) used a dataset from 141 countries between 1965 and 1990 to explore this 
relationship.  The findings suggested that “a one per cent increase in natural resource 
dependence … increased the probability of authoritarian government by nearly eight per 
cent” (Rosser, 2006a: 10).  In addition, Wantchekon’s (1999) study found that “countries that 
were rich in natural resources were more likely to experience failed or slow transitions to 
democracy” (Rosser, 2006a: 10).   According to Wantchekon (1999: 2):  
natural resource dependence and rentier economies tend to 
generate authoritarian governments and socio-political instability.  
The empirical observation is particularly valid in Africa.  All 
African petrostates or resource dependent countries have 
authoritarian governments or have experienced a very slow process 
of political reforms.  These include Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, 
Gabon, Cameroon and the former Zaire.  On the other hand, 
besides South Africa, transition to democracy has been successful 
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only in resource-poor countries such as Benin, Mali, Senegal, and 
Madagascar.27 
 
Based on a “simple model of electoral competition in a rentier economy”, Wantchekon’s 
(1999: 20) theoretical and empirical findings “suggest that rentier economies tend to generate 
incumbency advantage, undermine democratic governance and sociopolitical stability”.  His 
study notes that hallmarks of rentier economies “are the lack of transparency and the absence 
of rules in the process of rent distribution which depends on the level of centralization of the 
government” (Wantchekon, 1999: 4).  A lamentable offshoot of the centralisation of power is 
the absence or weakness of rule of law, which allows incumbents to consolidate their 
positions, entrenches patronage, creates one-party dominance and undermines democracy.  
Moreover, “incumbency advantage or [one-party] dominance could induce the opposition to 
resort to political violence to compete for political power and therefore generate political 
instability and authoritarian governments” (Wantchekon, 1999: 20).  As Wantchekon (1999: 
5) argues, the centralisation of power and weak rule of law tend to produce one-party 
dominance and breakdown of democracy in resource-rich rentier states.  Based on research 
findings, he concludes that natural resource abundance is a crucial determinant of regime 
types in Africa (Wantchekon, 1999: 20).  While Wantchekon’s argument is plausible, it 
should be added that the political environment or regime type also influences the 
management of natural resources. 
 
A related study (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004: 816-841) that focuses exclusively on Africa 
corroborates Wantchekon’s (1999) findings, which related to the period between 1965 and 
1990.  The significance of Jensen and Wantchekon’s (2004) study is that it focuses on the 
post-third wave democratisation period.  However, the authors did not find any significant 
                                                            
27 It may be argued that Madagascar no longer fits into this cluster of countries in the aftermath of the political 
crisis that has engulfed the state. 
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shifts from the findings of the previous study.  They note that while nearly all resource-rich 
African countries were authoritarian between 1965 and 1990, “the correlation between 
political regimes and resource dependence became more evident after the third wave of 
democratization” even as attempts at democratisation in resource-rich countries such as 
Algeria, the DRC and Sierra Leone plunged the countries into civil wars (Jensen and 
Wantchekon, 2004: 818).  Drawing from the data for Wantchekon’s (1999) earlier study, the 
authors then “constructed a number of time-series cross-sectional regressions” in order to 
“test the implications of natural resource dependence on political regimes” (Jensen and 
Wantchekon, 2004: 824).  Their findings “show that natural resource-dependent economies 
(a) were more likely to be authoritarian, (b) exhibit higher levels of government spending, (c) 
are associated with worse governance, and (d) were more likely to lead to breakdown in 
democracy after the third wave of democratic transitions in the 1990s” (Jensen and 
Wantchekon, 2004: 817).  What stands out in both studies (Wantchekon, 1999; Jensen and 
Wantchekon, 2004) is that resource-rich African countries tended to be more authoritarian or 
less democratic than their resource-poor counterparts. 
 
From a political economy perspective, the greatest number of scholarly works on the 
‘resource curse’ has examined the relationship between natural resource abundance and 
conflict.  Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005) have conducted the most 
prominent studies in this regard.  In a seminal study, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) examine the 
relationship between natural resources and conflict using a comprehensive dataset from 
ninety-eight countries and twenty-seven civil wars.  They found that natural resource 
abundance is a strong and significant determinant of the probability, onset and duration of 
civil wars.  Their analysis of rebellion strikingly captures certain economic fundaments.  For 
instance, government and rebel movements need revenue to finance their operations.  The 
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capacity of warring parties to attain their strategic objectives depends on their financial 
resources.  A taxable base – which natural resource abundance provides – is necessary for 
warring parties to reward their supporters in the event of a victory.  Moreover, without a 
doubt, there are costs and (anticipated) benefits associated with conflict.  As Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998: 567) note, “the probability of civil war and its duration are a function of the 
gains from rebellion, made up of the probability of rebel victory and the gains from victory 
…, and the costs of rebellion, made up of the opportunity costs of conflict and the cost of 
coordination.”  The availability of and access to natural resources often determine the gains 
and opportunity costs associated with rebellion.  A regression analysis by the authors showed 
that the effect of natural resource abundance on civil wars is “quite strong” (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998: 567) thus reinforcing the idea of a curse.  It is worth noting that some of the 
analyses in the literature on natural resource management refine, critique or disprove this idea 
using different analytical frames.28 
 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2001) “greed and grievance” thesis provided the intellectual stimulant 
for subsequent analyses of the nexus between natural resources and conflict.  The main idea 
in the greed dimension of the thesis is that belligerents in armed conflicts are motivated by 
economic benefits.  In this context, natural resources provide the requisite finance and motive 
for persons to orchestrate or engage in violence.  Grievance, on the other hand, encapsulates 
the idea that people rebel over issues that are linked inextricably with their identity: social 
class, ethnicity, and religion.  Hence, social and political exclusion, inequality, ethnic 
polarisation, and religious fractionalisation would constitute “grievance” motives for conflict.  
With reference to the greed versus grievance debate, Maconachie and Binns (2007: 104) 
make an important observation: 
                                                            
28 For example, see Kenny (2010), Cavalcanti et al. (2011), Haber and Menaldo (2011). 
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In studies concerning the political economy of war, the literature 
remains divided over the relative importance that each of these 
causal factors assumes in the incidence of conflict.  While the 
‘greed’ theory argues that looting and resource capture are the 
prime motives for rebel actors, proponents of the ‘grievance’ 
theory maintain that justice-seeking for the marginalization of 
social groups remains the key factor leading to violent rebellion. 
 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2001) study contributes to this debate by arguing that “grievance” is 
not a significant motivation for conflict while it provides robust arguments in support of the 
“greed” model.  In the authors’ view, “the true cause of much civil conflict is not the loud 
discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001: 101).  
Conflict risk increases due to greed on the part of elite groups within resource-rich weak 
states.  Apart from skewing resource distribution in their favour, elite groups may further 
economic agendas and harness economic resources through recourse to violence.  Greed 
(which may manifest in the desire for power or for control of economic resources) on the part 
of the elite may create grievances which rebel groups may then exploit or use to justify 
rebellion.  Where rebel groups extract mineral resources to finance rebellion, greed may 
replace grievance as the key motivation.  In some instances, parties may prolong a conflict as 
long as they control economic resources or have access to mineral resources.29  Collier and 
Hoeffler’s strong argument in support of the “greed” model also assumes that grievance 
produces further greed. 
 
In another study that analyses 46 wars, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) examine the impact of 
natural resource abundance on different forms of domestic conflicts, which they categorise 
into secessionist and non-secessionist.  The authors contend that the lure of natural resources 
increases the risk of civil wars.  According to the authors, 
                                                            
29 This point applies in the context of this study (infra, page 284). 
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when we take civil wars in their entirety, … natural resources play 
a powerful and dangerous role, greatly increasing risk.  There are 
two major reasons why natural resources might be a powerful risk 
factor – the opportunity which they provide to rebel groups to 
finance their activities during conflict and the lure of capturing 
resource ownership permanently if the rebellion is victorious 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002: 12). 
 
It is noteworthy that the authors view natural resources as a very strong but not necessarily 
the only motivation for a political community to fight a war of secession.  A political 
community may also engage in violence (not necessarily an attempt at secession) in order to 
make a case for an increase in its share of mineral wealth.  Using a regression analysis, 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) show that natural resources increase the risk of secessionist and 
non-secessionist conflicts.  However, they state that secessionist wars are three times more 
likely to be associated with natural resources than non-secessionist ones.  Hence, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002: 8) make this observation: “natural resources are usually geographically 
concentrated in a particular part of a country, so countries that are heavily dependent upon 
natural resource exports are likely to be prone to secessionist movements.”  The authors 
conclude that “secessionist movements that are able to scale-up to being organizations with a 
serious political or military capability are likely to occur in rich regions and contain an 
element of a ‘resource grab’” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002: 27). 
 
A subsequent study by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) undertakes a regression analysis of 98 
countries and 27 civil wars.  Their 2004 study “considerably extends and revises” their earlier 
(1998) work.  According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 565), analyses of the resource-
conflict nexus ought to consider the “opportunities for financing rebellion” which are derived 
from “extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile 
governments.”  The inclusion of other non-natural resource variables (such as donations and 
subventions) in the analysis refines Collier and Hoeffler’s earlier argument.  Nevertheless, 
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Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) study shows a very strong correlation between resource 
extraction (for example diamonds in West Africa and timber in Cambodia) and conflict, 
while “donations from diasporas” and “subventions from hostile governments” have 
considerably lower significance in conflict episodes.  Furthermore, the authors acknowledge 
that natural resources are linked to other factors that may precipitate conflict: corruption, 
economic mismanagement and poor public service provision (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 
567).  That said, the authors conclude that the control of rents from natural resources provides 
incentives and opportunities for conflict.  Still, the pertinence of the natural resource element 
remains high in the 2004 study. 
 
In a later study, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) revisit and critique the results of their previous 
studies, but the role of natural resources in conflicts remain salient in their analysis.  The 
authors posit that natural resources “generate the worst sort of civil wars” (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005: 627).  They also offer a nuanced perspective of the resource-conflict nexus, 
noting the role of intervening variables in conflict initiation, intensity and duration.  
Remarkably, their analysis moves away from an entirely pejorative view of natural resource 
abundance as the authors state that “[l]arge resource rents are not intrinsically a curse” but 
“have the potential to accelerate peaceful development” as in Botswana (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2005: 627).  In the authors’ view, that potential underscores a nuanced understanding of the 
impact of natural resource abundance.  This is more so as large resource rents may precipitate 
or prolong conflict in some cases but not in other instances.  Hence, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2005) suggest that other pertinent variables (besides natural resource abundance) should be 
considered in the analysis of conflict.  In Africa, ethnic configuration, elite interests, and the 
political environment/regime type are some of the important factors that are imbricated in 
conditions of natural resource abundance.  These factors combine with large resource rents to 
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produce specific and differentiated outcomes.  Therefore, the authors suggest a political 
economy approach, which encapsulates the pertinent factors, to exploring the relationship 
between natural resources and conflict. Nevertheless, the authors restate a number of key 
findings in their studies since 1998.  They reiterate that: (i) natural resource abundance can 
induce patronage politics, which in turn engenders tensions and conflict; (ii) natural resources 
can finance conflict; and (iii) resources can motivate conflict, especially secessionist wars 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2005: 632). 
 
Although the works of Collier and Hoeffler feature prominently in the literature on the 
‘resource curse’ thesis, there are other analyses (in economics, political science and 
geopolitics) that illustrate, or confirm, or challenge Collier and Hoeffler’s findings.  Wexler 
(2010) suggests possible explanations for the link between resource abundance and conflict.  
One explanation is that natural resources make a state potentially economically viable and 
may induce secessionist attempts.  Another explanation is that greed on the part of foreign 
actors, namely states and corporations, “may instigate civil conflict to facilitate resource 
extraction”.30  In this case, “outside actors prey upon or foment internal difficulties in order to 
overcome barriers to or to decrease expenses associated with resource extraction” even as 
“dependence of outside states and corporations on the natural resource may create or 
exacerbate inequalities that they seek to remedy through conflict” (Wexler, 2010: 1724).  
These explanations speak to the role of natural resources in instigating conflict. 
 
Other explanations suggest that natural resource abundance prolongs civil conflicts.  As 
Wexler (2010: 1724) notes, “[n]atural resources can provide the funds rebel forces need to 
keep fighting” and rebel movements “may lack interest in successfully negotiating peace so 
                                                            
30 Wexler’s reference to the link between resource-seeking corporations and civil conflict is instructive in the 
context of the subject matter of this study. 
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that they can continue looting.”  Although Wexler (2010: 1725) posits that factors such as 
“ethnic divisions and governance structures” matter a great deal in civil strife, the author – in 
agreement with Collier and Hoeffler – argues that “much evidence supports the influence of 
resource curses in both the initiation and duration of civil conflict”.  Wexler refers to Bannon 
and Collier’s (2003: 7) empirical conclusion to substantiate his position: “[n]early 50 armed 
conflicts active in 2001 had a strong link to natural resource exploitation, in which either licit 
or illicit exploitation helped to trigger, intensify, or sustain a violent conflict.”  Wexler (2010: 
1725) cites the exploitation of cassiterite, coltan, copper, diamonds, gold, and timber to 
illustrate the resource-conflict link, which typifies the ‘resource curse’. 
 
Rustad and Binningsbø (2012: 531-546) unpack the link between natural resources and 
conflicts using three mechanisms: distribution mechanism; finance mechanism; and 
aggravation mechanism.  Under the first mechanism, resource-distribution may spur conflict, 
for example where rebel movements fight the government over “(perceived) unfair access to 
natural resources, unsatisfactory distribution of benefits from natural resources, and lack of 
control over such resources” (Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012: 534).  In this case, rebel 
movements’ motivation to use violence is to improve their share, control of, or access to 
natural resources while the government’s is to retain control over resources. 
 
According to Rustad and Binningsbø (2012: 534), the distribution mechanism is illustrated in 
conflicts over oil in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and rural landlessness in El Salvador.  The finance 
mechanism refers to the context where natural resources provide “financial power to wage 
violent conflict, both for rebels and governments” (Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012: 534).  
Natural resource revenue is an important economic asset for rebels; it enables them to procure 
weapons and finance logistics associated with civil wars.  Natural resources may provide 
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governments with “revenues to finance the army and their counter-insurgency strategies” 
(Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012: 535).  The role of high-value natural resources such as 
diamonds in conflicts in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone illustrates the finance 
mechanism.31 
 
Rustad and Binningsbø (2012: 535) use the aggravation mechanism to describe the indirect 
role of natural resources in conflicts.  According to the authors, this mechanism  
includes conflicts where natural resources were less directly 
involved, but still aggravated the course of the conflicts by adding 
fuel to an already troublesome situation.  The aggravation 
mechanism contains various roles played by natural resources in 
conflict, but these roles clearly differ from those defined as 
distribution or financing mechanisms (Rustad and Binningsbø, 
2012: 535) [emphasis in the original]. 
 
Examples of situations that fit this mechanism include “proximity to (potential and real) 
pipelines, knowledge of natural resource reserves and environmental degradation” (Rustad 
and Binningsbø, 2012: 535).  The authors cite cases that illustrate this mechanism: South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts in Georgia over future oil revenues and location of oil 
pipelines; and Russia’s resolve to control Chechnya and suppress rebellion in the region in 
order to protect vital oil pipeline routes (Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012: 535). 
 
Rustad and Binningsbø’s (2012) analysis not only provides insights into the different roles of 
natural resources in conflicts but also highlights an important point: the three mechanisms are 
not mutually exclusive.  They can all be at play in a typical conflict situation.  For example, 
there are violent disagreements in relation to oil resources in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
                                                            
31 The general notions of “conflict minerals” or “conflict commodities” and the specific notions of “conflict 
diamonds” or “blood diamonds” derive from the realisation of the conflict-financing significance of natural 
resources.  A 2006 movie entitled, Blood Diamond, popularised these notions.  The movie’s title is based on the 
characterisation and reality of diamonds being extracted from Africa’s conflict zones and sold to finance deadly 
conflicts whereby warlords and MNCs derive immense profits in the process. 
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(distribution mechanism).  Militants “illegally tap oil from pipelines to finance violence” 
(finance mechanism).  Oil extraction results in environmental degradation, which engenders 
grievances and fuels violence, that is, aggravation mechanism (Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012: 
533). 
 
Furthermore, Le Billon’s (2008) analysis of “diamond wars” suggests that natural resources 
not only finance conflict but also shape the motives of violence as well as the behaviour of 
warring parties (Le Billon 2008: 345).  In the discussion of the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict, Le Billon (2008) uses an analytical framework that goes beyond the 
basic assumption about natural resource abundance and stresses the importance of flows, 
location and the political economy of resources.  The framework deals with three different 
but similar and complementary concepts: ‘resource curse’, resource conflicts, and conflict 
resources.  The concepts are similar in that they carry the idea that natural resources play 
certain roles in conflicts; their definitions portray the differences while the possibility of these 
concepts being at play in the same conflict situation demonstrates their complementarity.  
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As shown in Table 2.1 above (and as the studies reviewed thus far suggest), ‘resource curse’ 
presupposes that natural resources undermine governance and economic performance thus 
increasing the likelihood of conflict.  Resource conflicts entail the idea that the natural 
resource sector motivates disputes over resource distribution thereby inducing violent 
dispossession and resistance.  Conflict resources carry the idea that natural resources reward 
belligerents, increasing the likelihood of conflict escalation and prolongation.  In terms of 
conflict factors, the table shows that ‘resource curse’ relates to vulnerability, and resource 
conflicts and conflict resources respectively connect with the ideas of risk and opportunity of 
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violence.  Le Billon (2008) argues that the presence of natural resources does not necessarily 
pose a conflict risk, but the opportunity attached to them does.  For example, in “diamond 
wars”, opportunity results from the material, spatial and social characteristics of the mineral, 
as it is easily mined, highly valuable, easy to conceal, transport, store and trade.  Moreover, 
the resource “does not need any transformation before reaching international (rough 
diamond) markets” (Le Billon, 2008: 360).  Natural resources that “bear” these characteristics 
are most likely to induce, escalate and prolong violent conflict.32 
 
Thus far, it can be seen that the literature on the political economy of war contains studies 
that suggest that natural resources and conflicts are (causally) linked.  This is the case 
especially with natural resources that present opportunity for access, capture, and control 
(through violence or dispossession) and thus provide economic power to those who control 
the resources.  Nevertheless, natural resources with the opportunity element do not all have 
the same impact on conflicts.  Although Ross (2003: 47) shows that natural resources (and – 
less relevant to this study – illegal drugs) were strongly associated with domestic armed 
conflicts between 1990 and 2000, he argues that resources have different effects on conflicts.  
In order to illuminate this argument, Ross (2003) distinguishes between “lootable” and 
“unlootable” resources.33  According to Ross (2003: 47-48), lootable resources tend to “ignite 
nonseparatist conflicts, which once begun are harder to resolve; but they pose little danger of 
igniting separatist conflicts.”  Conversely, unlootable resources are likely to produce 
                                                            
32 These factors apply in equal, if not greater measure, to coltan – a strategic mineral resource that has been at 
the heart of the conflicts in the eastern regions of the DRC. 
33 Lootable resources (such as alluvial gemstones, agricultural products, timber, or coltan) are easily 
appropriated, exploited and transported by small groups of unskilled workers and thus benefit those who control 
the resource-rich areas and the local population whose labour is required.  Unlootable resources include oil, 
natural gas, kimberlite diamonds (deposited far underground) and other deep-shaft minerals.  The exploitation of 
these resources requires extensive capital and expertise.  Hence, they tend to benefit central governments and 
foreign companies that possess the capital and technology required for resource exploitation (Ballentine and 
Nitzschke, 2005a: 5-6). 
54 
separatist conflicts, but rarely ignite nonseparatist conflicts.34  Ross’ (2003: 47) analysis, 
which examines fifteen conflicts, suggests that “three characteristics of natural resources – 
their lootability, their obstructability, and their legality – are likely to influence civil wars”.35  
The insertion of these three factors streamlines the argument for the resource-conflict link, 
since “the role played by any natural resource depends largely on its lootability, and to a 
lesser extent on its obstructability and its legality” (Ross, 2003: 54).  In addition, the value-to-
weight ratio of a resource determines the impact that it has on a conflict.  An examination of 
the impact of resources on conflict (for example alluvial diamonds in Sierra Leone and coltan 
in the DRC) lends credence to Ross’ argument. 
 
How then do lootable and unlootable resources influence conflict dynamics?  Ballentine and 
Nitzschke’s (2005a) observations cohere with Ross’ (2003) analysis on the different effects 
of natural resources on conflicts.  With reference to lootable resources, empirical evidence 
suggests that  
[a]ccess to lootable resources may prolong conflict, as weaker 
parties can avoid ‘hurting stalemates’ by generating finances 
necessary to continue hostilities.  Where armed groups depend on 
easily accessible resources, there is a greater risk that conflict will 
be lengthened by the consequent fragmentation and 
fractionalisation of combatant groups, as internal discipline and 
cohesion are undermined by economic motives (Ballentine and 
Nitzschke, 2005a: 5-6). 
 
Unlootable resources produce a different effect on conflict.  Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005a: 
6) state that 
                                                            
34 Auty (2004) also makes a distinction between lootable and unlootable resources and contends that lootable 
resources are more likely to sustain conflict, as rebels and warlords can capture these resources more easily. 
35 A resource’s lootability refers to the ease with which it can be extracted and transported by unskilled 
individuals or groups.  Obstructability denotes the relative “ease with which the transportation of a resource can 
be blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons” or by many soldiers with heavy equipment.  
Legality addresses the question: whether the resource “can be legally traded on international markets” (Ross, 
2003: 54). 
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[w]here corrupt, exclusionary, and unaccountable governments fail 
to adequately share the resources generated or to provide adequate 
public goods and services, a sense of economic deprivation may 
fuel other local resentments and feed separatist violence, as 
occurred in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) and Sudan ... [T]he 
existence of [unlootable] resource wealth in one area may be 
viewed by separatist movements as a viable economic base for an 
independent state, thus encouraging armed conflict. 
 
To illustrate Ballentine and Nitzschke’s (2005a) point, the matrix below (Table 2.2) shows 
the relationship between lootable versus unlootable resources and separatist versus 
nonseparatist conflicts with reference to a number of case studies around the world. 
 
Table 2.2: “Resource Wealth, Lootability, and Types of Conflict” 
 Separatist Conflicts Non-Separatist Conflicts 
Lootable Resources Burma – timber, gems, opium Afghanistan – gems, opium 
Angola (UNITA) – diamonds 
Cambodia – timber, gems 
Colombia – opium, coca 
DRC – coltan, diamonds, coffee 
Liberia – timber, diamonds, cocoa, 
coffee, marijuana, rubber, gold 
Peru – coca 
Sierra Leone – diamonds 
Unlootable Resources Angola (Cabinda) – oil 
Indonesia (Aceh) – natural gas 
Indonesia (West Papua) – copper, 
gold 
Papua New Guinea – copper, gold 
Sudan – oil  
Angola (UNITA) – oil 
Colombia – oil, gas 
Congo Republic – oil 
DRC – copper, cobalt 
 
Source: Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005a: 6). 
 
These (conceptual) distinctions in the resource-conflict link are important as they enhance the 
understanding of “the political economy of rebellion as well as of state failure in explaining 
conflict onset and duration” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005a: 7).  They move away from the 
simplistic tendency to draw a linear linkage between natural resource endowment or 
abundance and conflict. 
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Le Billon and Nicholls (2007: 613) note the “growing consensus that insurgent access to 
natural resource revenues prolongs armed conflicts and presents significant hurdles to 
peacekeeping missions.”  They define accessibility as “the ease with which an armed group 
can generate revenues from [natural resources], through exploitation, theft, as well as taxation 
or extortion” (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007: 613).  Crucially though, access to natural 
resources – through which insurgents finance their operations – is dependent on two critical 
factors:  
(i) The “production and commercial characteristics of a resource”: the lower the 
financial, technological and labour inputs, the more accessible a resource is. 
(ii) The “geographical context and mode of exploitation of a resource”: a resource 
that “is spread over a vast territory, in a terrain propitious to insurgency, and 
along an international border … [and] exploited by high number of businesses 
vulnerable to protection rackets and protected by ineffective or corrupt security 
forces” is more accessible (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007: 626). 
 
However, the accessibility criterion does not suffice in providing economic power to 
insurgents; the resources have to be sold in order to finance a rebellion.  Le Billon and 
Nicholls’ (2007) analysis draws on Ross’ (2003: 54) argument regarding the legality of a 
resource in domestic and international markets.  It is this legal character of resources that 
“shapes specific opportunities for belligerents” (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007: 622).  In 
simple terms, belligerents must be able to sell the resources in order to generate revenue.  
Concisely, the main argument by Le Billon and Nicholls (2007) is that accessibility or 
lootability and legality define the financial opportunities that resources provide to warring 
parties, which consequently affect the duration and intensity of conflicts. 
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It can be deduced from the analyses by Ross (2003), Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005a), Le 
Billon and Nicholls (2007), and Le Billon (2008) that the commercial characteristics and the 
geographical context of natural resources, as well the political environment in which the 
resources are located, rather than natural resources per se, determine the onset, duration and 
intensity of conflicts. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, however, natural resource extraction and trade have provided 
opportunities for armed groups to carry out their operations.36  In what marks a “new” 
political economy of war, natural resources have “shaped strategies of power based on the 
commercialisation of armed conflict and the territorialisation of sovereignty around valuable 
resource areas and trading networks” (Le Billon, 2001: 561).  While it is established in the 
literature on the political economy of war that natural resources provide the means of funding 
and waging conflicts, there is some evidence that conflicts are a means to gaining access to 
and controlling natural resources (Le Billon, 2001:  562).  This suggests that natural resources 
affect and are affected by conflict.  An implication of this two-way interaction is that the 
linkage between natural resources and conflict increases the vulnerability of resource-rich 
weak states. It also heightens the possibility of volatility and political instability in such 
states.  Moreover, belligerents’ control of vast resource areas and substantial revenues from 
natural resources hinder the peaceful settlement of violent conflicts. 
 
Clearly, natural resources intrinsically do not trigger conflict.  Therefore, it is important to 
add here that analyses of the resource-conflict link should be cognisant of the socially 
                                                            
36 During the Cold War, armed groups in LDCs received financial and military assistance from the two 
superpowers, namely the United States of America and the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 
depending on the ideological leanings of armed groups.  The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered the 
sources of funding for armed groups. 
58 
constructed nature of resources.  This is because a natural resource per se, or resource 
scarcity, or resource abundance “is not a necessary or sufficient factor of conflict” (Le Billon, 
2001: 565).  The salience of social construction of natural resources is premised on the 
evidence that resources can influence conflict and “can also be mobilised in peaceful 
development” (Le Billon, 2001: 565).  Natural resources may mean nothing unless and until 
values are attached to them.  To illustrate:  
Diamonds provide one of the best examples of a useless material, 
except for industrial cutting and abrasive properties, constructed 
(both economically and discursively) as one of our most highly 
priced resources through the manipulation of markets by a cartel 
and the manipulation of symbols such as purity, love, and eternity 
through marketing (Le Billon, 2001: 565). 
 
Thus, natural resources derive their materiality from their social construction, which attracts 
local elites, foreign actors and global markets to these resources.37  Attraction to natural 
resources creates a network economy, which links local and foreign individuals, groups, and 
states that access or benefit from the resources.  Typically, a network may fuel conflict if it 
links belligerents with resource buyers, or companies involved in resource exploitation and 
trade (Le Billon, 2001: 572).  The idea here is that all actors within the network economy are 
attracted to the resources by virtue of its value, which is socially constructed.  Social 
construction intertwines with other factors such as the spatial distribution of resources, the 
pattern of resource exploitation, and lootability of resources to determine the effect of natural 
resources on conflict or peaceful development.  Against this backdrop, Le Billon (2001: 575) 
argues for “a reformulation of the dominant arguments on contemporary resource wars” – a 
shift from need (resource scarcity) or greed (resource abundance) arguments to a perspective 
which views conflicts “as a historical product inseparable from the social construction and 
political economy of resources” (Le Billon, 2001: 575).  This perspective, in the context of 
                                                            
37 It is also instructive to note that natural resources also derive their materiality from physical manipulation. (I 
am grateful to one of the examiners for this point.) 
59 
globalisation, should focus on not only profiteering networks, but also local and international 
(non-)governmental actors whose roles include advocating transparency and accountability in 
the natural resources sector. 
 
Humphreys (2005a) presents six mechanisms that explain the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict initiation and duration.  The first is the greedy rebels mechanism which 
argues that natural resources motivate rebel movements to attempt state capture or secession 
through violence.  In short, natural resource revenues enable rebels to keep fighting.  Second, 
the greedy outsiders mechanism, which refers to the context in which natural resource 
abundance provides an incentive for foreign actors such as states and MNCs to engage in or 
foster domestic conflicts.  Third, perceived deprivation of resource-bearing communities 
creates grievances and triggers violent resistance and secessionism – a reference to the 
grievance mechanism.  Fourth, the feasibility mechanism, which pertains to the financial 
opportunities that natural resources provide to belligerents, even in conflicts that have been 
triggered by factors that are not related to natural resources.  Fifth, the weak states 
mechanism speaks to the deleterious effects of natural resource abundance (for example weak 
state institutions, corruption, patronage, clientelism) which increase the likelihood of conflict.  
Finally, the sparse networks mechanism has it that resource-dependent or rentier states suffer 
from economic vulnerabilities that threaten peace and stability (Humphreys, 2005a: 511-513).   
 
In parsing these mechanisms, Humphreys’ (2005a) analysis touches on the relationship 
between natural resources and conflict duration.  Two plausible explanations for conflict 
prolongation are worth noting: “[g]roups that benefit during conflict may prefer to fight than 
to win and therefore act as spoilers to peace processes”; and if “natural resource endowments 
are associated more with greed-inspired rebellions, then the fighters in these conflicts may 
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not have an interest in the success of negotiations” (Humphreys, 2005a: 516).  This view 
coheres with the argument that a “state of armed conflict provides belligerents with economic 
and political entitlements and opportunities that cannot be achieved by peace or even victory” 
(Le Billon, 2005: 578).  Put differently, individuals and groups may benefit more during 
conflict than they would during peacetime.38  In this case, access to natural resources and 
revenues obtained from their sale provide a very strong incentive to belligerents to continue 
fighting and to undermine peace processes. 
 
In another study, Ross (2004) interrogates the relationship between natural resources and 
civil war based on hypothesis testing of thirteen cases, which included two successive wars in 
the DRC.39  The thirteen cases led to a number of notable findings.  First, Ross (2004: 61) 
finds “good evidence in the thirteen cases that natural resource wealth is causally linked to 
civil conflict”, and that natural resource abundance makes “conflict more likely to occur, last 
longer, and produce more casualties when it does occur”.  This finding confirms the 
predominant argument that has been made in numerous studies on the resource-conflict link. 
 
Second, only oil, nonfuel minerals (including gemstones), and illicit drugs appear to 
influence conflict, while other primary commodities such as agricultural produce do not have 
any correlation with conflict.  Third, the looting and grievance mechanisms do not appear to 
be valid in the thirteen cases: “there was no evidence that rebel groups funded their startup 
costs by looting natural resources or extorting money from resource firms”; and there was no 
“evidence that grievances over insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental 
degradation, inadequate job opportunities, or labor migration contributed to the initiation of 
                                                            
38 For example, Ross (2004: 54) notes that in “the war that plagued the DRC beginning in 1998—which has 
both the qualities of a civil war and an international war—the profitability of resource looting for foreign 
governments, rebel militias, and individual officers substantially reduced their incentive to end the conflict.” 
39 The thirteen cases are Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Colombia, Republic of Congo (or Congo 
Brazzaville), DRC I, DRC II, Indonesia, Liberia, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. 
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nonseparatist conflicts” (Ross, 2004: 62).  That said, Ross maintains that grievances are 
relevant and are a factor in low level and separatist conflicts. 
 
Fourth, natural resource abundance does not always worsen existing conflicts.  The cases 
suggest that “resources sometimes have contradictory and even peace-enhancing effects over 
the course of a civil war” (Ross, 2004: 62).  A conflict is prolonged when belligerents fight 
battles over resources; there is a quicker end to wars when combatants cooperatively exploit 
the same resources. 
 
Fifth, and in agreement with other studies reviewed here, the nexus between natural resources 
and conflict is underpinned, not by one mechanism, but by a variety of mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms combine to influence the onset, duration and intensity of conflict.  Closely 
related to this point is the evidence from Ross’ thirteen cases that natural resources have more 
than one effect on conflict.  The implication of this evidence is that it calls for a nuanced 
understanding of the resource-conflict link.  As Ross (2004: 62) observes, the “multiplicity of 
causal linkages—and the absence of a single, ubiquitous mechanism—may help account for 
the analytical muddle, and contradictory findings, of earlier studies.”  The sixth finding 
confirms the results of similar studies (already captured in this review section) which suggest 
that natural resources play different roles in separatist and nonseparatist wars. 
 
Finally, there are “four unforeseen mechanisms that link resource wealth to subsequent 
conflict” (Ross, 2004: 63).  The first unanticipated mechanism is that natural resource wealth 
increases the likelihood that “a foreign state will intervene on behalf of a nascent rebel 
movement” (for example Sierra Leone and DRC II), resulting in “long and costly civil wars” 
(Ross, 2004: 63).  The second and third mechanisms pertain to what Ross (2004: 63) calls 
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“booty futures” (that is “future exploitation rights to resources not under the seller’s 
control”), which may either initiate or prolong a conflict by providing rebel movements or 
governments with funds for combat operations.  The fourth unforeseen mechanism is 
“preemptive repression” – a situation in which the government takes “exceptionally harsh 
measures” to crush insurgencies that appear to threaten the government’s control of natural 
resource wealth (Ross, 2004: 63).  The import of Ross’ findings is that they provide a range 
of plausible explanations for the initiation, frequency, duration and intensity of domestic 
conflicts in resource-rich countries. 
 
The growing recognition of the role of natural resources in conflicts is redefining the contours 
of conflict research in general and the understanding of political economy of conflict in 
particular.  Garrett and Piccinni (2012: 4) capture this point thus: “[a]s a result of a new 
sensitivity to the economic dimensions of conflict, intrastate conflicts in natural resource-rich 
countries progressively became understood as ‘resource wars’, and the local economic 
systems from which combatants mobilized their resources defined as ‘war economies’”.  
Hence, the use of the term resource wars or resource conflicts in the literature points to the 
recognition of the centrality of natural resources to conflicts. 
 
In a study that focuses on corporate war crimes in resource-rich countries, Stewart (2011: 9) 
states that the illegal exploitation of natural resources has become the primary means of 
financing violent conflict.  In countries such as Angola, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
resource exploitation and trade created “perverse incentives for war”, provided financial 
opportunities for belligerents and sustained brutal conflicts (Stewart, 2011: 9).  The author 
describes the (effect of the) resource-conflict link thus: “[as] a consequence of the illegal 
trade in minerals, metals, timber, and other natural resources, armed conflicts in which 
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participants are able to draw upon easily accessible natural resource wealth are often more 
bloody, financially costly, and intractable than other forms of armed violence” (Stewart, 
2011: 9).  The crux of Stewart’s argument?  Natural resource abundance has contributed to 
making some countries conflict-prone.  Therefore, the imbrication of natural resources in 
conflicts has been the strongest argument for the ‘resource curse’.  The term, “resource 
wars”, which Stewart (2011: 9) utilises, has thus gained currency in the literature.  Resource 
wars, especially in Africa, have drawn in local and foreign profiteering networks whose 
activities have complexified such conflicts.  For example, Stewart (2011: 9) refers to the 
liability of foreign businesses that trade in illicit commodities.  This liability arises, in part, 
from the reality that resource wars “are entirely dependent on commercial actors to purchase, 
transport, and market the resources that are illegally acquired in order to sustain violence” 
(Stewart, 2011: 9).  In the case of the DRC, for example, several reports have pointed to the 
role of corporate actors in the illegal exploitation of the country’s natural resources.40  
Stewart’s work foregrounds the idea that studies on the political economy of conflict have 
tended to focus on the role of belligerents (governments and rebels) in the analysis of the 
resource-conflict nexus.  In order to address the conflict-financing mechanism of natural 
resources however, it is imperative to give attention to the role of corporate actors in conflict 
zones. 
 
According to Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005b: 1), “the increased commercialisation of civil 
wars has gained unprecedented academic and policy attention” since the end of the Cold War.  
Numerous contemporary domestic conflicts in the post-Cold War epoch have been 
characterised “by the predatory exploitation of natural resources and the pervasive 
criminalisation of economic life” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b: 1).  Resource 
                                                            
40 This is discussed later in this study (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
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exploitation and trade provide revenues that enable governments and warlords to acquire 
weapons and to finance their combat operations.  Hence, studies on the political economy of 
conflict demonstrate the “self-financing nature” of most domestic conflicts, creating war 
economies that have been facilitated by economic globalisation, financial market 
liberalisation and “elaborate quasi-criminal networks” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b: 1).  
Strikingly, war economies resulting from what Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005b: 1) refer to 
as “conflict trade” have made wars intractable. 
 
Furthermore, Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005b: 3) identify three fundamental linkages by 
which natural resources can affect a country.  First, natural resource abundance can “create 
permissive causes of violence and armed conflict” thereby undermining the “socioeconomic 
and political stability of a country” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b: 3).  Second, natural 
resource revenues can significantly influence the character and duration of conflicts.  On this 
point, Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005b: 3) state that “the ready availability of spoils of war in 
the form of lucrative and easily tradable natural resources in particular tends to complicate 
conflict termination and may pose important challenges for postconflict peacebuilding by 
creating ‘spoilers’ with an interest in continuation of violence and instability.”  The authors 
also capture how natural resources shape the character of conflicts.  They are of the view that 
“[n]atural resource predation and criminal economic activities can also have strong regional 
linkages with cross-border trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, and supportive 
neighboring regimes, particularly where conflicts are embedded in regional conflict 
formations” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b: 3).  Third, “there are nonnegligible moral, 
political, and even legal obligations for governments and companies in the developed world 
that arise from their commercial linkages with local war economies” (Ballentine and 
Nitzschke, 2005b: 4).  These three linkages draw “attention to the role of natural resources as 
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a source of combatant self-financing” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b: 4).  Most 
importantly, the obligations on the part of governments and MNCs are premised on the 
evidence that “most of the natural resources fueling conflicts are destined for consumer 
markets (both licit and illicit) in the developed world” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b: 4).  
Therefore, it is apposite to examine the roles external actors, whose social construction of 
lucrative natural resources (a la Le Billon, in this section) plays a part in the “conflict trade”.   
 
As noted in this section, resource exploitation and trade influence armed conflicts in a 
number of ways.  Humphreys (2005b: 25-44) outlines five modalities through which natural 
resources are linked with conflicts.  First, rent seeking, which highlights the political and 
economic dimensions of the ‘resource curse’ especially in terms of malfeasance by the ruling 
elites.  Second, grievances, which relate to the “(mal)distribution of natural resource wealth 
and the socio economic impacts of extractive operations.”  Third, economic instability, which 
results from the distortions associated with resource dependence.  Fourth, conflict financing, 
which offers opportunities for belligerents to keep fighting, thereby prolonging conflicts.  
Fifth, peace spoiling, a reference to the context in which natural resources alter the incentives 
for peace.  Humphreys’ (2005b: 25-44) analysis shows that different sets of actors and 
incentives are associated with each of these modalities.  While some mechanisms involve 
local actors, others relate to international actors such as foreign governments and 
corporations. 
 
Natural resources have been at the centre of deadly and protracted conflicts in Africa.  Hence, 
some of the studies on the political economy of conflict examine the resource-conflict link in 
the African context.41  For instance, Kabemba (2008: 6) contends that the management of 
                                                            
41 For examples, see Herbst (2000: 270-294) and Yartey (2004: 87-128). 
66 
natural resources in African countries provides ample evidence that natural resource 
abundance is associated with civil wars and political instability.  Unfair distribution of natural 
resource wealth has triggered conflicts and egregious human rights abuses by governments 
that are intent on quelling resistance.  Cases in point are the conflict scenarios in Angola’s 
Cabinda enclave/province and Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. Kabemba (2008: 8) adds that the 
continent history includes “interference by the world’s great powers (the new great powers 
are scrambling to exploit Africa’s resources through their multinationals).”  The net effect of 
the mismanagement of Africa’s natural resources has been negative development pathologies. 
 
Still on the regional context, one study that stands out is Alao’s (2007) penetrating analysis of 
the resource-conflict link in Africa.  Alao (2007: x) divides natural resources into four 
categories (land, solid minerals, oil, and water) and examines how each category is linked to 
conflict in the continent.  In agreement with several authors discussed in this section, Alao 
(2007: 15) posits that natural resources are linked to the causes, prolongation and resolution 
of conflicts.  Broadly, natural resources are linked to conflicts in Africa in three ways.  First, 
there are situations in which “natural resources constitute a direct or remote cause for 
conflict”.  Second, there are instances in which “natural resources fuel and/or sustain 
conflicts”.  Third, there are cases in which “resources have come into consideration in efforts 
to resolve conflicts” (Alao, 2007: 4).  The author cites resource linkages with conflicts in 
Angola, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as cases in point. 
 
According to Alao (2007: 112), solid minerals possess “high profit margins and ease of 
disposability” which draw the attention of an array of interest groups, such as armed 
groups/militias, mercenaries, political elites, regional states, and transnational corporate 
actors.  Furthermore, economic globalisation and market de-regulation have accentuated this 
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attraction to natural resources.  As Alao (2007: 270) observes, economic globalisation and 
market de-regulation have facilitated illicit resource exploitation and trade, increased the 
propensity of cross-border conflicts involving natural resources, and enabled resource-
dependent belligerents to develop parallel international linkages necessary for their survival.  
A prime example that illustrates Alao’s point is the conflict in the DRC where the complicity 
of local and transnational actors (seeking to reap resource profits) has led to a protracted 
conflict.  It is worth noting that in the case of the DRC, conflict perpetuation has resulted 
from the quest by local, regional and global actors to control the country’s vast mineral 
wealth in the context of state incapacity.  Where the state is weak or lacks the mechanism(s) 
for effective natural resource governance, the complicity of resource-driven and profit-
seeking actors increases the potential for conflict. 
 
In a study that examines the ‘resource curse’ with specific reference to the DRC, Guenther 
(2008: 348) argues that the country’s “natural resource wealth has facilitated both 
authoritarianism through political patronage as well as the destabilisation of the state by 
fuelling conflict.”  Natural resources played a role in the appropriation of the territory by 
Belgium, the secessionist uprisings in Katanga in the 1960s, the sustenance of Mobutu Sese 
Seko’s autocratic regime, and the two wars in the 1990s.  The salience of natural resources in 
the DRC’s woes has been more pronounced during the second war (which has been labelled 
‘Africa’s world war’) which witnessed the “systemic extraction and exporting of natural 
resources” by a plethora of armed groups including national armies (Guenther, 2008: 353).  A 
report by the United Nations Panel of Experts (United Nations, 2001: 41) noted that  
[t]he conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has become 
mainly about access, control and trade of five key mineral 
resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold.  The wealth 
of the country is appealing and hard to resist in the context of 
lawlessness and the weakness of the central authority (quoted in 
Guenther, 2008: 354). 
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In line with the foregoing observation, there have been alleged and proven cases of 
complicity by rebel groups, foreign national armies, UN peacekeepers and corporate actors in 
the illicit exploitation and trade in the DRC’s resources.  Indeed, the scramble for the DRC’s 
resources has been a key element in conflict perpetuation. 
 
Guenther (2008) draws three conclusions from the analysis of the DRC case study.  First, the 
country’s natural resource wealth has played an “instrumental role in poor governance and 
conflict implying the existence of a ‘resource curse’” (Guenther, 2008: 354).  Second, the 
geographical concentration of natural resources in the areas of Katanga and the northeast 
provinces in the DRC make it difficult for the central government to control these areas.  
Also, the “close proximity of resources to the DRC’s borders allows for them to be more 
easily captured by neighbouring states and rebel groups” (Guenther, 2008: 354).  This has 
fostered warlordism in eastern DRC, confirming Le Billon’s (2001) argument.  Third, “the 
conflict over resource rents has been further complicated by external interventions by states 
and corporations that are complicit in, if not in favour of, instability in the region” (Guenther, 
2008: 355).  These conclusions lend credence to some of the arguments for the ‘resource 
curse’ reviewed in this section.  However, Guenther (2008: 354) adds a note of caution that 
the country’s weak institutions complicate the DRC’s ‘resource curse’.  Interestingly, 
Guenther’s reference to the DRC’s weak institutions underscores the notion of governance in 
relation to the discussion of the ‘resource curse’. 
 
A significant element that is germane to understanding the resource-conflict link is the notion 
of natural resource governance.  Alao (2007: x) argues that “conflicts over natural resources 
in Africa are inextricably linked to the complete defectiveness or the selective efficiency of 
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the apparatus of natural resource governance.”  Natural resource governance refers to “the 
whole gamut of internal and external considerations, especially in the form of laws and 
practices, which come to play in the management (that is, the ownership, extraction, 
processing, distribution, and control) of natural resources” (Alao, 2007: x).  By introducing 
the idea of natural resource governance, Alao’s (2007) study – which draws on empirical 
evidence across Africa – also contributes to the refinement of the nexus between natural 
resources and conflict.  This is premised on the author’s assertion that  
there is no direct correlation between natural resources and conflict 
beyond the structures, processes, and actors associated with the 
management and control of these resources.  Consequently, 
contrary to conventional thinking, neither ‘scarcity’ nor 
‘abundance’ is in itself the real cause of natural resource conflict; 
rather, it is the ‘management’ of these resources.  This implies that 
the possession of natural resources is neither a ‘curse’ for those 
who have it nor is it a ‘blessing’ (in the form of escape from 
conflict) for countries not endowed with natural resources (Alao, 
2007: x). 
 
Simply put, the effects of natural resources differ significantly between and among countries.  
The presence of development pathologies in some resource-rich countries and their absence 
in others make generalisations difficult.  Country-specific conditions are very much at play in 
creating scenarios that illustrate or disprove the ‘resource curse’ thesis.  The effect of natural 
resources on “a country’s socio-economic and political development depends on a fairly 
dynamic and complex interplay of a number of contextual variables” (Basedau, 2005: 22).  
As such, the increasing recognition of the influence of other economic and political factors on 
natural resources has underpinned analyses that modify or reject the ‘resource curse’ thesis.   
 
Although natural resources can and do influence conflicts, Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005b: 
4) emphasize a caveat that the role of natural resources in conflicts should not be overstated 
at the expense of other salient underlying or proximate conflict triggers.  The authors contend 
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that “not all countries that suffer from armed conflict are rich in lucrative natural resources, 
nor are all resource-dependent economies prone to conflict” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 
2005b: 4).  Besides, there are studies which suggest that “even where natural resource 
predation features strongly in conflict dynamics, it is seldom the sole or even main cause of 
conflicts” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b: 4).42  Therefore, “while a political economy 
approach is a useful methodological framework for conflict analysis and policy development, 
it should not lead to ‘natural resource reductionism’ that neglects other, still crucial political, 
security and social dimensions of armed intrastate conflict” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 
2005b: 4).  This is a useful caveat that is necessary for a nuanced understanding of the 
resource-conflict link.  More importantly, it underscores the contradictions and contending 
perspectives in the literature and enables a robust understanding of the complexities 
associated with contemporary conflicts. 
 
As this section shows, the insertion of economic, social and political variables into the 
resource-conflict link modifies the thesis.  According to Wennmann (2007: 430), the fact that 
natural resource-rich countries (for example Botswana, Norway, Australia) or resource-poor 
countries (for example Japan) have not experienced armed conflict leads inexorably to a 
conclusion: what matters is not the presence of natural resources, but how they are managed.  
Therefore, analyses of the resource-conflict nexus should be anchored on the realisation that 
“resource abundance and scarcity are neither a necessary nor sufficient criteria for conflict” 
(Wennmann, 2007: 430). 
 
Additionally, Wennmann (2007: 430) critiques the broad focus on natural resources, which 
“does not capture the multitude of resources, their individual attributes, and their effects on 
                                                            
42 For example, see Herbst (2000), Porto (2002), and Ballentine and Sherman (2003). 
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different types of civil wars.”43  In view of the varying outcomes associated with conflicts 
involving different natural resources, the author argues for a nuanced understanding of the 
natural ‘resource curse’ as it relates to armed conflict.  This understanding is underpinned by 
the argument that the “link between natural resources and conflict is not automatic” 
(Wennmann, 2007: 431).  Here, it is worth noting that two studies (De Soysa, 2000: 113-35; 
2002: 395-416) based on econometric analysis found that there was no relationship between 
the incidence of armed conflict and the overall level of natural resource abundance.  The 
contradictions in the literature suggest that other factors are at play in conflicts involving 
natural resources.  Therefore, the insertion of these factors into analyses of the resource-
conflict link is necessary for accurate diagnoses and explication of conflicts in which the 
natural resource element features. 
 
There is an important repercussion associated with the inclusion of other factors in the 
analysis of the resource-conflict nexus.  In some analyses, the insertion of economic and 
political variables into the discourse on the effect of natural resources on a country is 
tantamount to a rejection of the ‘resource curse’ thesis.  An example is Basedau’s (2005: 22) 
argument that “in the strict sense, there is no such thing as a ‘resource curse’.”  Contextual 
factors such as historical legacies, the structures and parameters of governance, 
idiosyncrasies of political leaders (for example corruption, patronage and rent-seeking)44 and 
the revenue management system determine the effect that natural resources have on a 
country.  As Basedau (2005: 23) puts it, 
[v]ariables such as relations between identity groups, the level and 
dynamics of socio-economic development, the design and 
functioning of public and state institutions, behavioural patterns of 
                                                            
43 In response to Wennmann’s critique, studies reviewed in this section contain typologies that focus on the 
types and characteristics of natural resources as well as their different effects on the onset, intensity, and 
duration of conflict. 
44 For a discussion of the link between corruption and natural resources, see Kolstad and Søreide (2009: 214-
226). 
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elites, political parties, the military and civil society – not 
forgetting the regional and global setting – have to be scrutinised 
carefully when studying resource-related problems in any country. 
 
Whether natural resources have a beneficial or detrimental effect on a country depends on the 
interplay of these factors.  Basedau’s (2005) critique of the resource curse stems from 
explanations that ignore or gloss over these contextual variables. 
 
Sequel to an extensive literature survey on the ‘resource curse’ in general, Rosser (2006a: 12) 
contends that while most studies “provide evidence that natural resource abundance – or at 
least an abundance of particular types of natural resources – and various development 
outcomes are correlated with one another, they do not prove that the former causes the latter.”  
The author adds that “while there is strong evidence to support the notion of a resource curse, 
it is by no means conclusive” (Rosser, 2006a: 13).  What the review of the literature on the 
resource-conflict link suggests is that while there is an argument for correlation, an argument 
for causation is tenuous. 
 
From the discussion above, it is evident that “issues surrounding natural resources have 
become violently contestable” (Alao, 2007: x).  However, a logical conclusion that can be 
drawn from the review in this section is that the level and intensity of natural resource-related 
conflict is dependent, not on the possession of natural resources, but on a number of 
economic and political variables, including the efficiency of the state apparatus for natural 
resource governance.  What this suggests is that the relationship between natural resources 
and conflict is not linear and simple, but indirect and complex.  The conclusion here 
necessitates a modification of the resource-conflict argument in particular, and the ‘resource 
curse’ thesis in general. 
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Therefore, this study’s utilisation of the notion of ‘resource curse’ is informed by this 
“refined” understanding of the role of a strategic mineral resource namely, coltan, in the DRC 
conflict.  Other minerals that have influenced the dynamics of conflict in the country include 
cassiterite, cobalt, diamonds, gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten.45  This study applies some of 
the elements captured in this review section in its explication of conflict in the DRC.  The 
analysis here is informed by variables such as the characteristics of natural resources (their 
social construction and geographic distribution), the role of local, regional and global 
(profiteering) actors, and state deflation (including its associated variables for example weak 
state institutions, patronage and corruption).  In view of the subject matter of this research, 
the study places emphasis on the role of MNCs in the DRC conflict.  Although the ‘resource 
curse’ paradigm is trailed by contradictions and academic controversy, the elements 
associated with a nuanced understanding of the paradigm provide useful parameters within 
which one can interrogate the resource-conflict link in general and the subject matter of this 
research in particular.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has interrogated the nexus between natural resources and conflict through the 
prism of the ‘resource curse’ thesis.  It was noted that the literature contains narratives that 
either corroborate, modify or rebut the thesis, thus leading to a robust scholarly debate about 
the nexus between natural resources and conflict.  This chapter examined this debate and 
highlighted the factors associated with natural resource endowment that typically precipitate 
and/or exacerbate conflict.  It was stated that conflict is a function of several variables that 
interlink with natural resources, not natural resource endowment or abundance per se.  
However, the section noted empirical studies that suggest that the natural resource element 
                                                            
45 Where necessary, references will be made to these materials to illustrate pertinent points, arguments and 
empirical findings. 
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remains a significant factor in the initiation, escalation, prolongation and duration of 
conflicts. 
 
Given that corporate actors often determine the dynamics of the interactive relationship 
between natural resources and conflicts, the next chapter examines theoretical and analytical 
perspectives on conflict and MNCs.  The chapter, which combines scholarly narratives with 
the review and comparison of various schools of thought on MNCs, seeks to foreground the 





















THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT AND 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
As noted in the preceding chapter, this study interrogates the connections between natural 
resources, business and conflict.  The triangulation that this study adopts – natural resources, 
profit and peace – speaks to the interconnectedness of minerals, profit-seeking corporate 
actors (primarily MNCs) and conflict dynamics (especially the prospects for peace).  In 
teasing out the elements of this triangulation, the preceding chapter examined the intricate 
relationship between natural resources and conflicts.  It was noted that MNCs’ roles in 
resource-rich conflict environments influence the dynamics of the resource-conflict nexus.  
The analysis in Chapter Two presupposes that the corporate-conflict link deserves further 
interrogation. 
 
Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the connections of MNCs to natural resources 
and conflicts.  In doing this, the chapter reviews scholarly arguments on the place and roles of 
corporations as well as the debate on the impacts of their activities on host environments 
(especially in the LDCs).  Specifically, it presents the liberal, radical, contractarian and 
communitarian paradigms on MNCs and the stakeholder theory of corporations. The chapter 
also analyses the notion of CSR. 
 
3.2 Paradigmatic perspectives on multinational corporations 
The importance of the multinational corporation (MNC) is a key 
feature of globalization of the world economy (Gilpin, 2001: 278). 
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As noted in the introductory section in Chapter One, a distinct feature of the post-World War 
II global political economy has been the phenomenal spread of MNCs.  The immediate post-
Second World War epoch was characterised by the expansion of Western MNCs (mainly 
from the United States) to developing countries.  Latin America felt the wave of Western 
MNC expansion in the 1970s.  Later, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of 
communism facilitated the spread of MNCs in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and beyond.  In 
terms of the global spread of MNCs, Spero and Hart (2010: 129) report that by 1994, “there 
were 37,000 multinational parent firms controlling over 200,000 foreign affiliates” while in 
2006, “there were 78,000 MNCs with 780,000 overseas affiliates.”  The rapid expansion of 
MNCs and their economic clout have made these non-state actors important and influential 
players in contemporary international political economy. 
 
Crucially, the importance of MNCs derives from a number of attributes that give them 
comparative advantage or leverage vis-à-vis other actors in the international system.  The 
manner in which MNCs, especially those headquartered in the West, have used such 
comparative advantage/leverage in furtherance of their economic interest has been given 
considerable attention in academic and policy circles.  An examination of the literature shows 
that scholarly perspectives on MNCs draw on the characteristics and activities of MNCs.  
Moreover, the assumptions and conclusions which are articulated in these perspectives are 
generally predicated on the political, economic (and sometimes, socio-cultural) effects of 
MNCs’ operations on host countries.  In addition, several theories in the fields of economics, 
business management, and marketing have sought to explain the ownership, (internal) 
management/control, and expansion of MNCs.46  The intention in this section is not to review 
all theories, but to examine the paradigms that focus on MNCs’ operations and the impacts of 
                                                            
46 For an overview of some these theories, see Hennart (2009: 125-145), Forsgren (2008), Haley (2001), and 
Kuşluvan (1998). 
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their activities especially in host environments.  Narratives on the operations and roles of 
MNCs fall into two broad categories: the liberal and the radical/dependency paradigms.  This 
section focuses on the key aspects of MNCs’ operations that each perspective articulates in its 
formulation of an overarching idea about MNCs.  The section begins with a review of the 
liberal paradigm. 
 
The crux of the argument by advocates of the liberal school is that MNCs make important 
contributions in host countries.  Therefore, the paradigm sees MNCs as agents of 
development.  According to Fieldhouse (2000), host states, LDCs, derive (potential and 
actual) benefits from MNCs in three main areas: capital; organisation and management; and 
technology.  It is argued that MNCs bring in and invest capital in host countries.  This 
injection of capital by MNCs consists of machinery, expertise, and patents (Fieldhouse, 2000: 
173).  Such capital may be beyond the reach of local investors or even the state.  Most LDCs 
are unable to raise the capital needed to undertake certain strategic economic activities such 
as exploration and mining, which are capital intensive.  Many LDCs also lack the technical 
expertise needed in high-tech and capital intensive industries.  MNCs therefore serve as 
sources of capital in these sectors of the economy in the LDCs.  Furthermore, capital infusion 
by MNCs generates an added benefit for LDCs through job creation.  MNCs employ people 
in sectors such as banking/finance, manufacturing, mining, and pharmaceuticals.  The growth 
of MNCs across the world has been accompanied by significant increases in the number of 
people employed by these companies (Dobrai, Farkas, Karoliny, and Poór, 2012: 149).  With 
reference to capital, Fieldhouse (2000: 173) notes that investment by MNCs “may stimulate 
further aid from foreign governments.”  In sum, it is assumed that MNCs increase the level of 




In terms of organisation and management, Fieldhouse (2000: 173) posits that “the superiority 
of an MNC is undoubted, both as an efficient user of resources and as a demonstrator of 
sound business methods in countries where corporate ‘management’ is a novelty.”  When 
applied to the LDCs, the argument is that there is a dearth of managerial or technical capacity 
and expertise to superintend the extensive operations that MNCs typically undertake.  It is 
said that MNCs “bring with them sophisticated technical know-how, modern management 
and marketing techniques” (Radhu, 1973: 361).  Consequently, the organisational and 
logistical wherewithal which MNCs possess may benefit the host country’s economy as 
citizens employed by these companies acquire requisite managerial and technical skills.  In 
this sense, it is contended that MNCs are involved in some form of transfer of managerial and 
organisational skills/experience. 
 
Closely related to the aforementioned is the technology transfer argument.  Many LDCs are 
characterised by severe resource incapacities such as “weak research and development base, 
limited investment in [research and development], production and manufacturing capability, 
weak infrastructure and technological disadvantage” (Wahab, Rose and Osman, 2012: 142).  
Therefore, many LDCs “depend mainly on foreign direct investments (FDIs) from MNCs as 
their primary source of technology to enhance the technological capabilities and 
competitiveness of local industries” (Wahab, Rose and Osman, 2012: 142).  Technology is 
“usually taken to be the main contribution made by MNCs to LDCs” (Fieldhouse, 2000: 173).  
It is held that MNCs transfer technology to host LDCs through “(a) MNCs’ backward and 
forward linkages with indigenous firms and customers; (b) imitation of domestic firms by 
‘learning by watching’ in the presence of MNCs; (c) induction of trained workers and 
managers by MNCs; and (d) relocation of MNCs’ [research and development] activities to 
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host economies” (Zhao and Zhang, 2007: 249).  Through these means, individuals and 
industries in host countries acquire expertise that may not be available in the absence of 
MNC investment.  In other words, investment by MNCs generates technological diffusion or 
a spill over effect in LDCs.  As Abereijo and Ilori (2012: 185) note, the “availability of new 
foreign knowledge through MNCs may benefit domestic firms as they can learn the 
technology from them, which allow them to upgrade their own production process, and as a 
result, improve their productivity.”  On this point, Spero and Hart (2010: 307) refer to the 
liberals’ argument that “[t]echnology transfers and demonstration effects of new technology 
[improve] the total factor productivity of developing countries and [enhance] their 
international economic competitiveness.” 
 
Drawing from fifteen studies that highlight the wide-ranging positive impacts of technology 
transfer by MNCs on LDCs, Wahab, Rose and Osman (2012: 142-143) posit that 
[t]he technologies which are transferred by MNCs benefit the host 
country in terms of achieving long term economic growth, 
providing a higher potential of innovation 
performance/capabilities, increasing technological capabilities, 
enhancing the organizations’ competitive advantage, enhancing the 
organizational learning effectiveness, providing a positive effect on 
productivity, and increasing the technological development of local 
industry.  Other research studies have proposed technology transfer 
as one mechanism by which developing countries can break the 
vicious cycle of economic underdevelopment.  From the 
technology transfer initiatives, the host-country will also benefit in 
terms of improving quality of life, achieving technology 
progression through research and development, and increasing tax 
revenue. 
 
The extensive financial resources that MNCs possess enable them to invest in research and 
development within LDCs.  As noted earlier, this is especially the case in the capital-
intensive sectors of the economy such as mining, manufacturing and health.  In these sectors, 
innovative research requires large financial outlay, which is often beyond the reach of most 
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LDCs.  The spill over logic suggests that host countries benefit from research undertaken by 
MNCs in these sectors.47  Furthermore, the presence of MNCs could break monopolies and 
stimulate competition in host countries’ economies as local firms may be compelled to 
introduce new technology and improve their products and services (Blomström and Kokko, 
1998: 2) thereby producing benefits for consumers.  MNCs also contribute to the host 
countries’ economies through the payment of taxes and royalties (in the case of joint venture 
initiatives between MNCs and state-owned enterprises).  Host governments may be able to 
use the revenues generated through taxes and royalties to provide social services, 
infrastructure and diversify their economies. 
 
Proponents of FDIs contend that MNCs not only fill crucial resource gaps but that their 
presence also has a positive impact on welfare and the standard of living in LDCs.  It is 
argued that MNCs improve the standard of living through the “creation of new better paying 
jobs, the provision of new and better products and services, competitive prices, and programs 
to improve health, housing, and education for employees” (Spero and Hart, 2010: 308).  It is 
on the strength of these benefits that adherents of the liberal paradigm argue that MNCs make 
significant contributions to the development of the economies of LDCs.  The aforementioned 
positive influences of MNCs on LDCs underscore the liberal perspective’s conception of 
MNCs as “benign engines of prosperity” (Stopford, 1998-1999: 12). 
 
Despite these positive views of MNCs,  
[t]he multinational enterprise has come to be seen as the 
embodiment of almost anything disconcerting about modern 
                                                            
47 Spero and Hart (2010: 310) define a spill over as “spread of something valuable from the MNC to the local 
economy”.  There are three main forms of spill overs: a wage spill over, in which higher wages paid by MNCs 
lead to higher wages for employees of competing domestic firms; a technology spill over, where “a technology 
utilised by MNCs “is adopted or copied by local firms”; and a productivity spill over that is “when the presence 
of a multinational not only raises the productivity of the workers and capital associated with that firm but also 
raises productivity of local firms” (Spero and Hart, 2010: 311). 
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industrial society, and it has not acquired this role by sheer chance.  
Certain attributes of multinational enterprises have increased the 
probability that the enterprises would be singled out for that 
dubious distinction.  One such attribute is size; another is the kinds 
of business activities in which the enterprises have specialized; and 
third is the patterns of their management and control (Vernon, 
1977: 19). 
 
In line with Vernon’s assertion, the radical/dependency school highlights several aspects of 
MNC operations that are disconcerting.   Various arguments advanced in this regard highlight 
the activities of MNCs that produce pernicious effects in host countries.  The overarching 
conclusion by adherents of the radical/dependency paradigm is that MNC operations are 
inimical to the development of host countries, in sharp contradistinction to the dominant view 
espoused by liberal scholars. 
 
Radical/dependency narratives on MNCs attack the assumptions (including the benefits of 
MNC operations) that the liberal school espouses.  Dependency critiques of the liberal 
conception of MNCs range from mild to scathing.  Fieldhouse’s (2000) cautionary 
observations constitute a mild critique of the assumptions propounded by the liberal school 
thought.  While acknowledging the benefits of MNC operations vis-à-vis capital, organisation 
and management, and technology as outlined above, Fieldhouse (2000: 173) notes the 
contradictions inherent in the liberal school’s assumptions regarding these factors.  For 
instance, the point that MNCs invest capital in LDCs should be treated with caution.  While 
proponents of FDIs argue that MNCs are crucial sources of capital inflows that fill resource 
gaps in LDCs, critics are sceptical about and take exception to such claim.  Critics contend 
that MNCs bring in little capital, or they may raise capital within the host country using local 
loan sources thereby “diverting local savings from other activities” (Fieldhouse, 2000: 173) 
that could benefit the economies of LDCs.  For instance, investment finance required by 
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MNCs is often raised from host-country, as opposed to, foreign sources.48  Due to their 
strength, it is easier for MNCs to obtain finance for investment from local sources; they are 
more likely to provide collaterals and other guarantees (attached to loan conditions) that 
domestic businesses often find difficult to afford.  MNCs also use local financing to acquire 
existing indigenous firms and in the process stifle local entrepreneurs (Spero and Hart, 2010: 
308).49 
    
A strident criticism levelled against MNCs pertains to capital flight.  More often than not, 
MNCs repatriate the profits that they make in host countries to their home countries rather 
than reinvest the profits in the host economies.  Capital or profit repatriation creates volatility 
and economic dislocations in host countries.  More significantly, illicit capital flight by 
MNCs inflicts substantial damages on host economies, especially those of already 
impoverished LDCs.50  Closely related to illicit capital flight is the phenomenon of tax 
evasion by MNCs, which also hurts host countries’ economies.  Tax evasion occurs through 
the manipulation of intra-company transactions.  Specifically, a strategy that MNCs use to 
evade tax is intra-firm transfer pricing “whereby multinationals overprice and underprice 
components shipped among various affiliates in an attempt to shift income from high- to low-
tax venues” (Stopford, 1998-1999: 20).  In practical terms, MNCs in LDCs underprice their 
exports but overprice their imports, thereby “invisibly shifting profits from the South to the 
North” (Spero and Hart, 2010: 309).  The net effect of such intra-MNC strategy in LDCs is 
                                                            
48 In the 1960s for example, United States’ manufacturing subsidiaries in Latin America “obtained 80 percent of 
all their financing locally, through either borrowing or subsidiary earnings” (Spero and Hart, 2010: 308). 
49 A study found that 43 percent of United States’ MNCs established their presence in the Mexican economy by 
taking over existing firms.  Mexicans formerly owned 81 percent of the firms that these MNCs acquired (Spero 
and Hart, 2010: 308). 
50 For example, Dr Ibrahim Mayaki, the Chief Executive Officer of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), noted in 2013 that “over 80 percent of the illegal capital flight from Africa is done by 
the multinational companies that do not pay their taxes” and that “Africa loses over 160 billion U.S. dollars 
through the phenomenon of capital flight” (Xinhua News, 2013: i. d.). 
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that these countries are denied much-needed development finance.51  Therefore, the 
radical/dependency paradigm construes this aspect of MNCs’ operations as prejudicial or 
inimical to the national interests of LDCs. 
 
As Fieldhouse (2000: 173) opines, the assumption that efficient organisation and 
management by MNCs benefit host countries should equally be treated with caution as there 
“are potentially disadvantageous economic consequences of the organizational superiority of 
the MNC”.  Viewed from a “nationalist” or “welfare” prism, the organisational and 
management efficiency of MNCs may nurture or perpetuate a dependency syndrome in 
LDCs.  The “very efficiency of an MNC may have an adverse effect on domestic 
entrepreneurship in the host country” (Fieldhouse, 2000: 174).  Local firms may draw on the 
managerial expertise of MNCs or rely on service provision by MNCs such that they become 
oblivious of or lose their capacity for innovation, or relinquish control of strategic sectors to 
MNCs.  And in the event that “all the dynamic and technically advanced sectors of the LDC’s 
economy pass into the hands of foreign firms, this may check economic development by 
reducing the rate of capital accumulation” (Fieldhouse, 2000: 174).  It should also be added 
that MNCs’ organisational and management efficiency may not necessarily engender benefits 
for LDCs, especially if citizens of host countries do not occupy managerial positions in the 
MNCs or if (the diffusion of) expertise is confined to subsidiaries with little or no possibility 
of spill over into the public domain.52 
 
                                                            
51 In 2008, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stated that LDCs could be 
losing three times the amount they receive in aid due to tax evasion and avoidance (Gurría, 2008: i. d.).  
Furthermore, a report by Christian Aid, a United Kingdom-based international development charity, highlights 
the pernicious effect of tax evasion by MNCs in its conclusion that this phenomenon hinders development, 
especially in the LDCs (see Janský, 2013). 
52 For critics of the liberal perspective, the exclusion of “the indigenes of the host country” from managerial 
positions in MNCs, which, for example, is the thrust of Udofia’s (1984) scathing criticism of MNCs, is an 
important consideration since it contributes to human capital deficiency in LDCs. 
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Similar caveats apply to the argument that MNCs transfer technology to host countries.  
Fieldhouse (2000: 174) raises important questions regarding the purported benefits of 
technological contributions by MNCs to LDCs.  Could LDCs obtain the same benefits 
“except through the medium of a multinational so that some of the associated costs could 
have been avoided: for example, by licensing indigenous producers?”  Are “the technologies 
imported by MNCs ‘appropriate’ to the circumstances of LDCs?”  Are the technologies 
“excessively capital-intensive and do they serve the desires of an élite rather than the ‘basic 
needs’ of the masses?” (Fieldhouse, 2000: 174). 
 
The implication of these questions, viewed from a “nationalistic” and “welfare” prism, is that 
LDCs may not benefit from the technology and marketing skills that MNCs bring with 
them.53  In fact, LDCs may be worse off.  For instance, critics question the appropriateness of 
the technologies that MNCs bring into LDCs.  Spero and Hart (2010: 309) capture the 
problem of the importation of inappropriate technologies thus: “[a]lthough some foreign 
investment entered the South to take advantage of abundant Southern labor and thus 
contributed to employment, some MNCs brought with them advanced, capital-intensive 
technology developed in and for developed countries that did not contribute to solving the 
problem of unemployment in developing states.”  With reference to this problem in Nigeria’s 
(historical) context for example, Onimode (1978: 228) asserts that the technology that MNCs 
imported into the country was restricted to the foreign-dominated segment of the nation’s 
economy and affected less than ten percent of the country’s population.  Since the imported 
technology affected a tiny section of the population, it had “no real chance of being 
internalised by the masses” (Onimode, 1978: 228).  In effect, the technology that MNCs 
brought into Nigeria was “irrelevant to the overall input-endowment of the country … 
                                                            
53 Fieldhouse (2000: 175) states that in terms of marketing skills, for example, “MNC advertising may create 
‘unsuitable’ tastes, inducing the starving to spend their money on Coca Cola rather than on milk.” 
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produced technological distortions and technical discontinuities … and constitute[d] a potent 
imperialist barrier against the emergence of truly national technological culture” (Onimode, 
1978: 228).54  A deleterious consequence of the importation of unsuitable technology by 
MNCs into Nigeria, according to Onimode (1978: 225), is the “historical technological 
underdevelopment of the country.”  Overall, critics contend that the importation of 
technologies by MNCs hinder the development of technological capabilities in the LDCs 
(Spero and Hart, 2010: 309). 
 
Moreover, dependency scholars take exception to liberals’ argument that MNCs provide 
employment in host countries.  Dependency narratives contend that MNCs do little to 
ameliorate (but sometimes exacerbate) the problem of unemployment in LDCs.  MNCs’ 
acquisition of existing local firms not only stifles local entrepreneurship but may also lead to 
job losses.  Citizens may also lose jobs where domestic firms (which collapse ultimately) are 
unable to compete successfully with MNCs.55  As critics argue, MNCs contribute little to 
labour in LDCs when they employ expatriate staff instead of training local citizens or hire 
away local skilled workers (Spero and Hart, 2010: 309).  In order to buttress this point, 
dependency scholars also point out that MNCs use capital-intensive technologies that 
typically employ and benefit a few local people. 
 
In a scathing critique, Onimode (1978) views MNCs as agencies that hinder the cultural, 
economic, political and technological development of LDCs.  The organisational superiority 
                                                            
54 Onimode’s (1978) article, based on empirical data, consisted of several scathing criticisms of MNCs and their 
activities in Nigeria.  Still on how MNCs’ operations impacted on the technological capabilities of the country, 
Onimode (1978: 225) argued that corporations “not only halted the pace of indigenous technological 
development by Nigerian blacksmiths, iron-smelters, brass-workers, weavers, and the like by eliminating their 
markets through import of manufactures and subsidiary production, but also spread the illusion of technological 
transfer.” 
55 Contrary to the argument by proponents that the entry of MNCs creates competition as domestic firms are 
compelled to become more efficient and improve their productivity, critics argue that the economic strength of 
MNCs allows them to outcompete or cripple local businesses, thereby creating oligopolies or even a monopoly 
in the host economy (Blomström and Kokko, 1998: 5; Haley, 2001: 28; Fieldhouse, 2001: 177). 
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of the MNCs and their affiliation with home governments enable them to dominate states, to 
further hegemonic, neo-colonial interests, and to subvert national aspirations in the Global 
South.  Efforts by MNCs to subvert the national interests of the LDCs take overt and subtle 
forms.  Through their advertisements and promotional activities, MNCs shape consumer 
preferences in ways that erode local tastes and practices.  For example, Onimode (1978: 229) 
argues that MNCs subtly but deliberately undermine cultural norms through their assault on 
national dress as they insist on “tie and collar”.  The result is the subversion of cultural 
expressions such as in dress and grooming.  In this context, the propagation of foreign 
cultures, civilisations and lifestyles by MNCs is seen an embodying cultural hegemony, 
which erodes even healthy aspects of local customs and traditions.  A case in point is the 
advertising policy of multinational diary producers, which although is non-coercive but 
insidiously persuasive, promotes bottle-feeding but discourages breast feeding, thereby 
leading to infant illness and death in many LDCs.56 
 
According to the dependency school, interference in the domestic affairs of host countries 
constitutes the most devastating impact of MNCs’ operations in LDCs.  Indeed, political 
interference by MNCs in host countries’ politics has attracted the most strident criticism as it 
is construed as an assault on sovereignty.  MNCs interfere in domestic politics through legal 
and illegal activities.  Legal activities include lobbying of political elites and contributing to 
political parties (where and when this is permissible).  MNCs engage in illegal activities that 
include the hiring of private armies, making illicit contributions to political parties, paying 
bribes to politicians and government officials, and exerting inordinate pressure on 
governments (for example, enlisting home governments’ support in their bid) to avoid 
compliance with host countries’ laws and regulations (Nye, 1974: 156; Spero and Hart, 2010: 
                                                            
56 Based on evidence from Chile, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, a report on the 
aggressive promotion and sale of infant formula by MNCs characterizes the efforts of the companies as 
“hawking disaster in the Third World” (Mokhiber, 1987: i. d.). 
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311).  Given their power and affiliation with home governments, these legal and illegal 
activities enable MNCs to support friendly host governments or subvert/overthrow unfriendly 
host governments, regardless of the preferences of the local population. 
 
Dependency narratives on MNCs’ operations in LDCs refer to a few notable cases of blatant 
interference by MNCs in host countries’ politics to illustrate MNCs’ affront to sovereignty.  
The foremost instances are the interventionist activities of American multinationals in Latin 
America in the 20th Century.  For example, the United Fruit Company in Guatemala in the 
1950s orchestrated the military overthrow of the democratically elected government of 
Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán.  The company, using the threat of communism in 
Guatemala, lobbied the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to support the 1954 Guatemalan 
coup d’état which ousted Guzmán and installed a military regime headed by US-backed 
Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas (Schoultz, 1998: 337-340).  In Peru in 1968, a dispute 
between the International Petroleum Company and the democratically elected government of 
Fernando Belaúnde provided the catalyst for the military overthrow of Belaúnde’s 
administration (McClintock and Vallas, 2003: 25).  In the 1970s, the International Telephone 
and Telegraph Company “actively sought, first, to prevent the election of Salvador Allende as 
the president of Chile and, once Allende was elected, to engineer his overthrow” (Spero and 
Hart, 2010: 312).  These instances of “ruthless politics of intervention” by MNCs (Spero and 
Hart, 2010: 312) subverted the sovereignty of affected Latin American countries.57  In all the 
cases cited here, American multinationals lobbied or collaborated with their home 
government to effect regime changes in host countries.  Collaboration between MNCs and 
home governments engenders and sustains a mutually beneficial relationship in which home 
governments protect the interests of MNCs in their operational environments while MNCs 
                                                            
57 An extreme form of interference by MNCs in host countries is corporate complicity in conflict, which is 
discussed subsequently in this study. 
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serve as foreign policy tools of home governments.  Based on such collaboration between 
home governments and MNCs, which entrenches the power asymmetry in North-South 
relations, proponents of dependency analysis view MNCs as agents of Western hegemony 
and neo-colonialism (Onimode, 1978; Udofia, 1984). 
 
Empirical evidence and arguments, advanced by the liberal and radical schools respectively, 
clearly suggest that there are relative positive and negative impacts of MNC operations on 
host countries.  Contending narratives presuppose that the activities of MNCs produce 
different effects in the same or in different operational contexts.  On this point, Fieldhouse 
(2000: 176) notes that “[e]ach corporation and each country is a special case.  Individual 
examples can neither prove nor disprove general propositions.  Thus no general theory of the 
MNC and its relationship with the sovereign state can be drawn up.”  Fieldhouse’s point is 
borne out by several overlapping and contradictory realities.  In one instance, the interests of 
states and those of MNCs may coalesce (for example quelling agitations in resource-bearing 
communities and ensuring uninterrupted resource extraction, or processing, or export) while 
in another, those interests may clash (for example payment of royalties/taxes, assuming 
responsibility for ecological problems).  On one hand, the relationship between an MNC and 
the host government may be cordial and symbiotic.  On the other hand, acrimony may 
characterise MNC-host government relations.  Based on these relationship dynamics and 
depending on the perceived impact of each scenario on investment, MNCs may facilitate 
regime consolidation or support regime change. 
 
In the final analysis, contending paradigms on MNCs reflect the Janus-faced character and 
effects of MNC operations in host countries.  As this section shows, these paradigms provide 
explanatory frameworks for unpacking the ambivalent roles of MNCs and the variegated 
89 
effects of their activities in conflict zones.  That said, MNCs (reflecting the assumptions of 
the liberal school) often portray their community-based projects and provision of social 
infrastructure in LDCs as contributions to welfare/development in host environments.  This 
idea, which is encapsulated in the contested concept of CSR, is advanced to demonstrate that 
MNCs are not exclusively about profit. 
 
With the intention of setting the analytical context for answering the research question on 
MNCs’ roles in conflict zones, the sections that follow examine facets of corporate behaviour 
in the public sphere.  The analyses will focus on narratives that unpack the societal roles of 
MNCs and which ultimately underpin the ways that MNCs are perceived respectively by the 
liberal and radical schools.  This task will be undertaken with reference to the examination of 
(firstly) the concept of CSR, which lend credence to the assumptions of liberal theory, and 
(secondly) the roles of corporations in conflict zones, which exemplify the tenets of 
dependency theory.  The next section examines the notion of CSR, which in the context of 
this research, provides the bedrock for understanding constructive engagement by MNCs in 
the public sphere, especially corporate initiatives that seek to promote peace in conflict zones. 
 
3.3 Seeking profit, doing good: corporate social responsibility 
“Everything a company now does it does in the public gaze” 
(Humphreys, 2000: 129). 
 
The question regarding the role that business should play in society is not a new one.  In the 
late 1770s, classical economist, Adam Smith used the concept of the “invisible hand” to 
describe the societal prosperity inadvertently engendered by capitalists whose preoccupation 
was self-interest (in Wan-Jan, 2006: 176).  Smith argued that corporate activities intended to 
generate profit unwittingly resulted in societal benefits such as enhancing social welfare.  
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Since Smith’s assertion in the 1770s, scholars have debated the social responsibility of 
corporations as well as the impact of business activities on society.  The historical discourse 
of corporate activities created and followed an analytical binary between private interest and 
public good.  Although the scholarly debate on the relationship between business and society 
has been a long one, the epistemic contours of the debate have been shaped since the 1950s 
by an “embryonic and contested concept”, namely CSR (Idemudia, 2010: 833). 
 
An examination of the literature shows that there is no generally accepted definition or 
meaning of CSR.  In other words, there is a great deal of disagreement about the nature, 
scope and elements of the concept.  The definitional imprecision of CSR indicates that the 
term encapsulates several ideas and different elements (Lin-Hi, 2010: 79).  CSR has been 
associated with terms such as “corporate giving”, “corporate volunteering”, “personal values 
of managers”, “stakeholder dialogues”, “corporate philanthropy” (Lin-Hi, 2010: 81), 
“corporate citizenship”, “responsible business” (Ismail, 2009: 199), and “business ethics” 
(Yang and Rivers, 2009: 156).  Almost everything that the corporation does in society is 
associated with CSR, thus reflecting the tortuousness of the concept.  Although “the lack of a 
widely agreed definition [has] contributed to misunderstandings and cynicism towards the 
concept” (Wan-Jan, 2006: 176), it remains an important idea that underpins the ways that 
“businesses frame their attitudes, strategies and relationships with their stakeholders” 
(Idemudia, 2010: 833).  CSR speaks to the societal roles that corporations perform.  These 
roles are defined primarily by firms or are championed by stakeholders in the society.58  
Therefore, business practices and extant literature on CSR frame the concept as a business 
strategy or as an ethical position.  This dual conceptualisation of CSR is evident in the 
various definitions of the term. 
                                                            
58 A stakeholder is an entity that affects, or is affected by, the operations of an MNC. See subsection 4.4.3 in 
Chapter Four for an elaboration of stakeholder theory. 
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McWilliams and Siegel (2001: 117) define CSR as “actions that appear to further some social 
good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.”  The European 
Commission (2001: 5) defines CSR as “a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to 
contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment.”  It refers to a range of initiatives 
through which “companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European 
Commission, 2001: 366).  Smith’s (2002: 42) definition extends the European Commission’s 
by identifying the stakeholders and including a firm’s policies.  CSR, according to Smith 
(2002: 42), refers to “the integration of business operations and values whereby the interests 
of all stakeholders, including customers, employees, investors, and the environment are 
reflected in the organisation’s policies and actions.”  Kok et al. (2001: 287) define CSR as 
“the obligation of the firm to use its resources in ways to benefit society, through committed 
participation as a member of society, taking into account the society at large, and improving 
welfare of society at large independently of direct gains of the company.”  These definitions 
highlight the voluntary nature of CSR and the centrality of social and environmental concerns 
to the CSR agenda.  However, it should be noted that the adoption of CSR by a company may 
not always be voluntary, or defined solely by the company, but may be brought about by 
legislation and/or pressures from stakeholders. 
 
The usefulness of these definitions notwithstanding, Secchi (2007) advocates a definitional 
shift from a narrow conception of CSR as corporate philanthropy to one that sees the concept 
as “the contribution that the corporation provides for solving social problems” (Secchi, 2007: 
347).  Accordingly, Ismail (2009: 199) defines CSR as the strategies that corporations adopt 
to ensure that they conduct their operations “in a way that is ethical, society friendly and 
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beneficial to community in terms of development.”  In this context, CSR embraces a range of 
activities that produce beneficial impacts for society.  These activities include socially 
sensitive investment, collaboration with local communities, and the promotion of 
environmental conservation and sustainability (Ismail, 2009: 199).  This definitional shift is 
recasting the role of business in society, thereby reframing the CSR agenda.  In the context of 
globalisation and the increasing influence of corporations, businesses are now seen as 
important actors in the process of social transformation.  This is because the activities of 
corporations have far-reaching impacts, not only on corporations but also on society in 
general.  This realisation underpins the “business case” for CSR.59  In terms of the underlying 
incentives for CSR, an examination of the literature – as noted earlier – shows that the term is 
generally analysed from two prisms: as an ethical position or as a business strategy. 
 
From the ethical perspective, corporations may undertake CSR activities based on principle 
or conviction.  In this case, four explanations are pertinent.  First, corporations “expect 
nothing back from their CSR activities” and they behave responsibly simply because “that is 
the noble way for corporations to behave” (Wan-Jan, 2006: 178).  Second, corporations are 
guided by “enlightened self-interest” in which case corporations obtain tangible or intangible 
benefits from the execution of CSR activities.  Third, and related to the second idea, is that 
CSR activities bode well for investment as the stock market may respond favourably to 
socially responsible practices by corporations.  Finally, corporations may implement CSR 
activities in order to insulate themselves from external political pressures from either the 
government or civil society (Wan-Jan, 2006: 178).  These four incentives for CSR give 
                                                            
59 The “business case” is “the notion that acting in a responsible manner is good for profits.”  It links corporate 
actions in the societal domain to firms’ bottom line, that is, profits.  For example, effective environmental 
management by firms may reduce the costs of production, increase the efficiency of the production process and 
hence increase profits (Hamann, 2003: 242).  If this argument is taken as given, the underlying incentive for 
CSR may be far from altruistic but rather a gimmick to further the profit-seeking motive of corporations. 
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substance to the concept from an ethical perspective, which places very little or no emphasis 
on the gains that accrue to corporations. 
 
CSR as a business strategy focuses on the benefits that corporations reap from the 
implementation of CSR activities.  This perspective sees CSR as a means to maximise 
shareholder value.  On this point, Carroll (1979: 499) argues that the preeminent social 
responsibility of business is to make profit; other obligations that corporations have towards 
society are secondary.  Therefore, a corporation implements CSR activities with a view to 
deriving benefits such as becoming more competitive, obtaining favourable market ratings, 
and reaping more profits.  In this case, the implementation of CSR activities is a business 
strategy that is aimed at fulfilling the primary objective of the corporation – profit 
maximisation. 
 
In addition to these two paradigms, a school of thought rejects the notion of CSR.  In this 
regard for instance, Connolly’s (2012: 1228-1249) study refers to CSR as “a duplicitous 
distraction”.  This rejection of CSR draws from Milton Friedman’s famous expression that 
the “business of business is business” (quoted in Marsden, 2000: 10).  Although altruistic 
CSR may be predicated on the perceived “social contract” between the corporation and 
society, it is not and should not be the concern of firms.  This interpretation of CSR maintains 
that altruistic CSR does not fall within the scope of corporations’ objectives or activities.  
Based on this “Friedmanesque” interpretation, “businesses taking on social responsibilities 
lead to distortions of the market and interfere with the government fulfilling its 
responsibilities” (Hamann and Acutt, 2003: 257).  Hence, the argument goes thus: 
government’s role is to provide social services while the preoccupation of business is to make 
profits.  There is a clear distinction in the mandates of government and of business.  CSR 
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blurs this distinction.  More than this, CSR undermines the profit motive of firms.  Viewed 
from a “Friedmanesque” angle, CSR is “a dangerous concept … that threatens the basic 
principles of market economy” (Wan-Jan, 2006:179).  Notwithstanding this attempt to reject 
the conceptual legitimacy of CSR, the concept has shown remarkable resilience and has 
remained an important phenomenon in business theory and practice. 
 
Yankson (2010: 358) posits that the “development of CSR reflects the growing expectations 
of the community and stakeholders of the evolving role of companies in society, and in turn 
their response to growing environmental, social, and economic pressures.”  In this regard, 
civil society actors have exerted pressures on corporations because of the impacts of their 
activities, especially on the environment.  For example, critical incidents such as the Bhopal 
disaster in 1984, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, ecological crises (such as acid rain, arid 
farmland and poisoned rivers) in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 have foregrounded the impacts of business operations on 
society.60  These incidents have heightened the awareness in the public domain about 
corporate values and activities as well as their economic, ecological, social, and political 
impacts.  In other words, these incidents have given impetus to the notion of CSR and 
strengthened its relevance in business-society relations.  Stakeholders – more importantly, 
civil society organisations – are increasingly examining corporate behaviour in the light of 
CSR principles.  More often than not, corporate actions that have deleterious impacts on 
society generally attract opprobrium from local and/or international civil society actors. 
 
                                                            
60 See Varma and Varma (2005) for a discussion on the Bhopal disaster; Keim (2009) on the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill; and Robertson and Krauss (2010) on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  There is extant literature on 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region.  On the ecological dimensions of the Niger Delta problematique, see Babatunde 
(2010) and Ebiede (2011). 
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The increasing awareness of the social responsibility expected of corporations has 
engendered interventionist characterisations such as “name and praise” (positive image) and 
“name and shame” (negative image) which are attached to corporate behaviour (Hamann and 
Acutt, 2003: 260).  In view of the reputational effects of corporate behaviour on business, 
corporations may choose to “do no harm” or “do good” in their operational environments.  In 
choosing to “do good”, corporations apply CSR principles in their operations while seeking 
profit in the process.  This suggests that the concept of CSR is flexible enough to enable the 
profit-seeking objective of MNCs as long as companies implement activities that offer some 
benefit for the society in which they operate.   
 
Given the conceptual currency and normative imperative of CSR, corporate behaviours that 
have negative impacts on society are generally deemed to be at variance with “good practice” 
or a violation of CSR principles.  There is expectation (on the part of stakeholders in society) 
for businesses to demonstrate commitment to CSR principles, especially in operational 
environments characterised by weak state capacity, political instability and conflict.  The 
absence of regulatory frameworks (or their inadequacy) in such environments potentially 
offers companies the “opportunity” to violate CSR principles or engage in illicit behaviour in 
their quest for more profit.  Yet, in these geo-political environments with little or no room for 
accountability, businesses can demonstrate their commitment to CSR – a commitment that 
stems possibly from corporate conviction rather than the fear of societal sanctions.  
Increasingly, there is robust advocacy for voluntary compliance by MNCs with CSR 
principles and corporate codes of conduct.61  As will be shown in this study, corporate actions 
                                                            
61 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises represent an attempt at institutionalising corporate codes 
of conduct for MNCs that are headquartered or operating in OECD member states.  The main drawback of this 
mechanism, however, is that it is non-binding, thus limiting its utility to holding MNCs accountable and 
responsible for their activities in operational environments. 
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in conflict zones can either cohere with or deviate from CSR principles.  Next, this chapter 
reviews the key trends in and typologies of corporate behaviour in conflict zones. 
 
3.4 Corporations in zones of conflict 
The impact of the pursuit of economic interests in conflict areas 
has come under increasingly critical scrutiny (Kofi Annan, quoted 
in Bennett, 2002: 395). 
 
One of the key realities associated with the phenomenal expansion of MNCs is that some 
corporations now operate in conflict zones or conflict-prone areas.  MNCs become entangled 
in conflict environments in two basic ways.  First, an MNC may commence operations in an 
area prior to the onset of conflict, but the company is subsequently caught up in the conflict 
situation.  Second, an MNC may invest in, or move into, an environment that is already 
plagued by conflict.  In the second case, the decision to invest or commence operations in the 
conflictual environment is based on a strategic calculus – the company’s ability to contend 
with the volatility associated with the conflict.  Whether a company’s presence predates the 
onset of conflict or is subsequent to it, its activities affect and are affected by the dynamics of 
conflict.  Typically, a company’s actions or inactions shape the trajectory of conflict in 
fundamental ways to produce conflict dynamics such as escalation, or perpetuation, or de-
escalation.  In other words, corporate behaviour in conflict zones impinges on the 
transformative potential of conflict.  This section examines the forms of corporate behaviour 
in the zones of conflict. 
 
The key motivation of MNCs in expanding into conflict-prone environments is “attributed to 
the existence of natural resource-based assets and higher potential return” (Kanagaretnam and 
Brown, 2006: 3).  For example, this motivation accounts for MNC investment in Colombia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, despite the prevalence of violent conflicts in these countries.  
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In view of the “pull” factors in conflict-prone and fragile countries, “recent history of several 
conflicts has shown that access to lucrative economic resources with the active participation 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) has played an important role in fomenting and 
sustaining conflicts” (Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006: 1).  The involvement of MNCs in the 
first Liberian civil war (1989-1996) corroborates this claim, as “the warlord, and later the 
President, Charles Taylor was able to secure economic partnerships with major MNCs in 
sustaining his rebellion during the initial stages” (Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006: 1).  
Another case in point has been the “[a]ctive involvement of leading MNCs in trade in 
‘conflict diamonds’ in Central Africa, with the full knowledge that they were engaging in 
trade in illicit diamonds – consequently aiding and abetting the continuation of a deadly war”  
(Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006: 2).  Undoubtedly, the quest for profit has been the 
foremost motivation for corporate investment in conflict-prone environments. 
 
Moreover, as Kanagaretnam and Brown (2006: 10) observe, “focusing on profits to the 
exclusion of other considerations has resulted in [MNCs] getting involved either directly or 
indirectly in fomenting and sustaining tensions or civil wars in several countries.”  Thus, 
MNCs’ fixation with profit maximisation has resulted in investment decisions and illicit 
corporate behaviours that invariably exacerbate conflict.  Even the actions of government, 
which are intended to promote the economic interests of MNCs and to protect the revenue 
base of the government, have generated tensions and conflict.   In resource-rich countries 
such as Angola and Nigeria for example, the routine deployment of military personnel to 
protect MNCs’ facilities invariably exacerbates conflict (Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006: 3) 
as this often pits the government/MNCs against resource-bearing communities. 
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It can be deduced from Kanagaretnam and Brown’s (2006) analysis that the presence of 
natural resources in a geographical area plagued by conflict shapes (the logic of) corporate 
behaviour, including investment decisions.  MNCs are generally attracted to lucrative natural 
resources.  Investment by MNCs or their presence in conflict zones (to access natural 
resources that are implicated in conflict initiation or perpetuation) directly or invariably links 
companies to conflict.  MNCs’ extraction and sale of natural resources also link them to 
conflicts.  As noted in section 2.2.1, the involvement of profiteering networks, such as 
MNCs, may exacerbate and prolong conflicts.  In the context of state fragility or state 
failure62 for instance, corporate actions in conflict zones have a decisive impact on conflict 
and peacebuilding processes. 
 
As Patey (2006a: 5) observes, “the interactions between fragile states and MNCs are critical 
for prospects of peace and development” in conflict-prone environments.  Whenever MNCs 
become complicit in illicit activities, the potential for peacebuilding is undermined.  Put 
differently, corporate complicity offers little incentive to belligerents (that benefit from 
natural resource extraction) to seek peace as MNCs provide the financial muscle that 
belligerents require to sustain the war effort.  In this regard, “MNCs factor into the equation 
of contemporary civil war by functioning as economic vehicles that allow domestic actors to 
realize value from local assets through the global marketplace” (Patey, 2006a: 5).  
Conversely, MNCs’ withdrawal from conflict zones, their commitment to “do no harm” and 
their support for peace processes weaken the economic incentives for conflict perpetuation. 
 
                                                            
62 For instance, of 178 countries, the DRC – this study’s location – is ranked second after Somalia on the failed 
states index (FSI) for 2013 (Fund for Peace, 2013a: i. d.).  The FSI uses a “Conflict Assessment System Tool 
(CAST) analytical platform” which assesses the “vulnerability of states to collapse” (Fund for Peace, 2013b: i. 
d.) based on economic, social and political factors in “pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations” 
(Fund for Peace, 2014: i. d.).  Countries plagued by conflicts, those prone to conflicts, economic implosion and 
human displacement, rank highest on the FSI.  In addition, as the DRC case illustrates, a weak central 
government is a defining feature of state fragility or state failure. 
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Patey’s (2006a) study, which examines the operations of eight MNCs in the Sudan, 
emphasizes the point that a combination of domestic and international factors influences the 
behaviour of each corporation.  There are “critical differences” that shape the individual 
behaviour of MNCs such that it is difficult to formulate generalisations based solely on the 
profit-seeking logic (Patey, 2006a: 3).  These “critical differences” explain why some MNCs 
choose to stay in while others exit conflict zones.  For example, the critical variables that 
shape corporate behaviour include:  
(i) firm-specific factors (such as size, type of business activity, ample financial 
power and extensive international operations);  
(ii) the host country environment (including the geography of conflict/proximity of 
military activity, community relations, and state interest); and  
(iii) the international environment (encapsulating variables such as the relationship 
between MNCs’ host and home governments, pressure from international 
NGOs, advocacy groups in MNCs’ home markets, and prices of commodities in 
the international market).   
 
The aforementioned factors, which apply differently to each MNC, underscore and combine 
variously to determine corporate behaviour in zones of conflict (Patey, 2006a: 40-51).  The 
fact that an MNC’s profile in relation to each of these factors differs from that of a 
counterpart engenders complexities of corporate behaviour and its analysis thereof. 
 
In another study, Patey (2006b: 1) posits that MNCs are linked to conflicts, especially 
“resource wars” “through the extraction of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, timber, 
diamonds and other precious metals”.  Additionally, MNCs are imbricated in conflicts 
through “upsetting environmental and social balances in the local communities in which they 
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operate and by financing unaccountable, often repressive host governments” or parties to a 
conflict (Patey, 2006b: 1).  MNCs’ collusion with rebels or militias and their involvement in 
illicit trade of natural resources (“conflict diamonds”, for example) epitomise this aspect of 
the corporate-conflict dynamic, which speaks to the complicity of MNCs in perpetuating 
conflict. 
 
With reference to corporate behaviour, Berman (2000: 28-32) outlines five variables in the 
analysis of the strategies of MNCs in conflict areas: geography of conflict; severity of 
conflict; government and opposition; sector of industry; and investment structure.  Generally, 
MNCs tend to exit a conflict zone if the geographic impact of conflict is large.  However, 
MNCs may still “do business where the geographic impact of fighting is large [for example 
in Colombia where nearly forty percent of the country [was] in rebel hands] so long as 
conflict is contained and relatively stable” (Berman, 2000: 29).  Furthermore, MNCs 
typically tolerate isolated incidents of violence as opposed to frequent, large-scale conflicts.  
Perceptions and attitudes of the government and the opposition towards MNCs (whether 
these, from the companies’ perspective, are favourable or not) also influence corporate 
behaviour in a conflict situation.  According to Berman (2000: 31), the nature of an MNC’s 
industry determines its strategies in a conflict zone.  For example, the resilience of MNCs in 
the extractive sector (that is, their general willingness to enter or remain in a conflict zone) is 
attributable to the substantial yields on investment in which benefits generally outweigh costs 
associated with operating in a conflict environment.  Therefore, an investment structure that 
yields substantial returns for MNCs and that retains funds offshore typically make MNCs 
more tolerant of conflict (Berman, 2000: 30-32). Nevertheless, MNCs generally prefer an 
investment portfolio with low risk from armed conflict. 
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Richani’s (2005: 115) study is anchored on the empirical observation that MNCs in the 
extractive sector “find in markets of violence a favorable opportunity to obtain better 
contracts for investment when states’ authority has either partly or totally collapsed.”  In this 
same scenario characterised by state incapacity, MNCs are “motivated by the potential 
favorable concessions they could extract from a beleaguered state badly in need of extra 
income to sustain its war against a growing armed insurgency” (Richani, 2005: 115).  Based 
on these considerations, Richani’s study (2005: 113) discusses MNCs’ contribution “to the 
escalation of land conflicts and to the violent transformation of the rural economy” in 
Colombia.63  Two types of companies contributed to, and benefitted from, the Colombian 
civil war. 
 
In the first category were companies with investments in the extractive (oil, coal, and gold) 
industry which “found an investment opportunity in the civil war but did not depend 
exclusively on the market of violence for capital formation and accumulation” (Richani, 
2005: 116).  These companies mainly financed the war system’s actors in furtherance of their 
own economic agendas.  Specifically, multinational oil companies were instrumental to the 
formation of right-wing paramilitary groups and to the economic sustenance of guerrilla 
groups in the 1980s.   According to Richani (2005: 125), MNCs funded the war system 
through a “rentier system” in the form of “protection payments” to the state, guerrillas, 
paramilitary groups, and private security multinational corporations (PSMCs).  These 
payments enabled belligerents to finance their war efforts.64  The monies provided by MNCs 
“helped to establish a military balance between the guerrillas and the state, satisfying two 
                                                            
63 Colombia, ranked 57th on the FSI in 2013 (Fund for Peace, 2013a: i. d.), has been in the throes of a decades-
long low-intensity conflict between the government and a guerrilla movement – the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]).  Although there has been some 
progress towards peace, Colombia, retains the trappings of a fragile state. 
64 Richani estimates that MNCs provided between 40 percent and 60 percent of guerrillas’ income in the 1980s 
and the 1990s.  Remarkably, this income from MNCs was greater than what the FARC gained from taxing the 
extremely lucrative narcotrafficking industry (Richani, 2005: 126). 
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major conditions for the consolidation of the war system: a military impasse and enough 
economic resources to sustain a positive political economy for the guerrillas, making the 
impasse comfortable” (Richani, 2005: 126).65  In line with the logic of “comfortable 
impasse”, MNCs in the extractive sector are likely to retain, protect and/or increase their 
investments in conflict zones.  An examination of MNCs’ roles in Colombia leads to an 
inexorable conclusion: these corporations, ipso facto, “became agents of violence” (Richani, 
2005: 116).  Thus, Richani’s (2005) empirical study lays bare an aspect of MNCs’ complicity 
in conflict. 
 
The second category of companies involved in the Colombian conflict comprised “private 
security corporations, for which the market of violence is the main resource for capital 
formation and accumulation” (Richani, 2005: 116).  PSMCs complexified the Colombian 
conflict by exacerbating “the legitimacy crisis of a state that has never managed to establish 
its monopoly over the use of force since its independence in 1810” (Richani, 2005: 134).  It is 
instructive to note that the Colombian government as well as MNCs hired PSMCs to carry 
out combat and reconnaissance operations that they could not perform.  The use of PSMCs 
led to the “privatization of war”, a heightening of the rentier economy, and a fixation with the 
profit maximisation logic in which the perpetuation of the Colombian conflict was seen as 
offering economic incentives that seemed unattainable in a post-conflict setting.  In addition, 
the involvement of private security companies, especially American PSMCs, 
internationalised the Colombian war system.  For example, corporations “increasingly 
importuned the United States to act more aggressively to protect their investments” (Richani, 
2005: 137) – an exhortation that Washington responded to favourably by bolstering its 
military presence in Colombia.  The companies in the two categories “represent[ed] an 
                                                            
65 According to Richani (2005: 138), a “comfortable impasse is created when the actors’ political risks are 
minimal if they maintain a condition of war, whereas the costs or risks of peace may be higher than the costs of 
war.” 
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intersection of interests between local and international agents” (Richani. 2005: 116), thus 
lending credence to Richani’s argument regarding the internationalisation of the Colombian 
war system.  In sum, Richani (2005: 113) posits that the perpetuation of the Colombian 
conflict was attributable to the role of the corporations “in fomenting and financing the war 
system”.  The performance of these roles by MNCs produced mutually beneficial strategic 
outcomes for the government-MNC alliance – regime survival for the government and the 
furtherance of MNCs’ profit maximisation agenda. 
 
Granted, MNCs that operate in conflict zones may be able to maximise profit.  However, they 
may bear certain costs or incur losses, including reputational harm that could put their 
investments in jeopardy.  MNCs may bear costs associated with risk management, 
maintenance of security services, and material loss to company and public infrastructure.  In 
light of increasing local and international attention to the corporate-conflict nexus, a 
company’s reputation may be damaged (perhaps irreparably) by its involvement in “incidents 
that incite or exacerbate conflict” (Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006: 3).  Growing public 
scrutiny of corporate behaviour is propelling a shift from profit maximisation at any cost to 
conflict sensitive investment and business practices.  A significant initiative aimed at 
promoting conflict sensitive corporate behaviour in the diamond sub-sector, albeit 
characterised by limitations and violations, is the Kimberly Process.66  Evolving local and 
international advocacy efforts, geared towards the promotion of corporate responsibility in 
fragile political environments, are anchored in the recognition that businesses have the 
capacity to contribute to conflict prevention and attenuation.  While the involvement of 
MNCs in conflict transformation initiatives may be motivated by self-interest (for example 
                                                            
66 The Kimberly Process (KP), or the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), is an international 
governmental certification regime that was emplaced to prevent the trade in diamonds that help to finance 
conflict.  The scheme requires governments to certify that diamonds are conflict-free, that is are not extracted 
from conflict zones, or do not fund violent conflict.  For an overview of the KPCS and its limitations, see Grant 
and Taylor (2007: 385-401), and Bieri (2010). 
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improving the business environment for profit maximisation), Kanagaretnam and Brown 
(2006: 4-5, 13) argue that such initiatives can address the root causes of conflicts (such as 
poverty and economic exclusion), impact positively on efforts at promoting peacebuilding, 
and help to stabilise fragile states.  Yet, an examination of the literature on the corporate-
conflict nexus shows that instances of corporate peacebuilding pale into insignificance when 
compared to those of corporate complicity in conflict. 
 
Given the complicity of MNCs in conflict, civil society actors are focusing increasingly on 
how corporate actors can support conflict transformation and development initiatives.  This is 
premised on the realisation that, as powerful economic actors, MNCs can channel their 
potentialities towards constructive ends by initiating and supporting peacebuilding efforts.  
Potential and actual conflict transformation activities by MNCs represent the other side of the 
coin in the corporate-conflict dynamics.  Conflict transformation activities by businesses 
constitute corporate peacebuilding – a novel phenomenon in conflict research.   Hence, as 
Bennett (2002: 394) aptly notes, some – though limited – corporate-conflict analyses have 
begun to highlight the “other” dynamic, namely “the responsibility MNCs share in promoting 
peace and avoiding conflict.”  This responsibility arises from the expectation (on the part of 
stakeholders) that MNCs should play decisive roles in preventing or lessening “conflicts that 
are associated with economic production” (Bennett, 2002: 394).  In addition, the 
responsibility to initiate or support corporate peacebuilding efforts hinges partly on the “pro-
CSR” view that doing so makes business sense.  In line with the “business case”, MNCs’ 
routine actions or specific interventions can propel conflict transformation processes.  
Regarding this point, Bennett (2002: 397) postulates that MNCs facilitate peacebuilding 
through the provision of humanitarian relief and responsible management of companies’ 
security arrangements to forestall human rights violations.  In the aftermath of a war, 
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corporate initiatives such as “rebuilding infrastructure and investing in key productive 
sectors” facilitate post-conflict reconstruction (Bennett, 2002: 397).  The performance of 
these functions by MNCs is reflective of their (MNCs’) potential and actual contributions of 
corporate peacebuilding. 
 
In view of the heavy costs that businesses bear in conflict zones, Nelson (2000: 6) posits that 
the case for “corporate engagement in conflict prevention and resolution is compelling.”  
Therefore, investment decisions and corporate actions increasingly seek “to avoid the direct 
and indirect business costs of conflict and to reap the business benefits of peace” (Nelson, 
2000: 11).  Yet, facilitating peacebuilding is by no means an easy task for MNCs.  Investment 
decisions and corporate actions are shaped by individual company attributes (factors over 
which the company has some control) and structural variables at the local/community, 
national and international levels (factors over which the company has less control, or which 
are beyond the company’s control).  Still, a company that has little or no control over certain 
factors can contribute towards peacebuilding through synergies with stakeholders (Nelson, 
2000: 12).  According to Nelson (2000: 27-34), five principles underpin corporate 
involvement in peacebuilding.  These are:  
(i) strategic commitment to good practice (for example compliance, risk minimisation, 
and value creation);  
(ii) risk analysis and impact assessment (of company’s operations in a conflict zone); 
(iii) dialogue and consultation (with governments, NGOs and communities); 
(iv) partnership and collective action (for creating and sustaining mutually beneficial 
collaboration between business, government and civil society); 
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(v) evaluation and accountability (that is, a process that seeks to “understand, manage, 
measure, [verify and report on the] positive and negative social, economic and 
environmental impacts” of a company’s operations). 
 
The aforementioned principles combine with three key factors to determine corporate 
behaviour in conflict zones (Nelson, 2000: 37).  These three factors are: (i) the nature of the 
conflict (ii) the activities and relationships of other actors and (iii) the characteristics of the 
company.  Figure 3.1 depicts the key elements/considerations associated with each factor.    
 
Figure 3.1: “Framework for analysing business engagement in conflict” 
 
Source: Nelson (2000: 36). 
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The causes, stage and location of a conflict influence the role and responsibilities that a 
company performs.  For instance, the stage of a conflict determines the kind of interventions 
that a company will undertake such as supporting dialogue, disarmament, or infrastructure 
rehabilitation.  A company’s involvement in the conflict transformation process also depends 
on the “proximity of conflict to the company’s operations” (Nelson, 2000: 48).  Company 
ownership, size and spheres of influence determine the extent, form and acceptance of 
company involvement in peacebuilding initiatives.  It is important to add that the power, role 
and capacity of other stakeholders – government, NGOs and communities – constrain or 
enhance the performance of peacebuilding functions by MNCs.  As Nelson (2000: 37) notes, 
it “is the dynamic and complex linkages between these factors that determine how a company 
either influences or is influenced by conflict in any particular situation.  The linkages may 
operate on each other in different ways at different times.”  A logical deduction from 
Nelson’s observation is that company- and environment-specific factors render 
generalisations about corporate behaviour rather tenuous.  Nevertheless, MNCs – just like 
other actors – are able to contribute towards peacebuilding through specific and deliberate 
programmes of action.  In practical terms, MNCs facilitate peacebuilding through their “core 
business activities, social investment programs, and engagement in policy dialogue and civic 
institution building” (Nelson, 2000: 45). 
 
With regard to corporate behaviour in conflict zones, Banfield, Haufler and Lilly (2003: 5) 
identify three strategies through which MNCs play positive roles in a conflict situation: 
“compliance”; “do no harm”; and “peacebuilding”.  They argue that MNCs function as forces 
for good in a conflict environment by complying with national and international regulations 
even when the state is unable or unwilling to enforce these standards.  In this context of state 
incapacity, a company’s compliance with best practices demonstrates its commitment to 
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social responsibility based on an internal strategic conviction or core value.  Compliance also 
involves adherence to “any emerging international normative framework for governing 
corporate conduct in conflict zones” (Banfield, Haufler and Lilly, 2003: 5).  MNCs may 
choose to “do no harm” by initiating and implementing policies that “minimise any damage 
that may result from their own operations or those of their business partners” (Banfield, 
Haufler and Lilly, 2003: 5).  This speaks to the notion of “conflict sensitivity”, which 
underscores the need for business actors to take cognisance of “their ability to create or 
exacerbate violent conflict through their real and potential socio-economic, political and 
environmental impacts” (Banfield, Haufler and Lilly, 2003: 5).  Conflict sensitive business 
practices demonstrate a commitment by MNCs to prevent or alleviate situations that typically 
precipitate or exacerbate conflict. 
 
According to Banfield, Haufler and Lilly (2003: 5), peacebuilding is at the pinnacle of 
MNCs’ strategies for positive action in conflict zones.  It surpasses the compliance and “do 
no harm” strategies.  This elevated peacebuilding strategy entails proactive contributions by 
MNCs through “innovative social investment, stakeholder consultation, policy dialogue, 
advocacy and civic institution building” in collaboration with other companies (Banfield, 
Haufler and Lilly, 2003: 5).  These peacebuilding activities are part of an evolving “business 
case” and corporate agenda in conflict zones.  In this context, the positive roles that MNCs 
play in conflict zones draw from a commitment to CSR and an assessment of the long-term 
corporate benefits derivable from a stable operational environment.  Having said that, it is 
pertinent to note here that the evolving corporate peacebuilding agenda exemplifies the 
broadening and the deepening of CSR. 
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As this section shows, empirical analyses of the corporate-conflict dynamic highlight the 
ambivalent roles of MNCs in zones of conflict.  This study is located within the context of 
this analytical tradition.  However, it is instructive to note that whilst conventional analyses 
of the nexus between MNCs and conflict highlight the activities of MNCs, the underlying 
motivations for corporate behaviour are largely ignored.  Hence, Patey’s (2006b: 1) apt 
observation that there “is a dearth of knowledge concerning the factors that guide the 
strategic behaviours of [MNCs]” in zones of conflict.  In this regard, further “analytical, 
objective research is required” to unpack MNCs’ behaviour in zones of conflict (Patey, 
2006b: 2-3).  This observation is of particular relevance in the case of the DRC where no 
systematic analysis of corporate behaviour in the country’s conflict has been undertaken.  
Hence, this study addresses an extant gap in the research.   
 
As this final section of the chapter shows, the roles that MNCs play in conflict zones 
influence the dynamics of conflict, including the prospects for peace.  Such roles produce 
ebbs and flows that inform the trajectory of conflicts.  The notion of conflict transformation – 
a key construct in conflict analysis – is used to unpack the ebbs and flows of conflict.  It 
should be noted that while MNCs’ involvement in resource-rich conflict zones influence 
conflict dynamics, MNCs are not the only actors in resource-related conflicts.  There are 
other “stakeholders” whose involvement shape corporate behaviour and conflict dynamics.  
By focusing on other actors that influence corporate behaviour, the stakeholder theory 
furnishes insights into how interactions between MNCs and other parties shape conflict 
dynamics in conflict zones.  In order to understand this link, the chapter that follows 
examines conflict transformation theory and stakeholder theory – which, in combination, 




This chapter has examined theoretical and analytical perspectives on conflict and MNCs.  It 
discussed narratives on MNCs, which provide general prisms for understanding MNCs’ roles 
in the public sphere in general and in conflict zones in particular.  Its sections interrogated 
pertinent issues and debates on MNCs and their societal roles with a view to highlighting 
how these underpin the connections between MNCs and conflicts.  Specifically, the chapter 
examined the liberal and radical paradigms, highlighting their overarching conclusions on 
MNCs.  It was noted that while liberal paradigm views MNCs as “benign engines of 
prosperity” (Stopford, 1998-1999: 12) or as agents of transformative change, the 
radical/dependency paradigm contends that MNCs are agents of Western hegemony and neo-
colonialism (Onimode, 1978; Udofia, 1984) or bulwarks against autochthonous development 
in the LDCs.  It was concluded that the contending paradigms on MNCs are indicative of the 
Janus-faced character and effects of MNCs’ activities in host environments. 
 
The third section examined CSR in light of the arguments for and against the concept.  
Although there is some cynicism regarding the notion of CSR, it remains an important 
concept that speaks to an array of corporate actions that (potentially) offer some benefit for 
the society in which firms operate.  It was noted that corporations implement CSR based on 
either intra-firm considerations or pressure from other stakeholders.  The section concluded 
that the activities of MNCs in conflict zones – depending on where they are located in the 
conflict-peacebuilding continuum – typically detract from or cohere with CSR principles. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the fourth section examined corporate-conflict dynamics with 
specific focus on the activities of MNCs in conflict zones.  Relevant literature reviewed in 
this section highlighted the ambivalent roles of corporations in conflict environments.  At one 
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end of the spectrum, MNCs’ strategies and actions in a conflict zone (or conflict-prone 
environment) could stoke tensions or create discord, exacerbate volatility/instability, trigger 
and/or or perpetuate conflict.  At the other end, corporations could facilitate post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding through a range of initiatives such as the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and social services, peace advocacy and supporting national (or 
stakeholder) dialogues.  The roles that each corporation plays in a conflict zone are shaped by 
an interplay of company-specific and local, national and international factors.  In addition, 
such roles influence the trajectories of conflict, hence the relevance of conflict transformation 
to this study.  The next chapter discusses conflict transformation and the theoretical 


















CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION THEORY AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented theoretical and analytical perspectives on MNCs and conflict.  
It examined various discourses that touch on the characteristics and operations of MNCs as 
well as the impacts of their operations.  The chapter also discussed corporate behaviour and 
initiatives that facilitate transformative societal change under the rubric of corporate social 
responsibility.  Based on the theoretical perspectives on MNCs, it then examined corporate-
conflict dynamics with a specific focus on the activities of MNCs in conflict zones.  It was 
noted that MNCs’ operations in conflict environments typically exemplify ambivalent 
behaviour.  Corporate actions in conflict situations influence the trajectory of conflict, 
producing outcomes that escalate or alleviate conflict.  The notion of conflict transformation 
encapsulates these dynamics of conflict. 
 
This chapter narrows the focus, firstly, to conflict transformation theory and secondly, to 
stakeholder theory.  It analyses the notion of conflict transformation, which this study 
utilises, to show the ebbs and flows that the involvement of MNCs in conflict zones 
engender.  It is instructive to note that the involvement of MNCs in conflict zones in 
particular and in the public sphere in general typically produce impacts that provoke certain 
responses from other actors in host environments.  In this context, the corporate governance 
regime in host environments determines the extent to which other actors can hold MNCs 
accountable and responsible.  This chapter unpacks this idea by examining the two main 
corporate governance regimes that generally guide the interactions between MNCs and host 
environments.  The chapter concludes with a synthesis of aspects of the corporate governance 
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regimes in order to furnish a nuanced understanding of (the roles of) corporate actors in 
conflict zones in particular and in the public sphere in general. 
 
4.2 The emergence of conflict transformation theory 
The concepts of conflict management, conflict resolution, and – more recently – conflict 
transformation have become ubiquitous in peace and conflict studies.  There are similarities 
as well as (significant and subtle) differences amongst these concepts.  An important 
commonality amongst them is that they encapsulate attempts to stem the tide of conflict, or 
return to the status quo ante bellum, or to create conditions for peace.  The three notions – 
conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation – “are the main 
concepts that have been developed in conflict research to describe as well as to explain the 
combination of processes, methods and attempts to alter a conflict situation” (Whetho, 2006: 
64).  Certain key assumptions foreground the main differences amongst the three conceptual 
constructs.  Accordingly, this section seeks to tease out these differences as a prelude to 
providing a justification for a conflict transformation approach to explicating and organising 
this research. 
 
According to Bloomfield and Reilly (1998: 18), conflict management is 
the positive and constructive handling of difference and 
divergence.  Rather than advocating methods for removing 
conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of managing 
conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring 
opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a 
practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive 
management of difference. 
 
This definition presupposes that conflicts are long-term and ineluctable in human relations.  
As such, they are not resolvable in the short term.  The point here is that conflicts are 
ineradicable.  The conflict management approach holds that the idea of resolving conflicts is 
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unrealistic.  Against this backdrop, Miall (2005: 3) posits that “the best that can be done is to 
manage and to contain [conflicts], and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which 
violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed.”  As I have noted elsewhere, 
advocates of conflict management argue that “conflicts only become dysfunctional but are 
not resolved.  Conflict is conceptualised as an ever-present phenomenon that spins in cycles 
but does not wither away” (Whetho, 2006: 64).  On the practical plane, conflict management 
speaks to the reality in which powerful actors with enormous resources succeed in inducing 
warring parties to abandon the use of violence (Miall, 2005: 3) but not with a view to 
addressing the underlying causes of conflicts or resolving conflicts.  Therefore, the goal of 
conflict management “is to control volatility rather than to address the underlying source of 
the problem” (Irish Peace Society, n. d: i. d.). 
 
The conflict management perspective stresses the reduction of volatility or the control of 
instability.  Critics argue, however, that the emphasis on reducing volatility or controlling 
instability undermines attempts at building sustainable peace as factors that engender conflict 
are overlooked.  In addition, “the notion of [conflict] management suggests that people can be 
directed or controlled as though they were physical objects” (Irish Peace Society, n. d: i. d.).  
As this researcher notes elsewhere, the “assumption that it is always possible to manage 
parties and their differences so as to keep volatility at the barest minimum fails to 
acknowledge the complexity of human behaviour and the fact that humans are fundamentally 
different from apparatuses in the natural scientist’s laboratory” (Whetho, 2006: 65).  The 
implication of the logic of conflict management is that continuous attempts at checking or 
reducing volatility will always be required, while the effects of conflicts persist.  A major 
drawback of conflict management is that it offers a short-term rather than a durable solution 
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to conflict.  In view of this, the conflict management perspective does not resonate strongly in 
peace and conflict analyses. 
 
Conflict resolution is arguably the most popular concept in peace and conflict analyses.  As 
Lederach and Maiese (2003: i. d.) observe, the concept of conflict transformation is “more 
well-known and widely accepted in mainstream academic and political circles.”  It refers to 
the process of clarifying issues in conflict, building bridges between parties in conflict, and 
creating opportunities for developing new relationships (between the parties) on the basis of 
peaceful change  (International Alert, 1998: 28).  The conflict resolution perspective states 
that it is possible to transcend conflicts if certain conditions are met: the parties should be 
able “to explore, analyse, questions and reframe their positions and interests”; the parties 
should be assisted to “move from zero-sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum 
constructive outcomes” (Miall, 2005: 3).  The goal of conflict resolution is to create a win-
win solution that caters to the interests and aspirations of parties to a conflict. 
 
According to Bush and Folger (1994: 51), conflict resolution entails the manipulative search 
for an agreement that is acceptable to all parties to a conflict.  It seeks to address the latent 
interests of all the actors involved in a conflict situation.  Therefore, conflict resolution aims 
at an outcome that warring parties see as a permanent solution to the problem (Burton, 1991: 
81). 
 
The concept of conflict resolution has come under a barrage of criticisms.  For instance, the 
use of the term, ‘resolution’, is based on the view that conflict is intrinsically pathological 
and dysfunctional (Upreti, 2002).  The term implies that conflict is bad and therefore should 
be ended.  In other words, the assumption is that conflict is inherently a negative 
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phenomenon.  However, conflict could also be healthy or constructive (Roberto, 2010).  It 
may serve “as a vital agent or catalyst of change” (Miall, 2004: 162).  Additionally, not all 
conflict is ‘violent’.  The idea of ‘resolution’ ignores the constructive aspect of conflict.  
Given its preoccupation with ending dysfunctionality, it pays little or no attention to the 
deeper causal basis of conflict.  Lederach (1995a: 201) captures this point about conflict 
resolution thus: “perhaps unintentionally, this term carries the connotation of a bias toward 
‘ending’ a given crisis or at least its outward expression, without being sufficiently concerned 
with the deeper structural, cultural, and long-term relational aspects of conflict.”  From this 
premise, the emphasis on resolution is seen as a major drawback, given that it does not 
address the deep-seated, (sometimes) value-laden and relational aspects of conflict.  In other 
words, the conflict resolution perspective concerns itself more with conflict than with the 
underlying structures and patterns within which such conflict is embedded. 
 
Furthermore, this perspective relies heavily on the assumption of human rationality.  
However, human behaviour during conflict situations or peace processes is not necessarily 
guided by rationality.  Conflict resolution theorists also view conflict as “a short-term 
phenomenon that can be resolved permanently through intervention processes” (Botes, 2003: 
i. d.).  As Botes (2003: i. d.) notes, “underlying the conflict resolution perspective is an 
assumption that every conflict has a finite life and a clear end and can, therefore, be solved or 
declared intractable.”  However, as Väyrynen (1991: 23) argues, “any argument that a 
conflict has been solved for good, that history has ended, is based on an ahistorical illusion.”  
According to Rupesinghe (1995: 75-76), “the idea that conflicts can be resolved once and for 
all has been superseded by [a contending view that] not only recognises the dialectical nature 
of conflict but also argues for the transformation of conflict while taking pertinent cognisance 
of personal, relational, structural and cultural factors in conflict”.  Rupesinghe (1995) further 
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contends that conflicts are dynamic processes, and as such, efforts at addressing them must be 
dynamic and sustainable.  These realisations constitute a fundamental missing link in the 
conflict resolution fabric.  Given the drawbacks of ‘resolution’, Rupesinghe’s (1995: 65-92) 
study argues for and highlights a conceptual shift in the discourse on conflict attenuation – a 
shift from ‘resolution’ to ‘transformation’.  Therefore, the shortcomings of the conflict 
resolution approach underpinned the emergence (in the 1990s) of conflict transformation – “a 
relatively new invention within the broader field of peace and conflict studies” (Botes, 2003: 
i. d.).  Conflict transformation is viewed as “a process that will make up for the inadequacies 
of mere resolution” (Mitchell, 2002: 1). 
 
According to Lederach (1995b: 17), the concept of conflict transformation “emerged in the 
search for an adequate language to explain the peacemaking venture.”  Conflict 
transformation theorists contend that intervention in contemporary conflict situations 
“require[s] more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes” 
(Miall, 2005: 4), which is the hallmark of conflict resolution.  Additionally, it is important for 
intervenors to seek constructive change rather than simply satisfy the demands of warring 
parties, as there are causalities that are more fundamental to and involved in conflicts than at 
the level of disputes (Auvinen and Kivimaki, 1996: 3).  Conflict transformation thus 
transcends the boundaries of conflict resolution.  Conflict transformation is “a process of 
engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the 
very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall, 2005: 
4).  This perspective seeks to address the underlying structures, agencies and practices within 
the socio-political system that precipitate conflict. 
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As Spencer and Spencer (1995: 162) note, conflict transformation “can be thought of as a 
redefinition of the dispute situation by the actors themselves, one that may lead to opening a 
space for cooperation and peace.”  The process of redefining the conflict situation extends 
beyond the issues in conflict and seeks to transform the relationship between the parties.  
Hence, the conflict transformation perspective focuses on the “very structure of parties and 
relationships [which] may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend 
beyond the particular site of conflict” (Miall, 2005: 4).  In this context, conflict 
transformation is “the process by which people change situations, relationships or structures 
so that they become less violent, less conflictual and less unjust” (International Alert, 1998: 
28).  It encapsulates attempts that “seek to change the conditions that give rise to the 
underlying root causes of the conflict” (Diamond, 1994: 3).  The rationale for changing such 
conditions is to forestall the emergence or resurgence of conflict (International Alert, 1998: 
28) while promoting “nation building, national reconciliation and healing, change agentry, 
and social transformation” (Botes, 2003: i. d.). 
 
4.3 Principles and objectives of conflict transformation theory 
Conflict transformation – popularised by conflict research scholar John Paul Lederach – is 
both a descriptive and prescriptive theoretical framework.  Lederach and Maiese (2003) posit 
that transformation as a theory describes conflict dynamics and prescribes the overall 
purpose of peacebuilding.  Its descriptive element is seen in its recognition of the dialectical 
nature of conflict and its underlying philosophy that conflict is not necessarily a bad 
phenomenon.67  At the prescriptive level, the theory emphasizes the need to change the 
                                                            
67 The descriptive facet of the conflict transformation perspective draws from Galtung’s (1996) analysis of the 
dialectics of conflict.  He notes that conflicts “undergo a variety of transformational processes” ranging from 
“articulation or disarticulation, conscientisation or de-conscientisation, complexification or simplification, [to] 
polarisation or depolarisation, and escalation or de-escalation” (Galtung, 1996: 90). 
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perceptions of parties about not just the issue in dispute but the environment in which they 
interact. 
 
While conflict management and conflict resolution have short-term and limited foci, the 
focus of conflict transformation is long-term and broader.  For instance, conflict management 
and conflict resolution seek to contain and mitigate conflict or solve immediate problems, 
whereas conflict transformation strives to shift the attitudes of parties, and transform 
structures and relationships for durable peace and harmonious coexistence.  In other words,  
conflict transformation offers more than the mere elimination or 
control of conflict (as is promised by the resolution or management 
of conflict). It points to the inherent dialectical process, the ability 
to transform the dynamic of the conflict and the relationship 
between the parties—indeed to transform the very creators of the 
conflict (Botes, 2003: i. d.). 
 
In the words of Wallensteen (1991: 130), “[a] successful case of conflict transformation is 
one where the parties, the issues and expectations are changed so that there is no longer a fear 
of war arising from the relationship.”  Importantly, conflict transformation goes deep to 
promote a healthy view of “the other”.  (This point ties in with Mamdani’s (2001) analysis of 
genocide in Rwanda: reducing “the other” to a bestial level or (in Rwanda’s case) “a 
cockroach”, which is to strip “the other” of their human qualities and hence to eliminate 
normal inhibitions about wanton slaughter of other humans.68)  Fundamentally, conflict 
transformation seeks to transform the structural conditions that trigger conflicts or bring 
about their recurrence.  Ultimately, conflict transformation strives to create “new social 
relations, institutions, and visions” (Väyrynen, 1999: 151).  It is about structural and systemic 
change that is accompanied by the modification of the attitudes of actors and their 
relationships. 
                                                            
68 I am grateful to my co-supervisor, Dr Alison Jones, for drawing my attention to this valuable point. 
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In view of its manifold constitutive elements, conflict transformation addresses conflict in a 
way that other paradigms do not.  Although scholars place relative emphases on the 
descriptive and prescriptive dimensions of the concept, Mitchell (2002: 9-10) identifies the 
common values that are integral to effective conflict transformation processes: 
(i) “Multi-level participation, involving elements from all social levels 
of all the involved parties, from top decision makers through middle-
range opinion leaders to grass roots constituents, including those who 
would normally be excluded from the process and whose interests 
would not be represented in ‘normal’ negotiations”. 
(ii) “Efforts to empower the ‘underdogs’ in the struggle so that solutions 
and changes can be sought between parties that are more equal than 
they would otherwise be”. 
(iii) “Efforts to ensure that those directly involved in the conflict can 
control the transformation processes to their own satisfaction and 
thus make sure that any outcomes have the approval and support of 
those affected”. 
(iv) “A focus not merely on immediate issues but also on long standing 
traumas and hurts, and on any deep-rooted sense of past injustices”. 
(v) “Brokerage by appropriate intermediaries who understand the culture 
and social structures in which the adversaries are embedded”. 
(vi) “Co-creation of a new understanding of the conflict, how it arose and 
what needs to be changed, in order both to resolve it and to ensure 
that other or similar disputes do not arise in future”. 
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(vii) “An ability to create and put in place procedures that will maintain 
and continue the changes found necessary to resolve the current 
conflict and prevent others arising in future, or – when they arise – 
taking on a protracted and destructive form”. 
(viii) “The mutual, inter-active education of adversaries about the nature of 
the socio-political and economic systems from which the conflict 
arose and of the dynamics of that conflict; and their training in skills 
that will enable them to deal with that conflict and others that may 
arise in future”. 
 
Mitchell’s list highlights conflict transformation’s sensitivity to issues, patterns of 
relationships and structures (beyond warring parties) that may constitute remote and 
proximate conflict triggers.  These important factors set conflict transformation apart from 
other perspectives.  Table 4.1 below summarises the discussion in this section thus far by 









Table 4.1: Conflict Management, Resolution and Transformation: A Brief Comparison of Frameworks 
 Conflict Management Conflict Resolution Conflict Transformation 
Framework Realism Idealism Radicalism 
Understanding of conflict Power politics; inherent in humans Unsatisfied human needs Structural inequalities 
Actor and structure Emphasis on actor from an 
objective perspective 
Emphasis on actor from an inter-
subjective perspective 
Emphasis on structure from a holistic 
perspective 
Change Static Linear Dialectical 
Process and strategy Competitive Problem-solving Empowering 
(Un)ending conflict Unending conflict; balance of 
power; stability 
Ending conflict; satisfying human 
needs 
Open-ended; institutional/systemic change 
The key question How do we contain something 
inevitable? 
How do we end something not 
desired? 
How do we end something destructive and 
build something desired? 
The focus It is phenomenon-centred It is content-centred It is relationship-centred 
The purpose To mitigate, contain, or reduce 
volatility/crisis 
To achieve an agreement and 
solution to the present problem 
creating the crisis 
To promote constructive change 
processes, inclusive of – but not limited to 
– immediate solutions 
The development process It is built around the issue of 
volatility and its reduction 
It is embedded and built around 
the immediacy of the relationship 
where the present problems appear 
It is concerned with responding to 
symptoms and engaging the systems 
within which relationships are embedded 
Time frame The horizon is spasmodic and 
short-term 
The horizon is short-term The horizon is mid- to long-range 
View of conflict It is inevitable and unresolvable It envisions the need to de-escalate 
conflict processes  
It envisions conflict as a dynamic of ebb 
(conflict de-escalation to pursue 
constructive change) and flow (conflict 
escalation to pursue constructive change)  
Lacunae Lacks theoretical understanding of 
intra-state conflict, institutions, 
peacebuilding, culture 
Lacks theoretical understanding of 
power asymmetry, institutions, 
peacebuilding, culture 
Lacks theoretical understanding of actor, 
intentionality, strategic interaction 
 
Sources: Adapted from Lederach and Maiese (2003: i. d.); Aggestam (1999: 24).
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As Table 4.1 shows, conflict transformation differs from both conflict management and 
conflict resolution in fundamental respects.  A cardinal element of conflict transformation, 
which differentiates it from the other frameworks, is that it takes a holistic view of conflict 
and seeks to transform not only the parties’ perceptions but also the environment within 
which conflict occurs.  Lederach and Maiese (2003: i. d.) identify four central modes that 
conflict transformation targets with an eye on building sustainable peace: personal/actor 
transformation, relational transformation, structural transformation, and cultural 
transformation.  Miall (2005: 10) modifies Lederach and Maiese’s typology and adds context 
and issue transformations to the list. 
 
Each mode highlights the goal of conflict transformation.  At the personal level, conflict 
transformation seeks to “[m]inimise the destructive effects of conflict and maximise the 
potential for personal growth at physical, emotional and spiritual levels” (Lederach and 
Maiese, 2003: i. d.).  Relational transformation deals with the minimisation of poorly 
functioning communication and the maximisation of understanding.  The structural mode 
underscores the understanding of and dealing with the root causes of violent conflict.  It 
emphasizes the promotion of non-violent mechanisms and the minimisation of violence.  It 
advocates the fostering of structures geared towards meeting basic human needs as well as 
the maximisation of public participation in processes aimed at building peace.  The cultural 
dimension addresses the cultural patterns that contribute to violent expressions of conflict.  It 
also underscores the mobilisation of cultural resources for handling conflict constructively 
(Lederach and Maiese, 2003: i. d.).  The elements and goals of these modes show that the 
conflict transformation approach targets the essentials in the social mosaic in the attempt to 
build sustainable peace.  The foci of these modes are summarised in Table 4.2 below: 
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Table 4.2: Conflict Transformation Modes 
 
Mode Focus 
Context transformation    change in local, national, regional and international    
environment 
Structure transformation  - change from asymmetric to symmetric relations 
- change in power structures 
- changes of markets of violence 
Actor transformation - changes of leadership 
- changes of goals 
- intra-party change 
- changes in party’s constituencies 
- changing actors 
Issue transformation - transcendence of contested issues 
- constructive compromise 
- changing issues 
- de-linking or re-linking issues 
Personal/elite transformation - changes of perspective 
- changes of heart 
- changes of will 
- gestures of conciliation 
 
Source: Miall (2005). 
 
An examination of the literature on conflict transformation shows that the perspective 
advocates a commitment to long-term, structural and relational transformation.  In the 
absence or aftermath of a war, the transformational processes translate to peacebuilding.  
Therefore, conflict transformation is often linked or equated with peacebuilding (Whetho, 
2006: 70).  Analysts and practitioners (in the field of peace and conflict studies) sometimes 
use the terms interchangeably.  This derives from the realisation that conflict transformation 
and peacebuilding share certain elements or goals.  These include: 
• Identifying and dealing with fear, grief, and bitterness on the part of parties and 
rebuilding trust.  
• Reconciliation. 
• Developing a new perception of “the other”. 
• Demobilisation and demilitarisation. 
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• Increasing justice and equality. 
• Equitable resource sharing. 
• Reintegration of displaced populations.  
• Jump starting the economy.  
• Reconstruction or infrastructure rehabilitation.   
 
From a conflict transformation perspective, these elements are integral to altering a conflict 
situation and building peace.  Moreover, three steps are outlined towards building peace: (i) 
analysing the present situation; (ii) mapping the horizon of preferred future; and (iii) 
developing change processes linking the first two steps.  Certain practical variables are also 
fundamental to building peace, especially in the post-conflict epoch.  The factors that 
contribute to the success of the peacebuilding process include, inter alia, forgiveness, 
reconciliation, (re-)establishment of functional relationships and institutional capabilities as 
well as reconstruction (Rasmussen, 1997: 40).  Lederach and Maiese (2003: i. d.) posit that 
ultimately, conflict transformation is all about ending something not desired (pain and 
suffering) and building something that is desired, such as sustainable peace. 
 
A penetrating analysis of several narratives shows that the theory of “conflict transformation 
reflects a better understanding of the nature of conflict itself” (Bastidas and Gonzalez, 2008: 
2).  As noted earlier, conflict transformation goes further and deeper than conflict 
management and conflict resolution thereby addressing the shortcomings of the other 
approaches.  To an extent, then, conflict transformation theory fits Kuhn’s explication of “a 
change in visual gestalt”, which signifies a paradigm shift (in Jones, 2010: 45).  However, as 
is the case with any social construct, conflict transformation has a number of limitations.   
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Limitations of conflict transformation theory are as follows: although its emphasis on 
structures helps in the understanding of indirect violence, it minimises (the roles of) human 
personality and strategic interaction in conflict dynamics.  As Aggestam (1999: 23) argues:  
One weakness of conflict transformation is the inclination to 
overemphasise structures. Structures are considered to determine 
human behaviour.  Thus, the consciousness and reasoning of 
individuals and the strategic interaction receive less attention in 
some of these analyses.  For instance, structural violence is a much 
appreciated concept for understanding indirect violence but it is an 
abstract notion.  It tends to reduce individuals to the role of victims 
without revealing or attempting to analyse the more complex and 
contradictory understanding of the interplay between individuals 
and structures. 
 
Furthermore, conflict transformation is regarded as idealistic and value-laden (Lederach and 
Maiese, 2003: i. d.).  This view is predicated on the primacy of prescriptive notions such as 
justice, mercy, compassion, empathy, forgiveness and reconciliation.  In practice, some or all 
of these notions do not necessarily exert (decisive) influence on warring parties and 
profiteering networks in conflict situations and during peace processes.  The question is, to 
what extent do these moral codes influence parties driven by realpolitik or economic agendas 
within a conflict environment?  Proponents of conflict transformation continue to grapple 
with this question. 
 
In relation to the three main schools of thought on conflict, Nicholson (1992: 22) contends 
that they are somewhat illusory and pretentious, focusing more on social engineering than on 
social science.  Nonetheless, despite Nicholson’s contention, as well as other documented 
weaknesses of transformation theory, this chapter argues in favour of conflict transformation 
theory.  The argument can be summarised as follows: firstly, “the goal of transformation is 
unique in that it involves a supreme value that the other concepts do not encompass” (Bush 
and Folger, 1994: 81).  Secondly, with reference to the supreme value of conflict 
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transformation, Bastidas and Gonzalez (2008: 3) note: “[c]onflict transformation in current 
peacebuilding practice seeks long-term peacebuilding efforts oriented to outcomes, processes, 
and structural changes.  Its goal is to overcome conflict, transform unjust social relationships, 
and promote conditions that can help to create cooperative relationships.”  Similarly, Miall’s 
(2005: 17) position on the utility of conflict transformation highlights the supreme value of 
the perspective, which the author describes as follows:  
Conflict transformation is a comprehensive approach, addressing a 
range of dimensions (micro- to macro- issues, local to global 
levels, grassroots to elite actors, short-term to long-term 
timescales).  It aims to develop capacity and to support structural 
change, rather than to facilitate outcomes or deliver settlements.  It 
seeks to engage with conflict at the pre-violence and post-violence 
phases, and with the causes and consequences of violent conflict, 
which usually extend beyond the site of fighting. 
 
The strength of conflict transformation theory lies in its comprehensiveness, its emphasis on 
tackling the root causes of conflict, and its recognition of the need to change not only 
situations but also people, relationships, structures and agencies that engender conflict.  
Therefore, the approach holds greater promise for altering a conflict situation and for building 
peace.  This awareness of the potential of conflict transformation underscores the growing 
scholarly interest in applying the framework.  While conflict transformation theory does not 
quite fit the contours outlined by Kuhn (1970: 204) – “neural reprogramming”– as 
prerequisites of a paradigm revolution, it nonetheless qualifies as a significant paradigm shift. 
 
Finally, and most importantly in the specific context of the thesis, its author emphasises the 
relevance of applying conflict transformation theory to the DRC.  As noted above, conflict 
transformation takes cognisance of the dialectics of conflict, that is, the ebbs and flows that 
characterise conflict situations.  Over the years, the DRC has witnessed transformational 
processes ranging from simplification to complexification, polarisation to de-polarisation, 
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and escalation to de-escalation of conflicts.  In addition, a conflict transformation approach to 
studying the DRC conflict explicates the varied impacts that factors such as historical 
legacies, agencies, structures, and relationships between national and international actors 
have on the conflict.  It furnishes insights into the roles of MNCs and the impacts of their 
activities on the DRC’s conflicts and peace process.  Most significantly, conflict 
transformation theory offers useful ideas for building peace in societies plagued by conflict, 
such as the DRC.  It recommends a range of activities that should be undertaken to create 
conditions for peace.  These prescriptions are of relevance in the DRC context.   Therefore, 
this study adopts key elements of conflict transformation in its explication and analysis of the 
DRC conflict and the country’s peace process. 
 
For the purpose of a holistic explanatory and analytical framework, which incorporates the 
study’s perception of the interactive relationship or interface between conflicts and MNCs, 
the following section therefore addresses two main corporate governance regimes that shape 
MNCs’ relationship with their host environments.  These two regimes determine the societal 
roles of MNCs and the extent to which other actors influence corporate behaviour in the 
public sphere. 
 
4.4 Theoretical perspectives on corporate governance 
As noted above, scholars have propounded several theories on MNCs.  These theories 
straddle the fields of economics, marketing, management, law, and international relations.  
The majority of these theories, expounded and popularised by economists, address the 
(rationale for the) expansion of capital and FDIs by MNCs.  Other theories in the fields of 
management and law explain the ownership and control of MNCs.  It is instructive to note, 
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however, that these theories largely ignore the social environment of MNCs.69  In effect, 
these theories overlook the impacts of corporate behaviour on society.  Most economic 
theories of MNCs view and treat corporations essentially as private actors whose primary 
obligations pertain to satisfying the interests of shareholders.  These theories are underpinned 
by the understanding that MNCs tend to maximise the interests of their shareholders “without 
necessarily accepting responsibility for the consequences of [their actions] in national 
jurisdiction[s]” (Vernon, 1998: 28).  In reality however, there is a growing realisation of the 
interlacing of the destinies of businesses and states.  MNCs are part of society: hence, the 
larger social and political contexts in which they are situated shape their operations and affect 
their fortunes, including their overarching profit maximisation agenda. 
 
Although economic theories of MNCs do not focus on the social aspects of corporate actions, 
they are useful for understanding certain economic fundaments such as the logic of capital 
expansion, investment decisions, and the implications of market structures/conditions for 
profit.  However, from an international political economy perspective, the social and political 
environments in which MNCs operate are central to understanding corporate behaviour.  
Beyond the logic of profit maximisation, company behaviour is shaped by factors that are 
external to the company.  Societal pressures leading to the implementation of CSR activities 
by MNCs lend credence to this view.  While there is a “business case” for CSR, the 
involvement of corporate actors in the public sphere is in recognition of the fact that 
                                                            
69 To illustrate this point, Hennart’s (2009: 125-145) critical survey focuses only on theories that explain why 
MNCs exist.  Hennart identifies three broad explanatory frameworks: trade theories, industrial organisation 
theories, and transaction cost/internalisation theories.  An earlier study by Kuşluvan (1998: 163-180) examines 
the theories that explain international operations of MNCs.  These theories, which overlap with Hennart’s 
typology, include the location theory of international investment (MNCs are attracted by favourable demand and 
supply factors abroad), the Aliber theory (financial market relations and currency regimes that favour MNCs), 
Hymer-Kindleberger theory (market structures that give MNCs incentives to go abroad), and product cycle 
theory (technological innovations and new products enable firms to undertake international investment). 
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companies are part of society.  Therefore, the corporation cannot and should not be treated in 
isolation from society. 
 
In reality, there are linkages between business and society.  Business interfaces with society 
at different levels or stages of operation, for example product design, marketing/sales, and 
social responsibility projects.  The linkages at these levels determine the strategic behaviour 
of MNCs in host environments.  Given the subject matter of this research, which investigates 
a socio-political phenomenon (namely conflict), the interface between corporations and other 
actors becomes salient.  For any theoretical construct to be relevant to this study, it should 
necessarily go beyond the emphasis on capital or investment to encapsulate other actors 
whose actions or inactions (potentially) affect the corporation and vice versa.  Theories of the 
corporation that explore the linkage between business and society (that is, other stakeholders 
besides shareholders) are of scholarly utility.70  The relevance of such theories to this 
research is because MNCs’ actions unleash impacts – positive and/or negative – on host 
communities just as the activities of stakeholders shape the behaviour of MNCs.  In addition, 
these theories offer explanations regarding the conception of MNCs either as (strictly) private 
actors or as entities that are accountable to other stakeholders.  It is through these lenses – the 
conceptions of MNCs – that one can begin to analyse their social responsibility roles in their 
areas of operations as well as their potentially ambivalent roles in conflict situations. 
 
Two dominant paradigms explain the interface between the corporation and the society (or 
the lack of it): the contractarian and the communitarian/social institution schools.  The 
                                                            
70 I am grateful to Olufemi Amao of the University College Cork – National University of Ireland, Cork, Ireland 
for his comments and suggestions on this point, for sharing with me some of his research findings on MNCs, 
and for providing me with one of his scholarly works on MNCs.  This section draws partly from his work, 
“Reconstructing the role of the Corporation: Multinational Corporations as Public Actors in Nigeria”, Dublin 
University Law Journal, Vol. 29, 2007, pp. 312-340. 
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sections that follow discuss these scholarly approaches to the conceptualisation of MNCs as 
well as their relevance to this study.  First, the study discusses contractarianism. 
 
4.4.1 A private actor: a contractarian view of the multinational corporation 
Contractarianism has a long tradition.  The intellectual foundations of the contractarian 
school can be located in “the liberal-utilitarian model of Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Bentham and 
Mill”, which “emphasizes the primacy of the law and protecting rights and enforcing 
contracts” (Amao, 2007: 313).  In order to protect rights, each constituency within and 
outside the corporation is bound by precepts enshrined in binding contracts.  The 
contractarian theory argues that the role of the state, as far as corporate governance is 
concerned, is to provide an enabling environment that protects the rights of shareholders.  
Laws made by the state should not excessively restrain corporate behaviour.  These 
assumptions account for contractarianism’s neo-liberal orientation. 
 
Contractarian theory states that “the sole purpose of the corporation is to maximise 
shareholder’s profit” (Amao, 2007: 313).71  According to contractarians, the corporation 
exists at the behest of its shareholders.  Therefore, shareholders are the corporation’s residual 
claimants and as such, managers owe fiduciary duties exclusively to shareholders (Macey and 
Miller, 1993: 423).  Given the definitive priority accorded to shareholders, the paradigm is 
also known as the “shareholder primacy model”.  This paradigm, which is preeminent in 
corporate law, rejects contending views that ostensibly undermine the primacy of 
shareholders.  From a contractarian perspective, actors and factors external to the corporation, 
including social pressures, should not be allowed to weaken shareholders’ ultimate control 
over the corporation.  The maximisation of shareholder value takes precedence over all other 
                                                            
71 This view is in line with Friedman’s (1970: i. d.) assertion that the “social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits.”  The “Friedmanesque” idea, referred to earlier (supra, page 93), evidently provided the 
intellectual linchpin for the contractarian perspective. 
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considerations.  Managers are thus obliged to ensure that corporate actions serve the best 
interests of shareholders at all times.  Although the corporation may be concerned about the 
welfare of other constituencies at times, contractual or regulatory processes should be 
emplaced to ensure that the interests of shareholders are not jeopardised by concern for 
external constituencies.  Although the corporation may provide social welfare, managers 
should always remain “strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct 
terms, only to those interests” (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001: 439).  The protection of the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies is not the responsibility of the corporation. 
 
According to Amao (2007: 313), this shareholder-oriented model, which enjoys currency in 
the United States, “has been the bulwark for decades against realisation of other stakeholder 
protection within the corporate governance structure by discouraging the inclusion of other 
stakeholders’ issues in its scope.”  In other words, shareholder primacy has ensured the 
exclusion of the interests and concerns of non-shareholders from the corporate agenda.  At 
worst, such concerns and interests have been ignored; at best, they have been given marginal 
consideration in terms of their utility to maximising shareholder value.  As a result, little or 
no attention has been paid to the social, economic, political and environmental impacts of 
corporate behaviour. 
 
The intellectual roots of contractarianism continue to shape the character and behaviour of 
modern corporations.  As Mitchell (2001: 28) notes, “this conception of the corporation is a 
perversion of the enlightenment concept of autonomy, which emphasizes individualism and 
denies caring and community, and suggests that the pressure to maximize stockholder’s value 
often makes good corporations bad.”  The contractarian theory “emphasizes the private 
function of the corporation while downplaying its social roles” (Amao, 2007: 315).  The 
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reality, however, is that MNCs’ activities in host communities are not always entirely 
“private” or shareholder-driven.  For example, pressure from local communities, NGOs and 
governments often compel MNCs to undertake social responsibility projects.  In conflict 
zones, corporate actions are usually subject to public scrutiny.  Observers, and more 
importantly, civil society actors, are constantly seeking to assess the impacts of MNCs’ 
activities in conflict areas.  In the public domain and in a conflict situation, a corporation’s 
actions are viewed, not as those of a private actor, but as those of a stakeholder in society. 
 
Although the contractarian model finds relevance where MNCs’ operations in a zone of 
conflict seek to maximise shareholders’ interest vis-à-vis profit maximisation, it does not lend 
itself readily to the analysis of corporate peacebuilding which seeks to benefit, not just 
shareholders, but other stakeholders and the society at large.72  In reality, non-shareholder 
constituencies often make claims on the corporations.  In some cases, these claims undermine 
shareholder value rather than maximise it.  Powerful non-shareholder constituencies may 
modify corporate behaviour in ways that shareholders did not envisage, or in ways that they 
disagree with, or in ways that produce outcomes that do not make “business sense” from 
shareholders’ standpoint.  In order to understand corporate behaviour, other actors in society 
really matter.  This is because “non-shareholder constituencies plainly have a significant 
interest in a wide range of decisions that a firm may be called upon to make” (Macey and 
Miller, 1993: 423).  The contractarian theory downplays important intervening variables such 
as the influences of several non-shareholder constituencies.  Moreover, as highlighted below, 
there is another significant drawback in contractarianism. 
 
                                                            
72 A counterargument is that the quest to maximize profit could still entail or require that the MNC should 
implement social improvement projects or facilitate peacebuilding if not doing so assures failure to maintain the 
capacity to continue operating in a particular place.  In such a case, a social activity or corporate peacebuilding 
makes good business sense and, as such, could be deemed part and parcel of the quest to maximise profits. 
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Amao (2007: 319) contends that the contractarian theory “ignores the local context in which 
MNCs operate and distances the corporation from society”.  To ignore the operational context 
of MNCs is to assume that MNCs function in a vacuum or that they exist in isolation from 
society.  In reality, however, MNCs operate in a social context, which consists of several 
actors and interests.  Therefore, the “local context” (the social and political environment) in 
which MNCs operate, is germane to this research in that it aids the understanding of the 
intricate social realities associated with MNCs’ behaviour in zones of conflict.  A conflict 
situation typifies the local context in which MNCs operate.  In a conflict situation, corporate 
actions are determined, not only by (the interests of) constituencies within corporations, but 
also by (the activities of) other actors as this study illustrates.  The contractarian theory is of 
limited utility to this study because it ignores the local context of MNCs.  The next section 
discusses the communitarian paradigm. 
 
4.4.2 The communitarian paradigm: the multinational corporation as a complex social 
institution 
For the reasons outlined above, this study adopts the communitarian model (also known as 
the social institution model) as its broad theoretical framework.  Communitarianism stands in 
stark contrast to the contractarian theory.  Communitarians view the corporation as an entity 
whose purpose serves a broader function.  This conception of the corporation argues that 
managers need to take cognisance of the welfare of all the constituencies with which the 
corporation interacts.  Although managers do not owe fiduciary duties to non-shareholder 
constituencies, they ought to consider the welfare of these constituencies (Greenfield, 2006: 
148).  Communitarians believe that fixation with profit maximisation on the part of 
corporations is detrimental to the interests of non-shareholder constituencies.  Such fixation 
renders non-shareholder constituencies vulnerable to harmful corporate decisions and actions. 
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The communitarian model “introduces a new conception of the corporation through 
recognition of the claims of other stakeholders” (Amao, 2007: 315).  Communitarians see the 
corporation as “a community of interdependence, mutual trust and reciprocal benefit” 
(Millon, 1995: 10).  From this perspective, constituencies within the corporation have a 
responsibility to ensure – as the idea of interdependence presupposes – that their actions 
promote the overall welfare of society.  Corporate actions should therefore take cognisance of 
this responsibility.  Some communitarians stretch this view even further: they argue that the 
incorporation of this responsibility into the corporate agenda should not be voluntary (that is 
left to the discretion of corporations) but should be mandatory and enshrined in 
statutory/regulatory instruments (Millon, 1995: 12).  The idea here is that doing so will serve 
to protect non-shareholder constituencies from harmful corporate behaviour.  It will also 
enable these constituencies to seek redress where corporate actions produce deleterious 
impacts. 
 
The communitarian model conceives the corporation as “a complex social institution, which 
cannot be adequately conceptualized through the contractarian view or the concept of 
ownership” (Amao, 2007: 315).  This view of the corporation is instructive given that modern 
corporations seek legitimacy from both insiders and the wider society, thus introducing a 
public interest dimension into the operations of MNCs (Amao, 2007: 316).73  Reference to 
the wider society implies that there are non-shareholder constituencies or other stakeholders 
                                                            
73 A caveat is necessary here: much in the same way a contractarian might conceive that the best way to 
maximize profits is to be on the good side of the host community, it is plausible to argue that the communitarian 
is fundamentally no different since he (she) did not go into business per se to develop the community but rather 
to make a good living by extracting as much profits as possible but resolving to do so by taking the position that 
the host community should be enabled to accept that it (MNC) really does have its best interests at heart.  Unless 
such a company is organized in the form of a cooperative in which there is broad-based community ownership, 
the involvement of non-shareholder constituencies may be just another ploy to further shareholder interest as 
contractarians argue. 
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(external to the corporation) whose interests, aspirations and actions impinge on MNCs’ 
activities just as MNCs’ operations affect these stakeholders.74  The realisation that MNCs 
interface with other stakeholders in their areas of operations for the actualisation of mutual or 
sometimes incongruent interests forms the bedrock of the stakeholder theory, which is a key 
ingredient of the communitarian paradigm given that it espouses the main assumptions of the 
paradigm. 
 
4.4.3 Stakeholder theory: a seminal element of communitarianism 
In regard to MNCs, this study derives its analytical momentum from stakeholder theory 
which explains not only the structure of the corporation but also its operation.  The theory 
conceives the corporation as “an organizational entity through which numerous and diverse 
participants accomplish multiple and not always congruent purposes” (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995: 65).  The stakeholder theory, which enjoys currency in many European Union 
(EU) member states75, draws from the fact that the activities of MNCs affect others in society 
(and vice versa).  All those affected make up the corporation’s stakeholder base, which 
encapsulates shareholders, employees, customers, managers, suppliers, local communities, 
political groups and the government.  Advocates of the stakeholder paradigm contend that the 
corporation is accountable and responsible – albeit in varying degrees – to groups in society 
(Matten and Crane, 2005: 166).  The argument that corporations are accountable and 
responsible towards other groups in society is premised on the fact that the activities of 
corporations affect such groups.  The number of those affected by a corporation’s operations 
determines its stakeholder base.  The larger the number of those affected, the bigger the 
stakeholder base and vice versa. 
                                                            
74 A stakeholder is defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). 
75 It has to be stated though that nearly all EU MNCs are not really very different in their operational behaviour 
outside of the EU because the corporate governance paradigm in these other societies (which conceives the 
corporation as essentially private institution) is fundamentally contractarian. 
137 
 
Stakeholders fall into two categories: primary and secondary stakeholders.  Primary 
stakeholders refer to “those whose participation directly ensures the continuity of the 
corporation as a going concern” (Amao, 2007: 320).  Shareholders, employees, and 
customers constitute the primary stakeholder group.  Also included in this category is a very 
important cluster, the “public stakeholder group”, which is made up of “governments and 
communities that provides [sic] necessary infrastructure, market and the enabling legal 
framework” for corporations to function (Amao, 2007: 320).  The secondary stakeholder 
group consists of “those who influence or affect or are influenced or affected by the 
corporation but are not in transactions with the company or necessary for its survival” 
(Amao, 2007: 320).  In other words, secondary stakeholders do not have direct transactional 
relationship or business interactions with corporations, although they affect, or are affected 
by, the actions of corporations.  Depending on the stakeholder base of a corporation, the 
secondary stakeholder category comprises business support groups, NGOs/advocacy groups, 
the academic community and the media.  These constituencies shape corporate behaviour as 
much as their activities are also influenced by the operations of corporations.  Figure 4.1, a 
diagrammatic representation the stakeholder paradigm, depicts the interface between MNCs 









Figure 4.1: The Stakeholder Model of the Corporation 
 
Source: Adapted from Donaldson and Preston (1995: 69). 
 
Figure 4.1 above portrays some of the stakeholders who affect, or are affected by, the 
corporation’s activities.  The arrows show the relational flows, and consequently, the 
direction of influence in the interactions between the corporation and its stakeholders.  
Essentially, the figure illustrates the idea that corporate actions influence and affect 
stakeholders while the latter’s activities shape corporate behaviour. 
 
Against this backdrop, proponents of the stakeholder theory argue that the corporation “has a 
responsibility to society, and constituents of society, just as much as it has responsibility to its 
shareholders” (Wan-Jan, 2006: 181).  That said, stakeholder theory does not dismiss 
shareholders as irrelevant or unimportant.  Rather, the theory – although it rejects the idea 
that shareholders’ interests must always prevail – acknowledges the pivotal position of 
shareholders in the existence and operations of the corporation.  As Wan-Jan (2006: 181) 
notes, “it is also important to point out that stakeholder theory does not advocate abandoning 































serve.”  What the stakeholder theory does is to accord non-shareholder constituencies the 
requisite recognition as important actors whose activities influence corporate behaviour and 
ultimately facilitate or hamper the attainment of corporate objectives.  Given the existence of 
other stakeholders who affect, and are affected by, the corporation, theoretical explications of 
corporate behaviour, especially in the public sphere or in social contexts, must take 
cognisance of these stakeholders.  In defining the broad contours of the interactions between 
the corporation and stakeholders, the theory offers insights into how corporations behave and, 
therefore, is a useful tool for predicting corporate behaviour. 
 
4.4.4 Towards a synthesis: the multinational corporation and the private-public 
interface 
A review of the contractarian and communitarian arguments highlights a bifurcation in terms 
of each paradigm’s conception of the corporation.  The contractarian paradigm construes 
corporations as private actors; the communitarian school views them as public institutions.  
Amao refers to this binary as the public-private institution distinction.  The conception of the 
corporation has important ramifications in practice.  To be clear, the paradigms assume the 
status of corporate governance regimes in practice, not just analytical constructs.  In this 
way, the corporate governance regime that the government of a country adopts determines 
“the amenability of corporations to regulation and their responsiveness to other stakeholder 
issues” (Amao, 2007: 320).  The adoption of the contractarian governance regime by a 
government significantly limits the role of the corporation in society and the extent to which 
other stakeholders can influence the corporation.  In addition, the corporation may not readily 
acknowledge or accept responsibility for the societal impacts of its activities.  On the other 
hand, the communitarian conception is anchored on the premise that the corporation is “a 
source of public power which receives its licence to operate from society, and therefore 
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should be channelled to serve public interest” (Amao, 2007: 322).  Proponents of this 
conception argue that “since society allows corporations to exist through its legal system it is 
incumbent on corporations to be of benefit to society” (Amao, 2007: 322).  Amao, for 
instance, does not suggest that “the private structure of the corporation should be abandoned 
but that the private structure should be used to benefit public interest” (Amao, 2007: 322).  
The fundamental premises of communitarianism have important repercussions.  The adoption 
of the communitarian governance regime can encroach on the rights of the corporation (a 
legal entity that is usually accorded statutory protection) and can curtail the legitimate 
influence that investors and shareholders ought to exercise. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that paradigms of the corporation have implications in practice.  
Wolfe (1993: 1675) sums up the implications and concludes thereof:  
If we believe that corporations are private agents, they are free to 
mind their own business outside the purview of the rest of society 
…. If, on the other hand, corporations are understood as public 
actors, all these conclusions are reversed.  Corporations have 
obligations not only to their shareholders, but also to others in the 
society as well; they have public duties…. [Emphasis added]. 
 
Wolfe’s conclusion coheres with the European Union’s position that corporations operate in 
the public sphere and as such play public roles (Amao, 2007: 321).  Thus, in the European 
context, other stakeholders feature prominently in holding corporations to account for their 
activities. 
 
The conception of the corporation influences the way(s) that companies behave, their 
relationship with stakeholders, and corporate governance regimes in host environments.  
Although this study utilises the stakeholder approach in its capacity as an important feature of 
the communitarian paradigm, it nonetheless acknowledges that corporations, at times, 
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execute transactions that are strictly private and primarily shareholder-driven.  For instance, 
corporations conduct a number of intra-firm and inter-firm operations on a daily basis.  At 
other times, an action that the corporation considers private, in fact, affects other stakeholders 
in society.  Still, some corporate actions are explicitly public-oriented, such as CSR activities.  
At any given time and with respect to a given issue, a corporation (and its activities) may 
straddle the private-public domains, blurring the distinction between both in the process.  
Therefore, it is possible to conceive of the corporation as any of, or a combination of the 
following: a private agent, a public actor, a private agent with public roles, and a public actor 
with private roles.  A nuanced conception of the character and roles of the corporation allows 
for an understanding of the activities of MNCs in the social context, such as in a conflict 
situation, which enlarges corporations’ stakeholder base.  Here lies the utility of the 
stakeholder approach to this study.  In a conflict situation, MNCs’ stakeholders include the 
groups identified above, as well as national armies, armed groups/rebels/militias, and 
intervenors.  These stakeholders shape corporate behaviour in conflict zones, just as the 
corporate actions affect these stakeholders, including their ability to attain political objectives 
in respect of the conflict situation.  Therefore, this study utilises the approach while 
simultaneously acknowledging the private-public interface of MNCs’ operations.  
 
An analysis of stakeholder relationships furnishes an understanding of corporate behaviour in 
the public domain.  Moreover, an analysis which emphasizes the public roles of the 
corporation and corporate accountability to the society is germane to understanding the 
potentially ambivalent roles of MNCs in zones of conflict.  In other words, the stakeholder 
approach lends itself easily to explicating corporate actors’ complicity in conflict on one hand 
and corporate peacebuilding on the other.   More importantly, the stakeholder theory’s 
emphasis on the local context in which corporations operate is of considerable utility in 
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unpacking the strategic behaviours of MNCs in conflict zones.  Therefore, this research 
extrapolates and applies the assumptions of the stakeholder approach in the analysis of 
corporate behaviour in the DRC’s conflicts. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined conflict transformation theory and the stakeholder theory of 
MNCs.  Specifically, the chapter unpacked the idea of conflict intervention using three 
analytical frames: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.  It 
made a case for conflict transformation in view of its strengths.  It was noted that conflict 
transformation differs in certain fundamental ways from the cognate concepts of conflict 
management and conflict resolution.  A distinguishing element of the conflict transformation 
perspective is the idea that conflicts undergo several processes or ebbs and flows depending 
on the interests and actions of belligerents and intervenors.  In addition, conflict 
transformation places emphasis on post-conflict processes that seek to forestall a return to 
status quo ante bellum.  Most importantly, it advocates the emplacement of structures and 
conditions that are necessary for post-conflict peacebuilding.  Conflict transformation is of 
utility to this study in the context of the ebbs and flows that have characterised conflicts in 
the DRC.  In addition, the concept is an important analytical tool for charting a post-conflict 
path for the DRC. 
 
For the purpose of providing a holistic framework for understanding corporate behaviour in 
the public sphere in general and in conflict environments in particular, the chapter also 
examined two dominant paradigms: contractarianism and communitarianism.  It was noted 
that the contractarian approach views the corporation as a private actor whose actions are 
driven always by the idea of shareholder primacy.  As shown above, contractarianism as a 
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corporate governance paradigm gives little or no attention to the social context in which 
MNCs operate.  By contrast, communitarianism conceives of the corporation as a public actor 
to the extent that its activities affect and are affected by other stakeholders.  A corporation’s 
stakeholders are significant in shaping corporate behaviour.  In the context of this study, these 
stakeholders are pivotal in influencing the activities of MNCs in conflict zones. 
 
Finally, the chapter synthesized the elements of the contractarian and communitarian 
paradigms.  It was concluded that an examination of the roles of the MNCs in the social 
context underscores a nuanced understanding of corporations as private-public actors.  In 
rounding off this chapter, it is instructive to note that the review of narratives and arguments 
(in Chapter Two) and analyses of MNC-related issues (in Chapter Three and in this chapter) 
provide the backdrop for explicating corporate behaviour in the DRC – the study’s location.  
Prior to examining corporate behaviour in the DRC, however, it is necessary to present 
pertinent information on the country and the dynamics of conflict.  Therefore, the next 
chapter focuses on the study’s location: it presents an overview of the DRC and discusses the 












THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: ‘SCANDALE GÉOLOGIQUE’ AND 
THE LONGEVITY OF CONFLICT 
“Congo is a big country – you will eat it until you tire away”76 
(quoted in Whitman, 2012: 129). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined two theories that frame the epistemic contours of this study: 
conflict transformation and stakeholder theories.  It was noted that conflict transformation 
captures the dialectics of conflict and prescribes mechanisms for building peace – attributes 
that underscore its relevance to the DRC, a country that has been plagued by protracted 
conflicts.  The stakeholder theory of MNCs foregrounds the interactions between a company 
and society.  As noted above, the analysis of stakeholder relationships shows how corporate 
actions affect society on one hand, and how other actors in society influence corporate 
behaviour on the other hand.  In conflict situations, such as the DRC, such an interlocking 
relationship shapes the trajectory of conflict and the prospects of peace.  The chapter 
furnished important insights into the private activities and public roles of MNCs.  A crucial 
area of scholarly interest, given the phenomenal expansion of MNCs, is the presence of 
corporations in conflict zones.  A conflict zone in which MNCs have been active since 1996 
is the DRC. 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the study’s location – the DRC – with specific reference 
to its history, geopolitical attributes and its economy.  It highlights the DRC’s enormous 
natural resource endowment, arguably an unparalleled trait that gives the country the 
designation of ‘scandale géologique’, translated literally as geological scandal (Nzongola-
                                                            
76 This translation of an expression in Kiswahili (a language spoken in Central and East Africa) is indicative of 
the DRC’s enormous natural wealth, which domestic and external actors have plundered unrestrainedly. 
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Ntalaja, 2002: 4, 13).  However, in another sense, scandale géologique speaks to the 
contradictions of the DRC’s enormous natural resource base: the country’s mineral wealth is 
a significant factor in its perennial woes.  Based on this premise, this chapter highlights the 
centrality of natural resources to the vicious cycles of instability in the country.  Specifically, 
it discusses the exploitation of the DRC’s resources in relation to ‘Africa’s world war’ – the 
deadliest conflict in the continent’s contemporary history.  The tortuousness of the war 
(which engulfed the DRC between 1998 and 2003) derived from the involvement of several 
national armies, armed groups and profiteering networks with strategic/security, military and 
economic agendas in which the exploitation of conflict minerals featured prominently.  The 
discussion of the First and Second Congo Wars illustrates the resource-conflict nexus.  
Finally, this chapter – in its explication of the resource dimensions of Congo’s current 
traumas – highlights the international demand for, and exploitation and trafficking of, 
columbite-tantalite (commonly known as coltan) as a key factor in conflict perpetuation 
especially in the volatile eastern region of the country. 
 
5.2 Overview of the DRC: history, geopolitics and economy 
“Africa has the shape of a revolver; the trigger is the Congo” 
(Frantz Fanon, quoted in Mutume, 1999: i. d.). 
 
The DRC, situated across the Equator and located in Central Africa, is the continent’s second 
largest country after Algeria.77  Its total land mass is 2,344,858 square kilometres.  The DRC 
“is nearly twice the size of South Africa, three times the size of Nigeria, five times the size of 
France, and over 80 times the size of little Belgium, its former colonial power” (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 1998: i. d.).  A testimony to the country’s colossal size is that it shares borders with 
the following nine countries in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa: Angola, Burundi, 
                                                            
77 Until July 2011, the DRC was Africa’s third largest country after Algeria and Sudan.  However, the DRC 
became Africa’s second largest country sequel to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan. 
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Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia.78  The DRC “has three distinct land areas” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 168).  
These are: (i) “the tropical rain forests, located in the central and northern parts of the 
country”; (ii) “the savannahs, located in the northern and southern parts of the country”; and 
(iii) “the highlands, which consist of the plateaux, rolling meadows, and mountains found 
along the country’s eastern border, all along the Great Rift Valley.”  Of the DRC’s total 
landmass, “only 3% is arable land and 77 % [consists of] forests and woodland” (Moyroud 
and Katunga, 2002: 168).  The DRC’s population (based on 2013 estimates) is 75,507,308, 
with an annual growth rate of 2.54% (CIA, 2013: i. d.). 
 
In terms of economic profile, natural resource abundance is the most important factor in the 
country’s strategic significance.  Of all the world’s countries, the DRC is arguably the best 
endowed with natural resources.79  It “possesses 50% of Africa’s forests”, and its forestry as 
well as mineral resource profile underscore “its potential role as an economic power in 
central Africa” (Vandiver, 2010: i. d.).  Natural resources (see section 5.3 below) provide the 
backbone for the national economy.  The mining sector is the single largest source of export 
income.  Other export commodities include wood products and coffee.  The DRC’s main 
imports consist of foodstuffs, transport equipment, mining machinery and fuels.  The highest 
contributions to gross domestic product (GDP), based on 2012 estimates, are agriculture 
(44.2%), industry (22.6%) and services (33.1%).  The country’s economic growth rate is 
seven percent per annum (CIA, 2013: i. d.).  Its GDP per capita is estimated at US$ 400.  
However, 71% of its population live below the poverty line, placing its people in the bracket 
of the poorest on earth.  This poverty level contrasts sharply with the country’s economic 
growth rate and enormous mineral wealth.  Political instability, corruption and predatory 
                                                            
78 See Appendix 1 for the map of the DRC. 
79 See section 5.3 of this chapter for the DRC’s natural resource profile. 
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mineral exploitation have severely hampered the DRC’s ability to translate its potentials into 
economic gains. 
 
Furthermore, the DRC is endowed with enormous water resources, including an impressive 
network of waterways.  The Congo River carries the second largest volume of water in the 
world; its flow into the Atlantic Ocean has been measured at 40,000 cubic metres per second 
(Gourou, 1980).  This flow of the Congo River is a potential source of hydroelectric power.  
The potential to generate hydroelectric power has been harnessed – albeit marginally – 
through the Inga Dam projects (that is, Inga I, Inga II, Inga III, and Grand Inga), with the 
capacity to supply the electricity needs of the DRC and its neighbours.80  Based on the 
assessments of their hydroelectric potential, it has been observed that the Inga projects could 
“light up the whole of Africa” (Games, 2013: i. d.).  The DRC’s power generation capacity 
makes it a strategically important country in Africa, especially in view of the continent’s 
energy needs. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned attributes, the DRC has the prospect of putatively being 
Africa’s ‘bread basket’.  The country’s agricultural potential derives from “an estimated 75 
million hectares of arable land, of which at least 10 million hectares are used for cultivation 
and pasture land (which amounts to approximately 1.5 hectares per agricultural household)” 
(Smoes, 2012: 72).  A third of the DRC experiences rainfall all year round, thus guaranteeing 
stable agricultural yield and potentially obviating crop failure.  This point is illustrated with 
reference to a fraction of the country, the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.  It has been 
noted that the Kivu provinces “have the potential to rank among the most productive places 
in Africa.  The region is indeed a critical supplier of water, energy, food and arable land. 
                                                            
80 According to Vidal (2013: i. d.), the completion of these projects “would make the Grand Inga development 
the largest hydro project in the world, generating twice as much as the Three Gorges dam in China.  In theory, it 
could provide 40% of Africa’s electricity needs.” 
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Most farmers can yield up to three harvests a year” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 168).  
However, the DRC has been unable to harness its agricultural potential due to protracted 
conflicts and the lure of natural resources.81 
 
In terms of geopolitical structure, the DRC consists of ten administrative divisions (called 
provinces) and one city.  The provinces are Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Équateur, Kasai-
Occidental, Kasai-Oriental, Katanga, Maniema, Nord-Kivu (North Kivu), Orientale, Sud-
Kivu (South Kivu).  Kinshasa is the capital city.82  A number of areas in the provinces are of 
importance to the country’s political economy.  These locations include the country’s second 
largest city, Lubumbashi (which is regarded as the DRC’s mining capital and its economic 
powerhouse), Kisangani (the third largest city), and diamond-rich Mbuji-Mayi.83 
 
The DRC’s history is replete with instances of penetration and exploitation.  The story of the 
outside penetration and exploitation of what became the DRC begins with the arrival of 
exogenous forces in the form of Portuguese traders.  The Kongo empire (as it was then 
known) had its first contact with Europeans in 1482 when Portuguese explorer, Diogo Cão, 
“discovered” the Kongo villages after sailing into the mouth of the Zaire – now Congo – 
River (Gondola, 2002: 31).  In 1485, Diogo Cão returned to Portugal with a group of Kongo 
emissaries.  The group returned to Africa in 1491 with priests, soldiers, and European 
commodities.  Relations between the Kongo and the Portuguese centred on missionary 
activities and commerce (Fyle, 1999: 55).  The Kongo king sold slaves and ivory to the 
Portuguese in return for luxury goods from Europe.  By 1571, Kongo became a vassal state of 
                                                            
81 In the wake of the coltan boom for instance, many farmers and young men jettisoned “the hoe for the shovel” 
(Interviews with Professor Kibanda Matungila [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010; and with a mining economist 
(GTN) [Lubumbashi], 25 October 2010).  This expression (and its alternate rendition, “to swap the hoe with a 
shovel”) refers to the situation in which large numbers people abandoned their farms and resorted to mining 
(especially in search of the black gold, coltan). 
82 See Appendix 2 for the DRC’s political map. 
83 Interview with a professor of Political Science (GN) [Lubumbashi], 26 October 2010. 
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Portugal (Stokes, 2009: 375).  At this point, Portuguese penetration of the region had paved 
the way for further European (British, Dutch, and French) presence and exploitation. 
 
The Belgians arrived in the region in 1819 under the aegis of the International Association of 
the Congo.  Commercial exchanges between Europeans and the locals intensified.  In 1877, 
Anglo-American journalist, Henry Morton Stanley, produced a report that highlighted the 
enormous natural wealth of the region.  Stanley’s report caught the attention of the Belgian 
king, Leopold II, who immediately sought to exploit the region’s resources by setting up a 
private venture to colonise the territory.  Leopold II subsequently commissioned “Stanley to 
establish the king’s authority in the Congo” (BBC, 2013: i. d.).  The Belgian king secured 
commercial interests in the region through treaties with local chiefs.  Leopold II’s bold 
initiative to access the region’s resources marked a watershed in the “scramble for Africa”, in 
which European powers later staked claims to different parts of the continent.  In 1884-85, 
the Berlin Conference crystallised the ‘scramble for Africa’.  European powers at the 
conference formally recognised Leopold II as the sovereign over Congo.  In return for the 
formal recognition of his claim to the Congo, Leopold II granted concessions, including free 
access to the region, to European traders and missionaries.  In 1885, Leopold II rechristened 
the territory the Congo Free State (BBC, 2013: i. d.). 
 
Leopold II appropriated all land in the Congo Free State.  In his quest for the exploitation of 
the territory’s resources, Leopold II despatched missionaries to the Congo Free State, 
provided them with property and extended the right to perform state functions to them.  The 
missionaries monopolised service provision in the education and health sectors 
(Africana.com, n. d.: i. d.).  With Leopold II’s backing, European merchants and settlers 
harnessed the resources of the territory.  The unbridled exploitation of the resources of the 
150 
Congo Free State did not go down well with the locals.  Disenchantment over the plundering 
of the region’s resources led to protests.  Sporadic conflicts ensued between the region’s 
traders and the Force publique, that is, the Free State military (Africana.com, n. d.: i. d.).   
 
In addition, commercial companies, which Leopold II had granted concessions to exploit the 
region’s resources, employed maximum force to suppress local protests against the plunder of 
the region’s wealth.  The brutal suppression of dissent combined with famine and epidemics 
to decimate the population of the Congo Free State (Africana.com, n. d.: i. d.; Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2002: 14).  By 1900, the brutality of Leopold II’s rule had become infamous.  
International pressure groups made strident calls for reforms in the spheres of commerce and 
governance, which Leopold instituted – albeit haphazardly – in 1906.  Sustained pressure and 
burgeoning debt subsequently forced Leopold II to transfer the Congo Free State to the 
Belgian government thus absolving him of any personal responsibility over the territory.  In 
effect, the territory – officially – became a Belgian colony.  A name change took also place: 
Congo Free State became Belgian Congo (Africana.com, n. d.: i. d.). 
 
A Colonial Trinity – made of up the colonial administration, big foreign business and the 
Roman Catholic Church – administered the Belgian Congo (Merriam, 1961: 1).  However, 
the Belgian state exercised exclusive control over civil and political matters in the region.  
The colonial government isolated Congolese from higher levels of civil administration.  
Belgian and other Western MNCs controlled the economic life of the indigenous people.  
Congolese had limited (if any) opportunities in the civil service and in private 
enterprise/trade.  The colonial government designed and controlled educational services with 
a view to preventing the emergence of numerically significant elite that could form the core 
of the nationalist movement.  Graduates formed a miniscule elite class of citizens, known as 
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évolués, whose interest was to share comfortable living in the major cities of Elizabethville 
(now Lubumbashi) and Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).84  The logical inference that can be 
drawn from the colonial architecture and its modus operandi is that the overall system served, 
not the interests of the Congolese, but those of the Belgian government. 
 
Belgium’s colonial policy was characterised by what Merriam (1961: 32) calls “Benevolent 
Paternalism”.  Through the operationalisation of this principle, the Belgians sought to address 
the physical and material needs of the Congolese but neglected substantive prerequisites such 
as preparing the Congolese for the future task of nation building.   
 
The Belgians felt that “what the Congolese needed was work, money in his pocket, food in 
his belly, managed education, religion and technical training” (Legum, 1972: 39).  This 
subjective interpretation of the needs of the Congolese provided justification for their 
exclusion from higher positions in government and in the military; these positions were an 
exclusive preserve of Europeans, mainly Belgians (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 6).  M’bokolo 
(1999: 203) captures this historical reality thus: 
In the Belgian Congo … some sources reckoned that in 1958, there 
were 176 000 people out of a total population of 13 million […] 
comprising 31 642 ‘white collar workers’, 110 222 skilled and 
semi-skilled workers, 2335 foremen, 1430 members of the liberal 
professions, 19 710 shopkeepers and 11 259 self-employed 
craftsmen.  Other estimates, however, put the figure at 300 000  … 
the proportion of employees, possessed of the knowledge and skills 
dispensed by the colonial schools, greatly outweighed that of the 
entrepreneurs, whose initiative found no scope in the constricted 
and discriminatory system of colonization.  These key personnel 
were to lead the independence movements. 
 
 
                                                            
84 Évolués, literally translated as “evolved” or “developed”, referred – during the colonial period – to Africans 
who had imbibed European values through assimilation or education.  These individuals served as clerks in the 
colonial administration and lived in the urban areas.  They were perceived as desirable products of the colonial 
policy of assimilation (DeLancey and DeLancey, 2000). 
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Clearly, Congolese were not (worthy of being) prepared for governance.  This fundamental 
deficit in the colonial arrangement not only influenced political dynamics in the country but 
also accounted partly for its subsequent woes. 
 
The early 1950s marked a turning point in the political history of the Congo: the colonial 
government began to face intense opposition from the Congolese.  Ironically, évolués led this 
struggle against foreign domination.  They demanded reforms, which included the rights of 
Congolese to own land, participate in politics and access top echelons in public 
administration.  The colonial authorities acceded to these demands in an incremental fashion.  
For instance, in 1957, the Belgians granted franchise to Congolese in municipal elections.  
Anti-colonial sentiments waxed stronger despite the modest political reforms that the 
Belgians implemented.  In 1959, serious revolts orchestrated by a nationalist movement, 
Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) [Bakongo Alliance], seriously weakened Belgian control 
over the territory (BBC, 2013: i. d.). 
 
That évolués led agitations for independence caught the Belgians off-guard.85  In addition, 
anti-colonialist fervour in the Congo coincided with widespread sentiments in support of self-
determination, and against foreign domination, in other parts of Africa.  The Belgians 
initiated the process of granting independence to the Congo, albeit grudgingly.  Consultations 
between Belgians and the Congolese charted the path towards independence.86  The colonial 
administration urged évolués to form political parties and to hold elections, but Belgian 
                                                            
85 Ostensibly, to reject or revolt against the system and apparatuses that had “enlightened” Africans smacked of 
“primitiveness” from which the policy of assimilation (associated with French colonialism) had tried to extricate 
Africans. 
86 The Brussels Roundtable Conference, held in January-February 1960, was pivotal to the Congo’s quest for 
political independence.  It was at this conference that Belgium made commitments to grant independence to the 
Congo within six months (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 88). 
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nationals were expected to remain within the governmental machinery and to retain military 
positions that they held. 
 
In May 1960, national elections (which involved about forty political parties) were held in the 
Belgian Congo.  However, controversy and stalemate ensued after the elections.  The 
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) [Congolese National Movement], led by Patrice 
Émery Lumumba, which obtained the majority of votes, had been polarised by intra-party 
bickering over the form of (post-independence) government, that is, a centralised versus a 
federalist arrangement.  Lumumba’s MNC formed a coalition with the Bakongo Alliance 
(under Joseph Kasavubu’s leadership) in order to avert an electoral impasse and to defuse 
political tension.  Sequel to a declaration by Belgian King Badouin granting independence to 
the Congo on 30 June 1960, Kasavubu became the first President while Lumumba was 
named the Prime Minister in line with the coalition’s agreement regarding post-independence 
power-sharing arrangement (Hoskyn, 1963: 1). 
 
As noted earlier, Belgian colonial enterprise – with its deficient education system – had failed 
to prepare the Congolese for post-independence politics.  Ntanda Nkere, a political scientist 
at the University of Kinshasa, provides a case in point: “when the country became 
independent, there were only nine people with university degrees” (quoted in Fessy, 2010: i. 
d.).  Thus, at independence, the Belgians handed the administrative reins to individuals who 
had little knowledge, let alone mastery, of governance.87  Fundamentally, the colonial system 
forestalled the emergence of a critical mass of enlightened and competent citizenry.  The task 
of post-independence nation building could not have been more herculean.  It is not 
                                                            
87 Lumumba’s (educational) profile illustrates this point: Lumumba attended a Protestant Mission School but did 
not attend university.  His first job was post-office clerk (Wallerstein and Cordell, 2014: i. d.).  This example 
supports M’bokolo’s (1999: 204) contention that the leaders of the nationalist movements were largely drawn 
from the ranks of the lower middle class. 
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surprising that the effect of Belgian colonial policy began to manifest immediately after 
independence.  As noted elsewhere, the net effect of “Belgian failure to prepare the DRC for 
nationhood and to instil a sense of cohesion and nationalist fervour in the people did not take 
long to manifest” and the country’s “gravitation towards state failure was only a matter of 
time” (Whetho, 2006: 24). 
 
Barely a week after independence, erstwhile Belgian military apparatus, Force publique (that 
is, the army), which had been renamed Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) [Congolese 
National Armed Forces], mutinied (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 95, 89, 270).  Large-scale chaos 
erupted as troops attacked and killed Belgian officers.  Violent confrontations ensued 
between Belgians and Congolese on one hand, and between Congolese ethnic groups on the 
other.  Animosities nurtured during colonialism fed into ethnic hatred and civil strife.  
Separatists in Katanga, led by Moise Tshombe, proclaimed the independence (secession) of 
the province.  Belgian troops were deployed to Katanga “ostensibly to protect Belgian 
citizens and mining interests” (BBC, 2013: i. d.).  This set the stage for successive foreign 
military interventions in the Congo. 
 
Subsequently, external actors (consisting of white mercenaries predominantly drawn from 
white-ruled Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, France and the United States – through the 
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) [July 1960-June 1964]) surreptitiously 
backed Moise Tshombe’s attempts to excise the mineral-rich Katanga province from the 
Congo.  Evidently, the object of external support for Tshombe’s secessionist efforts was to 
protect foreign economic interests (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 113; 135).  Since then, the 
Congo has borne the brunt of covert and overt foreign interventions.  Foreign incursions into 
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the Congo have been patterned after, and are thus embedded in, the historical episodes of the 
1960s. 
 
The disturbances of the immediate post-independence period eventually truncated the 
political experiment.  Notably in September 1960, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as Prime 
Minister; the latter declared Kasavubu’s action unconstitutional.  Crisis brewed, and 
Lumumba was placed under house arrest.  In February 1961, Lumumba was kidnapped and 
assassinated, an act in which Belgium and the United States were complicit (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2002: 106-112).88   
 
Taking advantage of the political crisis, the Chief of Staff of the ANC, Colonel (later 
General, and from December 1982, Marshal) Joseph Désiré Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese 
Seko) seized power through a coup d’état in September 1960 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 271).  
However, Mobutu relinquished power in 1961 to allow for the formation of a government of 
national unity.  Although Katanga’s secessionist attempts were eventually halted in 1963, 
political tensions simmered.  Free and fair elections conducted in May 1965 did little to 
extricate Congo from the throes of political crisis (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 271). 
 
In November 1965, Mobutu used the political discord between Kasavubu and Tshombe as a 
pretext to stage his second coup (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 271).  Mobutu remained in control 
of the country’s political firmament for thirty-two years during which “an extraordinary 
personalization of political rule resulted [and] a cult of personality flourished” (McCalpin, 
                                                            
88 Nzongola-Ntalaja, an eminent scholar on DR Congo’s history and political economy, recalls that 
“Lumumba’s fall and assassination were the result of a vast conspiracy involving US, Belgian and UN officials 
on the one hand, and his Congolese political enemies, including Kasa-Vubu, Mobutu and Tshombe, on the 
other” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 107). 
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2002: 42).  Indeed, “[t]he Mobutu regime was characterised by repression and tyranny; its 
record of brutality was nonpareil” (Whetho, 2006: 24).89 
 
It is worth noting that Western powers supported (and consolidated) Mobutu’s brutal regime.  
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 160-161) predicates external support for the Mobutu regime on 
three interdependent premises.  First, the need to prevent or contain the spread of communism 
(especially in central Africa) in the context of Cold War politics.  Second, “the need to 
support loyal friends, regardless of their behaviour towards their own people” – another 
strand in the logic of Cold War politics.  Third, and perhaps the most important factor, was 
“the need to use the Congo to promote Western interests in Central and Southern Africa”.  At 
stake were the strategic and economic interests of the United States in particular. 
 
Given the foreign policy priorities of the Western powers during the Cold War, the 
unflinching support for an ally (that is, Mobutu) – a bulwark of some sort against 
communism – was an absolute imperative.  In essence, the fight against communism and the 
need to curtail Soviet influence in Africa provided strong incentives in Western capitals for 
backing Mobutu.  For example, the United States assisted Mobutu by building his ‘arsenal’ 
through a “steady supply of rifles, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, patrol boats, and 
communications equipment.  By the time the dictator was ousted in 1997, the U.S had 
delivered more than $300 million (measured in constant 1998 dollars) in military hardware to 
Mobutu’s regime” (Hartung and Moix, 2000: 3).  The West put “a hearty arsenal of deadly 
weaponry” at Mobutu’s disposal (Hartung and Moix, 2000: 3), in spite of his egregious 
                                                            
89 It is instructive to note that Mobutu’s name and the titles he adopted typified nothing but absolutism.  As self-
proclaimed Founder-President of the Nation, the Enlightened Guide, and the Leopard, Mobutu claimed bona 
fide right to exercise absolute power the Congolese, whom he regarded as his “children”.  His full name, Mobutu 
Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, which he adopted in 1972, depicted such absolutism.  There are several 
translations of his name.  The most common translation goes thus: the earthy, the peppery, and “the all-powerful 
warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire 
in his wake” (Wrong, 2000: 4). 
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human rights record.90  Western support led to the entrenchment of “Mobutuism” – a broad 
term that encapsulates the personal philosophy/ideology of Mobutu as well as the 
glorification of the leader’s idiosyncrasies.   
 
The cumulative effect of “Mobutuism” is that it combined with colonial legacies to 
undermine the Congolese state and to jeopardise its prospects for survival.  Clark (2002: 2) 
notes with reference to this point that “the internal logic of Mobutu’s … state was such that it 
evolved inexorably toward collapse.”  As DR Congo’s recent history shows, the inexorable 
movement of the country towards possible collapse became more profound as Mobutu’s 32-
year rule neared its end. 
 
An exposé of DR Congo’s history portrays the impacts that colonialism and immediate post-
independence politics had, and still have, on the country.  Belgian colonialism, the policies of 
Western powers, and “Mobutuism” have informed DR Congo’s postcolonial traumas, 
including the protracted conflicts since Mobutu’s ouster.  History shows that “the only 
constant in more than three decades of DR Congo’s independence had been patrimonialism, 
authoritarianism, and political decline” (McCalpin, 2002: 46).  This ‘constant’ to which 
McCalpin refers was a hallmark of Mobutu’s rule, which was characterised by the 
personalisation of power and the politics of exclusion. 
 
During Mobutu’s three-decade-long rule, movements towards the institutionalisation of 
popular political participation in the Congo were ruthlessly suppressed (Mvuluya, 1997).  
However, the suppression of pro-democracy efforts did not dampen agitations for political 
reform.  On the contrary, his brutality (invariably) provoked attempts to dislodge his regime.  
                                                            
90 As this researcher noted elsewhere, it can be said that Western powers betrayed the Congolese in at least two 
instances: first, their complicity in the assassination of DR Congo’s first Prime Minister and Pan-Africanist, 
Patrice Émery Lumumba; and second, their support for Mobutu and his dictatorship (Whetho, 2006: 25). 
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Several instances of underground resistance and guerrilla activities sought to depose his 
government.  For instance, the Angolan-based Front National pour la Libération du Congo 
(FNLC) [National Front for the Liberation of the Congo] launched an offensive (known as 
the Shaba invasions) to topple the Mobutu regime in 1978-79.  Remarkably, Belgian and 
French paratroopers as well as logistical support from the United States quashed the 
offensive.  Such overt international support for Mobutu’s regime continued until the end of 
the Cold War. 
 
The end of the Cold War meant that a key rationale for Western support for Mobutu (that is, 
combating Soviet influence and the spread of communism in Central Africa) no longer 
existed.  This dramatic change in the international landscape, which led to a decline in 
Western support for Mobutu, coincided with internal factors: a shrinking economy plagued 
by steep debt, the emergence of a more potent civil society (buoyed by the gains of 
democratic transition elsewhere) and popular discontent with one-party rule.  Mobutu 
understood the implications of these factors and acquiesced to demands for political reforms.  
He proposed the convocation of a conférence nationale souveraine (CNS) [sovereign national 
conference] in 1991 at which Congolese politicians and civil society actors were expected to 
chart a new political dispensation for the country (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 189).91 
 
Mobutu’s resistance to proposed political reforms and procedural disputes derailed the CNS.  
Two governments emerged, resulting in political stalemate.  Mobutu headed one government. 
Two persons, namely Monsignor Laurent Monsengwo (former Archbishop of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Kisangani who presided at the CNS) and Étienne Tshisekedi (veteran 
                                                            
91 The CNS opened on 07 August 1991 but was disrupted a month later due to looting and violence by unpaid 
and disgruntled soldiers.  It reconvened in 1992 but (as later became apparent) Mobutu was not interested in 
political reforms as he insisted on retaining substantial powers and formed his own government by the end of 
the year in contravention of the spirit of the CNS (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 189-208). 
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politician and leader of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) [Union 
for Democracy and Social Progress]) headed the other government.  The political stalemate 
ended in 1994 when the two governments merged to form the Haut Conseil de la République-
Parlement de Transition (HCR-PT) [High Council of the Republic-Parliament of Transition] 
with the proviso to hold presidential and legislative elections within two years (Gebrewold, 
2009: 99).  Mobutu reneged on promises to hold elections and instituted a protracted 
transition programme, leading to widespread discontent in the country.  During this period, 
political developments elsewhere complicated politics in Zaire (as the country was then 
known).92 
 
In the 1990s Central Africa was a hotbed of instability (mainly in the form of coups d’état 
and civil strife), resulting in humanitarian emergencies that had transborder implications.  
One of the foremost traumas in central Africa, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994,93 had 
ramifications for politics in Zaire inasmuch as the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
halted the genocidal campaign, defeating the génocidaires (that is, the perpetrators) who then 
fled Rwanda and established bases in refugee camps in eastern Zaire. 
 
Between 1994 and 1996, the refugee camps provided spaces for génocidaires to regroup, to 
launch attacks on Rwanda, and to orchestrate “the slaughter of Tutsi citizens and residents of 
the Congo” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 224).  The RPF government asserted that the presence 
of the génocidaires in eastern Zaire and their activities constituted a serious national security 
                                                            
92 It should be noted that the country’s name has been changed a number of times since independence.  It was 
known as the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1964 to 1971.  Mobutu unilaterally changed the country’s 
name from Congo to Zaire in October 1971.  After Mobutu’s ousting in 1997, (the late) Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 1). 
93 The Rwandan genocide (the mass slaughter of Tutsis and moderate Hutus by elements in the Forces Armées 
Rwandaises (FAR) [Rwandan Armed Forces] and Hutu extremists, known as the Interahamwe) claimed 
between 800,000 and one million lives in three months (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 223).  For detailed accounts of 
the genocide, see Gourevitch (1998), Des Forges (1999), Mamdani (2001), and Prunier (2009). 
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threat that needed to be obliterated.  Mobutu’s government and the UN (which was 
responsible for managing the refugee camps) failed to address this problem, thus providing a 
justification for Rwanda to resort to self-help.  This marked Rwanda’s intervention in Zaire, 
which it predicated on “humanitarian and defensive grounds” (Longman, 2002: 128). 
 
Around this period, Congolese dissidents formed an armed group – Alliance des forces 
démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) [Alliance of Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Congo] – with the aim to topple Mobutu.  On 06 August 1996, the 
AFDL, under the leadership of (late) Laurent-Désiré Kabila, launched a rebellion against 
Mobutu, marking the beginning of the First Congo War (1996-1997).  The RPF government 
saw an opportunity to neutralise the génocidaires in Congo.  With support from Rwanda and 
Uganda, the AFDL swept through Zaire as Mobutu’s poorly motivated soldiers offered little 
or no resistance.94  AFDL troops seized Kinshasa on 17 May 1997, marking the end of 
Mobutu’s rule.  Kabila proclaimed himself president and renamed the country Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  As will be shown later in this chapter, this did not mark an end to the 
country’s woes, as the Second Congo War (1998-2003) erupted just over a year later.95 
 
As this section showed, the DRC has had a chequered history.  This section’s ‘incursion’ into 
the DRC’s history attests to the fact that the country’s ‘biography’ is steeped in conflict.  
Congolese have never experienced peace over a sustained period in the post-colonial era.  A 
series of post-colonial traumas (highlighted in this section) illustrates the country’s perennial 
tempestuousness, making it the most volatile in Africa’s Great Lakes Region.  This historical 
                                                            
94 A highly controversial and unresolved point is that AFDL’s seven-month rebellion against Mobutu was 
allegedly characterised by retaliatory “massacres of Hutu non-combatants (old men, women and children)” by 
commanders and officers of the Tutsi-backed rebellion (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 224). 
95 The Second Congo War was sparked by a schism in the alliance that brought Kabila to power.  Rwanda and 
Uganda – two countries that had backed Kabila in the rebellion that overthrew Mobutu – took up arms against 
Kabila, chiefly because Kabila had reneged on the terms under which the alliance was consummated and 
sustained (see section 5.4 of this chapter). 
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setting provides insights into the DRC’s protracted political malaise, including intractable 
conflicts in which natural resources have been implicated.  As a prelude to explicating 
resource connections to conflicts in the DRC, it is necessary to offer a glimpse of the extent 
of the country’s mineral wealth.  Accordingly, the next section presents an overview of the 
DRC’s natural resource endowment. 
 
5.3 ‘Scandale géologique’: a sketch of resource endowment 
Economically, the Congo has enormous wealth in natural 
resources.  During the early phase of colonial penetration, a 
Belgian prospector was so awed by the wide range of mineral 
resources that he was led to conclude that the Congo was a 
geological scandal (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998: i. d.). 
 
The DRC is blessed with an assortment of mineral resources, and references to the country as 
a geological scandal are based on this reality.  In other words, the term, scandale géologique 
(geological scandal) refers to the country’s colossal natural resource endowment.  However, 
scandale géologique has assumed a different meaning in the wake of protracted conflicts in 
which natural resources have been a factor.  Nzongola-Ntalaja (1998: i. d.) captures the 
alternate conception of scandale géologique thus: 
The real scandal … is that the country’s wealth has not been used 
to benefit the vast majority of its inhabitants. During the colonial 
period, this wealth was extracted basically to spur the economic 
development of Belgium.  Since independence, it has been used 
mostly to enrich the state bourgeoisie that emerged during the 
Mobutu regime, together with their foreign associates ... Therein 
lies the deeper significance of the present crisis. 
 
Nzongola-Ntalaja uses the term, scandale géologique, with reference to three distinct 
contexts: (i) the exploitation of the country’s resources, during colonialism, to develop the 
colonial metropole; (ii) the appropriation of natural resources (revenues) by the Congolese 
elite and their foreign counterparts during Mobutu’s rule; and (iii) the pillaging of the 
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country’s natural resources during the First and Second Congo wars.  Similarly, Lemarchand 
(2009: ix) explains the ‘scandal’ in the context of a juxtaposition namely, chronic poverty in 
the midst of immense mineral wealth.  According to Professor Kibanda Matungila,96 natural 
resource abundance, which should benefit the country and its people, has become a bane and 
an albatross to peace and development.  This alternate connotation of scandale géologique 
coheres with the ‘resource curse’ thesis. 
 
The two meanings of scandale géologique are relevant to this study.  This section, which 
provides a sketch of the DRC’s natural resource endowment by way of a brief description and 
reference to the DRC’s share of world reserves of these strategic resources, is based on the 
first meaning.  The resource dimensions of conflicts in the DRC, explored subsequently in 
this chapter, illustrate the second meaning.97 
 
It is said that the DRC possesses “no less than eighty-seven different types of minerals” 
Lemarchand (2009: ix).98  The total mineral wealth of the country was “estimated to be some 
$24 trillion – equivalent to the GDP of Europe and the US combined” (Morgan, 2009: 52).  
Natural resources that have strategic value – by virtue of their uses – include “copper, cobalt, 
tin, zinc, gold, diamonds, iron ore, silver, cadmium, uranium, europium, niobium (or 
columbite), tantalum and thorium” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 28).  An overview of these 
strategic minerals follows. 
 
Copper: is a malleable metal, which is used in the manufacture of materials that conduct heat 
and electricity. It is also used in the construction of buildings.  “Copper reserves in the DRC 
                                                            
96  Interview [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010. 
97 See sub-sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 below. 
98 It is impossible to present (in this section) information on all the natural resources that the country possesses.  
Therefore, this section focuses on a number of strategic resources, or those that are found in commercial 
quantities in the DRC. 
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are of great importance, amounting to 34 percent of global reserves” (Zittel and Exner, 2013: 
64), making the country home to the second largest reserves in the world (World Bank, 2007: 
28).  The DRC is the world’s largest supplier “of high-grade copper” (Montague and 
Berrigan, 2001: i. d.).  Much of the DRC’s copper reserves are found in the Katanga 
province. 
 
Cobalt: is used in jewellery, paints and tint glass.  It is also “used in a variety of industrial 
and military applications, the most important of which are in the construction of jet engines, 
in superalloys and batteries” (World Bank, 2007: 28).  The DRC has the world’s largest 
(36%) reserves (World Bank, 2007: 10) and accounts for 28% of global production of cobalt 
(Zittel and Exner, 2013: 64).  Another estimate puts the country’s share of world’s reserves at 
60% (Montague and Berrigan, 2001: i. d.). 
  
Cassiterite (Tin): this mineral “is a hot commodity” used by the “global electronics industry” 
as a solder in circuit boards.  The DRC once accounted for between 10% and 15% of the 
world’s tin supplies (Sundaram, 2006: i. d.).  It is estimated that the country holds about 50% 
of world’s tin reserves while projections indicate that the DRC would become the world’s 
largest tin supplier between 2017 and 2022 (Metalbulletin.com, 2012: i. d.). 
 
Zinc: is the “fourth most widely consumed metal in the world after iron, aluminium, and 
copper”.  It is combined “with other metals to form materials that are used in automobiles, 
electrical components, and household fixtures” (Geology.com, n. d[a]: i. d.).  The DRC has 
10% of the world’s zinc reserves (AfDB/OECD, 2007: 212). 
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Gold: this coveted precious metal is used for coinage, ornamental objects and jewellery 
(Geology.com, n. d[b]: i. d.).  Gold “is also used by the electronics industry – as a coating for 
wires” (Global Witness, 2011: i. d.).  The DRC “was the world’s fifth-largest gold producer 
in the 1960s” (Lourens, 2012: i. d.).  It is said that the DRC has one of the “biggest gold 
reserves in the world” (Eaves, 2012: i. d.) but its percentage share of world’s reserves is 
unknown. 
 
Diamonds: these are renowned as valuable gemstones.  Diamonds are used as abrasives and 
constitute key elements in the production of jewellery, lasers, and x-ray machines.  The DRC 
accounts for 38% of global production and holds 25% of the world’s diamond reserves (Zittel 
and Exner, 2013: 64). 
 
Cadmium: this precious metal is used in batteries, electroplating, and nuclear fission.  It also 
has a number of laboratory uses (Scoullos et al., 2001).  The DRC’s share of world’s reserves 
is unknown. 
 
Uranium: this strategic mineral has civilian and military uses, namely to fuel nuclear power 
plants and to produce nuclear weapons.  Although it is assumed that the DRC holds millions 
of tons of uranium deposits, there are no estimates of its share of world’s reserves.  It is on 
record that in the 1960s the country supplied “60% of the world’s uranium” (Thorp, 2010: i. 
d.).  It is also worth noting here that Congolese uranium was used to build the world’s first 
atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) during the final stages of 
World War II (Montague and Berrigan, 2001: i. d.). 
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Columbite-tantalum (coltan): coltan is a rare, strategic mineral that “forms the basis of a 
high-tech global commodity chain” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 159).  It is used in the 
manufacturing of cell phones, pagers, digital versatile/video disk (DVD) players, computer 
chips, night vision goggles, fibre optics, jet engines, space aeronautics and nuclear reactors.  
The DRC has 80% of the world’s coltan reserves (Vesperini, 2001; Ross, 2005) and the 
mineral has been the country’s “most profitable export” (Morgan, 2009: 52).  Coltan’s 
strategic nature and value (including its profitability) have made the mineral resource a factor 
in protracted conflicts in the DRC.99 
 
Crude oil: The country “is not a major oil producer [but] it exploits some crude oil offshore, 
in its territorial waters along the 40-km strip of the Atlantic Ocean” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 
28).  The DRC has large oil reserves estimated at 100 billion barrels (Smoes, 2012: 68). 
 
The DRC possesses other natural resources such as germanium100, lithium101, manganese102, 
thorium103, wolframite104, and zirconium.105  This brief overview shows the strategic natural 
resources that the DRC possesses.106  The overview suggests that the country’s shares of 
world’s reserves of these resources are significant.  Another important factor is the high 
                                                            
99 Sub-section 5.4.4 (below) discusses coltan connections to the conflicts in the DRC. 
100 Used in the production of photocopying machines, civil and military satellites, and missiles (Interview with 
Professor Kibanda Matungila [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010). 
101 A mineral resource used to manufacture batteries for computers and other electronic products.  It is also 
combined with other materials to produce hydrogen bombs (Interview with Professor Kibanda Matungila 
[Kinshasa], 20 October 2010). 
102 An important element in producing stainless steels (Interview with Professor Kibanda Matungila [Kinshasa], 
20 October 2010). 
103 Used as fuel in nuclear reactors (Interview with Professor Kibanda Matungila [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010). 
104 This resource is used in the production of electric wires and munitions (Interview with Professor Kibanda 
Matungila [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010). 
105 Known for its heat resistant quality, it is used in gas turbines, jet engines (Interview with Professor Kibanda 
Matungila [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010). 
106 See Appendix 3 for the DRC’s natural resource map. 
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quality of the resource deposits found in the DRC – a key attraction for mineral-prospecting 
companies and local and foreign profiteering networks.107   
 
These natural resources are spread in varying amounts throughout the country.  However, 
certain provinces of the country are renowned for bearing large deposits of the strategic 
minerals.  The eastern DRC, the most volatile part of the country, has the largest 
concentration of natural (and lootable) resources (See Appendices 3, 4, and 5).  It is not 
surprising that Congolese readily link intractable conflicts in eastern DRC to the region’s 
enormous resource endowment.108  There are large diamond deposits in the Kasai provinces.  
Diamonds are extracted from communities in Bandundu, Équateur and Orientale.  Nord-
Kivu, Sud-Kivu and Orientale provinces have large reserves of gold.  The Kivu provinces are 
also the main mining centres for coltan and wolframite.  Coltan deposits are found in 
Maniema.  Katanga province has the highest concentration of cobalt, copper, germanium, 
manganese, and zinc (Kisangani and Bobb, 2010: 355).  Perhaps, interviewees’ 
unsubstantiated anecdotal – and perhaps hyperbolic – remarks (during fieldwork), that in 
many areas of the DRC one could literally strike “gold” and other resources by merely 
scratching the surface of the ground are indicative of the enormity of DR Congo’s mineral 
wealth. 
 
5.4 Natural resources and conflicts in the DRC 
As noted earlier, the DRC is plagued with serious development pathologies despite its 
immense natural wealth.  Local networks (of artisanal miners, militias, traders) and foreign 
interlopers have taken advantage of state incapacity and political instability to capture 
                                                            
107 Interview with an official of the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (AMB) [Kinshasa], 21 October 
2010. 
108 Interviews with a civil society activist (APK) [Goma], 11 November 2010; E-interviews (via SkypeTM) with 
a youth leader (BTN) [Goma], 26 February 2011; with human rights activist (PM) [Bukavu], 27 February 2011. 
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mineral sites, extract resources from these sites, or smuggle resources from the DRC via 
neighbouring countries.  In the process, the state loses much-needed revenue for funding 
basic services and infrastructure reconstruction.  The beneficiaries of this illicit exploitation 
and trafficking are the profiteering networks, (that do not pay any royalties or taxes to the 
Congolese government) and the DRC’s neighbours.109 
 
Furthermore, because some parties obtain enormous financial gains and thus become 
“economic lords”, “they do not want to see an end to Congo’s troubles”.110  Perennial 
conflicts in the country’s resource-rich zones serve an economic interest; ending the conflicts 
would undermine that interest.  As stated earlier, more often than not, interviewees during 
fieldwork linked the protracted conflicts in eastern DRC with the presence of strategic and 
lucrative lootable resources.  In order to substantiate this point, an interviewee raised the 
question: “why is it that conflict continues in the east while other parts of the Congo are 
relatively peaceful?”111  Questions such as this foreground the role of natural resources in the 
DRC’s recent travails, especially in what is known as the Second Congo War, which this 
section discusses. 
 
5.4.1 ‘Africa’s world war’: proximate causes and key actors 
As noted earlier (in the discussion on the DRC’s history), the DRC has been perennially 
tempestuous.  It was noted that peace remained elusive, even after Mobutu’s ouster.  
Expectations that the termination of Mobutu’s three-decade misrule would bring about peace 
faded in the wake of the rupture in the alliance that had brought Laurent-Désiré Kabila to 
                                                            
109 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Planning (MML) [Lubumbashi], 25 October 2010. 
110 Interview with an official in the Presidency (JDM) [Kinshasa], 19 October 2010. 
111 Interview with a youth leader (FN) [Lubumbashi], 24 October 2010.  Although there is some validity to the 
interviewee’s point, it should be noted, however, that natural resources alone do not account for the conflicts in 
eastern DRC.  The politics of ethnicity and nationality (broadly put, the matter of identity) has been a key factor 
in the conflicts (see Autesserre, 2010; 2012).  As is the case elsewhere, natural resources have intertwined with 
these factors in some instances to complicate conflicts and to make them intractable.  
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power.  As Kabila swept to power, he needed to satisfy expectations from three quarters. 
First, the Congolese population who yearned for a ‘fresh start’ and a clean break from the 
politics of the past.  Second, Kabila’s regional allies/backers (especially Rwanda and 
Uganda) that purportedly had national security concerns, specifically those emanating from 
eastern DRC.  Third, the ‘international community’ which expected Kabila to implement 
political, economic (including natural resource governance) reforms to create a stable 
ambience for FDIs.112 
 
On assuming power on 17 May 1997, Kabila promised to institute political and economic 
reforms.  However, Kabila could not, or had little time to, fulfil the expectations of these 
three constituencies.  No sooner had he attained power than he got entangled in political 
malfeasance (à la Mobutu): nepotism, corruption and human rights abuses (Owoeye and 
Amusan, 2000: 173).113  His popularity soon waned amongst Congolese.  In addition, he drew 
the ire of the ‘international community’ for his refusal to allow investigation into alleged 
massacres of Hutu refugees by his AFDL troops during the rebellion against Mobutu.114  His 
regional backers also turned against him, setting the stage for Congo’s next conflagration – 
‘Africa’s world war’. 
 
Kabila had appointed Rwandans (Tutsis) to key economic and military posts after he became 
president.  This irked the majority of Congolese who perceived Kabila as a puppet of foreign 
                                                            
112 Interview with a Professor of International Relations (JO) [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010. 
113 For example, Kabila banned all political parties and public demonstrations, and promulgated a decree that 
gave him virtually absolute (executive, legislative and military) powers.  He appointed members of his 
Balubakati ethnic group to key posts in the government: his cousin, Gaetan Kakudji became both Minister of 
State and Prime Minister while his brother, Florrent Kambale Kabila was appointed minister in charge of 
mining.  He removed the Chief of Staff, Massason Nindanga, and replaced him with his son (now President) 
Joseph Kabila.  In addition, prominent opposition figures were jailed for “threatening state security.”  On 28 
May 1997, Kabila’s government promulgated another decree, which gave Kabila power to abolish all organs of 
government.  State assets were reportedly acquired for his personal use and the recovery of stolen assets became 
an enterprise for personal enrichment (Owoeye and Amusan, 2000: 174-175). 
114 See footnote 94, supra, page 160. 
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powers (mainly Rwanda and Uganda).  In order to pacify Congolese and assert his authority 
over the DRC, Kabila relieved foreign appointees of their positions, thanked Rwanda and 
Uganda for their support for his “revolution” and on 27 July 1998 ordered all foreign troops 
to leave the country (Owoeye and Amusan, 2000: 175).  In effect, DRC’s “new king” turned 
“against the kingmakers” (Lemarchand, 2009: 33).  This marked a decisive point of 
deterioration in relations between Kabila and his regional backers. 
 
Rwanda and Uganda accused Kabila of giving tacit support to subversive elements that had 
been threatening the national security of the two countries.  Specifically, Rwanda accused 
Kabila of condoning the activities of the génocidaires, who were using eastern DRC as 
operational bases to launch incursions into Rwanda – the same accusation that Rwanda had 
levelled against Mobutu.  Uganda, on the other hand, accused Kabila of aiding the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF) – a rebel movement from Uganda – by allowing supplies meant for 
the ADF to pass through Congolese territory (Owoeye and Amusan, 2000: 172).  Unable to 
trust the ‘king’ that they had installed in Kinshasa, Rwanda and Uganda (whose forces were 
based largely in eastern DRC) officially declared war against the Kabila government on 02 
August 1998.  This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War, a conflict that 
snowballed into a regional war.  At the onset of the war, the initial image in domestic circles 
of Kabila as a nationalist had been diluted, the regional allies that brought him to power had 
abandoned him, and the “international community” had come to perceive him as part of the 
country’s problems. 
 
5.4.2 Complexities in ‘Africa’s world war’ 
The Second Congo War (1998-2003) was characterised by complexities that hitherto had not 
been witnessed in African conflicts.  At one time the war drew in the armies of nine African 
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countries – “directly or through the medium of proxy militias, mafia-style business networks 
or ethnic links” (Doyle, 2004: i. d.) – and as many as twelve irregular non-governmental 
militia groups.115  The conflict involved “a variety of shadow networks, states, mafias, private 
armies, ‘businessmen’ and assorted state elites from both within and outside Africa” (Taylor, 
2003: 45), with concomitant social, political and ecological dislocation116 for the whole of 
Central Africa.  The involvement of several local and regional actors gave the conflict the 
“qualities of a civil war and an international war” (Ross, 2004: 53).  This researcher in an 
earlier study described the war “as an internationalised intrastate conflict” (Whetho, 2001: 
62).  Between 1998 and 2003, interlopers and foreign national armies with discrete agendas 
aligned themselves with or fought against Congolese groups in this brutal war of partition and 
plunder. 
 
The involvement of several actors (and their discrete agendas), including global businesses 
(Latham, Kassimir and Callaghy, 2001: 2) and profiteering networks has gave the conflict the 
labels of “Africa’s First World War” (Taylor, 2003: 45) and “Africa’s First Continental War” 
(Weiss, 2000: 4).  The conflict has also been described as “the most deadly war ever 
documented in Africa or anywhere in the world during the past half-century” (Clark, 2002: 
1).  The DRC’s conflict, characterised by a “game of alliances” in which every actor was 
guided by “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” logic (Reyntjens, 1998: 10), was undeniably 
Africa’s biggest war since the end of the Cold War.  Moreover, according to the International 
Rescue Committee (2006: i. d.), a global agency involved in peace work, the DRC conflict 
was “the deadliest since World War II”. 
                                                            
115 The national armies of the following countries were involved (to a greater or lesser extent in the war) in the 
pro-Kabila camp: Angola, Chad, Republic of Congo (or Congo Brazzaville), Namibia, the Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe.  The anti-Kabila camp included Rwanda and Uganda, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement de 
Libération du Congo (MLC) [Movement for the Liberation of the Congo], and the Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie (RCD) [Congolese Rally for Democracy], which due to tensions split later into two, namely 
RCD-Goma (headed by Emile Ilunga) and RCD-Kisangani (led by Wamba-dia-Wamba). 
116 See footnote 150 (infra, page 187) for a discussion of the ecological effect of the war. 
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The involvement of several countries and private actors and their discrete agendas in 
‘Africa’s world war’ illustrate the complexities of the conflict.  After the declaration of war 
on Kabila by Rwanda and Uganda, three countries – Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe – 
intervened in support of the government in Kinshasa.  This intervention “widened” the war.  
Although the motivations of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe differed (as discussed below), 
their intervention in the DRC war was in response to Kabila’s diplomatic overtures, mainly 
the request for assistance in dealing with the aggression and invasion of the DRC by Rwanda 
and Uganda.117   
 
Furthermore, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe publicly predicated their support for the 
Congolese government on the logic of mutual defence as provided for in the security and 
defence framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Rupiya, 
2002: 96; Dunn, 2002: 64).  Although the intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
foiled the attempt by the Rwanda and Uganda-backed rebels to overthrow Kabila, private 
communications between key dramatis personae in intervening countries, as well as the 
activities of forces deployed to the DRC revealed other/ulterior motivations for their 
involvement in the DRC.118  This observation also features prominently in narratives on the 
Second Congo War.  For example, several chapters in Clark’s (2002) compendium illustrate 
the fact that each (intervening) state had its own interest(s) or agenda(s) besides those 
advanced publicly or in official briefings.  Having identified Rwanda and Uganda’s “official” 
motivations for involvement in the DRC conflict, this question follows: what are the specific 
motivations for intervention by the troika (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe)? 
 
                                                            
117 Interview with an official in the Presidency (AA) [Kinshasa], 19 October 2010. 
118 Private/confidential communication with an officer (I) in the Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) 
[National Intelligence Agency], [Kinshasa], 22 October 2010. 
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Angola premised its involvement in the DRC conflict on three key elements.  First, national 
security imperative to neutralise the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA) [National Union for Total Independence of Angola], “especially by interdicting its 
supplies”.  Second, the need to protect the oil installations that finance Luanda’s war efforts.  
Third, the need “to maintain a favourable or compliant regime in Kinshasa” (Turner, 2002: 
75).  In order to guarantee these imperatives, Angola deployed some 5,000 troops to the DRC 
to support Kabila in the war effort.  Later, the troops were stationed around strategic 
installations, such as “the Inga hydroelectric dam that feeds the Angola grid” (Turner, 2002: 
87).  Also noteworthy is that Angola’s participation in the war effort allowed its leader, José 
Eduardo dos Santos, to garner “economic spoils” which have enabled him “to cement his 
hold on power” (Turner, 2002: 87).  These key elements presuppose that geo-strategic, 
political and economic considerations informed Angola’s involvement in the DRC. 
 
The government of Namibia premised its involvement in the DRC on SADC’s commitment 
to support Kabila’s government.  Thus, Namibia deployed “up to 500 infantry troops to help 
repel the rebel advance toward Kinshasa” (Afoaku, 2002: 121).  As with other intervenors, 
Namibia’s involvement was not motivated entirely by its membership of SADC.  The 
economic interests of private individuals, including former President Sam Nujoma’s family 
members, partly underpinned Namibia’s intervention in the DRC.  Many of Nujoma’s family 
members reportedly were deeply involved in the mining industry in the diamond rich Mbuji-
Mayi in the Kasai provinces of the DRC (Owoeye and Amusan, 2000: 176).  Therefore, 
sending troops to protect Kabila and to quell the offensive against him enabled Namibia’s 
‘first family’ to protect their economic interests in the DRC. 
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Fundamentally, three factors underpinned Zimbabwe’s involvement in ‘Africa’s world war’.  
The first was President Robert Mugabe’s desire to project himself as Southern Africa’s 
première statesman and ‘kingmaker’ as a counterpoise to (the growing influence of a) post-
apartheid South Africa.  Mugabe’s role in the war also provided a counterweight against 
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, whose influence in sub-regional (that is, central 
African) politics had been on the ascendancy.  Second, the formal request by the government 
of the DRC to the SADC for assistance in dealing with what it termed external aggression 
provided the impetus for Zimbabwe’s deployment of troops in support of Kabila.  Finally (as 
was the case with other actors), the economic motives of Mugabe and his family members 
made intervention on the side of Kinshasa a fait accompli (Rupiya, 2002: 96-97; Owoeye and 
Amusan, 2000: 176).  In sum, sub-regional politics and elite economic considerations 
underpinned Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC. 
 
The involvement of Rwanda and Uganda (on the side of the rebels) and Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe (on the side of the government) exacerbated the conflict.  While different state and 
non-state actors provided “official” reasons for their involvement in the conflict, actual and 
perceived economic incentives and gains, largely intended to benefit ruling elites, lurked 
behind decisions to intervene.  Apparently, economic activities by the key actors involved in 
the DRC superseded military-security concerns.  Indeed, the exploitation of mineral resources 
in course of the conflict, either as a means of recouping investment costs in the war or for 
corrupt enrichment of the military and political elite, foregrounded the economic agendas of 
various actors.119  The unofficial view in neighbouring capitals that burdens/costs associated 
                                                            
119 Interview with the executive director of a civil society organisation (BK) [Lubumbashi], 25 October 2010.  
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with military involvement in the DRC could be offset by exploiting the country’s natural 
resources contributed to the sustenance of a war economy.120   
 
5.4.3 ‘Africa’s world war’: resource exploitation and the war economy 
Although colonial legacies121, the politics of ethnicity122, and national security concerns123 
have been key factors in the conflict, natural resources have been at the hub of the Second 
Congo War.124  A number of scholars (Afoaku, 2002: 109-128; Clark, 2002: 145-68; 
Longman, 2002: 129-144; Weinstein, 2000: 11-20; Cassimon, Engelen and Reyntjens, 2013: 
39-62) have argued that the underlying motivation for external actors’ involvement in the 
conflict and (by implication) conflict perpetuation has been primarily economic, clearly 
defined as the attraction to and exploitation of the DRC’s resources.   
 
Dunn (2002: 70) poignantly notes that in the course of the conflict, the country became “an 
economic colony for most of the combatants, with its resources being drained to the east and 
south”.  The plundering of the DRC’s natural resource wealth, which resulted in colossal 
enrichment of the region’s elite and foreign profiteering networks, led Dunn (2002: 70) to 
conclude that the war marked the “institutionalization of violence for profit”.  With reference 
to the pillaging of the DRC’s resources by invading armies of Rwanda and Uganda as well as 
other profiteering networks, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004: 15) aptly describes the conflict in the 
DRC as “the war for Congo’s natural resources”. 
 
                                                            
120 This point is based on the assessment that a bankrupt state, or an insolvent government such as the DRC’s, or 
even the rebels that Rwanda and Uganda sided with, could not reimburse intervenors for any military or 
logistical expenditures (Interview with an officer (II) in the Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) 
[National Intelligence Agency], [Kinshasa], 23 October 2010).  
121 As discussed with reference to the country’s history above (See section 5.2). 
122 In the context of the larger Hutu-Tutsi rivalry in the Great Lakes Region. 
123 For example, Rwanda’s quest to liquidate the génocidaires. 
124 It is acknowledged that the politics of ethnicity and security imperatives were crucial factors in the war. 
However, the economic motives and the vested commercial interests of parties undermined their saliency. 
175 
Furthermore, combatants’ ‘blitzkrieg strategy’ of capturing and controlling mineral resource 
areas and sites (especially in the two Kivus) demonstrated the centrality of natural resources 
to the conflict.125  The allure of the vast mineral wealth of the DRC and the profitability of 
resource looting for foreign governments, corporate actors, rebel militia movements, and 
individual officers not only made the war intractable but also vitiated any incentives to end it 
(Ross, 2004: 53-54).  Thus, ‘Africa’s world war’ gave credence both to the high correlation 
between natural resources and (civil) war, and to the continuation and expansion of its 
geographical scope (Fearon, 2004; Buhaug and Gates, 2002: 417-33). 
 
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (signed in 1999) and the deployment of United Nations 
peacekeepers126 did not halt violent clashes between rebel forces and government troops and 
between the armies of Rwanda and Uganda.  Rather than observe the terms of peace talks, 
warring parties fought to consolidate their positions on the ground with an eye on a military 
victory and ultimately the capture of the state.  President Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s 
assassination in 2001, and the installation of his son – Joseph Kabila – as president, took 
place during this period of hostilities.127  The convocation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
(ICD) and the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in 2002, followed by the 
formation of a transitional government in 2003, marked the official (declaration of) end of the 
war but did not bring about the cessation of hostilities.  In other words, both peacekeeping 
                                                            
125 Interview with a military officer (ALK) [Kinshasa], 19 October 2010. 
126 The UN established a two-phase peacekeeping force for the DRC in November 1999.  The force, known as 
Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC) [that is, United 
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo] initially had over 16,000 troops but later exceeded 
20,000 troops under a peacekeeping mandate in what was once the “[UN’s] biggest peacekeeping operation” in 
the world (Sundaram, 2005: i. d.).  Following the formal end of the Second Congo War and a political transition, 
the UN in 2010 revised MONUC’s mandate to include the eradication of violence (including seeking and 
destroying rebel groups) in eastern DRC, consolidation of state authority and security sector reform.  In line 
with this new multi-faceted mandate, MONUC was renamed Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour 
la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) [United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo]. 
127 Reports alleged that anti-Kabila forces (Rwanda, Uganda, and the United States) and curiously Kabila’s key 
ally (Angola) were complicit in the President’s assassination.  There were suggestions that Angola had begun to 
doubt Kabila’s loyalty and as such wanted him out of power (see Appendix 6 for a video on Kabila’s 
assassination). 
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and peacemaking initiatives did little to attenuate the conflict.  On the contrary, conflicts 
intensified, largely between signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and among 
former allies as well as rebel groups in eastern DRC (Boshoff and Rupiya, 2004: 29; 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). 
 
Profiteering networks (local and foreign businesspersons, private militias, rebel forces, and 
MNCs) took advantage of the instability in the eastern part of the country – where much of 
the DRC’s natural resources are located – to exploit and trade in minerals such as diamonds, 
gold, and coltan.128  From the point of view of interlopers and profiteering networks, the 
absence of state authority in eastern DRC and the inability of UN peacekeepers to bring about 
peace created opportunities for enrichment.  Resource-seeking actors entered into informal 
agreements with rebels or militias controlling mining areas with a view to accessing lucrative 
minerals.129  These deals obviated the formal arrangement of paying royalties/taxes to the 
state or following an ethical code; both are often costly to resource entrepreneurs.  Hence, 
this informal market, which made illicit resource exploitation and trade, and consequently, 
extensive enrichment possible, provided little or no incentive to end hostilities in eastern 
DRC.130 
 
Illicit exploitation of natural resources provided the funds needed for the war effort while the 
war sustained opportunities for enrichment.  Thus, the conflicts were, in a sense, self-
financing.  Moreover, the activities of these profiteering networks popularised the concept of 
“conflict minerals”.  Strikingly, ‘Africa’s world war’ became synonymous with illicit 
resource exploitation as different actors pursued what Amnesty International (2003: i. d.) 
                                                            
128 Sub-section 5.4.4 discusses coltan connections to conflicts in the DRC. 
129 Telephonic interviews with a volunteer with the Médecins Sans Frontières [Maniema], 02 November 2010; 
and with a fieldworker for Refugees International [Bunia], 02 November 2010. 
130 See Appendix 7 for video(s) on mining activities in eastern DRC. 
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referred to as the “war for profit” agenda.  Certain key minerals constituted the revenue base 
for warring parties in the DRC.  Table 5.1 depicts the actors (mainly armed groups) and their 
revenue base during ‘Africa’s world war’. 
 
Table 5.1: Major armed groups and revenue base (1998-2003) 
Armed group Minerals 
 Coltan Gold Tin Tungsten Diamonds Copper Cobalt 
Pro-government forces 
DRC army     √ √ √ 
Zimbabwean army     √   
Angolan army     √   
Mai-Mai √ √ √  √   
Anti-government forces 
Rwandan army √ √ √ √ √   
Ugandan army √ √ √ √ √   
RCD-Goma √ √ √ √ √   
RCD-ML √ √ √ √ √   
MLC √ √      
 
Source: Usanov et al. (2013: 60). 
 
The activities of armed groups and mineral traders and the connections between those 
activities and conflict perpetuation highlight the resource dimensions of the conflict in the 
DRC.  Moreover, the nexus between the illicit exploitation and trade in natural resources and 
the conflict in the DRC has been so strong that Katunga (2006-2007: 16) calls natural 
resources “engines of chaos”.  Moyroud and Katunga (2002: 182) sum up the longevity of 
conflict and conflict perpetuation potential of natural resources in the DRC: “… a vicious 
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cycle of war has developed in the DRC, where the illegal extraction and exploitation of 
natural resources has come to play a conflict-sustaining role.” 
 
Overall, the Second Congo War – essentially a war of partition and plunder – was a multi-
layered conflict that had concomitant repercussions in terms of human casualties, social 
dislocation, economic downturn and destruction of deficient infrastructure.131  Africa’s 
deadliest war and its aftermath resulted in extensive human displacement, producing millions 
of internally displaced persons and refugees.132  It reportedly claimed 5.4 million lives, with 
an average of 45,000 deaths per month (Bavier, 2007: i. d.), making it the largest documented 
death toll in a conflict since World War II.133  It is instructive to note that the magnitude and 
ramifications of the crisis in the DRC underpinned its description “as the world’s deadliest 
emergency” (International Rescue Committee, 2006: i. d.). 
 
As noted earlier, mineral resource exploitation and trade in the context of Africa’s deadliest 
conflict created a war economy in the DRC.  Even after the official withdrawal of Rwanda 
and Uganda, the cycles of violence have been fuelled by the exploitation and trafficking of 
natural resources and mineral revenue derived therefrom.  The Congolese army and rebel 
groups (which continued to receive foreign support) took centre stage in the cycle of violence 
for profit.  Table 5.2 shows the main armed groups that were involved in this cycle and their 
revenue base between 2006 and 2008. 
                                                            
131 The Second Congo War is described as multi-layered because of several related (and sometimes 
unconnected) episodes of violence that plagued the country between 1998 and 2003.  Notable instances of such 
episodes include, but not limited to, the Hema-Lendu ethnic conflict in Ituri in early 2001 and the clashes 
between regional forces, mainly the armies of Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani in August 1999 and May-June 
2000 (Murison, 2002: 227). 
132 It has been estimated that the war and its aftermath produced some 2.6 million internally displaced persons 
and 460,000 refugees (see Ranard, 2013; Refugees International, 2013). 
133 The scale of this conflict in graphic terms: “[i]n a matter of six years, the world lost a population equivalent 
to the entire country of Ireland or the city of Los Angeles” (International Rescue Committee, n. d.: i. d.).  It 
should be noted that although military operations claimed a great number of lives, war-related consequences 
such as food shortages, hunger, diseases and the collapse of health infrastructure accounted for more deaths. 
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Table 5.2: Major armed groups and revenue base (2006-2008) 
Armed group  Minerals 
 Coltan Gold Tin Tungsten Manganese Diamonds Copper Cobalt 
DRC army (FARDC) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Mai-Mai √ √ √   √   
PARECO √ √ √      
FDLR √ √ √ √     
CNDP √ √ √  √    
 
Source: Usanov et al. (2013: 61). 
 
Although relative peace prevailed in most parts of the DRC after the formal end of the 
Second Congo War, the eastern region of the DRC (the two Kivus – North and South – and 
the Ituri region) remained a theatre of war.  The eastern DRC continues to be plagued by 
conflict, even as at the time of writing.134  With reference to eastern DRC, which is still 
characterised by instability, no natural resource has been more prominent in the region’s 
volatility than a strategic mineral – coltan.  International attraction to coltan, its lootability135 
and stupendous profitability have made it a key factor in the instability in eastern DRC.  This 
study singles out coltan for separate scholarly attention, given the strategic nature of the 
mineral and its centrality to the cycles of violent conflict in eastern DRC.  Accordingly, the 
next section discusses coltan exploitation in the context of the conflict in the DRC. 
 
                                                            
134 The eastern DRC has been and continues to be a flashpoint of violent conflict and intermittent rebellion.  For 
instance, the region has witnessed sporadic conflicts between the Mai-Mai (Congolese grassroots-based militia 
group) and foreign forces.  There have been several rebellions in the east.  The most notable have been those 
orchestrated by the by the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) [Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda], a Rwandan Hutu rebel group; the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) 
[The National Congress for the Defence of the People], led by General Laurent Nkunda; and the Mouvement du 
23-Mars [March 23 Movement] popularly known as the M23 led by Bosco Ntaganda. 
135 See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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5.4.4 Coltan exploitation and conflict in the DRC 
“Greed for coltan haunts the DRC” (Lalji, 2007: 34). 
 
International competition for scarce resources in general, and for 
coltan in particular, is a key factor in the lack of state stability and 
the continuation of war in the DRC (Montague, 2002: 104). 
 
As noted earlier, the DRC holds 80% of the world’s coltan reserves.  Moyroud and Katunga 
(2002: 172) attest to the abundance of this mineral in the country: “[i]n eastern DRC, coltan 
deposits are found everywhere in farms, forests, savannahs, private and government land, in 
protected and unprotected areas”.  Coltan is derived from columbite-tantalite, “an essential 
but rare mineral” (Montague, 2002: 105).  It is a strategic mineral whose value is arguably 
unrivalled by that of any other mineral that the DRC possesses.136  Montague (2002: 104) 
refers to coltan as “the jewel of the DRC’s mineral wealth”.  Coltan’s strategic value derives 
from its manifold uses and the international demand for it.  Lalji (2007: 35) profiles coltan’s 
strategic nature thus:  
Its strength, high density, and chemical properties make it a 
valuable metal used in the manufacture of capacitators [sic] in 
high-tech and medical devices, including mobile phones and laptop 
computers. The US government extensively hoards stores of this 
mineral, and the US Department of Defense classifies coltan as a 
strategic mineral. 
 
Coltan is also used in the manufacturing of video games (such as Play Stations), “missiles, 
ships, and weapons systems” and it has  
become extremely valuable as technological advances have helped 
increase demand for the mineral … In the late 1990s demand for 
coltan skyrocketed following the boom of the technology industry.  
Between 1990 and 1999, sales of tantalum capacitors used in the 
electronics industry for cellular phones, pagers, PCs, and 
automotive electronics increased by 300 percent (Montague, 2002: 
105). 
 
                                                            
136 Interview with a director in the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (ML) [Lubumbashi], 26 October 
2010. 
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This demand engendered a “coltan rush”, or the “gold rush for coltan” (Lalji, 2007: 35).  
Dizolele (2007: i. d.) observes that “[a]t the beginning of 2000, a pound of unprocessed 
coltan cost between US$30 and US$40 on the international market [but by] the end of the 
year, the price had risen tenfold to US$400.”  This phenomenal demand for coltan, and the 
DRC’s abundant reserves of it, made the country an attractive site for international buyers, 
including MNCs.  However, it is worth noting that the international “rush” for DR Congo’s 
coltan took place while the country was in the throes of “the most deadly conflict since 
WWII” (Coghlan et al., 2004: iii).  In addition, the strategic mineral is located in the most 
volatile region of the country – the eastern DRC.  Therefore, the activities of coltan miners 
and traders – both local and foreign – as well those of forces controlling resource-bearing 
areas are bound to intertwine with, or affect or be affected by, the dynamics of conflict. 
 
The absence of state authority fuelled illicit exploitation of coltan by rebels, invading armies 
and foreign corporations whose main goal was to satisfy the tremendous international 
demand, ultimately with a view to making profits.  Neighbouring countries, mainly Rwanda 
and Uganda, became conduits for exporting coltan and other minerals extracted from the 
DRC.  According to Montague (2002: 105), many MNCs “imported coltan from the DRC via 
Rwanda for use in Europe, Asia and the United States.”137 
 
Furthermore, the nature of the local-global supply chain for coltan facilitated illicit 
exploitation and trade.  The local-global supply chain links individuals, informal and formal 
                                                            
137 The MNCs include “Banro-Resources Corporation, Geologistics Hannover, Rwasibo-Butera, Eagleswings, 
Veen, Soger, Afrimex, Cogecom, Ventro Star, Raremet, Finiming Ltd., Union Transport, Specialty Metal, and 
Finconcorde” (Montague, 2002: 105).  Montague’s list of the corporations involved in the coltan trade is drawn 
from the report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, June 2000 (see United Nations Security 
Council, 2000: 13). 
182 
networks.  Generally, artisanal miners do the actual mining of coltan.138  The ore is then sold 
to a number of intermediaries (sometimes up to two or three) who in turn transport the 
mineral out of the DRC139 (mainly to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and sometimes, South 
Africa140).  Once the mineral is out of the country, a company claims ownership of the ore 
and sells it to another company, usually the processing company.  At this stage in the local-
global supply chain, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the origin of the mineral.141  
Montague (2002: 105) captures this point thus: “[o]nce the coltan is sold onto international 
markets it is impossible to trace it from the end product back to the mines.”  Perhaps a much 
more fundamental facet of the local-global supply chain is that the “sale of coltan lacks a 
certification process that would flag its place of origin, as is currently being internationally 
implemented for conflict diamonds. Congolese coltan in effect reaches the market unnoticed 
and unhindered” (Montague, 2002: 105-106).  In practice, the lack of a certification scheme 
for coltan means the absence of the modest restraints that would typically apply in the trade 
of (other) conflict minerals, which are (fairly) regulated by international regimes. 
 
The “coltan exploitation cycle” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 174) highlights the stages and 
assortment of actors involved in the extraction and sale of the resource.  The cycle consists of 
five stages: (i) exploration (ii) detection (iii) extraction (iv) transportation, and (v) treatment.  
At stages (i), (ii) and (v), MNCs that undertake illicit investment in the DRC provide 
equipment that assist with identifying, locating, and determining the quality of coltan.  Stage 
                                                            
138 MNCs are generally hesitant to get involved in the actual mining process for a number of reasons.  MNCs 
have been hesitant to establish direct presence in the mining areas in the aftermath of the public scrutiny of their 
operations arising from the reports of the UN Panel of Experts (Interview with a journalist (DMT) [Kinshasa], 
20 October 2010).  Besides, it is cost effective for MNCs to buy coltan from intermediaries rather than 
undertake capital-intensive investment in volatile resource-bearing areas of the DRC.  Finally, coltan has a high 
degree of lootability, and as such, can be mined and transported easily by unskilled individuals. 
139 Several interviewees mentioned and corroborated this point in interviews conducted during fieldwork in the 
DRC. 
140 Interviews with a journalist (AL) [Kinshasa], 20 October 2010; with a colonel in the Congolese army 
[Kinshasa], 21 October 2010; with a youth leader in Ndjili community [Kinshasa], 22 October 2010. 
141 See Appendix 8 for the pictorial presentation of the local-global supply chain. 
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(iii) involves the use of basic equipment by unskilled individuals to excavate the mineral (a 
dimension of coltan’s lootability).  At stage (iv), military vehicles and light aircraft transport 
coltan from the DRC to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 174-
175).  Different actors play various roles across these stages.142  For instance, resource-
bearing communities provide the pool of unskilled individuals (artisanal miners) needed to 
extract coltan.  Armed groups (national armies and rebels/militias) generally provide access 
to mines or “protection” to miners.  Local and regional businesspersons serve as 
intermediaries or merchants.  Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda serve as conduits to international 
markets.  Foreign corporations oil the demand and supply mechanisms for coltan.  In their 
performance of these roles, these non-state and state actors lubricate the local-global supply 
chain for coltan and provide economic resources that support the political agendas of 
belligerents in the DRC. 
 
The local-global supply chain and the lack of a certification scheme have sustained a “pattern 
of illicit investment” (Montague, 2002: 106) in eastern DRC and foregrounded the 
imbrication of coltan in the conflicts in the region.  It is instructive to note that this “pattern 
of illicit investment” by MNCs in particular predated the Second Congo War.  For instance, 
during the AFDL rebellion against Mobutu Sese Seko (that is, the period of the First Congo 
War), several MNCs (re)negotiated mining deals/concessions with the leader of the rebellion 
(the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila) in order to access or retain control of mining sites or protect 
supplies from the DRC.143  In addition (and more importantly), some MNCs funded “military 
operations in exchange for lucrative contracts in the east of the DRC” (Braeckman, 1999: i. 
                                                            
142 See Appendix 9 for the tabular representation of the “key factors in coltan exploration” (Moyroud and 
Katunga, 2007: 175). 
143 These MNCs included Anglo-American Corporation, Anvil Mining, De Beers, and Tenke Mining 
Corporation (Montague, 2002: 106). 
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d.).144  The (re)negotiation of contracts and the funding of the AFDL’s military operations set 
a pattern that was carried over into the period of the Second Congo War. 
 
The Second Congo War involved more actors than the First.  Hence, the Second Congo War 
was characterised by the looting of the DRC’s natural resources by more actors.  Apart from 
local businesspersons and MNCs, neighbouring states and their officials became involved in 
the plunder of the DRC’s mineral wealth, creating and consolidating extensive and robust 
networks that sustained the war economy.145  Rwanda and Uganda – two countries that 
fought against Laurent-Désiré Kabila – began to feature prominently in the reports on the 
illicit exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources, especially coltan. 
 
Sequel to the occupation of eastern DRC by Rwanda and Uganda, companies reportedly 
created by (or that had close ties with) politicians and high-ranking military officials in both 
countries began to exploit coltan and other resources in the occupied territories.  Rwanda and 
Uganda also “directly or indirectly, appointed local rebel faction leaders and field 
commanders to serve as conduits for illicit trade originating from the occupied territories of 
the eastern DRC” (Montague, 2002: 106).  Besides, the armies of Rwanda and Uganda 
“ravaged the Kivu provinces for coltan” (Lalji, 2007: 36).  It was “estimated that the 
Rwandan army made $20 million per month mining coltan in 2000” (Ware, 2001: i. d.).  
Rwanda and Uganda earned millions of dollars from coltan sales and these revenues financed 
                                                            
144 These companies included “American Barrick Gold Corporation (whose shareholders include former 
President George Bush), the Australian Russell Resources headed by David Agmon, a former Brigadier General 
in the Israeli army, the Austrian company Krall, and the Canadian Banro American Resources” (Braeckman, 
1999: i. d.). 
145 It is instructive to note that even MONUC (as it was then known) – a peacekeeping structure – was complicit 
in the illegal exploitation of coltan.  Noury (2010: 34) stated that MONUC was “heavily criticised, including by 
the UN itself, in the light of allegations, some substantiated, concerning its complicity with rebel troops and 
other kinds of illegality and malpractice”.  For instance, in a highly publicised incident in August 2011, a UN 
official was arrested in Goma near the Rwandan border for mineral trafficking (Kavanagh, 2011: i. d.). 
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their war effort in the DRC (Montague, 2002: 107).146  The economic spoils obtained from 
coltan exploitation and trade provided little or no incentive for Rwanda and Uganda to 
withdraw from eastern DRC despite international pressure to do so.  Interestingly, some 
observers suggested that the armies of Rwanda and Uganda continued to control mining areas 
in eastern DRC after they publicised their “withdrawal” from the occupied territories.147  In 
most cases where direct presence was likely to expose their illicit activities, the Rwanda and 
Ugandan armies generally conducted their “coltan business by proxy”148 – a reference to the 
use of Congolese groups and intermediaries. 
 
Armed groups relied on force or the threat of force to access coltan sites and to enlist 
villagers as artisanal miners.  The RCD – the rebel group that was backed by Rwanda and 
Uganda but which later split – and the armies of both countries became the “most significant 
actors in coltan mining and trading in eastern Congo” (Usanov et al., 2013: 58).  Armed 
groups generally imposed taxes on coltan mining and transport in the areas under their 
control (Nest, 2011: 86).  In addition to direct involvement in mining operations, armed 
groups generated revenue to finance their war effort through “setting up illegal taxes and fees 
and from ‘gate keeping’ at mining locations.  For example, the RCD made every trading 
house (comptoir) pay US$ 15,000 for a yearly license, and collected taxes on mineral exports, 
estimated at 8% of the total export value” (Usanov et al., 2013: 58).  For its part, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) “provided protection to miners and companies extracting 
                                                            
146 It is noteworthy that Rwanda and Uganda recorded higher coltan exports at the height of their occupation of 
eastern DRC.  In 2000 for instance, “Rwanda produced 83 tons of coltan from its own mines [but] managed to 
export 683 tons!” (Noury, 2010: 35).  This leads to an incontrovertible conclusion: significant amounts of 
Rwanda’s coltan exports came from the DRC.  Similarly, “despite the lack of any known coltan or niobium 
production in Uganda, exports of these minerals steadily increased between 1997 and 1999” (Guenther, 2008: 
353). 
147 E-interviews (via SkypeTM) with a civil society activist (PMU) [Goma], 24 June 2012; with a Political 
Science lecturer (VK) [Goma], 26 July 2012; and with a journalist (JPM) [Goma], 26 July 2012. 
148 Interview with a field researcher for Enough Project [Kinshasa], 24 October 2010; and E-interview (via 
SkypeTM) with a journalist and blogger (PB) [Goma], 26 February 2011. 
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coltan in exchange for sharing their profits” (Usanov et al., 2013: 59).  This arrangement 
sustained the Rwandan army and its operations in the DRC. 
 
Apart from direct involvement in mining and illegal taxation, armed groups floated 
companies or entered into joint venture arrangements to reap economic benefits from coltan 
exploitation and trade.  For example after the split of the RCD rebel group into two (RCD-
Goma and RCD-Kisangani), RCD-Goma created a company – the Société Minière des 
Grands Lacs (SOMIGL) – to handle its coltan business.  RCD-Goma granted SOMIGL 
monopoly in terms of the exports of all coltan produced in the territories under the rebel 
group’s control.  SOMIGL’s monopoly enabled RCD-Goma to maximise the spoils from 
coltan exports and to obtain optimal tax returns.  For example, the rebel group earned some 
US$2.5 million in tax revenue from coltan in three months from late 2000 to early 2001 
(Nest, 2011: 87).  The funds provided the requisite economic backbone for the group’s war 
efforts.  Furthermore, coltan revenues made it possible for armed groups (and even grassroots 
militias) to maintain autonomy, crucially “for their supply of military equipment” (Moyroud 
and Katunga, 2002: 182).  Armed groups were able to purchase military equipment that they 
could not have acquired if they had no access to coltan and to other sources of mineral 
revenue. 
 
As different actors jostled to maximise economic spoils from the coltan trade, competition for 
access to and control over the strategic mineral ultimately fostered “warlordism” (Guenther, 
2008: 355) and as noted already, undermined the prospects for conflict reduction and 
peacebuilding.  Obviously, the militarisation of coltan exploitation has exacerbated conflicts 
in eastern DRC.  For instance, there has been infighting between local militias and rebel 
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groups over access to or control of mining sites and the distribution of mineral revenues.149  
Usanov et al. (2013: 60) report on the violent struggles that typically ensued between armed 
groups: 
[c]ompetition over the control of the coltan mines often led to 
violent confrontations between the different armed actors.  The 
number of clashes between the Rwandan army and the Mai-Mai 
intensified during the coltan boom between May and December 
2000.  Some of Rwanda’s attacks directly targeted coltan mines 
with the aim of capturing stocks of mined coltan.  Clashes over 
coltan and gold also took place between the Mai-Mai, the Ugandan 
army and the MLC rebel group in the Ituri district of Province 
Orientale. 
 
Several low-intensity conflicts over coltan have been waged by the Mai-Mai who are 
opposed to resource extraction by foreign actors (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 180).  
Remarkably, during the formal occupation of eastern DRC by Rwanda and Uganda, there 
were cases of violent conflicts “between Rwandan and Ugandan forces and their respective 
Congolese client factions … around coltan-rich areas in the so-called ‘coltan belt’ ... These 
battles … exacerbated ethnic relations, devastated entire communities, and undermined 
efforts to rebuild the foundations of a civil society” (Montague, 2002: 112).150   
 
In light of the connections of coltan (and other natural resources) to the conflicts in eastern 
DRC, the government of Joseph Kabila in September 2010 banned all mining activities in the 
coltan-rich provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema (BBC, 2010: i. d).  The ban 
was imposed in order to neutralise the economic powerbase of the rebels and to cut off a vital 
source of revenue for the DRC’s neighbours that were involved in illicit economic activities 
                                                            
149 An interviewee stressed this point with reference to the frequent emergence of splinter rebel groups and 
factional battles between rebel movements in eastern DRC (E-interview (via SkypeTM) with a Professor of 
Political Science [Kisangani], 25 July 2012). 
150 The conflicts in eastern DRC have produced far-reaching deleterious consequences – environmental and 
human.  Coltan exploitation and coltan-related conflicts have wreaked ecocide or ecological damage, for 
example the decimation of endangered species (of both flora and fauna) in the World Heritage sites: Kahuzi-
Biéga National Park and Virunga National Park (see Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 173).  Conflicts have also 
displaced 81% of the region’s population and more than 16% have repeatedly suffered sexual violence 
(Autesserre, 2010: 2). 
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in eastern Congo.  The ban, which hurt artisanal miners the most (as they depended on coltan 
mining to eke out a living), “failed to halt smuggling and break the link between armed 
groups and the mineral trade” (Doya, 2011: i. d.).  On the contrary, “members of the military 
… used their role in enforcing the ban to increase their stake in the mineral trade” (Doya, 
2011: i. d).  On the ground, illicit exploitation and trafficking in coltan and other resources 
persisted as armed groups (mainly Congolese soldiers and CNDP commanders) continued to 
conduct mining transactions with merchants and investors.151  The government lifted the ban 
six months later.  Since then, efforts by the Congolese government and MONUSCO have 
been redirected towards neutralising armed groups in eastern DRC (VOA News, 2014: i. d.). 
 
In rounding off the discussion in this section, it is pertinent to note that the nuanced 
understanding of the resource-conflict link (presented earlier in this study152) applies in equal 
measure to coltan and to the explication of its role in the conflicts in the DRC.  This nuanced 
understanding framed Grespin’s (2010: 30) apt observation regarding the role of coltan in the 
conflict: “[w]hile coltan is not a root cause of conflict in the DRC, it is indisputably an 
aggravating and conflict-sustaining factor … Many of the inter-tribal and economically 
driven microconflicts plaguing the DRC are aggravated by the patterns of coltan extraction 
and transport.”  In other words, while it is not a causal basis for war, coltan, as a factor in the 
DRC conflict, has played and continues to play a conflict-sustaining role.  As shown in this 
section, the allure of or the “gold rush” for Congo’s coltan (and by extension, other minerals) 
has sustained the vicious cycle of conflict in the country.  Therefore, Lalji’s (2007: 34) 
observation carries historical and contemporary weight: “[g]reed for coltan haunts the DRC.” 
 
 
                                                            
151 E-interviews (via SkypeTM) with a journalist and blogger (PB) [Goma], 26 February 2011; and with an 
official of a faith-based network (AT) [Bukavu], 28 February 2011. 
152 See Chapter Two. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a broad overview of the DRC – the study’s location.  The first 
section introduced the chapter.  The second section described the key attributes of the 
country, which give it geo-strategic significance in central Africa in particular and Africa at 
large.  The DRC’s landmass, topography, climate and hydroelectric capacity are important 
sources of potential and actual power.  However, the country’s chequered history (defined in 
terms of political instability and the longevity of conflict) has precluded the transformation of 
such potential power into actual power, or the harnessing of geo-strategic attributes for 
development.  Belgian colonial policies and the warped agendas of and interventions by 
foreign powers in the early days of statehood combined to set the Congo almost irrevocably 
on the path of governance deficit, state deflation/failure and associated development 
pathologies.  The import of the discussion in the second section of this chapter is that 
historical realities are germane to understanding the DRC’s current traumas. 
 
Employing the notion of scandale géologique, the third section of the chapter profiled the 
DRC’s enormous mineral wealth.  The term was used, in a sense, with reference to the 
country’s enormous natural resource endowment.  The DRC is arguably the richest country in 
Africa in terms of natural resources.  To provide a glimpse of the extent of its mineral wealth, 
the section highlighted the DRC’s share of world reserves of key minerals.  In addition, it was 
noted that the natural resources found in the DRC are of the highest (and in some cases, the 
best) quality.  Moreover, it can be deduced from this chapter that the attraction to DR 
Congo’s minerals has been a factor in the country’s perennial woes.  Here, scandale 




The fourth section, which discussed Africa’s deadliest conflict, presented an aspect of the 
DRC’s postcolonial traumas.  A discussion of ‘Africa’s world war’ showed the complexities 
associated with the biggest war since World War II: the multiplicity of actors and shifting 
agendas and allegiances, covert and overt motivations of parties, and the concomitant 
deleterious consequences of the conflict.  Although a number of causal bases and factors 
were at play in the conflagrations in the DRC from 1997 to 2003, the section (in line with the 
scope of this study), focused on the natural resource dimensions of the First and Second 
Congo Wars.  Cognisant of the intricate nexus between natural resources and conflict, this 
researcher noted that natural resources played a conflict perpetuation role in the DRC.  
Mineral exploitation and trafficking involving networks of state and non-state actors created a 
war economy that brought the conflict-financing capacity of natural resources to the fore.  
The illicit exploitation of natural resources (such as cobalt, copper, diamonds, gold, 
manganese, tin and tungsten) and the revenue that various actors obtained from resource trade 
provided little or no incentive for ending the conflict.  In this sense, the Congo’s resources 
have been a major factor in conflict perpetuation. 
 
However, as the fourth section showed, of all the Congo’s resources, one in particular – 
coltan – has been a more decisive element in conflict perpetuation during and after the 
Second Congo War.  The ‘gold rush for coltan’ has been a phenomenon sustaining the vicious 
cycle of conflicts in eastern DRC.  As noted in the section, the local-global chain for coltan 
has made it difficult to address the supply dimensions of coltan trade with a view to curbing 
illicit activities in the chain, primarily at source.  More importantly, the absence of a 
certification scheme (analogous to the KPCS for diamonds) has been a critical impediment to 
addressing the coltan connections to conflict in the DRC.  The net effect of these systemic 
inadequacies is that coltan has been (and remains) a key variable in the cycle of chaos in the 
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DRC.  It is likely that international attraction to coltan – a “rare mineral” (Montague, 2002: 
105) – will remain high in view of its strategic value, which perhaps is unrivalled by any 
other mineral.  As mentioned earlier, international attraction to natural resources (such as 
coltan) has been a key motivation for investment by foreign economic actors (mainly MNCs) 
in resource-bearing environments, including conflict zones.  With specific reference to 
conflict zones such as the DRC, the actions of foreign corporate actors have implications for 
conflict dynamics and the prospects for peace.  In line with this premise, the next chapter of 




















EXPLICATING CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented an overview of the DRC.  In doing so, it described the 
country’s historical trajectory, providing insights into how colonial legacies, post-
independence politics and foreign interference have combined to render the country 
perennially tempestuous.  The previous chapter also provided a sketch of the DRC’s resource 
endowment, noting how scandale géologique appositely captures the country’s immense 
mineral wealth.  As discussed, the DRC’s physical attributes and mineral wealth highlight its 
geo-strategic significance.  However, the chapter also showed that natural resource 
abundance has been part of the DRC’s nemesis.  Basically, both the attractiveness of DR 
Congo’s natural resources and their lootability have been contributory factors in the country’s 
cycles of post-colonial traumas, especially since the mid-1990s. 
 
Specifically, the preceding chapter explored the connections between natural resources and 
the First and Second Congo Wars.  In this regard, it touched on key state and non-state actors 
whose agendas and activities have exacerbated or contributed to the longevity of conflict in 
the DRC.  It is pertinent to state that mineral-prospecting and resource-trading MNCs are, 
arguably, the most important economic actors in the context of the resource dimensions of 
the wars.  Therefore, this chapter focuses on MNCs in the study’s locale.  Which MNCs are 
relevant in unpacking the study’s intricate nexus or triangulation of minerals, business and 
conflict in the DRC?  What reaction did the activities of these MNCs elicit, especially from 
the international community?  How does the immediate operational environment of an MNC 
(such as a conflict situation) determine the form that CSR takes, and did MNCs in the DRC 
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undertake CSR activities?  How did local, national and international conditions influence 
corporate behaviour in the DRC? 
 
This chapter explores these questions by examining the activities of prominent mineral-
prospecting and resource-trading MNCs in the DRC.  It is divided into six sections.  The first 
section gives an overview of the chapter while the second is a profile of selected MNCs in the 
DRC, mainly those involved in mineral resource extraction, purchasing/marketing and supply 
chain processes.  In section three, the chapter analyses the reports by the UN Panel of 
Experts, which investigated allegations of the plunder of DR Congo’s natural resources.  The 
reports of the Panel of Experts provide a panoramic view of the involvement of key state and 
non-state actors in the exploitation of the DRC’s resources in a way that highlight the 
resource dimensions of conflicts.  Given the scope of this chapter, however, only relevant 
aspects of the reports (that is, those that deal with MNCs) will be considered.  Following this, 
the chapter – in the fourth section – examines corporate social responsibility by MNCs in the 
DRC.  In line with the study’s hypothesis, the fifth section explores the local, national and 
international contexts of corporate behaviour in the DRC.  The crux of this section is to 
describe how conditions and variables at the three levels of analysis influenced the behaviour 
of MNCs in the country.  Section six concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Profiles of selected multinational corporations in the DRC 
MNCs are important actors in the context of this study, which explores the link between 
natural resources, business and conflict.  International economic actors were active in the 
country before it gained independence.  However, the MNCs became actively involved in the 
DRC after its independence, and their influence increased during Mobutu’s era.153  
                                                            
153 Interview with a Professor of International Political Economy (ALM) [Lubumbashi], 27 October 2010. 
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Multinationals with connections to the DRC fall into two categories.  In the first category are 
mineral-prospecting MNCs.  This study also refers to these companies as resource-extracting 
MNCs.  These corporations are involved in the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources that this study highlighted in Chapter Five.  MNCs involved in resource extraction 
conduct their operations through mining concessions granted to them by some of the key 
Congolese political actors – either the government or the group controlling the resource-
bearing community.  Such companies may enter into joint ventures with Congolese 
companies (sometimes a national company) or a consortium of companies which are 
incorporated in more than one country.  In some instances, mineral-prospecting companies 
conduct their operations through subsidiaries that may be sold off easily, rather than 
undertake risky operations in the DRC.154   
 
Companies in the second category are resource-trading MNCs.  These do not undertake direct 
mineral exploration and exploitation in the DRC but buy minerals from other MNCs or 
intermediaries.  More often than not, the intermediaries are comptoirs (that is, trading houses 
or mineral merchants) based in the DRC.  Comptoirs are legitimate businesses – they are 
licensed and registered by the Congolese government to trade in minerals.155  In addition, 
intermediaries may come from the DRC, neighbouring countries or from Asia, Europe, and 
America.156  Resource-trading MNCs buy unprocessed minerals, which the companies (may 
or may not) refine and then sell to end-users.  This section provides brief profiles of MNCs in 
both categories.  Although the reports of the United Nations Panel of Experts identified as 
many as 85 companies as having had connections with the DRC conflict, some of the 
                                                            
154 Interview with a director in the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (J-PM) [Kinshasa], 18 October 
2010. 
155 It should be noted that the use of comptoirs might conceal the illicit aspects of mineral exploitation and thus 
absolve MNCs of responsibility for any illegality in the DRC. 
156 Interview with an official in the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (J-DK) [Lubumbashi], 27 October 
2010. 
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companies fall outside the two categories outlined above.157  This study deals specifically 
with MNCs involved directly with natural resource issues in the form of either 
exploration/exploitation or trade.  Thus, the list of companies in this section is based on 
research findings during fieldwork in the DRC.  In what follows, this study presents the 
profiles of selected MNCs in alphabetical order. 
 
Afrimex (UK) Ltd 
Afrimex (UK) is incorporated and headquartered in the United Kingdom (UK).  It was 
founded in 1984.  It is a resource-trading company privately owned by UK national, 
Ketankumar (or Ketan) Kotecha.  The company’s sole directors are Kotecha and his wife, 
Didi Ketan Kotecha.  It trades mainly in cassiterite, coltan and wolframite.  Between 1998 
and 2005, Afrimex was the greatest coltan “trader in terms of volume [and] the second largest 
exporter of cassiterite from South Kivu, controlling more than 40% of the cassiterite from the 
province, while also buying minerals from mines in North Kivu” (Global Witness, 2007: 5).  
Afrimex also acts as a commissioning agent for other companies involved in mineral trade 
(OECD, 2010: 48).  Until 2008, Afrimex obtained its supplies of these minerals from Goma 
in eastern DRC primarily through comptoirs based in the region (Global Witness, 2008: 69).  
Specifically, it conducted its operations “in eastern DRC through the Congolese registered 
companies Société Kotecha158 and SOCOMI, both based in Bukavu” (Global Witness, 2009: 
68).  The company claimed in 2008 that it had terminated its business operations in the DRC 
(Global Witness, 2009: 68).  Afrimex’s claim has not been independently verified. 
                                                            
157 It is worth noting that MNCs are also active in other sectors in the DRC besides the mining industry.  These 
sectors include agribusiness, banking, construction, food processing, security, telecommunications, transport 
(especially airfreight), and tourism.  In some instances, MNCs in these non-mining sectors provided logistical 
services to actors in the DRC conflict and, therefore, were named in the reports of the UN Panel of Experts as 
being complicit in the conflict. 
158 Société Kotecha is a Congolese company established in the 1960s by Ketan Kotecha’s father (UK 
Parliament, 2006: i. d.).  Ketan Kotecha and his wife “are also the directors of Société Kotecha” (Global 
Witness, 2007: 3), a company with strong ties to Afrimex.  As a report by Global Witness (2007: 3) indicated, 
“Afrimex operates in eastern DRC as Société Kotecha”. 
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Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC 
This company was established in 1929.  It is incorporated and headquartered in the UK.  A 
seven-member board of directors oversees the company’s operations.  It “is a worldwide 
supplier of raw materials and intermediate products, with a focus on non-ferrous metals, steel 
and construction materials for a broad range of industrial applications.  Its geographic spread 
provides a balanced exposure to localised economic cycles” (AMC Group, n. d.: i. d.).  The 
company has two operational divisions: “AMC Trading and AMC Industrial” (AMC Group, 
n. d.: i. d).  It “operates through subsidiaries or associates in Europe, North America, Africa, 
Asia and Australasia” (Global Witness, 2009: 62).  It conducts its predominantly resource-
trading operations in the DRC through its “principal subsidiary” – the Thailand Smelting and 
Refining Corporation (THAISARCO), whose profile is presented subsequently in this 
section.  Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC, operating mainly through its “principal 
subsidiary”, is reportedly one the largest buyers of cassiterite from the DRC, mainly from the 
Kivu Provinces (Global Witness, 2009: 62). 
 
America Mineral Fields (now Adastra Minerals, Inc.)159 
This is an American mining company incorporated in the UK.  It was created in 1979.  Jean-
Raymond Boulle, a Mauritian-born British citizen, founded the company “in partnership with 
his brothers Franco and Bertrand” (Prunier, 2009: 140-141).  Boulle owns several companies 
that conduct exploration and mining operations for cobalt, copper, diamonds, gold, nickel and 
platinum in Africa, North America and South America.  George H. W. Bush, former United 
States President, was until 2006 a member of Adastra’s international advisory board 
(Queyranne, 2006: i. d.).  At that time, Mike McMurrough, a friend of former United States 
                                                            
159 This study uses the company’s former name, America Mineral Fields (as opposed to Adastra Minerals Inc.), 
because it was known as such during the First and Second Congo Wars – the period covered by this study.  
Moreover, participants (interviewees and respondents to questionnaire) had used this name during fieldwork. 
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President, Bill Clinton, was the company’s chair (Kern, 2007: 99).  Listed on the London 
Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange, Adastra Minerals (formerly America 
Mineral Fields) “engages in the acquisition, exploration, and development of mineral 
resource properties in Africa.  It primarily focuses on cobalt, copper, zinc, and diamond 
minerals” (Business Week, 2012: i. d.).  Its main investments in Africa are in Angola, the 
DRC and Zambia.  The company’s mining operations in the DRC are concentrated in 
Kolwezi (in the DRC’s copper belt region), where it extracts cobalt and copper and in 
Kipushi and Solwezi (where it exploits zinc).  In 2006, another MNC, First Quantum 
Minerals, acquired the company’s properties and concession (Business Week, 2012: i. d.).   
The company reportedly had close links with the late President Laurent-Désiré Kabila and 




Anglo-American PLC was founded in 1917.  It is headquartered in the UK.  Anglo-American 
PLC is listed (and its shares are traded) on the London and Johannesburg Stock Exchanges.  
The company describes itself as “one of the world’s largest mining companies” (Anglo 
American, 2013a: i. d.).  Its investments are geographically diverse; it conducts operations in 
Africa, Europe, and North and South America.  Across its global operations, Anglo-American 
PLC mines copper, diamonds, manganese, nickel, niobium, iron ore, phosphates, platinum, 
and coal.  It is the world’s largest producer of diamonds and platinum and the fourth largest 
producer of iron ore.  Its operating profit in 2012 was US$6.2 billion (Anglo American, 
2013a: i. d.).  Some of the copper, diamonds, and iron ore it produces for the international 
                                                            
160 Interview with a former Minister of Mines [Kinshasa], 18 October 2010. 
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market are sourced from the DRC through a joint venture with Adastra Minerals Inc. 
(formerly America Mineral Fields). 
 
Anvil Mining 
Anvil Mining, a Canadian company, was formed in 2002.  A Chinese company, Minmetals 
Resources Limited, acquired Anvil Mining in March 2012.  Prior to this acquisition, Anvil 
Mining’s major shareholders were First Quantum Minerals, Deans Knight Management (both 
based in Canada), and Australia’s Colonial First Estate (a financial services company).  Anvil 
Mining was listed on the Toronto and Australia Stock Exchanges.  The company was a 
copper producer.  It had investments in the DRC, Philippines and Zambia.  It began 
operations in the DRC in 2002, in the same year that it was established (Anvil Mining, 2011: 
i. d.).  Anvil Mining considered the DRC as its “key focus for exploration” (JETRO, n. d.: i. 
d.).  Its operations in the DRC were concentrated in the copper-rich Katanga Province, where 
it operated three mines.  The three mines – “Kinsevere, Dikulushi and Mutoshi” – were 
located in the area that “traditionally produced more than 70% of the DRC copper mineral 
product” (JETRO, n. d.: i. d.).  Anvil Mining’s strategic investments in the DRC’s copper belt 
zone made it a key economic actor in the DRC.  The company was the largest copper 
producer in the DRC (JETRO, n. d.: i. d.).  Moreover, its investment profile and contribution 
to mineral revenue enabled the company to enjoy government support.161 
 
Banro Corporation 
Banro Corporation (also operating as Banro Resources), is a Canadian company with 
connections to Malaysia and South Africa (by virtue of its registration in the two countries).  
Its major shareholders are Franklin Resources Inc., Tradewinds Global Investors LLC, 
                                                            
161 Interview with an economist at the University of Lubumbashi (LMBN) [Lubumbashi], 26 October 2010. 
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Gramercy Funds Management LLC, JP Morgan Chase & Co. (all four are American 
companies), and Canada’s I. G. Investment Management Limited.  Banro Corporation’s 
profile states that it “enjoys strong support from institutional investors primarily in North 
America, the UK and South Africa” (Banro Corporation, n. d[a]: i. d.).  It is listed on the 
Toronto and New York Stock Exchanges.  It is primarily a gold mining company.  The aim of 
the company is to create a large gold mining project in the DRC (Barradas, 2011: i. d.).  Its 
main operations in the DRC are in the “gold belt” region in South Kivu and Maniema 
provinces (Banro Corporation, n. d[b]: i. d.).  Banro Resources “holds exploration titles in 
three gold mining areas in South Kivu (Twangiza, Lugushwa, Kamituga) and one in the 
neighbouring province of Maniema (Namoya)” (Global Witness, 2009: 24).  The company 
commenced operations in the areas in 1997.  This followed the collapse of the state mining 
company, whose gold mining rights Banro Resources acquired.  The conflicts in eastern DRC 
disrupted Banro Corporation’s operations until 2004 when it resumed exploration (Global 
Witness, 2009: 24). 
 
Cabot Corporation 
Cabot Corporation is headquartered in the United States of America.  It was established in 
1882.  Its top five shareholders are American companies that provide financial services: 
Fidelity Investments, Vanguard Group Inc., State Street Corporation, Royce & Associates 
and Wellington Management Company.  Cabot Corporation prides itself as “a global 
specialty chemicals and performance materials company” (Cabot Corporation, 2012: i. d.).  It 
operates in more than 20 countries.  The company’s main activities include the processing of 
rubber, carbon and precious metals.  Its revenue from global operations in 2012 was put at 
US$3.3 billion (Cabot Corporation, 2012: i. d.).  Cabot Corporation is a major buyer of 
tantalum.  There is no company-specific information on Cabot Corporation’s presence in the 
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DRC, through either affiliates or subsidiaries.  However, the UN Panel of Experts cited the 
company “for its indirect business ties and involvement in purchasing, trading and/or using 
coltan from the DRC”, a charge that Cabot Corporation denied (OECD, 2004: i. d).162 
 
De Beers 
De Beers was founded in 1888.  The company is incorporated in two countries – the UK and 
South Africa.  De Beers is owned and controlled by three parties: Anglo American [PLC] 
with 45% stake, the Oppenheimer family (40%) and the government of Botswana, which has 
15% stake (Sguazzin, 2007: i. d.).  It is the largest diamond company in the world.  De Beers 
commenced operations in the DRC in 2004.  The DRC has been described as “an extremely 
high priority” for De Beers (Mining Review.com, 2008: i. d.).  In line with its objective “to 
accelerate diamond exploration in [the] Congo”, the company stepped up its investment in the 
DRC after the country’s 2006 elections (Sguazzin, 2007: i. d.). 
 
First Quantum Minerals Ltd 
First Quantum Minerals Ltd is headquartered in Canada.  It was co-founded in 1983 by 
British nationals Geoffrey Clive Newall and Martin R. Rowley.  Its main shareholders are 
Hexavest Inc. of Canada, UK’s Gulf International Bank, and two US-based companies 
namely, Aperio Group and World Asset Management Inc.  First Quantum Minerals Ltd is 
listed on the Toronto and London Stock Exchanges.  Its main business consists of “mineral 
exploration, development and mining” (First Quantum Minerals Ltd, 2012: i. d.).  The 
company has investments in the DRC, Mauritania, Panama, Peru, Spain, and Zambia.  First 
Quantum Minerals Ltd describes itself as “an established and rapidly growing mining and 
metals company”, specialising in the production of “copper, nickel, gold, zinc and platinum 
                                                            
162 It is instructive to note that the study participants referred to Cabot Corporation in their responses to 
questions that the researcher posed during fieldwork. 
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group metals” (First Quantum Minerals Ltd, 2012: i. d.).  Its main operation in the DRC 
involved cobalt and copper mining, which it suspended in 2009 over disagreements with the 
Congolese government.  The disagreement arose after the Congolese government withdrew 
the company’s mining licence as part of the government’s effort to renegotiate the company’s 
contract.  The company rejected this move by the government, insisting that the purported 
revocation of its exploitation permit was in violation of the country’s mining code and laws, 
which protected its investment (First Quantum Minerals Ltd, 2010: i. d).  The Congolese 
government had its way despite the MNC’s reservations, forcing the company to terminate its 
operations in the DRC.  First Quantum Minerals Ltd subsequently instituted international 
arbitration proceedings against the DRC government.  It is instructive to note that while the 
dispute with the Congolese government lasted, “First Quantum … received the support of the 
Canadian government which delayed, but ultimately failed to stop, approval by the World 
Bank and IMF for [US]$12.3 [billion] in debt relief to the DRC” (Ryan, 2010: i. d.). 
 
Tenke Mining Corporation 
Until 2007 when Lundin Mining Corporation163 acquired it, Tenke Mining Corporation was 
headquartered in Canada.  It was also listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.  Following its 
acquisition by Lundin Mining Corporation, Tenke Mining Corporation was de-listed from the 
Toronto Stock Exchange.  The defunct resource-extracting company conducted business in 
Chile, Argentina (both in South America) and the DRC (Infomine.com, n. d: i. d).164  Its 
mining operations in these countries were concentrated in the cobalt and copper sub-sectors.  
In the DRC, Tenke Mining Corporation undertook cobalt and copper mining in the Katanga 
Province, where it controlled several mines.  Tenke Mining Corporation was an important 
                                                            
163 Adolf H. Lundin (a Swede) founded Lundin Mining Corporation in 1994.  The company is headquartered in 
Canada. 
164 Although Lundin Mining Corporation took over Tenke Mining Corporation’s investment and activities in the 
DRC in 2007, participants in this study referred to the latter in responses to research questions. 
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player in the mining business in the Katanga Province.  Its economic influence in the copper 
belt zone was rivalled arguably only by that of Anvil Mining Corporation.165  
 
Thailand Smelting and Refining Corporation (THAISARCO) 
THAISARCO was founded in 1963.  As at the time of writing this thesis, it conducts 
operations as a subsidiary of Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC.  THAISARCO is 
“recognised worldwide as an industry leader in the manufacture of tin, tin alloys and tin-
related, added value products” (THAISARCO, n. d.: i. d.).  It is “the world’s fifth-largest tin-
producing company” (Global Witness, 2009: 59).  The company deals in minerals that are 
used “in the manufacturing of tinplate for food and drink cans and other types of containers; 
in solder for the electronics and computer industries; in chemicals as organo-tin compounds 
for PVC stabilisers, fungicides and wood preservatives; and for use in bearing alloys and 
pewters” (THAISARCO, n. d.: i. d.).  In addition, the company serves the aerospace, 
automotive, defence, construction, marine, food processing, petrochemical and ceramics 
industries.  It created a trading division in 2008 to handle supply chain aspects of its global 
operations.  The UN Panel of Experts found that THAISARCO had bought minerals from 
comptoirs in the DRC (Global Witness, 2009: 7), prompting its inclusion in the list of MNCs 
with connections to resource-related conflicts in the country. 
 
The profiles of the aforementioned MNCs present a microcosm of a corporate web from 
which extrapolations can be made.  This web serves as an analytical and practical frame that 
sheds light on some of the attributes on MNCs with connections to the DRC.  In other words, 
looking at a few MNCs in the DRC enables one to understand investment patterns and 
                                                            
165 Interview with an economist at the University of Lubumbashi (LMBN) [Lubumbashi], 26 October 2010. 
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operations by corporate actors.166  It also highlights the natural resources that MNCs are 
attracted to, and the modalities for accessing those minerals.  Against this backdrop, a few 
extrapolations can be made:   
(i) The vast majority of MNCs with investments, affiliates/subsidiaries, operations 
(whether sole or joint venture arrangements) in the DRC are owned by individuals 
and/or entities from the West.  Most of the companies are also headquartered in 
the West.   
(ii) These MNCs have extensive (sometimes, global) reach and connections.   
(iii) MNCs are attracted to a few strategic minerals that offer very high returns on 
investment.   
(iv) The comptoir arrangement suits MNCs that deal in lootable resources as it 
minimises reputational risks when compared to direct presence in a resource-rich 
conflict zone.   
(v) Resource-trading MNCs largely favour supply chain arrangements that conceal 
illicit activities in general or the link between minerals and conflict in particular.   
(vi) The use of affiliates or subsidiaries might shield the parent company from 
culpability in illicit activities in the supply chain. 
 
Corporate investment and actions in the DRC reflect the broad patterns presented above.  
These patterns influence or even shape the modus operandi and actual nature of company 
activities and support base.  For instance, companies owned by individuals and/or entities in 
the West (or those headquartered in the West) may feel insulated from the effects of 
corporate actions in host environments and, as such, may not be concerned with issues 
                                                            
166 I am indebted to a Professor of International Political Economy at the University of Lubumbashi for this 
point.  This idea is underscored by the fact that mineral-prospecting and resource-trading companies (and MNCs 
in general) tend to exhibit certain common attributes, which allow for generalisations or the development of 
typologies regarding corporate behaviour (Interview with a Professor of International Political Economy (ALM) 
[Lubumbashi], 27 October 2010). 
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pertaining to corporate accountability and responsibility.  However, the stakes that companies 
have in host environments may limit the saliency of headquarter location.  In the DRC, both 
mineral-prospecting and resource-trading MNCs have (or had) high stakes in the country, 
which are crucial to furthering and realising the profit maximisation agenda of these 
corporations.  In a conflict zone, such (investment) stakes and the quest for profit 
maximisation often directly or inadvertently complicate, exacerbate and/or prolong conflict 
thus laying bare the connections of business to war. 
 
Moreover, corporate actions in the DRC highlighted the intricate linkages between natural 
resources and conflict in a manner that generated international concern and response.  A 
significant response from the international community took the form of UN-sanctioned 
scrutiny of actors involved in the DRC conflict, especially their connections to the country’s 
resources.  The next section turns attention to this point. 
 
6.3 An analysis of the reports of the United Nations Panel of Experts 
As noted already in this study, the illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources 
marked a defining feature of the First and Second Congo Wars as well as other (subsequent) 
conflicts in eastern DRC.  The palpable connections of natural resources to these violent 
conflicts (especially the Second Congo War) provoked a response from the United Nations 
(UN).  In June 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) requested the UN 
Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, to establish a panel to investigate and report on 
the illicit exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources against the backdrop of the resource 
dimensions of the conflicts in the country.  In July 2000, the UN Secretary-General 
established the panel, known as the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter 
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referred to as the UN Panel of Experts, or simply as the Panel).  The UN Panel of Experts, 
whose six-month timeline was extended a few times due to the enormity of its task and 
reactions to its work, was given the mandate: 
(i) “To follow up on reports and collect information on all activities of illegal 
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, including violation of  the sovereignty of that country”; 
(ii) “To research and analyse the links between the exploitation of the natural resources 
and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
continuation of the conflict”; 
(iii) “To revert to the Council with recommendations” (United Nations Security Council, 
2001a: 3). 
 
Between 2001 and 2003, the Panel submitted a number of reports on its findings to the 
Secretary-General, who in turn presented the reports to the UNSC for deliberation and action.  
The Panel’s submissions included the first report in April 2001 (S/2001/357), Addendum to 
the Report (S/2001/1072, in November 2001), an Interim Report (S/2002/565, May 2002) 
and the Final Report (S/2002/1146, in October 2002).  The Panel subsequently compiled an 
attachment (S/2003/1027) in October 2003 to the Final Report.167 
 
In terms of methodology, the Panel obtained information and evidence from primary and 
secondary sources.  Primary sources included official documentation from government 
                                                            
167 The October 2002 Report generated angry responses and vehement rebuttals from state and non-state actors 
that the Panel had indicted for complicity in the illicit exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources.  Some of the 
aggrieved parties claimed that the Panel had not given them an opportunity to demonstrate or state their 
innocence.  Therefore, the UNSC instituted a follow-up Panel in order “to pursue a dialogue with individuals, 
companies and States referred to in the [2002] report, exchange information with those parties, assess key 
actions taken by them and compile their reactions for publication as an attachment to the report” (United 
Nations Security Council, 2003: 4).  In 2003, the follow-up Panel issued an attachment to the October 2002 
Report.  The attachment (S/2003/1027) contained the outcomes of the Panel’s consultations with the aggrieved 
parties.  It also noted the progress made by the parties (such as desisting from illicit activities in the DRC) after 
the publication of the October 2002 Report. 
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“ministries and other institutions as well as recorded minutes of meetings involving various 
relevant actors” (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 4).  Secondary sources of 
information included “[r]eports, workshop proceedings, published and unpublished literature” 
(United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 4).  The Panel also conducted interviews with 
relevant persons, using “various network referrals” (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 
4).  Crucially, the Panel travelled extensively in the DRC and visited other countries (in 
Africa and beyond) which were affected by or involved in the DRC conflict.  During these 
visitations, the Panel interviewed and obtained information (oral testimony or documentary 
evidence) from individuals, companies, armed groups, civil society actors, government 
functionaries, and officials of international organisations – governmental and non-
governmental.  The Panel focused on the role of both state and non-state actors in the illicit 
exploitation of natural resources and other acts that fuelled the conflict in the DRC. 
 
The UN Panel of Experts uncovered illegal exploitation168 with respect to “three categories of 
products”: “(a) mineral resources, primarily coltan, diamonds, gold and cassiterite; (b) 
agriculture, forests and wildlife, including timber, coffee and ivory; and (c) financial 
products, mainly in regard to taxes” (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 4).  Products in 
the first category have direct relevance to this study.  As the Panel’s First Report highlighted, 
illegal activities took two forms namely, “mass-scale looting and the systematic and systemic 
exploitation of natural resources” (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 3).  For example, 
the report indicted the armies of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda as well as the RCD rebel 
                                                            
168 The Panel used four criteria or instances to define or determine illegality.  One, an activity was deemed 
illegal if it violated the sovereignty of the DRC, that is, if it occurred without the consent of the Congolese 
government.  Two, an action was considered illegal if it contravened existing regulatory framework of the DRC, 
or if it infringed on the law of the country, or violated “an existing body of regulations”.  Three, an action was 
regarded as illegal if it deviated from “widely accepted practices in trade and business and the way business 
[was] conducted” in the DRC. Four, any activity that violated international law was construed as illegal.  In 
determining illegality, the Panel employed these criteria “in a complementary manner, refusing to be exclusive 
or to focus on one single element” (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 5). 
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group for mass-scale looting of coltan in the DRC.169  The Panel noted with reference to the 
second form of illegal activities that “[w]hen resource stockpiles were looted and exhausted 
by occupying forces and their allies, the exploitation evolved to an active exploration phase” 
(United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 9-10).  In this phase, “[b]oth Congolese (civilians 
and soldiers) and foreigners (civilians and soldiers) became involved in the extraction of 
natural resources” (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 10). 
 
It is in the context of the extraction, and by extension, “the production, commercialization 
and exports of natural resources and other services such as transport and financial 
transactions” that the Panel indicted several actors, including individuals, national armies, 
rebel groups, and MNCs (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 5).  With reference to the 
systematic and systemic exploitation of natural resources, the Panel in its October 2002 
Report “listed 29 companies and 54 individuals against whom it recommended the imposition 
of financial restrictions and travel bans” (RAID, 2004: 2).  An annex to the report also 
included the names of 85 other companies, whose activities the Panel found to be in 
“violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (RAID, 2004: 2).170  The 
list included mineral-prospecting and resource-trading MNCs from inter alia, Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, and the UK.171 
 
The Panel mapped the connections of these companies to the DRC, showing how they 
“directly or indirectly, deliberately or through negligence, contributed to the prolongation of 
                                                            
169 The Panel uncovered one instance in 1998 whereby Rwandan forces and their RCD allies looted seven years’ 
worth of coltan which had been stocked by a company, the Société minière et industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI) 
[that is, The Kivu Mining and Industrial Company].  “A very reliable source told the Panel that it took the 
Rwandans about a month to fly this coltan to Kigali” (United Nations Security Council, 2001a: 8). 
170 The OECD Guidelines refer to an international regime on corporate social responsibility, which provides “a 
government-supported (through voluntary) mechanism for monitoring and influencing corporate behaviour”.  
Governments that subscribe to the Guidelines are required to establish “National Contact Points” to ensure that 
MNCs comply with the Guidelines and to resolve problems that may arise in the course of MNCs’ operations 
elsewhere (RAID, 2004: 2). 
171 See Annex III of the October 2002 report (S/2002/1146). 
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the conflict and other human rights abuses” (RAID, 2004: 3).  Reports by the Panel of 
Experts highlighted alleged cases of misconduct by MNCs, which fuelled the conflict.  
MNCs listed in the October 2002 report fell into one or more of the following categories: 
• “Companies that benefited from the direct assistance of the combatants, such as those 
trading in minerals, which were mined using forced labour or those whose assets were 
protected by soldiers or militia.” 
• “Companies supplying arms to either rebel or government forces or even participating 
in military action.” 
• “Companies engaged in the smuggling of diamonds to supply international markets, 
money laundering, and illegal currency transactions.” 
• “Companies buying minerals from former foreign or rebel-controlled areas without 
conducting due diligence tests as to where the minerals came from or who was 
profiting from the trade.” 
• “Companies directly involved in the trade in resources from former foreign army and 
rebel-controlled areas of DRC.” 
• “Companies offering inducements or exercising anti-competitive influence at a time 
of great instability to secure lucrative concessions or contracts.” 
• “Companies profiting from lucrative joint ventures, mainly in government controlled 
areas, set up to exploit DRC’s natural resources with little or no benefit going to the 
Congolese people.” 
• “Banks failing to exercise due diligence when providing facilities for companies 
engaged in misconduct” (RAID, 2004: 3). 
 
In line with the findings of the UN Panel of experts as outlined in the aforementioned 
categories, some participants during fieldwork noted that MNCs were also involved in the 
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payment of taxes to rebel formations and militias.  In some cases, payment to rebel forces 
took the form of a barter in which companies supplied arms in return for mining rights or 
access to minerals.172 
 
In addition, as resource-trading companies sourced minerals from the DRC these minerals 
were transported through neighbouring countries, primarily Rwanda and Uganda (RAID, 
2004: 35).  Other companies provided transportation and logistical services that facilitated the 
movement of natural resources from the DRC through neighbouring countries to international 
markets.  In the performance of these roles, MNCs formed relationships with other actors in 
the conflict, especially rebel groups, warlords and government forces.  The Panel of Experts 
concluded that by engaging in these activities, MNCs directly or indirectly, deliberately or 
inadvertently sustained the DRC conflict. 
 
Expectedly, both state and non-state actors named in the October 2002 Report took exception 
to and challenged the Panel’s findings and recommendations.  State actors lodged complaints 
with the UN; MNCs did the same with their home governments.  Specifically, the Congo’s 
neighbours denied and denounced the allegations, stressing that the allegations had the 
potential to undermine the peace process in the DRC.  MNCs complained to their home 
governments, some of which rallied to the defence of the companies or shielded the 
companies from further scrutiny.  One example stands out: Canadian companies indicted by 
the report lodged a complaint with their home government, requesting their names to be 
expunged from the report (Drohan, 2003: 322).  Canada’s Ambassador to the UN at the time 
– Paul Heinbecker – subsequently told the UN Security Council that although his government 
                                                            
172 Interviews with officials in the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (CN) [Kinshasa], 17 October 2010; 
(VD) [Kinshasa], 17 October 2010; (J-DK) [Lubumbashi], 27 October 2010; and E-interviews (via SkypeTM) 
with a consultant to the Division des Mines Nord-Kivu [Goma], 05 March 2011; with an official of the Division 
des Mines Sud-Kivu [Bukavu], 07 March 2011. 
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accepted the Panel’s overall findings the allegations against the companies were unfounded 
and had “diverted attention from the other valuable findings of the report” (United Nations 
Security Council, 2002b: i. d.).  Complaints and accusations of bias levelled against the UN 
Panel of Experts almost derailed the work of the Panel. 
 
In order to address the concerns raised by the aggrieved (indicted) actors, the UN Security  
Council established a follow-up Panel to engage with state and non-state actors named in the 
October 2002 Report.  Aggrieved parties made representations and submissions to the follow-
up Panel with a view to disproving the allegations made against them and ultimately to clear 
their names.  The follow-up Panel’s October 2003 Report (S/2003/1027), an attachment to 
the October 2002 Report, indicated that some indicted actors had taken steps to address “the 
issues that led to their being listed in the October 2002 report” (United Nations Security 
Council, 2003: 9).  The attachment also noted that each case pertaining to the involvement of 
actors in illicit activities in the DRC “had to be considered on its own merits” (United 
Nations Security Council, 2003: 9).  In view of this, the October 2003 report categorised 
MNCs into five new categories based on the consultative review of their connections to the 
DRC conflict. 
 
Category I comprised companies (and other actors) whose status was considered “resolved”.  
MNCs that the Panel placed in this category attempted to “clear their names” by providing 
clarifications which led to the resolution of issues that had resulted in their indictment.  
Consequently, resolution led to their names being expunged from the list of those indicted by 
the October 2002 report.173  The UN Panel noted that resolution was to “be seen in the 
context of a win-win outcome both for the parties involved and the Democratic Republic of 
                                                            
173 See Annex I of the October 2003 report (S/2003/1027) for the list of companies in Category I. 
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the Congo, in terms of a reduction in the conditions or environment that have fostered the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources” (United Nations Security Council, 2003: 9).  
However, it cautioned 
that resolution should not be seen as invalidating the Panel’s earlier 
findings with regard to the activities of those actors.  Rather, it 
signifies that there are no current outstanding issues, the original 
issues that led to their being listed in the annexes have been 
worked out to the satisfaction of both the Panel and the companies 
and individuals concerned (United Nations Security Council, 2003: 
9). 
 
It is pertinent to make a brief comment on the Panel’s position as stated above.  Although 
MNCs in Category I had addressed the issues relating to their involvement in or connections 
to conflict in the DRC (for example, by ceasing to extract conflict minerals, fund rebels, or 
buy minerals from conflict zones), the companies could not be exonerated for actions that led 
to their indictment in the first place. 
 
The Panel also placed in Category I companies that acknowledged that their behaviour in the 
DRC had been inappropriate and had “taken action to remedy” such behaviour or “given 
firm, time-bound commitments to do so” (United Nations Security Council, 2003: 10).  In 
addition, Category I comprised companies (mainly resource-trading MNCs) that had ceased 
either operations in the DRC or transactions with parties in the country.  Remarkably, the 
Panel also included in this category companies that had been operating in the DRC before the 
outbreak of the Second Congo War.  The Panel was of the view that although the companies 
had been operating in rebel-controlled areas and evidently funded insurgencies, the 
companies made “positive contributions to their communities in providing goods and 
services, as well as jobs for local people.  Specifically, the Panel was able to establish that 
they [ran] their businesses in a responsible manner and have not directly funded activities 
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contributing to conflict” (United Nations Security Council, 2003: 10).174  This conclusion by 
the UN Panel startled many Congolese.175 
 
Category II comprised cases with “provisional resolution” status.  MNCs in this category 
made commitments to the Panel to refrain from illegal activities in the DRC.  The Panel 
included these companies in this category of “provisional resolution” as the companies 
promised to fulfil their “commitments on corporate governance … after the end of the Panel’s 
mandate” (United Nations Security Council, 2003: 11).  In order to monitor the companies’ 
fulfilment of their commitments and compliance with corporate governance standards, the 
Panel referred the companies to the National Contact Points of OECD member states.176 
 
The UN Panel of Experts placed cases “referred for updating or further investigation” in 
Category III.  The Panel also referred companies in this category to the National Contact 
Points, as it could not achieve resolution with the companies.  Lack of resolution resulted 
mainly from the companies’ inability to resolve issues with the Panel and/or more 
remarkably, the companies’ rejection of the Panel’s contention that they needed to address 
issues relating to their activities in the DRC.  For instance, “a company … refused to accept 
that it [had] a responsibility to do what it [could] to avoid providing support, even 
inadvertently, to rebel groups in conflict areas where it [operated or had business interests]” 
                                                            
174 This observation by the UN Panel raises a fundamental question: how could activities normally expected of 
legally mandated companies serve as a justification for actions taken in the DRC by companies in question?  
The fact that they (MNCs) stole untold quantities of  non-replenishable mineral resources, funded armies that 
killed and maimed thousands of civilians, destroyed properties and farmlands, and destroyed the future of 
individuals and communities did not seem to have mattered to the members of the Panel.  Supposedly, that alone 
serves as a reason to doubt the veracity of the Panel members’ report and/or recommendations. (I am grateful to 
my supervisor, Professor Ufo Uzodike, for this point.) 
175 The majority of participants in the three focus group discussions conducted with Congolese expatriates in 
three South African cities of Durban (07 July 2012), Johannesburg (02 June 2012) and Pretoria (09 June 2012) 
took strong exceptions to this conclusion by the Panel.  They argued that the UN Panel would not have reached 
the same conclusion had it taken into cognisance the atrocities perpetrated by the rebel groups or insurgents and 
the (indirect) complicity of their economic collaborators, mainly MNCs. 
176 See Annex I of the October 2003 report for the list of MNCs. 
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(United Nations Security Council, 2003: 11).  This category also comprised companies that 
apparently failed to uphold “their own self-imposed best practice principles” or code of ethics 
(United Nations Security Council, 2003: 11).177 
 
Category IV comprised cases “referred for further investigations”.  The Panel asked the 
home governments of companies (and individuals) listed in this category to conduct 
investigations into the activities of these actors.  The inability of the Panel to meet with 
companies during its proceedings necessitated this referral.  Therefore, the resolution of the 
issues involving the companies was dependent on the political will of the home governments 
to engage with the companies over their activities or connections to the DRC conflict.178 
 
Category V comprised “parties that did not react to the Panel’s report”.  MNCs and other 
actors in this category neither sent reactions to nor contacted the Panel, exercising their right 
not to reply to the findings in the October 2002 report.179 
 
It is pertinent to note that the reports of the UN Panel of Experts were significant in the 
context of mapping, exposing, and addressing the corporate connections to the conflict in the 
DRC.  However, critics have raised issues regarding the methodological shortcomings of the 
reports, especially the October 2002 report.  For example, parties implicated in illegal 
activities in the DRC and therefore named in the reports could not confront those who gave 
evidence to the Panel, as the Panel was bound by the principle of confidentiality.  In addition, 
the October 2002 report highlighted a drawback in the Panel’s work: the non-adherence to the 
legal principle of audi alteram partem, which presupposes that MNCs and other parties 
                                                            
177 Eighteen companies were listed in Category III.  See Annex I of the October 2003 report. 
178 Category IV comprised companies from Canada, Germany, South Africa and the UK.  See Annex I of the 
October 2003 report. 
179 See Annex I of the October 2003 report for the list of the companies and other actors in Category V. 
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implicated ought to have had an opportunity to examine and respond to the allegations before 
the publication of the report. 
 
Furthermore, there were suggestions that at the behest of the French government, the Panel 
refrained from investigating the involvement of the Congolese government in illegal 
activities (Samset, 2002: 86).  Although the justification for excluding the Congolese 
government was apparently premised on its status as the internationally recognised legitimate 
authority over the DRC and its resources, excluding the government ignored the fact that 
even legitimate structures (that is, duly constituted organs and agencies of the state) are 
capable of illicit actions and activities that could exacerbate conflicts.  Crucially, there were 
allegations that the Panel’s initial report contained the names of American companies and 
officials, but it was edited to remove suggestions or evidence of connections of the United 
States (possibly high ranking officials in previous administrations) to illegal activities in the 
DRC (Grignon, 2006: 87). 
 
Despite these shortcomings, it cannot be gainsaid that the reports of the UN Panel of Experts 
marked an important step in accentuating – for requisite international attention – the 
connections between business and the cycle of violent conflict in the DRC.  Between 1998 
and 2003 (and beyond, especially in eastern DRC as noted earlier), profiteering networks 
contributed directly and inadvertently to the exacerbation of conflict in the DRC.  The 
creation of the UN Panel of Experts was a pivotal response and a decisive intervention in the 
DRC crisis by the foremost intergovernmental organisation in the international system. 
 
As noted above, the UN Panel’s reports engendered a motley of responses from various 
actors – governments, MNCs, and local and international NGOs.  The reports also gave 
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significant fillip to local and international advocacy efforts aimed at breaking the connections 
between minerals and conflicts in the DRC.  For instance, while Congolese civil society 
actors had striven to raise awareness about the deadly connections between business and 
conflict in the country, their efforts did not resonate strongly in the international community 
until the publication of the reports by the Panel.180  In addition, the Panel’s reports provided 
impetus to advocacy by international non-state actors such as Enough Project, Global 
Witness, Oxfam and Rights and Accountability in Development.181  These international 
NGOs used the Panel’s findings as bases to exert pressure on MNCs to desist from illegal 
activities in the DRC or to refrain from buying conflict minerals from the country.  
Simultaneously, these organisations brought pressure to bear on MNCs’ home governments 
to investigate the activities of companies in the DRC.  In sum, the reports of the UN Panel of 
Experts provided the stimulus for both local and international advocacy against illicit 
activities by MNCs and other actors in the DRC. 
 
A striking effect of the reports is that of engineering a shift in corporate behaviour.  It is 
worth noting that some MNCs discontinued illegal activities in the DRC due to the work of 
the Panel.182  Other MNCs expressed commitments to ensure best practices in their mining 
                                                            
180 Interviews with a member of the Executive Committee of the Association africaine de défense des Droits de 
l’Homme (ASADHO) [African Association for the Defence of Human Rights] (KM) [Kinshasa], 29 October 
2010; with a staff of the Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix (CEJP) [Episcopal Commission for Justice and 
Peace] (CH) [Kinshasa], 29 October 2010; with a legal practitioner and human rights activist (GNM) 
[Kinshasa], 29 October 2010. 
181 This point came to the fore during a focus group discussion with Congolese expatriates in Pretoria, South 
Africa, 09 June 2012. 
182 A caveat applies to this view, expressed by participants in the focus group discussion with Congolese 
expatriates in Johannesburg, South Africa, 02 June 2012.  It should be noted that while some resource-trading 
companies terminated their business dealings, others became more “discreet” in their transactions with the 
comptoirs, or changed comptoirs in order to conceal the source(s) of the minerals and to avoid further scrutiny 
and consequent international opprobrium.  A number of interviewees confirmed this point. They also stressed 
that while the Panel’s reports may have contributed to halting some illegal activities, the general insecurity in 
eastern DRC provided an ambience that was conducive to illicit exploitation of, and trafficking in, natural 
resources. (Interviews with an ex-director in the national mining company, Gecamines (SNT) [Lubumbashi], 28 
October 2010; with a supervisor in a mineral trading house (EK) [Lubumbashi], 28 October 2010; E-interviews 
(via SkypeTM) with human rights activist (J-BT) [Goma], 01 March 2011; with a former student/youth leader 
(FLN) [Bukavu], 06 March 2011). 
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operations and supply chain processes.  In addition, the Panel’s findings have been important 
sources of information for National Contact Points of OECD member states in their 
engagements with MNCs referred to in the reports. 
 
At least two important deductions can be made from the analysis of the Panel’s work.  On 
one hand, the reports of the UN Panel of Experts highlighted the ‘dark side’ of the corporate-
conflict nexus.  On the other hand and at the practical level, the Panel’s work offered an 
important lesson in terms of the modest beneficial outcomes that may result from 
investigations into the connections of business, natural resources and conflict. 
 
Although the reports of the Panel exposed the complicity of MNCs in the DRC conflict, there 
is some evidence that corporate actions in the country have not been entirely deleterious.  
Some resource-extracting companies in the DRC have undertaken extensive public relations 
initiatives to highlight their social responsibility projects, which, as one interviewee implied, 
were emblematic of “good” corporate behaviour.183  However, a question may be raised as to 
how any company can show truly “good” behaviour in a place like the warn-torn DRC where 
even the government had something to answer for and where resources in the hands of the 
government also served to fuel conflicts.  Certainly, there are serious contestations around the 
issue of CSR (as discussed in Chapter Three), not least in volatile political environments.  
Although there are instances of good corporate behaviour in the form of social responsibility 
in the DRC, they are controversial and are highly distrusted by many Congolese.184  In the 
context of this study, however, such company initiatives – juxtaposed with the evidence from 
                                                            
183 Interview with a Professor of Corporate Law (YN) [Kinshasa], 07 October 2010. 
184 The vast majority of participants in focus group discussions conducted in Durban, South Africa (07 July 
2012) and Pretoria, South Africa (09 June 2012) denounced CSR projects by MNCs in the DRC as “publicity 
stunts” or a “sham”. 
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the UN Panel’s reports – serve to illustrate the ambivalence of corporate behaviour.  In line 
with this point, the next section presents some CSR activities by MNCs in the DRC. 
 
6.4 “Good” behaviour in a “bad” environment? Multinational corporations and 
corporate social responsibility in the DRC 
This section commences with an anecdote from the DRC.  During fieldwork in the country, 
the researcher broached the subject of CSR during interviews and informal discussions with 
Congolese.  As a prelude to asking participants to identify specific CSR activities by MNCs, 
the researcher posed a question on the roles of companies in the DRC’s public sphere, which 
required a general response regarding MNCs and CSR in the country.  However, a common 
response to the question took the form of another question: “CS what?”  Some Congolese 
jokingly remarked that as far as the DRC is concerned, the term did not exist in the corporate 
governance lexicon.  Aside from this lighter note, it emerged during fieldwork that the 
majority of the study participants were oblivious of CSR activities by MNCs.  A few 
participants who supposedly had an idea of CSR summarily dismissed such activities by 
MNCs as a façade, or as smokescreens that corporate actors used to conceal their economic 
crimes against the country and its people.  (The researcher had to resist the temptation to 
highlight sparse evidence on CSR activities by MNCs as this might nudge participants 
towards shifting their positions.)  An important deduction can be made from this anecdote.  In 
a conflict-prone environment such as the DRC where “corporate actions have been associated 
primarily with criminality”,185 good business practice in the form of social investment may go 
unnoticed, or may be perceived as duplicitous.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
majority of the study participants were unable to identify any CSR activities by MNCs. 
 
                                                            
185 Interview with a Professor of Law (MM) [Kinshasa], 29 October 2010. 
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However, there is a modicum of evidence of “good” corporate behaviour in this conflict-
ridden (“bad”) environment.  Before presenting the very few cases of CSR activities by 
MNCs in the DRC, it is important to state at the outset that most of the companies with 
connections to the DRC are resource-trading MNCs or mineral buyers; only a few are 
involved in direct mining operations.  Since resource-trading MNCs do not have direct 
presence in the country, there is no evidence or record of CSR activities by these 
companies.186  Therefore, only MNCs involved in natural resource exploration and extraction 
have carried out CSR functions.  Furthermore, two companies readily stand out as far as the 
implementation of CSR activities is concerned.  These are Anglo-American PLC and Banro 
Corporation.  Their CSR initiatives are presented below. 
 
Anglo-American PLC 
As of 2013, Anglo-American PLC was still conducting exploration activities in the DRC; it 
did not operate any mines in the country at that time.  However, through the Anglo-American 
Group Foundation, the company has been providing critical social services in partnership 
with international NGOs.  The social services have been targeted specifically to assist the 
most vulnerable groups in society, especially children and women, who have been affected 
the most by the cycle of conflict and sexual violence especially during and after the Second 
Congo War.  The DRC’s health sector is a critical area of intervention for Anglo-American 
PLC.  In this sector, the company has chosen maternal health care sub-sector as its primary 
focus for its CSR engagement.  Anglo-American PLC has predicated its intervention in the 
maternal health care sub-sector on the observation that in the DRC, 
the maternal mortality rate is estimated at 549 deaths for every 
100,000 live births.  This means that 15,000 mothers are dying 
                                                            
186 Interestingly during fieldwork in the DRC, my research assistant in Lubumbashi described as “wild goose 
chase” my tenacious efforts at finding first-hand any CSR activities by foreign companies in the country.  His 
words to me suggested a fatalistic view regarding the remotest possibility of CSR initiatives by MNCs: “I told 
you that you won’t find any; they do not exist; stop chasing after the wind.” 
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every year during pregnancy, delivery or after delivery (which 
equates to almost two women per hour), and places the DRC 
amongst six countries accountable for about 50% of global 
maternal mortality.  In addition, under-five mortality is 
increasingly concentrated: 50% of deaths occur in only five 
countries, of which the DRC is one.  The overall risk of mortality 
in the DRC for children under five is 148 out of 1,000 live births, 
or roughly one-in-seven (Anglo-American, 2013b: i. d.). 
 
In view of the magnitude of this problem in the DRC, Anglo-American – in partnership with 
other actors – has focused on improving the conditions that should make it easier for women 
to access health care services.  For example, the company has “been working in partnership 
with World Vision and local government to help tackle the pressing issue of maternal and 
infant mortality rates in the DRC” (Anglo-American, 2013b: i. d.).  In 2013, the company and 
World Vision (an international NGO) refurbished a health care centre in Kinshasa “in an 
effort to improve conditions for pregnant women and their babies” (Anglo-American, 2013b: 
i. d.).  Specifically, the refurbishment of the Kitokimosi health centre “included structural 
repairs to the roof, ceilings, doors and the laboratory; the installation of water tanks to capture 
rain water; and the provisioning of hospital beds and medical equipment” (Anglo-American, 
2013b: i. d.).187  The health centre provides critical maternal health care services such as pre-
natal, child delivery and post-natal care. 
 
Anglo-American PLC considers the refurbishment of the Kitokimosi health centre as a 
decisive and socially beneficial intervention, as the facility is “situated in the Selembao 
district of Kinshasa – one of the poorest areas in the capital” (Anglo-American, 2013b: i. d.).  
The company’s Head of Representation in its DRC office, Thierry Viengele, remarked 
following the inauguration of the health centre: “[it] was deeply touching to experience the 
genuine gratitude of the clinic staff, the patients, the governor of Selembao, and the 
                                                            
187 See Appendix 10 for the photograph of the refurbished Kitokimosi health centre. 
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provincial health minister.  We intend to remain involved with the health centre and to work 
closely with them to further support their needs” (Anglo-American, 2013b: i. d.).  Anglo-
American PLC’s Chief Executive Officer responsible for overseeing the copper business, 
John MacKenzie, noted that the refurbishment and inauguration of the health centre 
will make a massive difference to the lives of the people who live 
in Selembao, and I have no doubt will be responsible for saving the 
lives of many mothers and children. During my visit to the health 
clinic last year I was particularly shocked by the lack of running 
water, and the impact that caused on the ability of the doctors and 
nurses to maintain sanitary conditions – it is really pleasing to see 
that this too has been addressed (Anglo-American, 2013b: i. d.). 
 
The company believes that, in this instance, its CSR activity “will go towards improving 
overall care for patients and making a real and positive difference” (Anglo-American, 2013b: 
i. d.).  Anglo-American concludes that although it does not operate a mine in the DRC, “the 
refurbishment of the Kitokimosi health centre demonstrates our long-term commitment to the 
country and our desire to collaborate with local government and communities to become the 
partner of choice” (Anglo-American, 2013b: i. d.).  From the company’s perspective, this 
intervention in the health sector foreshadows increased social investment in the DRC when 
the company commences resource extraction. 
 
Banro Corporation 
As noted earlier, Banro Corporation’s investment in the DRC has been focused primarily on 
gold mining in the provinces of South Kivu and Maniema.  The company has extensive gold 
mining operations in these areas.  Banro Corporation has also undertaken extensive CSR 
activities in its mining zones.  According to the company, its  
commitment to corporate social responsibility has many facets, 
including the building of positive and supportive relations with 
local communities, the creation of capacity-building jobs for 
Congolese citizens, environmental protection, workplace safety, 
the purchase of goods and services locally and the Banro 
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Foundation, which promotes local social and economic 
development (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d). 
 
In demonstration of the company’s commitment to CSR, it has created an agency to execute 
the projects in the core CSR areas.  Banro Corporation has implemented its CSR projects 
under the auspices of the Banro Foundation, “a registered Congolese charity funded primarily 
by the company” (Banro Corporation, 2012: i. d.).  The Foundation was established in 2005. 
It is based in Bukavu, South Kivu Province.  The Banro Foundation has the “mandate to 
improve the lives of thousands of people living in South Kivu and Maniema provinces 
through strategic investments in education, health and infrastructure development and to 
provide humanitarian assistance as needed” (Banro Corporation, 2012: i. d.).  Banro 
Corporation’s 2013 Sustainability Report, entitled “Investing in Capacity-Building Jobs and 
Community Development”, presents the company’s “contributions to regional economic 
development in the eastern [DRC]” (Banro Corporation, 2013b: i. d.).  It should be noted, 
however, that beyond the positive rhetoric, there are no indications of the monetary figures 
actually involved in the CSR activities.  The report highlights the company’s CSR projects in 
these categories188: 
 
Job creation189: “Since November 2004, Banro has invested US$492 million in South Kivu 
and Maniema provinces, creating jobs and business opportunities for tens of thousands of 
local people, [and] generating taxes…” (Banro Corporation, 2013b: i. d.).  According to the 
company, it “employs over 1,000 Congolese in technical, professional, management or 
supervisory jobs that build real capacity; another 3,000 Congolese are employed through 
contractors.  This direct employment generates an additional 20,000 + jobs indirectly in the 
                                                            
188 Appendix 11 contains photographs depicting Banro Corporation’s CSR projects in these categories. 
189 Although Banro Corporation identifies job creation as one of its CSR activities, it can be argued that jobs 
created through its investments in the DRC are normal for any business.  Thus, how job creation is truly a CSR 
credit per se is disputable. 
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larger economy with a multiplier effect that helps to support around 200,000 local people” 
(Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.).  The company has also constructed market places 
(consisting of stalls) to facilitate “the commercial exchange of goods” (Banro Corporation, 
2013a: i. d.), signalling contributions to (stimulating) the informal economy. 
 
Infrastructure provision: Part of the US$492 million that the company has invested since 
November 2004 has been spent on “adding new public facilities and infrastructure” (Banro 
Corporation, 2013b: i. d.).  The company’s report shows that it has been “making a 
substantial contribution to social infrastructure, including the upgrading and construction of 
over 500 kilometres of roads, plus … housing, health care facilities, potable water systems 
and more” (Banro Corporation, 2013b: i. d.).  Cognisant of the DRC’s infrastructural 
deficiencies and challenges, Banro Corporation (2013a: i. d.) notes: “[g]ood roads and 
bridges are critical to the economic and social development of local communities”.  In view 
of this realisation, the Banro Foundation has given priority attention to road construction and 
rehabilitation (Wells, 2011: i. d.), especially in and around Bukavu.  In June 2012, “the Kama 
Bridge in Namoya, one of the most ambitious of the social infrastructure projects undertaken 
by the Banro Foundation, was officially inaugurated by the Governor of Maniema Province” 
(Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d).190  
 
Furthermore, Banro Corporation has built potable water systems in Bukavu as part of its 
infrastructure provision.  It has built 50 water stations in the area, as at 2012.  It has also 
installed solar panels “to power public lighting for night use” of the water systems (Banro 
                                                            
190 A caveat is necessary here: the infrastructure projects are located in the company’s areas of operations and, 
as such, they are linked to the need to facilitate mining activities as well as to improve the company’s ability to 
transport its products effectively to market destinations.  Therefore, it can be argued that the contribution of such 
projects to the economic and social development of local communities is coincidental.  Beyond this, there is an 
issue regarding the reliability of the figures the company is using, which government officials could not verify 
when this researcher conducted fieldwork in the DRC. 
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Corporation, 2013a: i. d).  In relation to infrastructure provision, the Banro Foundation – 
since 2005 – has implemented “60 social development projects, representing a total 
investment of $4 million” (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d).191 
 
Education, vocational training and skills development: “Education is the top priority for the 
Banro Foundation” (Banro Corporation, 2013b: i. d.).  The Foundation has “constructed 10 
new schools and rehabilitated two more schools, serving a total of 4,000 students in South 
Kivu and Maniema provinces” (Banro Corporation, 2013b: i. d.).  All the schools “have also 
been outfitted with desks and furniture.  This has been complemented by initiatives to 
increase school enrollment by girls, retain teachers, rescue and educate former child artisanal 
miners, and introduce community literacy programs” (Banro Corporation, 2013b: i. d.).  In 
2012, the company introduced the “teacher tuition” programme, “which pays a basic salary to 
all teachers employed in schools built by the Banro Foundation” (Banro Corporation 2012: i. 
d.).  In addition, Banro Corporation is collaborating with the Bukavu Official University to 
build “the industrial skills base of Congolese through vocational training and skills 
development in the workplace; strengthening of university faculties in relevant disciplines; 
and scholarships for high potential students” (Banro Corporation, 2013b: i. d.). 
 
In the sphere of adult education, the Foundation in 2011 constructed a women’s centre in 
Lugushwa community to provide “literacy training and livelihood skills such as sewing” 
(Banro Corporation 2012: i. d.).  The Makalanga Women’s Centre, another centre built in 
2011, offers “courses in basic literacy, sewing, bread making, soap making and hair dressing” 
(Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.). 
 
                                                            
191 This figure is perhaps illustrative of the minimal nature of CSR investments in a highly needy environment.  
One may ask: how are 60 projects totalling four million dollars over several years truly wonderful for a 
company with such extensive mining rights?  (See section 6.2 for the description of the company’s profile). 
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Moreover, the Banro Foundation, in collaboration with Congolese NGOs, is coordinating a 
number of programmes “to provide training in such skills as carpentry, masonry, motor 
mechanics, agriculture and tailoring to former artisanal miners at Twangiza”, one of the 
company’s mining zones (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.).  Besides, the Foundation has 
instituted a three-year programme, “including psychological counseling, designed to 
reintegrate 100 former child artisanal miners into the educational system; an additional 100 
older children have elected to enroll in a variety of livelihood skills training programs geared 
to their age group” (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.).  This initiative by the company created 
“what by all appearances is a welcoming educational environment” (Wells, 2011: i. d.) for 
former child artisanal miners. 
 
Health care: The health sector has been a major beneficiary of Banro Corporation’s CSR 
initiatives.  A few of the company’s interventions in the health sector are worth noting here.  
In August 2012, the Banro Foundation inaugurated a US$100,000 multipurpose women’s 
health centre at the Panzi General Hospital in Bukavu.  The women’s health centre was built 
“to support prenatal consultation, family planning and HIV sensitization, child health and 
other activities related to women’s health” (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.).  Banro 
Corporation (2013a: i. d.) reports that the “Panzi Hospital has earned a global reputation in 
the field of medical care for women, including women who have been victims of sexual 
violence.”  The hospital treats “3,500 women each year, free of charge” (Gillespie, 2013: i. 
d.). 
 
In a related earlier intervention, the Banro Foundation – in collaboration with international 
NGOs – twice (in 2009 and 2010) organised the shipment of medical equipment from Canada 
to the DRC.  The medical supplies were distributed to clinics and hospitals in the Maniema 
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and South Kivu provinces (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.; The African Business Journal, 
2013: i. d.).  In September 2012, the Banro Foundation organised a fundraising event in 
Toronto, Canada towards the “construction of a new $165,000 hospital in the town of 
Salambila, Maniema Province” (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.).  According to Banro 
Corporation (2013a: i. d.), the event “received outstanding financial support from Canadian 
and international companies active in the mining industry” in the DRC.  However, the 
company’s claim that the event “received outstanding financial support” seems dubious, 
given that $112,000 was raised at the event (Gillespie, 2013: i. d.).192 
 
Sports: Banro Corporation, through its Foundation, has also been active in promoting sports 
(especially among the youth) in communities in which it has been operating.  In December 
2012, for example, the Foundation inaugurated a new basketball court in the Bagira 
community in Bukavu.  This was the “third basketball court built by the Foundation” in the 
city of Bukavu.  The Foundation also presented new basketball kits to the youth of the 
community.  The construction of basketball courts has been a cardinal sports development 
initiative by the company (Wells, 2011: i. d.).  The popularity of basketball in the DRC has 
underpinned this aspect of the company’s CSR engagement in its areas of operations (Banro 
Corporation, 2013a: i. d.). 
 
Humanitarian assistance: Banro Corporation has – as needed – provided humanitarian 
assistance to those displaced by conflict in its areas of operations.  For example, in December 
2009, the company delivered humanitarian aid to displaced persons near the city of Uvira.  
The relief items included “blankets, clothes and food” (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.).  In 
December 2012, the Banro Foundation offered humanitarian assistance to people displaced 
                                                            
192 It is surprising that the various companies involved struggled with, and were unable to raise, the full amount 
in question. 
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from Goma and adjoining areas of North Kivu province following the conflict involving the 
M23 rebel group.  The “Foundation delivered 24 tons of food and non-food aid to the 
Bulengo refugee camp.  At the time, the camp, located about 10 kilometres from Goma’s city 
centre, was providing shelter for 15,000 individuals.  This represented the first delivery of 
food aid to the refugee camp by any NGO” (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. d.). 
 
Apparently, Banro Corporation’s CSR profile in the conflict-ridden provinces of the DRC 
depicts the range of possibilities of corporate peacebuilding.  Moreover, the company’s 
interventions in various sectors show that CSR activities need not be static, but should 
respond creatively to the needs of communities, especially those plagued by violent conflicts 
and its associated effects.  Banro Corporation’s CSR programmes appears to illustrate this 
point. 
 
That said, there is no doubt that Banro has a very good public relations department, and that it 
has invested a good amount of energy in identifying relevant CSR issues and public relations-
friendly targets.  The company seems to have even used investments aimed at its bottomline 
to weave stories of its CSR efforts.  Otherwise, minimal investments in key areas are used to 
make major claims of serious corporate responsibility.  It is difficult to ascertain how 
measurably better off communities in Banro Corporation’s areas of operation are compared 
with non-conflict areas in the DRC.  It is also possible that the company’s CSR activities (to 
the extent that they exist and robustly) are aimed at mitigating potentially damaging 




In line with these observations, the company’s CSR engagement has attracted a number of 
criticisms.193  For instance, Banro Corporation’s job creation profile has been criticised from 
three angles.  One, “83% of employees are Congolese citizens, which means almost 20% are 
migrants.”  Two, of the company’s “workforce of over 1,000, only 53 are women.”  Three, 
“[m]any specialist skills are imported” (ResolutionPossible, 2013: i. d.).  Another criticism 
pertains to the company’s infrastructure provision and rehabilitation efforts:  
Banro has built many roads and bridges built, which have certainly 
linked communities that were previously disconnected and 
separated by a five day bicycle ride.  However, these constructions 
are fundamental to the very functioning of the mine (for example, 
transportation of minerals), rather than a proactive attempt at 
providing for the community (ResolutionPossible, 2013: i. d.). 
 
In addition, it is argued that Banro Corporation’s other “CSR programmes do not reach the 
most vulnerable members of the population (women and children)” even as its large-scale 
mining operations have failed to “alleviate problems associated with Artisanal and Small-
scale Mining (ASM)” (ResolutionPossible, 2013: i. d.).  That said, these criticisms speak to 
the shortcomings that have been typically associated with MNCs’ operations in host 
environments. 
 
Despite the criticisms against Banro Corporation’s CSR initiatives, the company has received 
local and international accolades “for its contributions to social development in the DRC”, 
especially for its “contributions to community development” and its “active support of the 
DRC’s “five pillars” for social and economic reconstruction” (Banro Corporation, 2013a: i. 
d.).194  An international assessment depicted Banro Corporation as a model company with “a 
                                                            
193 It is pertinent to note that these criticisms are not peculiar to Banro Corporation.  They are levelled against 
almost all resource-extracting MNCs in the LDCs. 
194 The DRC’s “five pillars” (French: cinq chantiers) for social and economic reconstruction are education, 
health, infrastructure, water/electricity, and job creation.  The government of Joseph Kabila has designated these 
as key priority areas (Interview with a staff in the Presidency (VDC) [Kinshasa], 17 October 2010). 
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community development program that would put many majors to shame, let alone other 
juniors” (Chadwick, 2007: i. d.). 
 
Finally, Banro Corporation’s CSR profile in eastern DRC suggests that “good” business 
practice (that is, responsible corporate behaviour) is possible even in a “bad” (volatile or 
conflict-prone) environment.  Yet, it is equally trite to argue that CSR initiatives may not 
mitigate or undo the damage that illicit corporate actions inflict on people and the 
environment.  In other words, the effects of illicit corporate behaviour may produce far-
reaching consequences that even the best-intentioned and sustained CSR intervention may 
not reverse.195  In view of this, an interviewee – using the analogy of “a good student in an 
unruly class” – argued that CSR should not be motivated by “corporate guilt” but should 
emanate from a company’s conviction to “do the right thing” even if the environment is 
“thoroughly compromised” or saturated with “bad behaviour”.196   Besides, MNCs and their 
stakeholders should not construe CSR initiatives, especially those undertaken in conflict 
zones, as attempts to “right the wrongs” relating to corporate complicity.197   
 
The “business case” for CSR implies that MNCs are capable of “good” behaviour, even in a 
“bad” environment.  In some cases, corporate actions in conflict zones may include a 
transformative potential, such as resettlement, reintegration and capacity building 
programmes for former combatants (including child soldiers), IDPs and refugees.  Based on 
                                                            
195 Some participants in the focus group discussion conducted in Durban South Africa (07 July 2012) expressed 
this view.  In an attempt to illustrate this point, they suggested a juxtaposition of all CSR initiatives with all 
losses (human, material and mineral) that the DRC had incurred because of corporate complicity in the DRC’s 
conflicts.  For some participants, no amount of social investment or CSR projects by MNCs could compensate 
for the decimation of the population and social dislocation that have been associated with conflicts in which 
MNCs have been implicated. 
196 Interview with a Professor of Corporate Law (YN) [Kinshasa], 07 October 2010. 
197 Interview with a Professor of Corporate Law (YN) [Kinshasa], 07 October 2010. 
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this understanding, the provision of humanitarian assistance by corporate actors takes CSR to 
another (arguably, a higher) level. 
 
Overall, the implementation of CSR projects in the DRC remains a controversial subject at 
both corporate governance and community levels.  On one hand, critics claim that corporate 
activities are designed to salvage the consciences and claims to humanity of the MNC 
leaderships or to earn cheap public relations points.198  On the other hand, corporate actors 
contend that social investment and humanitarian activities by MNCs are geared towards 
transformative involvement in the daily lives of the members of host communities.199  In the 
DRC (as is the case in most countries), CSR issues are headaches that companies must deal 
with in contemporary times and they invest heavily in public relations to convince anybody 
that cares to listen that they care and are involved in humanitarian and/or social activities.  As 
the case of the DRC shows, companies will generally invest as little as they believe is 
necessary (while claiming generosity) to ensure positive or continued support and approval of 
members of local, national and international communities. 
 
In the context of this study, this CSR activity (that is, humanitarian assistance) is preeminent.  
It is a key element of corporate peacebuilding or conflict transformation.  Natural disasters 
and violent conflicts necessitate humanitarian assistance, which is different from 
conventional CSR activities such as the provision of basic services.  Humanitarian assistance 
goes beyond the provision social services.  It aims at assisting those affected by violent 
conflicts to cope with, or adjust to, conflicts or tragedies through material and psychological 
support.  It is worth noting that in a conflict situation, the provision of humanitarian 
                                                            
198 This conclusion is drawn from opinions expressed by the study participants during the focus group 
discussions. 
199 Based on the views of Anglo-American PLC and Banro Corporation with reference to the impact of their 
CSR activities. 
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assistance may expose a corporate actor to risk, including attacks from armed groups that 
might construe such corporate intervention as an attempt to undermine the impact of their 
military offensive. 
 
As this study has highlighted, corporate behaviour in conflict zones is characterised by 
ambivalence.  In other words, corporate actions may contribute to the onset of conflict and 
conflict perpetuation or they may facilitate peacebuilding.  As the next section shows, 
contextual factors (namely the local, national and international environments in which MNCs 
operate) underpin specific corporate actions in particular and corporate behaviour in general.  
This idea, which informs this study’s hypothesis, is explored with specific reference to 
corporate behaviour in the DRC. 
 
6.5 The local, national and international contexts of corporate behaviour in the DRC 
A number of factors – internal and external to the corporation – shape corporate behaviour.  
Some of the internal factors that underpin a company’s behaviour include ownership and 
control (that is, the influence of shareholders and directors), the firm’s mission and vision, its 
core values (all of which constitute its corporate culture), and human and material resources.  
External factors that determine a corporation’s behaviour include the company’s 
stakeholders200, its competitors, regulatory frameworks, and the broader local and national 
environments within which it operates.  For MNCs, the international environment also 
matters, given MNCs’ transnational character and operations. 
 
Generally, the operational environment of MNCs consists of three spheres: local, national and 
international.  It is necessary to clarify this study’s conceptions of these spheres.  The local 
                                                            
200 See section 4.4.3 in Chapter Four for the discussion of the notion of “stakeholders”. 
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environment refers to the community in which the business/investment (such as a mine or in 
the case of an oil MNC, an oil installation – for example, an oil rig or refinery) is located.  In 
line with this conception, resource-bearing communities constitute the local environment of 
MNCs.  The local environment is at the core of these concentric spheres of MNCs operations. 
 
The national environment, simply put, refers to an MNC’s host country.  However, it is 
necessary to elucidate this.  The national environment comprises an assortment of variables 
within the MNC’s host country.  At this level, key factors include the type of government, 
state structures and agencies, the MNC’s industry/sector, the corporate governance 
framework (either contractarian or communitarian201), national legislation (for example, the 
Companies Act), and the influence of civil society (mainly national NGOs). 
 
The international environment encapsulates factors such as the MNC’s home country and 
government (and crucially, the relationship between the home and host governments), the 
international market for the MNC’s products/services, international regulatory 
mechanisms/regimes, and international NGOs.  In a conflict situation, the international 
environment of an MNC encompasses other state actors such as intervening/neighbouring 
countries, and regional and/or international governmental organisations.  This study explores 
how these three levels of analysis – and how the interactive clusters of actors at these levels – 
furnish insights into corporate behaviour, which may underpin conflict perpetuation or 
facilitate conflict transformation/peacebuilding. 
 
Across the three spheres, several actors (or stakeholders) and conditions interact to influence 
corporate behaviour.  In conflict situations, MNCs are exposed to variables that are often 
                                                            
201 See Chapter Four. 
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non-existent under normal operational conditions.  For instance, the activities of armed 
groups, military combat, general insecurity, humanitarian crises/complex emergencies, and 
the activities of local and international advocacy groups exert pressure on MNCs that invest 
or operate in conflict zones.  These factors combine with MNC-specific variables to shape 
corporate behaviour in fundamental ways.  In such instances, MNCs may choose to exit or 
remain in conflict zones.  Where the decision is to remain in conflict zones, MNCs may “do-
no-harm”, become complicit in conflict, or facilitate peacebuilding.  Against this backdrop, 
this section focuses on the macro-level factors in the local and national environments, as well 
as the international context, of corporate behaviour in the DRC.  The three levels of analysis 
are discussed below. 
 
The local context in which MNCs operate in the DRC has been characterised by insecurity.  
The First and Second Congo Wars affected resource-bearing communities the most.  Some of 
the most deadly hostilities took place in and around resource-bearing communities in the 
resource-rich provinces of Maniema, North Kivu and South Kivu.  More often than not, 
armed groups waged battles in order to access or control mining zones.  Once an armed group 
achieved a decisive military victory, it instituted a new code of operations to regulate mining 
activities, commercial transactions and taxation.202  This practice was prevalent before and 
during both Wars as well as the subsequent conflicts in eastern DRC.  For instance, the 
AFDL captured a number of mineral sites at different stages of its rebellion against Mobutu 
Sese Seko.  In those instances, companies had to defer to the rules made by the “new” 
powers, which often included renegotiation of mining concessions and payment of “taxes” to 
                                                            
202 Interviews with a former minister in Mobutu Sese Seko’s government [Kinshasa], 06 October 2010; with a 
consultant to the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (FD) [Kinshasa], 30 October 2010. 
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the rebel group.203  During the Second Congo War, the areas controlled by the armies of 
Rwanda and Uganda as well as their proxies had similar arrangements. 
 
Given the imperative of profit maximisation for MNCs and the crucial need to protect their 
investment/operations, some MNCs undertook to comply with the arrangements instituted by 
forces that controlled resource-bearing communities.  (Re)negotiation of mining concessions 
with rebel groups/militias or paying taxes to them directly and indirectly contributed to the 
economic arsenal that was crucial to sustaining conflicts.  General insecurity (especially the 
presence and activities of grassroots militias) in the resource-bearing communities compelled 
MNCs to adopt and rely on “unorthodox” means to protect their investment.204  The problem, 
however, was that such means contributed significantly to fuelling conflicts.  Hence, MNCs’ 
connections to conflict perpetuation.  In this regard, the local context underpinned MNCs’ 
actions that typified corporate complicity. 
 
Still on the local context, the lootability of natural resources located in the resource-bearing 
communities contributed significantly to artisanal and small scale mining (ASM).  In 
addition, the majority of people in resource-bearing communities considered mining as “a 
ticket out of poverty and unemployment” and, as such, took to ASM.205  Thriving ASM 
business provided impetus to the mineral trade, resulting in the emergence of several 
comptoirs (mineral traders or trading houses).  Resource-trading MNCs thus had ample 
mineral supply sources in the DRC.  The problem, however, was that the minerals were being 
obtained from conflict zones; thus, connecting resource-trading corporations to the DRC 
conflict.  Therefore, local conditions (in other words, the base or origin of the supply chain) 
                                                            
203 Interviews with a consultant to the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (FD) [Kinshasa], 30 October 
2010; with a director in the Ministère du Plan [Ministry of Planning] (CMA) [Lubumbashi], 26 October 2010. 
204 Interview with a Professor of Economics (EL) [Kinshasa], 29 October 2010. 
205 Interview with a geologist (VN) [Lubumbashi], 26 October 2010. 
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influenced the behaviour of MNCs based elsewhere (even thousands of kilometres away from 
the DRC).  Local factors such as the availability of lootable resources, ASM and the activities 
of comptoirs obviated the need for direct presence (or investment) by resource-trading 
MNCs, but these factors linked the corporate actors to conflict in the DRC.  Again, the local 
context is germane to understanding the complicity of MNCs in the DRC conflict. 
 
The local context is equally useful in unpacking the CSR initiatives discussed in the 
preceding section.  CSR projects by Anglo-American PLC and Banro Corporation illustrate 
that local conditions determine the necessity and the forms of interventions that typify 
corporate peacebuilding.  For instance, there has been relative peace in some of the mining 
areas since the end of the Second Congo War.  This has enabled Banro Corporation to 
implement a number of CSR projects.  (These projects could not have been implemented in 
situations of conflict and insecurity.)  Severe infrastructure deficiency, unemployment, high 
levels of illiteracy, lack of health care services and humanitarian crises plague local 
communities in the DRC.  Accordingly, CSR projects have been designed to respond to these 
challenges.  The point here is that local conditions typically determine the form that CSR 
engagement takes. 
 
In sum, the local context offers specific insights into aspects of MNCs’ activities in the public 
sphere, especially in conflict zones.  In the DRC, local context shaped corporate activities 
that contributed to conflict and those geared towards positive transformative change.  
Therefore, the local context is germane to understanding and unpacking corporate behaviour, 
which may illustrate corporate complicity or exemplify corporate peacebuilding. 
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Conditions in the host country (that is, the national environment) also played a key role in 
shaping corporate behaviour during and after the two wars in the DRC.  A cardinal factor was 
the absence of state authority, which created a vacuum that other non-state actors filled.206  
Non-state actors such as rebel groups and militias took control of resource-rich areas and thus 
became de-facto governors.  The absence of state authority meant that MNCs had to operate 
in accordance with the rules prescribed by the “governors” in mining zones.  As noted earlier, 
such rules were often at variance with good business practice.  Lack of state authority 
presupposed that companies could not count on the government to protect their investment.  
Defying the “governors” who controlled mining areas could have resulted in the revocation 
of mining concessions or denial of access to minerals. 
 
Closely related to this point is the problem of a weak national army, which has been unable to 
protect the territorial integrity of the state or maintain peace.  The national army, most 
notably towards the end of Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule, had been disoriented and since then has 
remained poorly paid and demotivated.  Given such low morale, the army could not stem the 
tide of illegal activities, including illicit exploitation and trafficking of minerals.  In some 
instances, members of the armed forces (sometimes, high ranking officers) joined in the 
looting and trafficking of minerals.207  Therefore, rather than serve as a bulwark against 
illegality, the condition of the national army allowed and even aided it.  In view of this 
scenario, MNCs and other actors (including the armies of invading countries, rebel groups, 
and mineral merchants) were able to trade in conflict minerals, thus contributing to conflict 
perpetuation. 
 
                                                            
206 Interview with a Professor of Political Science [Kinshasa], 29 October 2010. 
207 Interviews with a youth leader (RU) [Lubumbashi], 27 October 2010; with a military analyst [Kinshasa], 04 
November 2010; and E-interview (via SkypeTM) with a staff of Radio Okapi [Goma], 08 March 2011. 
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State incapacity also reflected (initially) in the inability to develop a feasible mining code and 
(subsequently) to implement it after its revision.  The mining code aimed at regulating all 
mining activities – commercial and artisanal – in the DRC.  However, the revision and 
implementation of the code were fraught with controversies and bickering by different actors 
– politicians, resource-bearing regions, and MNCs – seeking to protect their interests.208  As 
the controversies lingered, there was no substantive statutory instrument to regulate resource-
extracting companies, comptoirs, and artisanal miners.   
 
In addition, there were no national benchmarks or yardsticks for determining best practice 
and (in)appropriate behaviour by actors in the mining sector.  Corruption and poor/weak 
enforcement of mining contracts have also contributed to the sustenance of illegal activities 
in the mining sector.  For instance, it is not uncommon for a prospective comptoir to offer a 
bribe to be registered or for a government official to ignore an illicit action by a comptoir.209  
An interviewee likened the situation in the mining sector to a “free for all” or “a jungle” in 
which each actor was guided solely by self-interest,210 the actualisation of which often 
influenced the ebbs and flows of conflicts. 
 
The absence of state authority and a weak national army contributed to the emergence and 
sustenance of another factor – “politique des chefs de guerre” (that is, warlordism or warlord 
politics).211  In relation to corporate behaviour, warlordism provided the context in which 
MNCs dealt with rebel commanders as opposed to organs or agencies of the state (which 
were absent or incapacitated by the factors cited above).  MNCs entered into agreements that 
                                                            
208 For instance, politicians wanted to maximise the gains that accrued to the government from mining 
operations, resource-rich regions desired a bigger share of the resource “pie”, while artisanal miners and MNCs 
favoured less stringent rules to regulate the mining sector (Interview with a member of the Assemblée nationale 
[National Assembly] (MT) [Kinshasa], 21 October 2010). 
209 Interview with a supervisor in a mineral trading house (EK) [Lubumbashi], 28 October 2010. 
210 Interview with a former minister in Mobutu Sese Seko’s government [Kinshasa], 06 October 2010. 
211 Interview with an independent political and public policy analyst (KU) [Kinshasa], 04 November 2010. 
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offered financial benefits to warlords in return for access to natural resources.  This practice, 
whereby an individual – through fiat – cedes the country’s natural resources to a company 
had its provenance and was firmly rooted in Mobutuism.212  As president, Mobutu Sese Seko 
had unilaterally granted mining concessions to foreign companies in return for personal gain.  
Again, history bequeathed a practice that allowed for the plunder of the country’s natural 
wealth.  Warlordism obviated the need for MNCs to comply with statutory regulations; all 
that mattered was keeping one person happy (that is, the warlord, whom an interviewee 
referred to in French as “grand patron” [English: “big man”]).213  It also foreclosed 
accountability on the part of corporations.  In effect, warlordism provided a fertile ground for 
corporate complicity in conflict. 
 
Porous borders also contributed significantly to the plundering of the DRC’s mineral wealth.  
This is especially the case in eastern DRC.  Specifically, the government has been unable to 
secure the borders that the DRC shares with Rwanda and Uganda.  This has made resource 
trafficking easier.  Comptoirs in the DRC and merchants from neighbouring countries have 
taken advantage of the porous borders in their quest to meet international demand for 
resources such as cassiterite, coltan, and gold.  The DRC’s porous borders are crucial to the 
lubrication of the local-global supply chains for these resources.  Porous borders enabled 
suppliers to transport minerals from conflict zones to neighbouring countries en route 
international markets.  In this way and with reference to local-global supply chains, porous 
borders enabled resource-trading MNCs to conceal the sources of minerals that are extracted 
in conflict zones in the DRC. 
                                                            
212 It may even be argued that Mobutu Sese Seko merely conformed to a tradition that had been instituted in 
colonial times.  After all, King Leopold II had also considered the territory and its resources his personal 
property, which he could use as he pleased.  I am grateful to one of the study participants for pointing my 
attention to the provenance of this practice (Interview with an Assistant Professor of Political Science (EM) 
[Kinshasa], 05 November 2010). 
213 Interview with a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC) [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo] (SFK) [Kinshasa], 23 October 2010. 
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As is the case with the local context, the national context influenced MNCs’ actions in ways 
that typify corporate complicity in conflict.  Yet, the national environment also underpinned 
corporate initiatives that facilitated social investment and peacebuilding efforts in conflict 
zones.  For instance, the absence of state authority and government incapacity have 
underscored CSR projects such as infrastructure provision and rehabilitation as well as 
investment in education and health care, albeit these were not sufficient to constitute real 
transformation in the DRC, given the country’s profound structural problems.  The 
significance of the national context to the performance of these CSR functions lies in the fact 
that – more often than not – in conflict-prone areas, corporate actors have had to perform 
public functions that are typically undertaken by governments.  Therefore, the national 
context is a crucial determinant of the ambivalent character of corporate behaviour in conflict 
zones. 
 
The international context is also pivotal to understanding corporate behaviour.  Key variables 
at this level of analysis include the role of intervening countries, the international market for 
minerals, the absence of an international regime to regulate coltan trade, the role of the UN as 
well as international NGOs.  As noted earlier, countries that intervened in the DRC conflict 
also controlled access to mineral sites during their occupation of parts of the DRC.  They 
were thus able to facilitate the transfer of minerals from the DRC to international markets.  
For instance, resource-trading MNCs were able to use neighbouring countries as conduits for 
resources extracted from the DRC.  As noted earlier, the reports of the UN Panel of Experts 
revealed that Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda served as key channels of transfer in the local-
global supply chain for minerals such as cassiterite, coltan and gold.  Comptoirs generally 
239 
sold minerals to buyers who then transported the minerals through neighbouring countries en 
route international markets.214 
 
Resource-trading MNCs also had ‘agents’ in these neighbouring countries.  The significance 
of this point is that the governments of neighbouring countries allowed these agents to 
operate on behalf of MNCs or sell minerals to MNCs.  These ‘agents’ facilitated commercial 
transactions (on behalf of MNCs) relating to mineral procurement from the DRC.215  
However, some MNCs dissociated themselves from the activities of the ‘agents’, thus 
attempting to absolve the companies of any culpability in illegal activities that fuelled 
conflicts in the DRC.  Nevertheless, the point here is that without direct presence in the DRC, 
MNCs relied on neighbouring countries for mineral supplies. 
 
Another factor at this level of analysis is the international market for the DRC’s natural 
resources.  As noted earlier, international attraction to, and demand for, the DRC’s high 
quality minerals influenced the resource-conflict dynamics.  For example, the unprecedented 
technological boom resulted in phenomenal demand for DR Congo’s coltan, a strategic 
mineral used in the high-tech industry.  Resource-trading MNCs had to satisfy the high 
demand by manufacturers and, in the bid to do so, obtained coltan from the DRC’s conflict 
zones.  Consequently, resource buyers were linked to the conflicts and conflict minerals.  
International demand for natural resources served as a ‘push’ factor that propelled MNCs into 
the DRC’s conflict zones.  In addition, the dynamics within international markets for natural 
resources gave fillip to the quest for profit maximisation by MNCs.  In this way, the 
international market functioned as a determinant or motivation for corporate behaviour. 
                                                            
214 The majority of the study participants (interviewees, respondents to questionnaires and those who 
participated in the focus group discussions) stressed this point, which corroborated the findings of the UN Panel 
of Experts. 
215 For details, see United Nations Security Council (2001a; 2001b; 2002a) and RAID (2004). 
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Furthermore, the absence of an international regime to regulate coltan trade created 
‘opportunities’ for illicit exploitation, trafficking and sale.  Although a certification scheme 
(such as the KPCS) – in itself – does not prevent or eliminate illegal activities, it provides a 
modicum of restraint on illicit actions and provides avenues for accountability, punitive 
measures and redress when they occur.  With reference to coltan, the absence of an 
international regime – even though the natural resource was included in the ‘conflict 
minerals’ category – undermined international efforts to tackle illicit activities in relation to 
the natural resource.  Moreover, there was no obligatory requirement to certify coltan as 
‘conflict-free’ before it could be traded on the international market.  This crucial ‘missing 
link’ in the supply chain process contributed to illegal behaviour by resource buyers and 
sellers; it also made it difficult to rein in such behaviour.  With specific reference to MNCs, 
the net effect of the absence of an international regime to regulate coltan trade is that it 
bolstered illicit action (that is, trading in conflict minerals), which exemplified corporate 
complicity in the DRC conflict. 
 
It is instructive to note that the international context also underpinned changes in corporate 
behaviour.  The roles of the UN and international NGOs illustrate this point.  For instance, 
the work of the UN Panel of Experts engendered behavioural changes on the part of MNCs.  
While some MNCs ceased direct transactions in the DRC, other companies officially severed 
ties with comptoirs that had been linked to (trade in) conflict minerals.  In addition, a few 
MNCs expressed their commitment to meet ethical standards or work towards best practices 
(such as compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) thus 
signalling an undertaking to alter their behaviour. 
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Similarly, advocacy by international NGOs (such as Enough Project, Global Witness, and 
Oxfam) has stimulated changes in corporate behaviour.  Some MNCs headquartered in 
OECD member states have had to reassess and adjust their practices following their referrals 
to the National Contact Points because of the activities of international NGOs.  Due to the 
advocacy campaigns by these international NGOs, many MNCs, especially resource-trading 
companies and manufacturers of ‘hi-tech’ products, are increasingly dissociating themselves 
from conflict minerals in general and minerals originating from the DRC in particular.216 
 
In sum, the local, national and international contexts are of vital utility in the explication of 
corporate behaviour in conflict zones.  An examination of these levels of analysis suggests 
that a number of factors combine to determine corporate behaviour.  Although profit 
maximisation is a dominant logic in corporate activities, it is accentuated or mediated by 
other variables that are internal and external to corporations.  To understand corporate 
complicity (in conflict) and/or corporate peacebuilding, it is necessary to examine the 
contextual factors that underpin the (in)actions of companies in conflict zones.  Just as it is 
difficult to unpack the complexities of human behaviour with reference to a single factor, it is 
difficult to do so in the case of corporate behaviour.  Therefore, it is simplistic and 
reductionist to advance a mono-causal explanation for a gamut of corporate actions, or the 
specifics of corporate behaviour, especially in conflict situations that are often characterised 
by complexities.217  Consequently, the different contexts that determine MNCs actions serve 
as useful prisms for unpacking corporate behaviour in conflict situations.  An examination of 
these contexts furnishes reasons for corporate actions, thereby helping to answer the most 
                                                            
216 Focus group discussion with Congolese expatriates in Pretoria, South Africa, 09 June 2012. 
217 This is not to understate the saliency of profit maximisation, which is the bottomline for MNCs.  It is trite 
that companies invest in their operations to gain profit; they are not going to be in any community if profit is 
impossible.  Thus, MNCs are bound to navigate the complexities of conflict zones in ways that guarantee 
bottomline considerations.  The point here is that the different ways in which MNCs choose to do so generally 
respond to dynamics in conflict areas. 
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important poser that social scientists (especially international relations scholars) grapple with 
in their study of political phenomena – the “why” question. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter, devoted to the explication of corporate behaviour in the DRC, has examined 
pertinent aspects of MNCs’ operations in the context of the connections between business 
and conflict.  In doing so, the chapter presented profiles of selected MNCs – those that were 
prominent in the DRC and therefore featured prominently in research findings.218  The UN 
Panel of Experts, which investigated the illegal exploitation of DR Congo’s natural resources, 
also named these MNCs in its reports.  These corporations discussed in the chapter were 
involved in mineral resource extraction, purchasing/marketing and supply chain processes.   
 
As discussed, the UN Panel of Experts found that these MNCs had been involved in illegal 
activities in the DRC.  The Panel also established that these companies had fuelled conflicts 
in the DRC by virtue of their connections to resource extraction and mineral trade.  It was 
noted that the reports of the UN Panel of Experts have provided a basis for examining the 
intricate nexus or triangulation of natural resources, business and conflict in the DRC.  
Although a number of shortcomings trailed the work of the UN Panel, its establishment 
signalled a significant response from the world body towards attenuating conflict in the DRC. 
 
While the reports of the UN Panel of Experts revealed instances of corporate complicity in 
the DRC conflicts, this chapter presented a few cases of CSR activities by MNCs in the 
country, thereby foregrounding the ambivalent character of corporate behaviour.  CSR 
projects have focused largely on social service provision and infrastructure rehabilitation, 
                                                            
218 See Chapter Seven. 
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with a substantial need for corporate initiatives that facilitate conflict 
transformation/peacebuilding. 
 
In order to unpack corporate behaviour in terms of its ambivalent manifestations, the chapter 
utilised three levels of analysis – the local, national and international environments.  These 
three spheres, which constitute the operational milieu of MNCs, encapsulate interactive 
clusters of actors and processes (even as they are devoid of mechanisms) that influence 
corporate actions in specific ways.  As this chapter showed with reference to the DRC, local, 
national and international contexts undergird corporate behaviour.  In line with this study’s 
hypothesis, this chapter underscored the idea that contextual factors underpin corporate 
actions in conflict zones.  It also emphasized the point that an examination of such factors, as 
opposed to simplistic or reductionist explanations, engenders a holistic understanding of 
corporate behaviour.  The question that merits attention is: how do research findings correlate 
with the analyses in this chapter?  The next chapter addresses this question by presenting and 













DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS – BETWEEN PROFIT AND PEACE: 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter provided a broad or general explication of corporate behaviour in the 
study’s location.  In tackling this thematic concern, it presented the profiles of corporate 
actors with links to the DRC.  These economic actors consisted of resource-extracting and 
mineral-trading MNCs, whose actions with reference to the DRC’s conflicts typified 
deleterious and constructive forms of corporate behaviour.  A deleterious form of corporate 
behaviour that the previous chapter highlighted – through the analysis of the reports of the 
UN Panel of Experts – is corporate complicity in conflicts in the DRC.  The chapter also 
discussed corporate actions geared towards transformative change in the DRC, which 
exemplified a contrasting (that is, constructive) form of behaviour.  It was noted that 
constructive corporate actions in conflict zones constitute “good” behaviour in a “bad” 
environment. 
 
In view of the preceding chapter’s analytical focus, namely, the broad explication of 
corporate behaviour in the DRC, the study examined the variables that informed MNCs’ 
actions in the country.  This approach to exploring the thematic concern of the chapter is 
premised on the idea that in order to understand corporate behaviour (or any type of 
behaviour), it is necessary to situate it in context.  Therefore, the chapter contextualised 
corporate behaviour using three concentric spheres – or operational contexts – within which 
MNCs operate.  It was explained that different scenarios and interactive clusters of actors at 
the local, national and international levels combine to determine the strategic behaviour of 
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MNCs in conflict zones, such as their involvement or non-involvement in conflicts as well as 
their facilitation of or non-participation in conflict transforming activities.  The chapter 
showed that a coalescence of local, national and international factors engenders specific 
response(s) by corporate actors in a typical conflict situation.  It also argued that an 
examination of the contextual variables at these three levels of analysis is essential for 
understanding corporate actions in the DRC. 
 
Chapter Seven, drawing from the analysis in the preceding chapter, deals with the 
presentation and analysis of research data.  This chapter presents findings from fieldwork 
with reference to MNCs and conflict transformation in the DRC.  The idea here is to 
explicate the data obtained during fieldwork and to situate the data in the context of the 
discussion in preceding chapter.  Chapter Seven does this by framing the activities of MNCs 
based on the perspectives of the study participants, against the backdrop of the main trends in 
corporate behaviour in conflict zones.  In other words, this chapter foregrounds participants’ 
views on corporate behaviour in terms of its ambivalent character.   
 
In what follows, this chapter gives an overview of the methodology and data obtained from 
the study areas between 2010 and 2012.  Deductions are made from the data to explicate the 
two typologies of corporate behaviour: MNCs’ complicity in conflict as well as their 
peacebuilding roles.  In addition, the data offer insights into participants’ perceptions of the 
interface of MNCs, conflict and peace.  The chapter discusses specific roles of corporate 
actors in the DRC’s conflicts and the peacebuilding process from the perspectives of the 
study participants.  It also depicts research findings on the rationale for corporate actors’ 
involvement in conflicts and the conflict transformation process.  As noted in Chapter Six, 
corporate peacebuilding (that is, CSR engagement that facilitates conflict transformation) 
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constitutes a significant shift in corporate behaviour.  Given the novelty of corporate 
peacebuilding, this chapter presents participants’ assessments of MNCs vis-à-vis this facet of 
corporate behaviour.  It also discusses the issues that emerge from the review of literature, 
theoretical frameworks, paradigmatic perspectives and survey findings.  Based on research 
findings, the chapter concludes with a prognosis on corporate peacebuilding in the DRC.  The 
following section deals with the methodology and description of data from the study’s 
location. 
 
7.2 Methodology and description of research data 
As noted in Chapter One, this study relied on primary and secondary sources of data.  
Secondary sources of data were used extensively in the analyses in the previous chapters, 
which also featured the interpolations of primary data where necessary.  Primary data for this 
study was obtained from fieldwork conducted in the DRC and South Africa during various 
months between 2010 and 2012.  The study participants were chosen using a combination of 
purposive (expert) and snowball sampling methods.  The foremost criterion for including 
individuals in the sample was knowledge or awareness of MNCs’ operations in the DRC.  
The researcher used three key data collection methods namely, focus group discussions, in-
depth interviews and questionnaires. 
 
Three focus group discussions were held in 2012 with Congolese expatriates in three South 
African cities of Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria.  Each group comprised 10 members.  In 
total, 30 persons – comprising academics, artisans, businesspersons, civil society actors, 
medical professionals and refugees – participated in the focus group discussions.  The focus 
group discussions were held for further engagement with and clarification of issues arising 
from fieldwork, specifically the responses in questionnaires administered in the DRC in 2010 
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and 2011.  In sum, the focus group discussions complemented other data collection modes, 
namely interviews and questionnaire administration. 
 
As noted in Chapter One, the researcher conducted 71 in-depth interviews.  Interviewees 
were drawn from MNCs’ stakeholder base – the government, local communities, and civil 
society.  The interviews, which took three forms (face-to-face, telephonic and electronic), 
enabled the deep exploration and engagement with issues pertaining to natural resource 
governance and corporate behaviour in the DRC.  Moreover, interviewees’ responses to 
questions offered insights that the researcher could not obtain during focus group discussions 
or through the questionnaire. 
 
In terms of the third data collection technique, the researcher administered more than 350 
questionnaires in the DRC, of which only 150 were returned.219  This and subsequent sections 
present the data obtained from the survey.  Respondents were expected to provide qualitative 
responses to clarify certain cardinal and ordinal variables in the questionnaire.  Qualitative 
responses often explained or highlighted the significance of views stated in cardinal and 
ordinal forms.  Relevant sections of the questionnaire were captured and cross tabulated with 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).220  There were a number of variables 
pertaining to the 150 respondents to the questionnaire.  These variables include the 
respondents’ stakeholder affiliation, location/region in the DRC and awareness of MNCs’ 
activities in the DRC.  This section presents the varying responses to these variables by the 
150 respondents.  First is the stakeholder affiliation of respondents. 
 
 
                                                            
219 See sub-section 1.6.1 in Chapter One for an explanation of the reason for low response rate. 
220 Officially known as IBM SPSS Statistics. 
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Figure 7.1: Respondents’ stakeholder affiliation 
 
As Figure 7.1 shows, a sizable number (one-third) of respondents, that is 50 out of 150 
(representing 33%) were affiliated with MNCs.  These respondents consisted mainly of 
individuals working with or for comptoirs and former employees of companies in the DRC.  
In the second highest category were individuals in academia, comprising 32 respondents and 
representing 21% of the sample population.  Government officials constituted the third 
highest category in terms of representation (with 25 respondents out of 150), that is 17% of 
respondents.  Individuals from the civil society constituency numbered 22, making up 15% of 
the sample population.  Eleven respondents (7%) were leaders or members of local 
community organisations or groups.  There were 10 individuals from the mass media, 
representing 7% of the respondents.  A note on the profiles of respondents is instructive. 
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That the majority of respondents were affiliated with MNCs is significant.221  This set of 
respondents were directly or indirectly involved or connected with MNCs’ activities in the 
DRC.  Presumably, they were able to provide insights that other respondents did not possess.  
Respondents in the second highest category, that is, academia, were also crucial for a key 
reason.  The academy (especially the social sciences community in the DRC) has been 
marked by scholarly interest in issues related to natural resources in the country.222  
Furthermore, government officials (especially those in the Presidency, key departments such 
as the Ministries of Mines and Planning) also had knowledge of issues pertaining to natural 
resource governance.  With a view to stimulating transformative change in the DRC, the civil 
society and the mass media had been instrumental to accentuating the resource dimensions of 
conflicts, especially the complicity of profiteering networks in conflicts.  These points about 
stakeholder affiliation highlight the calibre and credentials of respondents as well as their 
potentialities in providing pertinent information that speak to the research questions. 
 
Another important variable was the respondents’ location/region in the DRC, which is 






                                                            
221 It is instructive to note that preliminary discussions with my research assistants (prior to fieldwork in the 
DRC) suggested that those affiliated with MNCs were generally more favourably disposed to completing the 
survey instrument as opposed to granting interviews.  Given the sensitive nature of this study, this set of the 
study participants apparently felt that the modus operandi associated with the questionnaire administration 
protected their anonymity better than interviews would. 
222 For instance, I found out during my visits to the Universities of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi that almost all the 
disciplines in the Social Sciences had faculty who had conducted studies or developed expertise in issues 
relating to natural resources in the DRC. 
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Figure 7.2: Respondents’ location/region in the DRC 
 
As Figure 7.2 shows, the majority of respondents were from, or were based in, key locations 
that have significance for this study.  Personal observations and experiences of respondents as 
well as exposure to corporate-conflict dynamics in resource-rich provinces would be a 
plausible explanation for this higher frequency.  As noted in Chapter Four, the provinces of 
Nord-Kivu (North Kivu), Sud-Kivu (South Kivu), Katanga and Maniema are resource-rich.  
These areas have also been epicentres of resource-related conflicts.  Kinshasa is significant as 
the capital city and the seat of national government.  A breakdown of the sample population 
shows that 39 (26%) respondents were from Nord-Kivu, 34 (23%) from Sud-Kivu, 26 (17%) 
from Kinshasa and 23 (15%) from Katanga.  Nine (6%) respondents were from Maniema, 
seven (5%) from Bas-Congo, five (3%) from Bandundu, three (2%) from Équateur, and two 
each (1%) from Kasai-Occidental and Kasai-Oriental.  The combined numbers of respondents 
from Katanga, the two Kivus and Maniema indicate that the majority of respondents (105 
individuals, representing 70%) were from areas that had been plagued with resource-related 
conflicts.  Most likely, these respondents were able to provide information based on their 
personal experiences and understandings of the strong links between natural resources and 
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conflicts in these areas as well as the involvement of corporate actors in conflicts and in the 
peacebuilding process. 
 
A key variable was respondents’ knowledge of corporate actors in the DRC, which the chart 
below (Figure 7.3) depicts. 
 
Figure 7.3: Respondents’ awareness of MNCs’ operations in the DRC 
 
 
All 150 respondents answered the question: “Are you aware of MNCs’ operations in the 
DRC?”  As Figure 7.3 shows, 149 respondents (99%) were aware of the activities of MNCs 
in the country while one respondent (1%) answered in the negative.  Respondents’ awareness 
of MNCs’ operations was crucial to providing answers to subsequent questions posed in the 
questionnaire.  This was a pivotal requirement for respondents, as their ability to provide 
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pertinent information on corporate behaviour hinged on awareness of MNCs’ operations in 
the DRC. 
 
It was also necessary to find out the extent of knowledge that respondents had about 
corporate actors in the DRC.  This underpinned another question, which is examined below. 
 
Figure 7.4: The extent of respondents’ awareness of MNCs’ operations in the DRC 
 
Of 150 respondents, 149 responded to the question on the extent of their awareness of MNCs’ 
operations in the DRC.  One respondent did not answer this question.  As Figure 7.4 shows, 
100 respondents were “very aware” of the activities of MNCs, representing 67%.  This was 
followed by 42 respondents (28%) who were “moderately aware” of the operations of MNCs.  
Seven respondents (5%) were “barely aware” of MNCs’ activities in the DRC.  The 
combined numbers of those who were “very aware” and “moderately aware” indicate that the 
vast majority of respondents (142 out of 149, representing 95%) were (reasonably) competent 




Drawing from respondents’ level of awareness of MNCs’ operations in the DRC, the 
questionnaire required respondents to identify the MNCs whose operations they were most 
familiar with.  Figure 7.5 (below) presents respondents’ responses to this question. 
 
Figure 7.5: Respondents’ identification of MNCs in the DRC 
 
The question, which required that respondents identify specific MNCs whose activities they 
(respondents) were most familiar with, allowed for multiple responses.  In other words, each 
respondent could name as many MNCs as possible based on their knowledge of the 
companies’ activities in or connections with the DRC.  Figure 7.5 above shows the MNCs 
that respondents identified and the number of occurrences/frequencies for each company.  
Respondents identified 14 companies in varying frequencies.  The MNC with the highest 
frequency (identified 116 times) was America Mineral Fields (now Adastra Minerals).  Banro 
Corporation (111 times) had the second highest frequency.  Cabot Corporation had the third 
highest frequency with 106 occurrences.  Anglo-American PLC was mentioned 102 times.  
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Respondents mentioned Anvil Mining 63 times.  Other MNCs had considerably fewer 
frequencies.  These included Tenke Mining Company (35), Afrimex (34), De Beers (26), 
THAISARCO (23) and Amalgamated Metal Corporation (22).  Companies that had a 
frequency of less than 20 included American Diamond Buyers (19), Barrick Gold 
Corporation (17), Cogecom Coltan Trading Company (13) and First Quantum Mining (11). 
 
The frequencies indicate respondents’ knowledge of the MNCs’ presence in, or connections 
with, the DRC.  Such knowledge was based on a number of factors such as respondents’ 
stakeholder affiliation (which exposed them to MNCs’ operations), respondents’ location (for 
example, where MNCs’ activities were conducted), and information presented in the media or 
published in articles, reports or on the internet. 
 
Having presented the profile of respondents, the next section analyses findings on MNCs and 
conflict in the DRC from the perspectives of respondents. 
 
7.3 Presentation and analysis of findings on multinational corporations and conflict 
in the DRC 
This section presents respondents’ articulation of the connections between MNCs and the 
DRC’s conflicts and the peacebuilding process.  Specifically, this section addresses the 
research question on the specific roles of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts and peacebuilding 
process.  As noted repeatedly in this study, the strategic behaviour of MNCs in conflict zones 
is characterised by ambivalence: some corporate actions sustain conflict while others 
facilitate conflict transformation.  In view of this reality, this section is divided into two.  The 
first sub-section deals with respondents’ perspectives on MNCs’ roles in the DRC’s conflicts.  
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The conflict transformation roles of MNCs, according to respondents, constitute the focal 
point of analysis in the second sub-section. 
 
7.3.1 Typology of corporate behaviour – Corporate marauders? MNCs’ complicity in 
conflict 
As noted above, this sub-section focuses on a typology of corporate behaviour, that is, 
corporate complicity in conflict.  Precisely, this sub-section seeks to answer key interrelated 
research questions: What specific roles did MNCs play in the DRC’s conflicts?  Why did 
corporate actors play these roles?  Respondents had to answer four preliminary questions 
before identifying the specific roles of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts.  These questions 
foreground important variables that relate to respondents’ ability to identify MNCs’ actions 
that exemplify the first typology of corporate behaviour. 
 
First, respondents were asked to indicate whether they were aware of the involvement of 
MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts.  Figure 7.6 below depicts their responses. 
 
Figure 7.6: Respondents’ awareness of MNCs’ involvement in the DRC’s conflicts 
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All 150 respondents answered the question on awareness of MNCs’ involvement in the 
DRC’s conflicts.  Figure 7.6 shows that the majority of respondents (133), representing 89% 
were aware of the involvement of MNCs in conflicts in the DRC.  Of those surveyed, 17 
respondents (11%) answered in the negative.  A cross tabulation of the responses according 
to stakeholder affiliation highlights an important point. 
 
Table 7.1: Cross tabulation of stakeholder affiliation and awareness of MNCs’ 
involvement in the DRC’s conflicts 
 Are you aware of the involvement 





 Stakeholder affiliation 
Government 25 0 25 
Multinational corporation 34 16 50 
Civil society 21 1 22 
Academia 32 0 32 
Mass media 10 0 10 
Local community 
organisation/group 
11 0 11 
Total 133 17 150 
 
As Table 7.1 above shows, of the 17 respondents who answered in the negative, one was 
affiliated to the civil society; the remaining 16 respondents were affiliated to MNCs.  The 
remarkable thing is that nearly half of those affiliated to MNCs were unaware of this key 
activity of their employers or business associates.  This suggests that MNCs as well as other 
actors affiliated to them were more likely to reject the idea of corporate complicity in 
conflicts and illicit activities in the DRC. 
 
Furthermore, respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their awareness of the 
involvement of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts.  The figure below presents their responses. 
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Figure 7.7: Extent of respondents’ awareness of the involvement of MNCs in the DRC’s 
conflicts 
 
Of 150 individuals surveyed, 133 respondents answered the question on the extent of 
respondents’ awareness of MNCs’ involvement in conflicts in the DRC.  This means that 17 
respondents who were not aware of corporate actors’ involvement in the DRC’s conflicts – 
appropriately – did not answer this question.  Based on the 133 ‘yes’ responses, Figure 7.7 
above shows that more than half, that is, 75 respondents (56%) were “very aware” of the 
involvement of MNCs in conflicts.   This was followed by 56 respondents (comprising 42%) 
who indicated that they were “moderately aware” of MNCs’ involvement in conflicts.  Two 
respondents (2%) were “barely aware” of the involvement of MNCs’ in the DRC’s conflicts.  
The combined numbers of respondents in the “very aware” and “moderately aware” 
categories indicate that 131 out of 133 respondents (98%) were in a position to provide 
information on corporate actors’ involvement in the DRC’s conflicts. 
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Drawing from the above question, respondents were asked to identify the MNCs that were 
involved in the DRC’s conflicts.  The figure below (7.8) shows respondents’ responses to the 
question on the corporate actors that were involved in conflicts. 
 
Figure 7.8: Respondents’ identification of MNCs involved in the DRC’s conflicts 
 
The question on the MNCs that were involved in the DRC’s conflicts allowed for multiple 
responses.  Figure 7.8 above shows the MNCs and their frequencies.  Respondents identified 
13 companies with connections to conflicts in the DRC.  America Mineral Fields (now 
Adastra Minerals) had the highest frequency of 121, followed by Cabot Corporation with 
101.  Next were Anglo-American PLC with a count of 72, Cogecom Coltan Trading 
Company with 65, and Anvil Mining with 55.  Respondents identified THAISARCO 32 
times.  The frequency for Banro Corporation was 25, while De Beers had 23.  Afrimex and 
Tenke Mining Company had the same frequency of 22.  Similarly, two companies – 
Amalgamated Metal Corporation and American Diamond Buyers – had a frequency of 21.  
Barrick Gold Corporation had the lowest frequency (17).  As will be seen subsequently, 
research findings suggest that these corporate actors were involved or connected to conflicts 
in the DRC in a number of ways. 
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Having presented respondents’ responses to the four preliminary questions, this section 
follows with the discussion of the specific roles of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts as 
articulated by respondents.  Figure 7.9 below shows respondents’ indication of the main roles 
that MNCs played in conflicts in the DRC. 
 
Figure 7.9: Respondents’ articulation of MNCs’ roles in the DRC’s conflicts 
 
The question on the main roles that MNCs played in the DRC’s conflicts also allowed for 
multiple responses.  In other words, each respondent – to the best of her/his knowledge – 
could identify more than one conflict-sustaining activity by MNCs.  Figure 7.9 above depicts 
MNCs’ roles in conflict and the frequency of reference to each role. 
 
The role that had most occurrences (121) was “trading in minerals”, which many respondents 
(as well as interviewees) felt was instrumental to perpetuating conflicts.  For instance, one 
interviewee argued that MNCs were the main buyers and suppliers of “conflict minerals” and, 
as a result, that they were responsible for conflict prolongation and the devastating impact of 
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resource-related conflicts in the DRC.223  There was consensus amongst respondents who 
cited this role that MNCs’ actions in this regard sustained war efforts.  With reference to this 
role by MNCs, mineral revenue provided the economic backbone for military efforts through 
which combatants sought to achieve their political objectives.224  “To the rebels and their 
supporters, the mineral money [was] a godsend” (McKinley, 1997: i. d); to MNCs, the rebels 
and other collaborators were important stakeholders that furthered the profit maximisation 
agenda.  This dynamic illustrates deleterious connections between business and conflict. 
 
Another role that respondents identified was the “illegal exploitation of natural resources”, 
referred to 100 times.  This corporate activity involved accessing minerals in the DRC’s 
conflict zones.  According to one respondent, mercenaries occasionally facilitated MNCs’ 
quest to access the DRC’s minerals.225  The involvement of corporate actors in illicit 
exploitation of natural resources prompted another respondent to liken MNCs to 
“mercenaries”.226  The links between corporate actors, militias, rebels and foreign armies, 
which lubricated illicit resource extraction and trafficking, exemplified an aspect of corporate 
complicity in the DRC’s conflicts. 
 
According to respondents, companies also provided support for belligerents during conflicts.  
Corporate support for warring parties took three forms.  One, funding for combatants, which 
respondents mentioned 62 times.  Two, supplying arms to rebel/government forces (also with 
62 references).  Three, facilitating military actions, which had 17 occurrences.  Companies 
that operated in conflict zones were involved in economic arrangements that provided 
funding for combatants (rebels and national armies).  For instance, companies and comptoirs 
                                                            
223 Interview with a member of the Congo Leadership Initiative (a youth empowerment NGO) [Kinshasa], 06 
November 2010. 
224 Respondent Q1. 
225 Respondent Q9. 
226 Respondent Q3. 
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(acting in the interest of MNCs) paid “taxes” and made other financial contributions to rebel 
groups.  Companies were also implicated in the DRC’s conflicts through the supply of 
military weapons to warring parties.  As noted in interviews, the barter system, whereby 
MNCs supplied arms to rebels in exchange for access to minerals, was a case in point.227 
 
In addition, corporate actors facilitated military actions by providing logistical support to 
warring parties, such as the leasing of helicopters and the provision of communication 
equipment (for example, satellite telephones).228  For instance, it was reported that the co-
founder of America Mineral Fields (Jean Ramon Boulle), who concluded a US$1 billion 
mining contract with the AFDL rebel group in April 1997, allowed the rebels to use his 
private jet (Montague, 2002: 110).  Jean Ramon Boulle put his jet at the late Kabila’s disposal 
in return for securing mining deals (McKinley, 1997: i. d).  A respondent cited another 
example in which Anvil Mining in 2004 “helped the government by supplying weapons and 
logistics” to neutralise rebel groups in Kilwa in Katanga Province.229 
 
Respondents indicated that companies operating in resource-rich conflict zones enlisted the 
support of rebel/government forces.  This role had a frequency of 34.  A respondent pointed 
specifically to a dimension of this role, that is, the active collaboration between companies 
and rebel leaders.230  Generally, support from rebel/government forces offered some 
“protection” for corporate investment and activities in conflict zones.231  Resource 
entrepreneurs typically rewarded armed protection with financial incentives, which provided 
                                                            
227 Interviews with officials in the Ministère des Mines [Ministry of Mines] (CN) [Kinshasa], 17 October 2010; 
(VD) [Kinshasa], 17 October 2010; (J-DK) [Lubumbashi], 27 October 2010; and E-interviews (via SkypeTM) 
with a consultant to the Division des Mines Nord-Kivu [Goma], 05 March 2011; with an official of the Division 
des Mines Sud-Kivu [Bukavu], 07 March 2011. 
228 Interviews with an officer (III) in the Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) [National Intelligence 
Agency], [Kinshasa], 07 November 2010; with a former local commander of a rebel movement [Kinshasa], 06 
November 2010. 
229 Respondent Q32. 
230 Respondent Q1. 
231 Respondent Q79. 
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warring parties with economic and military arsenal.  For instance, interviewees remarked 
with reference to this point that comptoirs and corporations sometimes requested the 
assistance of the army or rebel commanders, with the latter obtaining personal favours in 
return.232  These favours included providing assistance in the areas of arms procurement, 
supply of uniforms, (international) financial transactions and settling the wage bill of 
officers.233  This arrangement was a facet of a “symbiotic relationship” between corporate 
actors and belligerents, a relationship that suggested the complicity of companies in the 
DRC’s conflicts.234  Respondents’ articulation of corporate complicity also required the 
identification of the motivations for the performance of conflict-sustaining roles by MNCs.  
In other words, why did corporate actors play the aforementioned roles in the DRC’s 
conflicts?  The following figure provides the answer to this question. 
 
Figure 7.10: Rationale for corporate actors’ involvement in the DRC’s conflicts 
 
                                                            
232 Interviews with a former member of the MLC [Kinshasa], 06 November 2010; with a member of the UDPS 
[Kinshasa], 07 November 2010. 
233 Interviews with a former member of the MLC [Kinshasa], 06 November 2010; with a member of the UDPS 
[Kinshasa], 07 November 2010. 
234 Interview with a Professor of International Political Economy (ALM) [Lubumbashi], 27 October 2010. 
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With reference to this multiple response question, respondents identified five reasons for 
MNCs’ involvement in the DRC’s conflicts.  The reason with the highest frequency (106 
occurrences), was corporate actors’ quest to access mineral/resource sites.  As noted earlier, 
the relationship between MNCs and other actors enabled the former to access natural 
resources.  According to one respondent, corporate actors benefitted from the war situation in 
some ways, including being able to acquire mining rights from rebel groups: “they [MNCs] 
like the war because once the war continues, they’ll continue with their illegal exploitation.  
That’s why some time [sic] they do force the rebels to carry on with the war so as they 
continue to benefit from the disorder.”235  A striking example during the rebellion against 
Mobutu Sese Seko illustrates this point.  The New York Times reported that less than two days 
after the AFDL captured Lubumbashi, executives of MNCs “were already flying into the city 
aboard private jets and setting up shop in the Hotel Karavia.  They could be seen meeting at 
poolside and over meals with the rebels’ finance minister and the newly appointed Governor 
of the province” (McKinley, 1997: i. d.).  America Mineral Fields, one of the first MNCs to 
do business with the AFDL rebel group, reportedly signed a contract worth US$885 million 
with Laurent Kabila in return for exclusive mining rights (at that time) to copper and zinc in 
the DRC (McKinley, 1997: i. d.). 
 
The rationale with the second highest frequency was the international demand for natural 
resources, which propelled MNCs into the DRC’s conflict zones.  Respondents identified this 
reason 90 times.  As noted earlier, international demand for natural resources such as 
cassiterite and coltan led to a “rush” for DR Congo’s resources.  MNCs had to satisfy the 
demand for these minerals and, in doing so, adopted a variety of mechanisms, including 
collaboration with parties involved in conflicts in the DRC. 
                                                            
235 Respondent Q10. 
264 
 
With frequencies of 67 and 58, respondents identified the need to retain control of the mines 
and the desire to obtain/retain concessionary deals as the third and fourth reasons for 
corporate involvement in the DRC’s conflicts.  In practice, companies collaborated with 
government forces and/or rebels when mining areas fell under the control of the armies or 
rebels.  Military takeover and power dynamics in a mining area generally put corporate 
investment at risk.236  For instance, prior to Mobutu Sese Seko’s ouster, MNCs were 
concerned with protecting their mining rights or getting better deals (McKinley, 1997: i. d.).  
Therefore, MNCs that sought to obtain/retain concessionary deals or maintain control of 
mining sites felt obliged to collaborate with the powers at any given time.  As noted earlier, 
such collaboration directly and indirectly linked corporate actors with conflict-perpetuating 
activities, which highlighted the complicity of such actors in conflicts. 
 
The quest for more profit had the lowest frequency (21).  It is difficult to question the 
dominance of the profit-maximisation logic in MNCs’ decisions and operations.  Many 
MNCs continued to “scramble for DR Congo’s resources” despite the high level of volatility 
in the country.  The DRC’s resources offer greater prospects for immense profits in view of 
the high quality of the minerals.  In the quest to make profits, companies were caught up in a 
“roller coaster ride towards treasure” (Montague, 2002: 110) in which virtually all actions 
were permissible, including those that fuelled conflicts.  In other words, profit making was an 
end that justified any means.  According to one respondent, the absence of regulatory 
frameworks (such as a mining code or an “investment code”) in conflict zones presupposed 
                                                            
236 For instance, Montague (2002: 109) noted that economic arrangements between the AFDL and MNCs 
“effectively took precedence over previous agreements negotiated by the Mobutu administration.  As major 
cities located in mineral rich areas fell under AFDL control, mining corporations swarmed into rebel held 
territory”, precisely to negotiate new or validate existing mining contracts. 
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that MNCs could make as much profit as possible.237  With reference to this point, for 
instance, an interviewee asserted that in the bid to make profit, companies cast aside (the idea 
of) “corporate conscience and ethical compass”.238  At some point during the interview, this 
interviewee turned to the researcher and stated tersely: “some of these companies that you are 
calling corporate actors behave like marauders”.  The emphasis on profit maximisation, 
according to one of the study participants, tended to make “good” corporations act badly.239 
 
The reasons that respondents cited for corporate actors’ involvement in the DRC’s conflicts 
find relevance in this study’s hypothesis.  As explained in the previous chapter, the strategic 
behaviour of MNCs is a function of the interplay of company-specific factors and variables in 
the local, national and international environments in which companies operate.  This section 
shows that MNCs’ roles in the conflicts and the rationale for such roles derived from or were 
closely associated with other actors’ influences as well as factors at the three levels of 
analysis. 
 
Having said that, how did respondents rate the significance of corporate actors’ involvement 







                                                            
237 Respondent Q1. 
238 Interview with a staff of the Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix (CEJP) [Episcopal Commission for 
Justice and Peace] (CH) [Kinshasa], 29 October 2010. 
239 Interview with a Professor of Corporate Law (YN) [Kinshasa], 07 October 2010. 
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Figure 7.11: Respondents’ assessment of the impact of MNCs’ involvement in the 
DRC’s conflicts 
 
Figure 7.11 shows that of the 133 respondents that were aware of the involvement of MNCs 
in the DRC’s conflicts, 73 (55%) were of the view that corporate actors’ roles in conflicts 
were “very significant”.  Some respondents (57, comprising 43%) indicated that MNCs’ roles 
were “significant”.  Two respondents (1.5%) stated that corporate actions in the context of the 
DRC’s conflicts were “of some significance” while one respondent (0.5%) felt that MNCs’ 
roles were “of little significance”.  Respondents were required to provide qualitative 
responses to buttress their assessment of the significance of corporate complicity in the 
DRC’s conflicts. 
 
Most respondents asserted that the involvement of mineral-prospecting and resource-trading 
companies complicated and perpetuated conflicts in the DRC.  Some argued that belligerents 
could or would have been starved of economic resources needed to prosecute their war efforts 
if corporate actors were not involved in the DRC’s conflict zones.  In the view of these 
respondents, the roles of companies in natural resource exploitation and trade contributed 
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significantly to conflict elongation.240  A respondent argued that despite the insecurity in 
conflict zones, MNCs favoured protracted conflicts as it obviated compliance with best 
practices that more often than not are deemed costly.241 
 
In addition to complicating and prolonging conflicts, MNCs’ involvement in the DRC 
produced other deleterious complications.  According to one respondent, the interactions 
between rebels and companies (which were viewed as “international actors”) somewhat 
legitimised the rebel groups and undermined the national government,242 thereby 
exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy in the DRC.  A corollary of this consequence was that 
corporate actors’ recognition of, and negotiation with, rebel leaders fostered warlordism, a 
situation that made participation in the peace process unattractive to rebels.  A respondent 
argued that corporate complicity “created a mafia network that gave to some Congolese 
personalities and foreigners control of the state.”243  Evidently, the effects of corporate 
complicity were far-reaching, extending beyond the companies, their collaborators and local 
communities to exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy in the country.  In rounding off this 
section, it is worth noting that these consequences of protracted conflicts highlight the 
significance of corporate complicity in the DRC.  The next sub-section presents the 
contrasting dynamic of corporate behaviour in conflict zones. 
 
 
                                                            
240 I had an interesting exchange on this point with a former member of the national parliament.  He felt strongly 
that corporate complicity explained the whole gamut of economic dimensions of the wars in the DRC.  “What 
does a rebel know about coltan”? he asked rhetorically.  “The companies opened their [the rebels’] eyes and all 
of a sudden, people were no longer interested in peace because of coltan” (Interview with a former member of 
the national parliament [Kinshasa], 07 November 2010). 
241 Respondent Q10. 
242 Respondent Q39. 
243 Respondent Q33. 
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7.3.2 Typology of corporate behaviour – Catalysts for peace? MNCs’ peacebuilding 
roles 
This sub-section addresses the other typology of corporate behaviour, that is, MNCs’ actions 
in support of conflict transformation.  It seeks to answer these research questions: What roles, 
if any, did MNCs play in the DRC’s conflict transformation process?  What were the 
motivations for the performance of such roles (if any)?  Respondents had to answer three 
preliminary questions before identifying the specific roles of MNCs in the conflict 
transformation process in the DRC.  First, respondents were asked to indicate whether they 
were aware of the involvement of MNCs in the DRC’s peace process.   Figure 7.12 below 
presents respondents’ answers to this question. 
 
Figure 7.12: Respondents’ awareness of MNCs’ involvement in the peacebuilding 
process 
 
Of 150 respondents, 149 responded to the question on awareness of corporate actors’ 
involvement in the DRC’s peacebuilding process.  Figure 7.12 above shows that 83 
respondents (representing 56%) were not aware of the involvement of MNCs in the DRC’s 
peace process.  66 respondents (44%) indicated that they were aware of corporate actors’ 
involvement in the peace process.  A cross tabulation of respondents’ stakeholder affiliation 
269 
and awareness of MNCs’ involvement in the peacebuilding process in this typology contrasts 
with that of the typology presented above. 
 
Table 7.2: Cross tabulation of respondents’ stakeholder affiliation and awareness of 
MNCs’ involvement in the DRC’s peace process 
 Are you aware of the involvement 
of multinational corporations in the 





Government 8 17 25 
Multinational corporation 32 18 50 
Civil society 8 14 22 
Academia 11 20 31 
Mass media 3 7 10 
Local community organisation/group 4 7 11 
Total 66 83 149 
 
As depicted in Table 7.2 above, the highest number of respondents who indicated that they 
were aware of the involvement of corporate actors in the peacebuilding process were 
affiliated to MNCs.  (In the first typology, which highlighted corporate complicity, nearly 
half of respondents affiliated with MNCs indicated that they were not aware of the 
involvement of corporate actors in conflicts.)  While 32 (64%) out of 50 respondents in the 
MNC cluster were aware of MNCs’ involvement in the DRC’s peace process, the majority of 
respondents in the academia and government clusters were not aware of corporate actors’ 
involvement in the peacebuilding process. 
 
A number of deductions and plausible explanations can be made from the result of this cross 
tabulation.  It is possible that some respondents affiliated with MNCs sought to present a 
positive image of corporate actors by inadvertently linking traditional CSR activities with 
corporate peacebuilding.  It is also instructive to note that as many as 18 (36%) out of 50 
respondents in the MNC cluster were not aware of the involvement of corporate actors in the 
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DRC’s peacebuilding process.  However, it may be conjectured that these 18 respondents 
were affiliated to MNCs that did not perform any peace-enhancing functions in the public 
sphere.  Remarkably, the majority of respondents in all other stakeholder groups were 
unaware of the involvement of MNCs in the peacebuilding process.244  What are the plausible 
explanations for this? 
 
It is likely that other stakeholders were of the view that MNCs did not perform any 
peacebuilding roles.   If indeed MNCs contributed to the conflict transformation process, then 
it is likely that the performance of such roles was devoid of the input of or collaboration with 
other stakeholders.  It may also be worth asking if corporate actors publicised their peace-
supporting initiatives.  The plausible deductions and explanations notwithstanding, it is 
pertinent to state here that this aspect of the study was highly controversial during fieldwork.  
In some instances, respondents were sharply divided into pro-MNC and anti-MNC camps and 
therefore expressed diametrically opposing views.   The key lesson that this provides is for 
the formulation of cross-stakeholder understanding of what constitutes corporate 
peacebuilding and what does not.  This will obviate claims and counter-claims about the 
nature and definition of corporate actors’ involvement in peacebuilding in particular and in 
the public sphere in general. 
 
Moving away from this controversy, respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their 
awareness of the involvement of MNCs in the peacebuilding process.  The graph below 
depicts respondents’ responses to this question. 
 
                                                            
244 Indeed, it is surprising that corporate activities in the sphere of peacebuilding would either escape 
respondents from broad sections of the Congolese society (including media groups, academics and civil society) 
or that these respondents failed to acknowledge such corporate actions.  This point may be located in the 
controversy associated with CSR in the DRC as discussed in the preceding chapter. 
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Figure 7.13: Respondents’ extent of awareness of the involvement of MNCs in the 
DRC’s peacebuilding process 
 
Of the 66 respondents who were aware of the involvement of corporate actors in the DRC’s 
peacebuilding process, 65 indicated the extent of their awareness of MNCs’ operations.  
Figure 7.13 above shows that 15 (23%) respondents were “very aware” while 48 respondents 
(74%) were “moderately aware” of such corporate involvement.  The “barely aware” 
category had two respondents (3%).  The combined numbers of respondents in the “very 
aware” and “moderately aware” categories” indicate that 63 respondents (97%) were in a 
position to provide information on corporate peacebuilding in the DRC.   
 
Against this backdrop, respondents could identify MNCs that implemented peacebuilding 








Figure 7.14: Respondents’ identification of MNCs involved in peacebuilding in the DRC 
 
The question that required respondents to identify MNCs involved in the conflict 
transformation process in the DRC allowed for multiple responses.  Figure 7.14 above shows 
the corporate actors that respondents identified and the frequencies for each actor.  Anglo-
American PLC had a frequency of 37.  Respondents mentioned Anvil Mining five times.  
Banro Corporation had the highest frequency of 44.245 
 
What specific roles in the conflict transformation process did respondents ascribe to these 








                                                            
245 While other companies might have executed peacebuilding projects, respondents mentioned only three 
MNCs, which are identified in the graph.  
273 
Figure 7.15: Respondents’ articulation of MNCs’ peacebuilding roles in the DRC 
 
Figure 7.15 above shows – from respondents’ perspectives – the peacebuilding roles that 
corporate actors performed in the DRC.  The numerical values in the chart represent the 
frequencies or the number of occurrences for each role.  Respondents cited the reconstruction 
of infrastructure more than any other role.  It had 57 occurrences.  The performance of this 
role by corporate actors has been necessitated by the destruction of the DRC’s deficient 
infrastructure.  As was illustrated in the case of Banro Corporation’s CSR initiatives,246 the 
construction of roads, bridges and health facilities has been a priority area for non-state actors 
that possess the wherewithal to undertake infrastructure rehabilitation in the DRC. 
 
The provision of social services had the second highest frequency of 42.  The government of 
the DRC has been severely handicapped in terms of the provision of essential social services, 
especially education and health care.  As noted in the discussion of CSR activities by Anglo-
American and Banro Corporation, MNCs are stepping into the vacuum created by 
government incapacity to provide these services in the regions where these companies 
conduct operations. 
                                                            
246 See Chapter Six. 
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Respondents cited humanitarian assistance 35 times, giving it the third highest frequency.  As 
noted in Chapters Five and Six, conflicts in the DRC have displaced thousands of Congolese.  
This intervention by corporate actors was a direct response to this reality of human 
displacement.  Humanitarian assistance consisted of the provision of food, clothing and other 
essential supplies to IDPs.  It was noted in Chapter Six that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance by MNCs opens up a vista of corporate behaviour in conflict zones, which extends 
the frontiers of CSR. 
 
Peace advocacy/education and the promotion of civic institution building were mentioned 15 
times.  Specifically, Banro Corporation has performed these roles through the curriculum 
support programme in schools and universities and through vocational training workshops for 
women and ex-combatants.  It is worth noting that peace advocacy and the promotion of civic 
institution building have not been implemented beyond the parameters of the training 
programmes for designated groups as stated here.  Peace advocacy in particular is crucial 
within local communities that have been theatres of some of the deadliest clashes between 
grassroots militias. 
 
Respondents cited the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants 12 times.  This is a 
vital element in conflict transformation, as it plays a part in changing the disposition of 
people and diminishing the potential for recourse to violence.  Banro Corporation’s initiatives 
in the public sphere have included, albeit on a very small scale, the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of former child soldiers.  In eastern DRC in particular, the lack of tangible 
progress on the part of MONUC/MONUSCO in the area of disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration has been a serious peacebuilding deficit.  In this regard, an interviewee noted 
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that Banro Corporation was doing on a small scale what the UN has largely failed to do in 
eastern DRC.247 
 
Some respondents identified three forms of corporate support for peacemaking efforts 
undertaken by other actors.  First, financial support for local peace forums (nine occurrences).  
Second, support for local and national reconciliation efforts (with a frequency of seven).  
Third, logistical support for MONUC/MONUSCO (cited five times).  Some of the study 
participants noted that comptoirs and entrepreneurs that are associated with MNCs have 
provided financial support towards dialogues at the community level and have collaborated 
with NGOs in facilitating the participation of individuals in seminars and workshops on 
issues pertaining to peacebuilding.248  A respondent noted that corporate actors funded some 
associations and NGOs so that these entities could conduct their campaigns and implement 
projects relating to peace.249 
 
One interviewee asserted that corporate actors indirectly facilitated MONUC/MONUSCO’s 
operations through the rehabilitation of public infrastructure, which the UN force – like other 
actors – relies on and uses.  Although this interviewee conceded that corporate actors “have 
not been saintly”, he argued that some activities suggest that companies have been “catalysts 
for peace” in the DRC.250 
                                                            
247 Telephonic interview with a mining consultant (BS) [Bukavu], 02 November 2010. 
248 Interviews with a youth leader (FN) [Lubumbashi], 24 October 2010; with a supervisor in a mineral trading 
house (EK) [Lubumbashi], 28 October 2010; with a member of the Congo Leadership Initiative (a youth 
empowerment NGO) [Kinshasa], 06 November 2010. 
249 Respondent Q18. 
250 This interviewee, who spoke glowingly of MNCs and their CSR record in the face of pervasive malfeasance 
on the part of the Congolese political elite, cautioned: “when you accuse companies of doing bad things, don’t 
forget to talk about the good things they do in [the] Congo”.  He anchored his argument that corporate actors 
facilitated MONUC/MONUSCO’s operations on an interesting premise, which I shall paraphrase: when 
companies construct or repair roads and bridges or build community centres, they [the companies] do not 
prevent MONUC/MONUSCO from using these facilities.  Undoubtedly, these facilities provide logistical 
support for MONUC/MONUSCO in the execution of its mandate (Interview with a former employee of Anvil 
Mining (EFB) [Lubumbashi], 26 October 2010). 
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Respondents’ articulation of corporate peacebuilding also required the identification of the 
motivations for the performance of peacebuilding roles by MNCs in the DRC.  In other 
words, why did corporate actors implement these elements of conflict transformation?  The 
chart below indicates the rationale for MNCs’ involvement in the peacebuilding process. 
 
Figure 7.16: Rationale for corporate actors’ peacebuilding roles 
 
Respondents identified six reasons for the implementation peacebuilding initiatives by 
corporate actors.  Figure 7.16 above shows the reasons and their frequencies.  “Pressure from 
local advocacy groups” had the highest frequency of 49.  Respondents were of the view that 
corporate actors undertook some peacebuilding initiatives in response to pressure from local 
NGOs.  A number of respondents shared the sentiment that the denunciation of companies by 
local advocacy groups (for the former’s complicity in the DRC’s conflicts) spawned attempts 
by corporate actors to undertake social investment, which delivered some public goods.251 
 
                                                            
251 Respondents Q8, Q9, Q13, Q15, Q18, Q33. 
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The need to create a stable operational environment had the second highest frequency.  
Respondents cited this reason 47 times.  It was imperative for corporate actors to operate in 
an environment that was conducive to business.  This necessitated the defusing of tensions, 
the alleviation of suffering and the provision of social services in local communities.  Some 
respondents felt that social investment enabled companies to continue their operations in 
resource-bearing communities in the aftermath of the opprobrium engendered by the damning 
UN Panel’s reports.252 
 
Another rationale for corporate involvement in peacebuilding efforts, from the perspective of 
respondents, was pressure from international NGOs, which had a frequency of 46.  As noted 
in Chapter Six, advocacy campaigns by organisations such as Enough Project, Global 
Witness and Oxfam contributed to a shift in corporate behaviour.  Using the findings of the 
UN Panel of Experts and their own research findings as bases for robust advocacy, these 
organisations tasked MNCs to comply with best practices in their operations in the DRC.  
Some of the study participants were of the view that MNCs’ positive engagement in the 
public sphere marked a response to international advocacy efforts.253  A respondent argued 
that MNCs “were obliged to revise their strategies [in] … operational zones” because of 
international advocacy against illicit corporate behaviour.254 
 
However, some respondents argued that corporate peacebuilding was essentially a reflection 
of companies’ commitment to CSR.255  In other words, the performance of peacebuilding 
roles was premised on corporate conviction, rather than an externally driven or imposed 
imperative.  An apparent justification for this viewpoint was that companies had made 
                                                            
252 Respondents Q11, Q14, Q57, Q93. 
253 Focus group discussion with Congolese expatriates in Pretoria, South Africa, 09 June 2012. 
254 Respondent Q16. 
255 Respondents Q144, Q145, Q148, Q150. 
278 
explicit commitments to CSR in their investment profiles and action plans with reference to 
the DRC.  Therefore, companies had simply given practical expression to their professed 
commitment to CSR by engaging in corporate peacebuilding, which the companies were not 
under obligation to undertake, according to one interviewee.256 
 
According to some respondents, corporate actors performed peacebuilding roles in order to 
pacify host (that is, resource-bearing) communities.  This rationale was cited 24 times.  
Conflicts in which corporate actors were implicated had produced deleterious consequences, 
unleashing physical, emotional and social scars in communities.  Therefore, it was necessary 
for corporate actors to ameliorate the suffering in (and in the process pacify) local 
communities.257  That some corporate initiatives sought to alleviate the effects of the war on 
the people underscore this argument.  However, as noted earlier, some of the study 
participants were of the view that no amount of social investment could compensate for the 
losses that the Congolese and the country had incurred because of the conflicts in which 
corporate actors have been culpable. 
 
Some respondents felt that the performance of any peacebuilding initiatives served to further 
the interest of corporate actors, which has been to continue to access the DRC’s resources.  
The argument is that CSR activities were a façade, an attempt to mask the illicit activities 
undertaken by MNCs.  For example, a respondent noted: “They’re just hiding their atrocity 
by giving the so called humanitarian assistance.”258  This argument construes the rationale for 
                                                            
256 This interviewee felt that other actors could not and should not compel companies to implement CSR 
activities because companies pay taxes, which the government ought to use to provide the services that other 
stakeholders expect companies to perform.  He extended his argument, querying: “Why must a company 
provide humanitarian assistance when you have the government, MONUC and many other international 
agencies in [the] Congo?  What are those people doing?” (Interview with a former manager at SOMINKI (SL) 
[Kinshasa], 06 November 2010). 
257 Respondents Q69, Q71, Q77, Q83, Q90. 
258 Respondent Q25. 
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corporate peacebuilding (and other interventions in the public sphere) as dictated primarily by 
corporate interest, defined in terms of the quest for profit more than any other actor’s interest 
or external imperatives. 
 
If corporate complicity had a significant impact on the DRC’s conflicts as discussed in the 
preceding sub-section, it would be reasonable to examine the effect of corporate 
peacebuilding in the context of the drive towards peace in the DRC.  Therefore, this sub-
section presents respondents’ articulation of the impact or significance of corporate actors’ 
peacebuilding roles.  The figure below illustrates this point. 
 
Figure 7.17: Respondents’ assessment of the impact of corporate peacebuilding in the 
DRC 
 
The combined numbers in Figure 7.17 above indicate that 76 respondents offered an 
assessment of the significance of corporate peacebuilding in the DRC.  Of the 76 
respondents, 23 (30%) were of the view that the involvement of MNCs in the conflict 
transformation process was “significant”.  The second highest number of respondents (21, 
representing 28%) felt that corporate actors’ involvement was “of some significance”.  In the 
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third highest category (14 respondents, comprising 18%) were those who felt that corporate 
peacebuilding was “of little significance”.  Ten respondents (13%) indicated that companies’ 
involvement in the DRC’s peacebuilding process was “very significant”.  Finally, eight 
respondents (11%) were of the view that corporate actors’ peacebuilding roles in the DRC 
were “of no significance”.  A cross tabulation of these assessments and respondents’ 
stakeholder affiliation is instructive. 
 
Table 7.3: Cross tabulation of respondents’ stakeholder affiliation and assessment of 
corporate peacebuilding in the DRC 
 How would you assess the impact of corporate actors’ involvement 












Government 0 2 3 1 0 6 
Multinational 
corporation 
7 14 7 4 0 32 
Civil society 1 2 2 4 4 13 
Academia 2 5 4 4 4 19 
Mass media 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Local community 
organisation/group 
0 0 2 1 0 3 
Total 10 23 21 14 8 76 
 
Table 7.3 above shows that respondents affiliated with MNCs (in comparison to other 
stakeholders) rated the impact of corporate actors’ involvement in the DRC’s peacebuilding 
process highly.  Of 10 respondents who rated the impact of corporate peacebuilding as “very 
significant”, seven were affiliated with MNCs.  Similarly, of 23 respondents who rated the 
impact of corporate actors’ involvement in the peacebuilding process as “significant”, 14 
were affiliated to MNCs.  This suggests that individuals associated with MNCs viewed the 
roles of corporate actors as important contributions to conflict reduction and to stimulating 
positive transformative change in the DRC.  Other stakeholders, however, did not feel this 
way.  Some respondents across the stakeholder spectrum provided qualitative responses to 
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justify their assessment of the impact/significance of corporate peacebuilding as shown in 
Figure 7.17 above. 
 
Respondents who argued that MNCs’ roles were significant in the peacebuilding process 
pointed to the potential consequences associated with the absence of the services that 
corporate actors provided.  For instance, the provision of humanitarian assistance helped to 
alleviate the suffering that the war-weary population was experiencing in the conflict zones.  
Without such assistance, the humanitarian consequences of conflicts could have been more 
severe, especially where state capacity was weak and international action was lacking.  By 
providing humanitarian assistance, MNCs alleviated human suffering and complemented 
peacebuilding efforts by other actors.259 
 
Furthermore, the involvement of corporate actors in rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-
combatants contributed to setting ex-combatants and conflict-ridden areas on a post-conflict 
trajectory.  Generally, ex-combatants constitute a group that, if not managed properly, could 
easily orchestrate the recurrence of conflict.  Therefore, corporate initiatives that sought to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-combatants through education and vocational training were 
instrumental to nurturing peace in conflict-prone areas.  A respondent argued that the positive 
outcomes associated with such initiatives make corporate actors’ intervention in the conflict 
zones significant and important.260 
 
Respondents who argued that MNCs’ actions were not significant viewed corporate 
initiatives as embodying tokenism.  A respondent argued that “even if they [MNCs] do 
                                                            
259 Respondent Q146. 
260 Respondent Q141. 
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something it is not proportional enough [sic] with what they take out of the country.”261  
Again, the argument here was based on a juxtaposition of what MNCs gained with what the 
companies gave back to the country and its people.  Furthermore, another respondent 
contended that the activities of other MNCs such as “supporting rebel groups [weakened] the 
peace process” and obliterated any significance of corporate peacebuilding by a set of 
companies.  In other words, contemporaneous ambivalent corporate behaviour rarely 
produces positive or transformative change but straddles the negative and the status quo ante.  
As one respondent argued, MNCs “facilitate peace and war at the same time”.262  In the end, 
they hardly “facilitate anything in the peace process since they play a double game – 
supporting peace process and supplying weapons to rebel groups.”263 
 
The foregoing presupposes that the effects of corporate complicity may be so pervasive that 
beneficiaries and observers perceive corporate peacebuilding as no more than an attempt at 
doing damage control.  Having said that, an objective analysis of corporate behaviour in the 
DRC suggests that MNCs have been culpable in the country’s conflicts just as they (the 
companies) have performed peacebuilding functions, albeit to varying degrees with reference 
to the two typologies.  In the final analysis, MNCs’ actions in the DRC reflect the 
contradictions associated with corporate behaviour in terms of its ambivalence.  What, then, 
do the study’s findings suggest?  The next section addresses this question. 
 
7.4 Inferences from research findings and discussion of emerging issues 
The review and comparisons of literature, theoretical considerations, paradigmatic 
perspectives and survey findings presented in this study foreground a number of issues.  
These include the nexus between natural resources and conflicts, the roles of business in 
                                                            
261 Respondent Q52. 
262 Respondent Q26. 
263 Respondent Q26. 
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conflict zones, the peace process mechanism in resource-related conflicts, the character of the 
Congolese state, the lack of a corporate governance regime, the sub-regional political 
economy of natural resource exploitation and trafficking, and the role of international actors 
in natural resource governance.   
 
7.4.1 The nexus between natural resources and conflicts 
What emerges from the study is that natural resources, per se, do not precipitate conflicts.  In 
other words, the mere presence of natural resources (or natural resource abundance) is not a 
sufficient (pre-)condition for conflict.  Rather, a number of contextual variables interlink with 
natural resources to influence the trajectories of conflicts.  As the study notes, factors such as 
the characteristics of natural resources (their social construction, geographic distribution, and 
revenue management system), the role of local, regional and global (profiteering) actors, and 
state deflation (including its associated variables for example weak state institutions, 
patronage and corruption) determine the impact(s) that natural resources have on a country 
(for example, Ross, 1999; 2003).   
 
That said, natural resources are implicated in conflicts in a fundamental way namely, their 
conflict-financing capacity (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005b; 
Humphreys, 2005b; Stewart, 2011; Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012).  Simply put, natural 
resources provide warring parties with the economic wherewithal to finance conflicts.  This 
context makes the roles of resource-seeking (profiteering) actors – such as MNCs – 
particularly salient.  Additionally, economic resources derivable from natural resources in a 
conflict setting may induce belligerents to act (and consolidate their positions) as spoilers to 
peace processes.  This point featured prominently in conversations with participants during 
fieldwork.  According to most interviewees, there is no real incentive for some rebel leaders 
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who control mineral sites in eastern DRC to lay down their weapons or join the Kabila 
government that is barely able to pay salaries.  One interviewee noted that the government 
paid about US$50 per month to junior officers while their counterparts “in the bush” (that is, 
rebels) earned about US$150.264  It is instructive to note that rebel groups could implement 
such “generous” payment structure as they generated revenue from mining activities, 
lucrative deals with mining companies (and comptoirs – that is, trading houses) and “taxes” 
levied on resource extractors and traders in the areas controlled by the rebel groups.  From 
this perspective, the natural resource element is a significant factor in the escalation, 
prolongation and duration of conflicts. 
 
As this study argues, a critical point to note, however, is that the level and intensity of natural 
resource-related conflict is dependent, not on the possession of natural resources, but on a 
number of economic and political variables, including the efficiency of the state apparatus for 
natural resource governance.  Empirical analyses show that the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict is not linear and simple, but indirect and complex.  Therefore, this 
reality underscores a rethink of the resource-conflict argument in particular, and the ‘resource 
curse’ thesis in general. 
 
7.4.2 The roles of business in conflict zones 
As this this study shows, a number of factors attract companies (especially multinationals) to 
conflict zones.  Of these factors, profit maximisation – a bottomline consideration for all 
companies – is the foremost driver of investment in conflict areas.  As discussed in the study, 
a company may be entangled in conflict settings in two ways.  One, it may have commenced 
operations in an area prior to the onset of conflict, in which case conflict is subsequent to the 
                                                            
264 Interview with a military officer, JDM [Kinshasa], 19 October 2010. 
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investment.  In this instance, the company is invariably drawn into a conflict setting.  Second, 
a company may decide to invest in an active conflict zone, in which case the company 
deliberately immerses itself in a conflict setting.  Both cases present companies with choices, 
challenges and opportunities.  Depending on the nature of the industry and the investment 
profile, companies may choose to exit or remain in conflict zones.  Where the decision is to 
remain, companies face the challenge of responding to the ebbs and flows of conflict in ways 
that guarantee bottomline considerations and/or minimise reputational risks. 
 
From the study, it is evident that corporate behaviour in conflict zones takes two forms 
namely, corporate complicity and corporate peacebuilding.  A conflict situation, especially 
where the state apparatus is weak or non-existent may create opportunities for enrichment – a 
chance that companies may seize in order to maximise profit.  As shown in the case of the 
DRC, this may involve collaboration between companies and government forces, between 
companies and rebel forces, or between companies and foreign interlopers.  Moreover, such 
collaboration may sustain illicit resource exploitation and trafficking by armed groups and 
companies.  While companies provide belligerents with economic resources and logistical 
support, armed groups facilitate resource extraction and trade by companies.  This setting, 
which was applicable in the DRC, highlights corporate complicity in conflicts. 
 
By contrast, a conflict situation also gives companies an opportunity to implement conflict-
sensitive business strategies.  These strategies pertain to the deliberate actions that companies 
take to prevent or alleviate situations that typically precipitate or exacerbate conflicts.  More 
importantly, conflict-sensitivity should encapsulate corporate actions that nurture or sustain 
peace.  Companies (especially multinationals, which are powerful economic actors) may 
contribute towards conflict reduction in particular or peacebuilding in general through 
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deliberate programmes of action such as supporting dialogue, disarmament, or infrastructure 
rehabilitation.  Furthermore, economic resources at the disposal of MNCs also enable them to 
provide humanitarian assistance or support humanitarian efforts in conflict zones.  As the 
study depicts, these actions are consistent with the “business case” of social responsibility.  
Corporate peacebuilding – an embryonic concept – encompasses the range of strategies 
through which business contributes to conflict reduction and peace enhancement.   
 
In unpacking the conflict-perpetuating and peacebuilding roles of MNCs in the DRC, the 
study emphasises the contradictions of corporate behaviour in conflict zones.  Research 
findings suggest that several considerations (vis-à-vis the quest for profit maximisation) 
underpin the specifics of corporate behaviour in conflict settings.  Overall, the dialectics of 
corporate behaviour in conflict areas underscore a nuanced analysis and understanding of the 
corporate-conflict link. 
 
7.4.3 The peace process mechanism in resource-related conflicts 
A point that flows logically from the discussion above is the significance of the roles of 
resource-seeking (profiteering) actors in peace processes.  Conventional peace processes in 
Africa and elsewhere often focus exclusively on warring parties.  Specifically, mediation 
efforts or conferences aimed at peaceful settlement of conflicts generally involve armed 
groups, political actors and civil society.  This practice draws from mainstream conflict 
analyses that focus essentially on political and military actors – agents that are perceived to 
have a direct bearing on conflict situations.  However, non-state actors are known to have 
indirect but decisive influence on conflicts, which if ignored, may undermine peacebuilding 
efforts.  With regard to resource-related conflicts, for example, the role of economic actors is 
a decisive element in conflict reduction and the peacebuilding process.   
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Given the roles of MNCs in the DRC, it is logical to expect the integration of companies into 
formal efforts to address the country’s resource-related traumas.  Drawing from the DRC 
case, this study furnishes important lessons namely, that important and powerful non-state 
actors influence conflicts in fundamental ways, and that efforts to address such conflicts 
require more encompassing frameworks that encapsulate (the motivations, strategic interests 
and roles of) such actors.  Concisely, peace process mechanisms that seek to address 
resource-related conflicts require inclusive stakeholder participation (including businesses). 
 
7.4.4 The character of the Congolese state 
The Congolese state (like many of its African counterparts) is a product of exogeneity – 
Belgian colonialism.  This has repercussions for the contemporary state in Africa, which as 
Englebert (1997: 767-775) observes, is neither African nor a state.  The state in Africa is not 
African because  
[i]t descends from arbitrary colonial administrative units designed 
as instruments of domination, oppression and exploitation. No 
doubt after some [50] years of independence these states have been 
transformed, adopted, adapted, endogenised. Yet, their origin 
remains exogenous: European, not African, and set up against 
African societies rather than having evolved out of the 
relationships of groups and individuals in societies (Englebert, 
1997: 767).265 
 
The average state in Africa is not a state because it does not meet the criteria or elements of 
the Weberian definition of a state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Englebert, 1997: 
767) [Emphasis in original].  In this regard, Englebert (1997: 767) contends that  
                                                            
265 The argument that African states did not evolve from within could also be applied to most Western states (as 
they were once known). 
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in many respects, most African states fail to meet these criteria: 
theirs is a dubious community of heterogeneous and occasionally 
clashing linguistic, religious and ethnic identities; their claim to 
force is rarely effective and much less monopolistic; their frequent 
predatory nature fails the test of legitimacy; and their territoriality 
is generally at best hesitant and contested.266 
 
Englebert’s argument speaks to the very idea of the nature of the state in Africa, which is at 
the core of most of the challenges confronting the continent.  As Englebert (1997: 768) 
argues, “the numerous instances of state failure in Africa” and “other pathologies derive from 
the very exogeneity of the state, its lack of embeddedness, its divorce from underlying norms 
and networks of social organisation.”  The state in Africa was a product of the colonial 
enterprise, put together by fiat to satisfy external interests.  
 
Instructively, the states that the immediate post-independence leaders inherited from the 
colonial leaders retained the main characteristics of the colonial architecture.  As Olayode 
(2005: 4) posits,  
[t]he attainment of independence, however did not fundamentally 
transform the structure of the African states.  The political class 
that supplanted the colonial officers were committed to the 
protection of the ‘colonial legacy’.  The emerging nationalists 
whose political tutelage was under colonialism continued to 
operate with a ‘bureaucracy trained and tested in the authoritarian 
habits and practises of the departed colonialists’.  The African state 
thus retained its forceful and authoritarian character. 
 
These observations resonate strongly in the case of the DRC.  Put together initially as the 
personal fiefdom of King Leopold II, the Congolese state has retained the essential character 
of an extroverted entity, in addition to serving the interest of the local elite.  More than that, it 
                                                            
266 It should be noted that many of these features obtained in many African states (as with European and other 
states) but not necessarily at the point of achieving independence.  If post-independence leaders failed to meet 
the often inflated aspirations of many of their citizens, and found their leadership challenged because of 
subnationalist forces funded by external interests, the existence and legality of the states are questioned as 
though the Westphalian notions of statehood still applies to them or ever actually applied to historical Western 
states. (I am indebted to my supervisor, Professor Ufo Uzodike, for this point.) 
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has become almost synonymous with dysfunctionality.  Throughout the DRC’s history, the 
nature of the state (as described here) has facilitated the appropriation of the country’s 
wealth, including its natural resources, by a combination of exogenous forces and 
endogenous comprador elite.  For instance, Mobutu Sese Seko’s years in power were marked 
by mismanagement and looting of the country’s wealth, which left the people further 
impoverished.  Rather than benefit the people, the country’s mineral wealth served Mobutu’s 
and foreign interests, including those of MNCs.  A dysfunctional state and the net effect of 
“Mobutuism” have combined to deprive the Congolese of the benefits of natural resources.  
Clearly then, as presently constituted, the Congolese state is severely handicapped with 
respect to mobilising its natural resource abundance for development. 
 
7.4.5 The lack of a corporate governance regime 
State inertia and protracted post-colonial traumas have impeded the development a corporate 
governance regime in the DRC.  A corporate governance regime serves two key purposes: to 
regulate corporate behaviour and to map the relationship between companies and other 
stakeholders.  As discussed (in Chapter Four), countries may adopt the communitarian or 
contractarian regimes to fulfil these ends.  The implication of the absence of a codified 
regime in the DRC is that the regulation of corporate behaviour is determined by the whims 
of the country’s president or warlords, depending on the forces that control a particular 
mining area.  This state of affairs has abetted unregulated artisanal mining, the illegal 
exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, and illicit corporate behaviour.  Moreover, it 
has hampered initiatives by civil society at holding companies accountable and responsible.  
Effective management of natural resources requires an efficacious governance architecture 
that regulates actors and their operations.  A mining code, which the DRC government has 
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been trying to develop, is an essential component in the development of a corporate 
governance framework. 
 
7.4.6 The sub-regional political economy of natural resource exploitation and 
trafficking 
A number of studies267 have depicted the role of sub-regional state and non-state actors in the 
illicit exploitation and trafficking of Congolese natural resources.  National armies, the 
political elite and corporate entities from sub-regional states, especially Rwanda and Uganda, 
have been implicated in illegal activities in the DRC.  Extra-African actors (mainly 
companies headquartered in the West) have also used the territories of the two countries as a 
conduit for illicit resource trade.  Thus, resource-extracting and resource-trading MNCs have 
found sub-regional actors to be important ‘allies’ in the quest to access the DRC’s natural 
wealth.  The economic benefits (or ‘spoils of war’) that powerful sub-regional actors obtained 
from war-ravaged DRC made the continuation of war an attractive proposition.  Additionally, 
the opportunities for enrichment, which the war economy affords, make sub-regional actors 
potential spoilers to peace processes.  Clearly, beyond the national security concerns of sub-
regional states, there are vested economic interests that an unstable DRC serves. 
 
7.4.7 The role of international actors in natural resource governance 
As the study demonstrates, the international context is crucial to unpacking aspects of 
corporate behaviour in the DRC.  Important considerations at this level of analysis include 
the international market for minerals (especially the global supply chain), the roles of MNCs’ 
home governments, the UN and international NGOs.  As the study’s discussion of coltan 
connections to the DRC’s conflicts shows, the local-global supply chain conceals and 
                                                            
267 For instance, see Owoeye and Amusan (2000); United Nations Security Council (2001a); Longman (2002); 
Moyroud and Katunga (2002); Rupiya (2002); Noury (2010); Lalji (2007); Guenther (2008); Cassimon, Engelen 
and Reyntjens (2013); and Usanov et al. (2013). 
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sustains illicit resource exploitation and trade.  Thus, an effective international mechanism to 
address supply chain issues is required. 
 
Beyond positive rhetoric, home governments have been unwilling or unable to take firm 
action against MNCs implicated in illegal behaviour in the DRC.  Although initiatives such 
as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (in the United States) seek to stimulate responsible 
corporate behaviour, there has been a lack of political commitment in Western capitals to 
enforce compliance and to hold companies accountable for actions in conflict zones in the 
DRC.  However, the work of the UN Panel of Experts and the advocacy efforts of 
international NGOs stemmed the tide of illegal behaviour on the part of MNCs while 
compelling other profiteering networks to seek ‘ingenious’ ways of concealing their illicit 
activities in the DRC.  As the study shows, international pressure on MNCs to observe 
conflict-sensitive business practices has given fillip to the idea of corporate peacebuilding, an 
imperative that broadens and extends the frontiers of CSR. 
 
Arising from the imperative referred to above, this study addresses its final key question: 
based on research findings, what conclusions do MNCs’ roles in the DRC engender regarding 
the perils and promise of corporate peacebuilding? 
 
7.5 Looking forward: does corporate peacebuilding mainstreaming hold any 
promise? 
Research findings with reference to corporate behaviour in the DRC suggest that corporate 
actors have played significant roles in the country.  This study shows that MNCs’ roles in the 
country demonstrated the ambivalence of corporate behaviour in conflict zones.  Having 
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discussed the specific roles of MNCs in the DRC and the rationale for such roles from the 
perspective of respondents, a number of policy and practical issues arising from research 
findings are worth noting.  These issues are of significance for corporate behaviour in 
particular and corporate governance in general in a post-conflict DRC.  This section presents 
a prognosis – a brief analytical projection informed by the trends in corporate behaviour in 
the DRC. 
 
As this study has shown, corporate complicity in the DRC’s conflicts had ramifications for 
MNCs and other actors, including the Congolese state.  Specifically, corporate complicity 
attracted international opprobrium and damaged the reputation of MNCs implicated in the 
DRC’s conflicts.  The extent of the reputational harm done to companies could be seen in the 
cynical stance of the majority of the study participants regarding corporate peacebuilding.  
Nevertheless, MNCs have played significant roles in the public sphere, especially in the 
implementation of traditional CSR activities such as the provision of social services and 
infrastructure rehabilitation.  That said, corporate conflict transformation initiatives have been 
implemented (expediently and haphazardly) as part of pragmatic responses to situations in 
conflict zones.  However, as the discussion in Chapter Four showed, conflict transformation 
is a systematic, planned, methodical and inter-stakeholder conflict intervention strategy.  This 
point highlights a key issue arising from the trend of corporate peacebuilding in the DRC. 
 
Congolese need to see corporate actions in support of conflict transformation for what it 
really is – corporate peacebuilding.  For this to happen, MNCs will have to formulate and 
implement their actions in ways that do not conflate the actions with traditional CSR 
activities (which – ordinarily – are executed in the absence of conflict).  As noted already, 
corporate peacebuilding shifts and deepens CSR.  Crucially, corporate conflict peacebuilding 
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requires inter-stakeholder participation and engagement from project conception through 
implementation to evaluation.  It is evident from research findings that this has been lacking 
in the DRC.  MNCs’ peacebuilding roles risk being undermined, and unrecognised, without 
the requisite buy-in from other stakeholders. 
 
Furthermore, for corporate peacebuilding to be effective, companies need to address the 
reputational harm arising from complicity in conflicts.  Some respondents were of the view 
that it is difficult to trust corporate actors or to accept help from them when these actors have 
not accepted responsibility for their actions in the communities.268  Therefore, a pivotal 
consideration in this regard is the (re)building of trust in and with communities and other 
stakeholders.  It is unlikely that communities will acknowledge or appreciate corporate 
peacebuilding where there are unresolved issues associated with the complicity of companies 
in the DRC’s conflicts. 
 
Another risk to corporate peacebuilding is the palpable contradiction between a company’s 
everyday actions and interventions in the public sphere.  For instance, a company that has the 
reputation for using military force (for example, the army or rebels) to suppress dissent in its 
operational areas may find that its implementation of peacebuilding initiatives may be 
construed by other stakeholders as duplicitous.  The case of Anvil Mining, which came to the 
fore during fieldwork, illustrates this point and underscores the need to anchor corporate 
peacebuilding on best practices.269  A mismatch between routine corporate actions and 
                                                            
268 Respondents Q49, Q73. 
269 A number of the study participants referred to Anvil Mining’s record of enlisting the support of security 
forces to quell peaceful demonstrations against what participants referred to as the negative effects of the 
company’s operations.  Participants were quick to use Anvil Mining’s reputation in this regard to dismiss any 
CSR initiatives by the company (Interviews with a youth leader (FN) [Lubumbashi], 24 October 2010; with the 
executive director of a civil society organisation (BK) [Lubumbashi], 25 October 2010; Respondents Q32, Q61). 
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interventions in the public sphere (no matter how well intentioned or their magnitude) is a 
risk factor that undermines corporate peacebuilding. 
 
It is apt to state that addressing these risk factors (which imperil corporate peacebuilding) is 
not the sole responsibility of companies.  As this study shows, other stakeholders as well as 
variables at the local, national and international levels shape corporate behaviour.  Therefore, 
it is necessary for all stakeholders to create an ambience that is conducive to nurturing 
corporate peacebuilding.  Fundamental to this is the lessening of conflicts, especially in 
eastern DRC.  The role of the government and MONUSCO in this regard cannot be 
overemphasized, as they bear primary responsibility for guaranteeing security and stability, 
which are sine qua non for post-conflict peacebuilding.  To strive towards effective corporate 
peacebuilding in the absence of these prerequisites is illusory.  The potential salient 
contributions that other stakeholders could make towards effective corporate peacebuilding 
suggest that MNCs have to recognise the utility of stakeholder involvement and partnerships 
to the DRC’s reconstruction.  This underscores the need for complementarity of initiatives by 
corporate actors and other stakeholders. 
 
In terms of prognostication, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic about the possibility of 
effective corporate peacebuilding in the DRC.  Corporate actors have already conducted a 
number of interventions typically associated with conflict transformation.  The formal end to 
conflicts, progress in the implementation of MONUSCO’s mandate in eastern DRC and 
sustained domestic and international scrutiny of MNCs’ operations are important variables 
that should bolster corporate peacebuilding.  It is on this cautiously optimistic note that this 





This chapter presented and analysed research findings on MNCs and conflict transformation 
in the DRC.  It explicated the data collected during fieldwork, providing insights into the 
broader contextual analysis in Chapter Six.  The presentation and analysis in this chapter 
framed corporate actions from the perspectives of the study participants, against the backdrop 
of the main trends in corporate behaviour in conflict zones. 
 
The second section of this chapter presented an overview of the methodology and data 
obtained from the study areas.  It dealt specifically with the statistical presentation of data 
obtained through 150 questionnaires completed by individuals in the DRC.  The section 
presented a number of variables pertaining to the 150 respondents to the questionnaire.  
These variables included the respondents’ stakeholder affiliation, location/region in the DRC 
and awareness of MNCs’ activities in the DRC.  It was noted in the section that these 
variables were crucial to discerning the knowledge base of respondents vis-à-vis the subject 
matter of this study.  In addition, these variables were useful indices in the cross tabulations 
that offered some insights into the data obtained from the study’s location. 
 
The third section, which had two sub-sections, presented and analysed research findings on 
MNCs in the DRC in the context of the ambivalent character of corporate behaviour.  Logical 
deductions were made from the data to explicate the typologies of corporate behaviour 
namely, MNCs’ complicity in conflicts and their peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC.  The 
section also discussed the rationale for MNCs’ roles as articulated by respondents in a way 
that underscored the motivations for corporate behaviour under each typology.  As noted, 
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research findings suggested that MNCs were involved in the DRC’s conflicts and in the 
conflict transformation/peacebuilding process.  
 
The fourth section discussed the issues that emerged from the review of literature, theoretical 
frameworks, paradigmatic perspectives and survey findings.  In view of the stultifying effects 
that MNCs’ complicity in conflicts have had on corporate peacebuilding, the fifth section – a 
prognosis – discussed the perils and promise of corporate peacebuilding.  It was noted that 
certain variables imperilled effective corporate peacebuilding.  In addition, it was emphasized 
that effective corporate peacebuilding is dependent on addressing the systemic and relational 
factors that imperil MNCs’ efforts.  The section concluded that effective corporate 
peacebuilding is possible in the DRC, subject to the proviso that all stakeholders address 
systemic and relational impediments in a complementary fashion.  Next, Chapter Eight 















SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Summary of findings 
This study is interdisciplinary in nature.  Its contextual elements straddle the disciplines of 
international relations (specifically the sub-field of international political economy) and 
conflict transformation and peace studies.  The study interrogated the connections of 
powerful transnational economic actors to conflict dynamics in resource-rich but conflict-
prone environments.  Its primary unit of analysis, from an actor perspective, are MNCs – 
powerful economic non-state actors that Chandler and Mazlish (2005) refer to as 
“leviathans”.  Its focal point of analysis in the domain of conflict analysis is conflict 
transformation.  Broadly speaking, this study has examined the intricate relationship between 
international business and conflict.  Specifically, it investigated the roles of MNCs in conflict 
zones, using the DRC as a case study.  In terms of methodology, the empirical nature of this 
study necessitated a combination of research methods and approaches.  Therefore, it adopted 
historical, qualitative and quantitative approaches to the explication of the subject matter of 
the research. 
 
Chapter One was a primer, an introduction to the study.  Its presentation of the background to 
the study foregrounded the research problem.  It also identified the research task and outlined 
the study’s hypothesis.  The chapter presented the research objectives and corresponding 
research questions.  Furthermore, Chapter One delineated the study’s scope and limitations.  
It highlighted the significance of the study, followed by a brief statement of the research 
methodology and research design.  The chapter also noted that an empirical study of this 
nature is bound to grapple with certain methodological and practical limitations, which the 
chapter identified.  A section of Chapter One was devoted to the clarification of the key 
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concepts that underpinned the study’s thematic concern.  The chapter concluded with a 
description of the structure of the study. 
 
Chapter Two – a review and comparison of relevant literature – interrogated the interface 
between natural resources and conflict.  The analysis of the resource-conflict nexus was done 
with a view to advancing a nuanced understanding of the role of natural resources in 
conflicts.  Furthermore, the discussion of the resource-conflict link provided a context in 
which the connections between business and conflict could be located.  Using the ‘resource 
curse’ thesis as the focal point of analysis, Chapter Two examined the debate about the nexus 
between natural resources and conflict.  It was noted that although the literature contains 
narratives that either corroborate or disprove the ‘resource curse’ thesis, the relationship 
between natural resources and conflict is not linear and direct but complex and indirect.  This 
is because natural resource endowment, per se, does not engender development pathologies 
or precipitate conflict. 
 
Through a review and comparison of relevant literature, Chapter Two highlighted the 
intervening variables in the resource-conflict link.  Crucially, the chapter showed that a 
number of intervening variables associated with natural resources and resource-bearing 
territories (communities and/or countries) combine with social, economic and political factors 
to precipitate, exacerbate and perpetuate conflicts.  In other words, these variables intertwine 
with natural resources to produce conflict dynamics, such as conflict onset, duration, intensity 
and perpetuation.  In its explication of these variables, Chapter Two emphasized the need for 
a nuanced understanding of the link between natural resources and conflicts, which also 
provides a framework for unpacking the roles of resource-seeking and profiteering actors 
(such as MNCs) in resource-rich but conflict-prone environments. 
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Having discussed how state and non-state actors and variables interact with natural resources 
to shape conflict dynamics in Chapter Two, Chapter Three presented theoretical and 
analytical perspectives on MNCs in conflict zones.  The chapter examined relevant 
paradigms (or schools of thought) and the theories and arguments (pertaining to MNCs) 
associated with paradigmatic perspectives.  The analysis of related sub-themes in the chapter 
sought to provide a panoramic framework that lends itself to understanding corporate 
behaviour in the public sphere in general and in conflict zones in particular.  The chapter’s 
interrogation of the liberal and radical paradigms on MNCs foregrounded the contending 
views vis-à-vis the impacts of MNCs’ activities in host environments, especially in the LDCs.  
It was noted that the liberal and radical schools advance different premises that lead to 
apparently incommensurate conclusions on the effects on MNCs’ operations on host states.  
The liberal school contends that MNCs make important contributions to LDCs and therefore 
are “benign engines of prosperity” (Stopford, 1998-1999: 12).  By contrast, the radical school 
argues that MNCs’ activities undermine state sovereignty and produce pernicious effects in 
LDCs and as such, these powerful economic actors impede autochthonous development.  
However, the chapter noted that the performance of CSR activities by MNCs underscore 
aspects of the liberal argument, while corporate complicity in conflicts lends credence to 
facets of the radical school’s arguments.  It therefore is evident that the two paradigms are not 
necessarily or inevitably incommensurate since neither provides a definitive worldview.  
Rather, each represents an aspect of reality. 
 
An examination of the liberal and radical paradigms provided a useful backdrop for the 
analysis of “good” and “bad” corporate behaviour in Chapter Three.  As the discussion 
highlighted, the performance of CSR activities by companies exemplify an aspect of “good” 
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corporate behaviour.  It was noted that although the concept of CSR is plagued by 
definitional imprecision, cynicism and rejection, it has remained resilient on the analytical 
and practical planes.  Importantly, MNCs (and business in general) continue to profess 
commitment to CSR.  Moreover, civil society (at national and international levels) is 
increasingly championing adherence to CSR principles by corporate actors, especially in 
volatile environments.  Chapter Three emphasized that although the profit-seeking motive 
may propel companies towards illicit tendencies, CSR serves as a compass that underscores 
ethical behaviour. 
 
The significance of CSR lies in its utility as a tool, a yardstick that is used to evaluate 
corporate behaviour, primarily in terms of actions that cohere with or detract from CSR 
principles. In this regard, stakeholders generally censure (or seek 
accountability/responsibility for) corporate actions that detract from CSR principles.  This is 
most applicable when companies are implicated in conflicts.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter Three (and highlighted in other chapters), MNCs’ complicity in conflicts is one 
dimension of corporate behaviour.  The other facet of corporate behaviour pertains to the 
involvement of companies in activities that seek to transform conflicts or facilitate 
peacebuilding.  In its explication of corporate behaviour in conflict zones, the chapter 
highlighted the fact that such behaviour is characterised by ambivalence.  The chapter’s 
empirical analysis of the corporate-conflict dynamic underscored the point that the discourse 
on the roles of MNCs in conflict environments (and by extension in the public sphere) should 
be anchored on an awareness of the dialectics of corporate behaviour. 
 
In conflict situations, interactions of actors and processes produce conflict dynamics, or ebbs 
and flows, which shape the trajectory of conflict and the prospects for peace.  The concept of 
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conflict transformation, which is often used interchangeably with peacebuilding, encapsulates 
these postulations on conflict.  Chapter Four examined the theory of conflict transformation 
in view of the fact that resource-related conflicts (like all conflicts) are characterised by 
several ebbs and flows and that resource-extracting and mineral-trading actors often shape 
such conflict dynamics.  In the context of this study, profiteering networks, MNCs in 
particular, are important actors that influence the dialectics of resource-related conflicts.  
Chapter Four underscored the point that conflict transformation is useful to unpacking the 
conflict-perpetuating and peacebuilding roles of MNCs in conflict zones.  As noted, such 
roles significantly influence the trajectory of conflicts. 
 
While corporate behaviour shapes conflict dynamics in host environments, the corporate 
governance regime in host countries – among other factors – influences corporate behaviour 
itself.  In line with this realisation, Chapter Four analysed the dominant corporate governance 
regime types namely the contractarian and communitarian paradigms.  The interrogation of 
the paradigms showed that the adoption of one or the other by a host government determines 
the extent to which MNCs could be held accountable and/or responsible for their activities in 
the public sphere.  It was noted that while the contractarian paradigm views the corporation 
essentially as “a private actor” that is accountable only to shareholders, the communitarian 
school regards the corporation as “a complex social institution” that is accountable to other 
stakeholders (Amao, 2007: 313, 315).  As Chapter Four highlighted, this binary (that is, the 
private-public distinction) is fraught with practical implications.  On one hand, a 
contractarian corporate governance regime could undermine the legitimate claims/concerns 
of other stakeholders, especially when the actions of MNCs produce deleterious social 
impacts.  On the other hand, a communitarian governance regime could violate the rights of 
companies as legal entities or “corporate citizens”. 
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In order to address the drawbacks associated with the bifurcation alluded to above, this study 
– in Chapter Four – synthesized aspects of the contractarian and communitarian paradigms.  
In doing so, the study argues for a nuanced conception of the corporation as any of the 
following: a private agent, a public actor, a private agent with public roles, and a public actor 
with private roles.  As argued in Chapter Four, this perception of corporations allows for a 
holistic understanding of the activities of MNCs in the social context, such as in a conflict 
situation whereby corporate behaviour influences and is influenced by other stakeholders. 
 
In view of the centrality of other actors and their activities in shaping corporate behaviour in 
conflict zones, the study adopted the stakeholder approach in its explication of MNCs’ 
activities in the DRC’s conflicts and peacebuilding process.  Chapter Four unpacked the 
stakeholder theory as well as its utility to the study, based on the premise that shareholders, 
employees, governments, armed groups (government forces and rebels), resource-bearing 
communities, and intervenors shape corporate behaviour in conflict zones.  The chapter 
concluded by arguing that the stakeholder theory’s emphasis on the local context in which 
corporations operate is germane to understanding the strategic behaviours of MNCs in zones 
of conflict. 
 
The analysis of the resource-conflict nexus (in Chapter Two) provided the background and 
context for the examination of the interface of natural resources and conflicts in the DRC in 
Chapter Five.  In this chapter, the study undertook a detailed depiction of the DRC’s 
economy, geopolitics and history.  It was noted that certain tangible attributes or elements of 
power underscore the country’s strategic significance.  These include its territory, topography 
and most importantly, immense natural resource endowment.  This enormous mineral wealth 
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earned the country the appellation of scandale géologique (that is, geological scandal).  As 
noted in the chapter, the DRC is home to “no less than eighty-seven different types of 
minerals” Lemarchand (2009: ix).  What gives the country strategic significance, however, is 
not the sheer number (or staggering amount) of natural resources but the DRC’s considerable 
share of world’s reserves and the high quality of the minerals.  The discussion in Chapter 
Five showed that the DRC (arguably the richest country on earth in terms of natural resource 
endowment) possesses crucial tangible elements of power that potentially stimulate socio-
economic development. 
 
However, the DRC’s history and contemporary situation depict a paradox.  A study of DR 
Congo’s history reveals a litany of woes: exploitative colonial experience, post-independence 
political instability, government inertia, endemic corruption and poor natural resource 
governance.  Systematic pillaging of the country’s natural wealth were hallmarks of its pre-
colonial and post-colonial epochs.  Hence, natural resource abundance has not stimulated 
development; rather, it has been a factor in the country’s post-colonial traumas.  The allure of 
the DRC’s resources has made the country susceptible to, and a victim of, domestic 
insurrection, foreign aggression/military intervention and protracted conflicts.  Hence, for an 
overwhelming majority of Congolese, the country’s abundance of natural resources has 
brought poverty, disease, violence and suffering.  This, according to Nzongola-Ntalaja (1998: 
i. d.), is the “real scandal”, which Chapter Five unpacked with reference to an alternate 
conception of scandale géologique.  No phenomenon illustrates this alternate conception of 




Therefore, Chapter Five examined natural resource links to the First and Second Congo 
Wars.  With reference to the First Congo War (1996-1997), the AFDL rebel group and its 
foreign backers targeted resource-rich areas in the offensive against Mobutu Sese Seko.  
Once the rebels captured a mineral-rich zone, they became “de facto” governors and 
concluded lucrative mining deals with MNCs through which the rebels were able to finance 
the rebellion.  The resource dimensions of conflict were even more pronounced during the 
Second Congo War (1998-2003), during which national armies, militias and corporate actors 
plundered the country’s mineral wealth on a grand scale.  The period witnessed the illicit 
exploitation and trafficking of natural resources such as cobalt, coltan, copper, diamonds, 
gold and tin by both state and non-state actors. 
 
In particular, coltan exploitation and trade (stimulated by unprecedented international 
demand and the boom in the electronics/hi-tech industry) created a war economy that brought 
the conflict-financing capacity of natural resources to the fore.  MNCs were integral 
participants in this war economy, which was sustained by a local-global supply chain.  In 
addition, the nature of the local-global supply chain and the absence of an international 
regime to regulate coltan trade aided MNCs’ complicity in the DRC’s conflicts.  Chapter Five 
emphasized that the economic incentives that armies, rebels and profiteering networks 
obtained from “conflict minerals” provided little or no incentive for ending the conflicts in 
the DRC.  In this way, DR Congo’s resources have been a formidable factor in conflict 
perpetuation. 
 
In Chapter Six, the study provided broad explications of corporate behaviour in the DRC.  It 
examined the activities of selected mineral-prospecting and resource-trading MNCs in the 
study’s locale.  The chapter presented the profiles of MNCs with reference to their home 
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countries, their main activities in the minerals sector and connections to the DRC.  MNCs’ 
connections to DR Congo’s minerals (through either exploitation or trade) became highly 
controversial in view of the role played by natural resources in conflicts.  The involvement of 
several actors (including MNCs) in the illegal exploitation and trafficking of the DRC’s 
natural resources prompted the UN to establish a Panel of Experts to investigate the resource 
dimensions of the conflicts.  As noted, reports of the UN Panel revealed the complicity of 
corporate actors in the plunder of the DRC’s mineral wealth.  The reports elicited strong 
reactions from indicted and (reputedly) aggrieved actors, leading to subsequent consultations 
and dialogue between the Panel and the affected parties.  While the consultations and 
dialogue led to the resolution of some of the issues raised by the actors, the work of the UN 
Panel brought elements of corporate actors’ complicity in the DRC’s conflicts to the fore. 
 
However, the discussion in Chapter Six showed that the involvement of MNCs in the DRC’s 
conflicts was one facet of corporate behaviour.  The other facet revealed an aspect of “good” 
behaviour in a “bad” environment, that is, the implementation of CSR initiatives in a volatile, 
conflict-ridden space.  The chapter noted that CSR activities by Anglo-American PLC and 
Banro Corporation illustrated MNCs’ potential and actual peacebuilding capabilities.  In 
addition, it highlighted the point that MNCs’ interventions in the public sphere in this regard 
have focused largely on traditional CSR projects (mainly infrastructure rehabilitation and 
social service delivery).  Importantly, drawing from empirical evidence, the chapter argues 
that corporate peacebuilding was in its embryonic stages. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, research findings indicate the saliency of social responsibility 
initiatives undertaken by MNCs in the DRC.  It was shown that some of the initiatives have 
been geared towards creating a peaceful and stable environment.  These initiatives are 
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essential aspects of corporate peacebuilding – an emerging construct in conflict analysis.  The 
chapter argued that although peace-enhancing initiatives by MNCs constitute a dimension of 
social responsibility, they do not fall strictly within the purview of traditional notion of CSR.  
In this sense, corporate peacebuilding transforms the concept of CSR.  Crucially, the formal 
end to conflicts and the Congolese government’s adoption of the “cinq chantiers” [five 
pillars] for social and economic reconstruction offer MNCs ample space and opportunities to 
implement programmes in support of post-conflict peacebuilding. 
 
Chapter Six analysed the operational contexts that underpinned the contradictions of 
corporate behaviour in the DRC.  The chapter undertook this analysis in light of the study’s 
hypothesis, which states that the interplay of corporate objectives and the operational context 
(that is, the local, national and international environments) underpin the strategic behaviour 
of a multinational corporation.  As discussed, contextual factors and interactive clusters of 
actors (which this study refers to as stakeholders) at three levels of analysis – local, national 
and international – influenced MNCs’ activities in support of conflict or contribution towards 
positive transformative change.  It was argued that understanding the context in which MNCs 
operated was pivotal to unpacking corporate behaviour, especially in terms of its 
ambivalence. 
 
Chapter Seven undertook a statistical presentation and analysis of data on MNCs’ 
connections to conflicts and peacebuilding in the DRC.  The chapter examined the specific 
roles of MNCs in the DRC’s conflicts and peacebuilding process, thereby illuminating the 
broad explication of corporate behaviour (undertaken in Chapter Six).  This was done 
through the presentation and analysis of the data obtained during fieldwork in the DRC.  
Research data revealed ambivalent corporate behaviour, that is, corporate actors’ complicity 
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in conflicts as well the MNCs’ implementation of initiatives geared towards 
positive/transformative change. 
 
MNCs’ actions, which typified corporate complicity in conflict, included the illicit 
exploitation of minerals, trading in conflict minerals and providing financial and logistical 
support for belligerents.  From respondents’ perspectives, these actions portrayed MNCs as 
“corporate marauders”.  Research findings suggested that the involvement of companies in 
the DRC’s conflicts exacerbated and prolonged conflicts, thereby having a significant impact 
on conflict dynamics.  For instance, it was noted that the economic spoils that MNCs and 
other actors reaped from conflicts underpinned conflict perpetuation but provided little or no 
incentive for actors to seek peace. 
 
Nonetheless, research findings indicated that MNCs were involved in activities that 
exemplified elements of conflict transformation/peacebuilding.  As noted in this study,270 the 
conflict transformation theory underscores provision of humanitarian assistance during 
conflict situations.  In addition, it emphasises infrastructure reconstruction, peace 
advocacy/education and the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants as crucial 
processes in a typical post-conflict epoch.  MNCs’ implementation of these peacebuilding 
initiatives stood in stark contrast to corporate complicity in conflicts.  From the perspectives 
of respondents, the involvement of companies in activities aimed at facilitating peace and 
positive transformative change depicted MNCs as “catalysts for peace”. 
 
The chapter drew inferences from research findings and discussed emerging issues, 
highlighting the lessons learnt from this study on MNCs and conflicts in the DRC.  Key 
                                                            
270 See Chapter Four. 
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issues that have significance for the research hypothesis and research questions included the 
nexus between natural resources and conflicts, the roles of business in conflict zones, and the 
peace process mechanism in resource-related conflicts, the character of the Congolese state.  
Other issues discussed were the lack of a corporate governance regime, the sub-regional 
political economy of natural resource exploitation and trafficking, and the role of 
international actors in natural resource governance.   
 
Chapter Seven also emphasised the point that the involvement of corporate actors in the 
DRC’s conflicts and their implementation of peacebuilding initiatives highlighted the 
dialectics of corporate behaviour.  It was also noted that the complicity of MNCs in conflicts 
undermined corporate peacebuilding.  In view of this, Chapter Seven undertook a 
prognostication of corporate behaviour in the DRC.  Based on research findings and the 
operational contexts of MNCs, the chapter concluded with deductions on the possibilities and 
challenges of mainstreaming corporate peacebuilding into natural resource governance in the 
DRC.   
 
The chapter’s analytical projection of corporate peacebuilding, drawing from historical and 
contemporary trends, suggested that a number of factors potentially jeopardise MNCs’ 
abilities to implement effective peacebuilding programmes.  It was pointed out that a post-
conflict DRC offers considerable promise for effective corporate peacebuilding.  However, 
the chapter presented a caveat: the success of corporate initiatives aimed at facilitating 
reconstruction, peace and development in the DRC depends largely on the extent to which 
stakeholders address the substantive (that is, systemic and institutional) factors that 
potentially imperil effective post-conflict peacebuilding.  Drawing from the study’s findings 
as outlined here, the next section presents key logical conclusions, which may provide the 
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bedrock for future research into the corporate-conflict nexus and corporate peacebuilding in 
conflict zones. 
 
8.2 Concluding remarks 
This study has explored the intricate nexus between natural resources and conflict.  Using a 
triangulation (natural resources, profit and peace), it interrogated the connections of profit-
seeking mineral-prospecting and resource-trading actors to conflict dynamics.  This 
triangulation underscored the political economy of natural resources, which foregrounds the 
linkages between minerals, business and politics.  Specifically, this study examined the 
linkages with reference to the involvement of profiteering networks (that is, mineral-
prospecting and resource-trading MNCs) in conflict settings.  An examination of the linkages 
suggested that the profit motive propels MNCs into resource-rich environments, including 
conflict-prone areas.  Furthermore, in conflict zones, the profit maximisation rationale 
combines with other variables to determine the behaviour of MNCs in two fundamental 
ways: whether to get involved in conflict-sustaining activities or to facilitate the search for 
peace.  Thus, the key point of the triangulation is that MNCs in the minerals sector, whose 
investment in conflict zones is underpinned by profit maximisation, typically undertake 
activities that shape conflict dynamics and the prospects for peace. 
 
The study applied this triangulation to the DRC, a country that is arguably the richest on earth 
in terms of natural resource endowment but plagued by protracted conflicts in which natural 
resources have been implicated.  This study pointed out that a determining factor in a 
resource-seeking corporate actor’s decision to invest in a country is the availability of natural 
resources in commercial quantities.  Therefore, the DRC’s natural resource abundance and 
the high quality of its resources have been a source of strong attraction for MNCs.  It is also 
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instructive to note that investing in volatile regions exposes MNCs to risks and 
vulnerabilities, including the possibility of being implicated in processes that sustain or 
entrench volatility.  This point applies in the case of the DRC, as this study shows.  Given the 
intractable resource-related conflicts in the DRC, MNCs have been entangled – directly and 
indirectly – in conflict-sustaining activities, thereby bringing corporate complicity to the fore.  
Nonetheless, a conflict situation offers MNCs an opportunity to support conflict 
transformation, thereby distinguishing themselves as “good” corporate citizens.  This is 
especially the case in the context of state deflation and/or government inertia.  As powerful 
economic actors (with robust “financial muscle”), MNCs in the DRC have implemented CSR 
activities in support of peacebuilding, especially where the government’s incapacity has been 
evident.  In this way, MNCs’ involvement in the public sphere gives practical expression to 
the “peace” component of the triangulation that this study adopts. 
 
Based on the outline above in respect of MNCs’ involvement in the DRC, this study makes 
the following specific conclusions with reference to the salient aspects of the research. 
 
• With regard to the research hypothesis – namely, that the interplay of corporate 
objectives and the local, national and international environments underpin the 
strategic behaviour of multinational corporations in conflict zones, – research findings 
suggest that MNCs are motivated by the goal of profit maximisation, which 
underscores the decision to invest and conduct operations in foreign environments.  
As the case study illustrates, such foreign environments may be volatile, unstable, 
conflict-prone or conflict-ridden.  In this regard, MNC investment may predate or be 
subsequent to the onset of conflict.  Where the investment predates conflict, an MNC 
is faced with the decision to “exit” or “remain” in the conflict zone.   Instructively, the 
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decision to exit or remain in a conflict zone is based on a cost-benefit analysis 
associated with either course of action.  Of course, the decision is influenced by a 
combination of factors: the nature of the investment (that is the MNC’s industry), the 
level of volatility, the ability of the corporation to divest and the availability of 
alternate sources of production.  Generally, it is easier to divest in the case of labour 
intensive industries in which the main resources are highly lootable.  In the case of 
resource-extracting and capital intensive investment, a few alternate sources of 
minerals, and where resources have little or no lootability, MNCs generally remain in 
conflict zones.  The decision to remain in a conflict zone presents a choice scenario 
namely, the form that corporate behaviour should take.  In this regard, an MNC is 
confronted with a range of options: to become complicit in conflict; to “do no harm”; 
or to undertake corporate peacebuilding.  Whatever the form that corporate behaviour 
takes in this situation, this study showed that it is informed by a combination of 
internal (company) dynamics and the predisposing or countervailing variables at the 
local, national and international levels.   
 
Therefore, although complex, corporate behaviour – whether in the form of 
complicity in conflict or the facilitation of conflict transformation – is contextual and 
should be understood and analysed from this prism.  Thus, research findings confirm 
the study’s hypothesis. 
 
• With regard to the first research question – that is, the context-specific factors that 
undergirded the strategic behaviour of MNCs in the DRC’s conflict zones – this study 
shows that at the local level, volatility (conflicts) in resource-bearing communities, 
the presence and activities of armed groups, and a large pool of unskilled but artisanal 
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miners shaped the behaviour of resource-extracting and mineral-trading MNCs.  At 
the national level, the absence of state authority in resource-bearing areas, porous 
borders, corruption, poor/weak economic governance, the lack of a national 
regulatory framework (that is, a mining code) and warlord politics enabled corporate 
complicity in conflicts.  On the other hand, the retooling of state authority (especially 
the revitalisation of the national army), the national reconciliation process and the 
activities of domestic NGOs created an ambience that was conducive to corporate 
peacebuilding.  At the international level, the demand for the DRC’s resources, the 
absence of an international regime (specifically to regulate coltan trade) and the 
involvement of intervenors (especially neighbouring countries) aided corporate 
complicity in the DRC’s conflicts.  On the contrary, corporate peacebuilding has been 
undergirded by variables such as UN intervention (for example, the activities of the 
UN Panel of Experts and MONUC/MONUSCO) and advocacy by international 
NGOs.  What conclusion do these variables furnish? 
 
Actors and phenomena at the three concentric spheres combine with the profit-making 
rationale to provide a holistic explanation for the specificities of corporate behaviour 
in conflict zones.  Therefore, an examination of these variables is sine qua non for a 
nuanced understanding of the strategic behaviour of MNCs in conflict zones. 
 
• In answering the second research question (regarding the roles of MNCs in the DRC’s 
conflicts and peacebuilding process), the study shows that corporate actors undertook 
activities that exacerbated and prolonged conflicts and hindered initiatives aimed at 
conflict transformation in the DRC.  The roles of companies in the DRC’s conflicts 
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and in the peacebuilding process demonstrated the complexities of corporate 
behaviour. 
 
Thus, the study concludes that is no simple answer to the above question, given that in 
conflict zones, MNCs can be parties in conflict even as they can be agents of peace. 
 
• The third research question pertains to the impacts of corporate behaviour on the 
DRC’s peace and conflict transformation process.  This study bears out the 
significance of corporate actors in resource-related conflicts.  Evidently, the pursuit 
and realisation of the political objectives of belligerents hinged largely on the roles of 
corporate actors – the purveyors of economic capital required to prosecute war efforts.  
Moreover, the involvement of MNCs shaped conflicts in fundamental ways, 
especially in terms of their intensity, technological sophistication, longevity and the 
prospects for their attenuation.  Research findings suggest that MNCs’ impact on the 
DRC’s conflicts was significant, contributing to conflict perpetuation.  Clearly, the 
economic spoils of the DRC’s conflicts, which the activities of MNCs brought to the 
fore, constituted a disincentive to peace.  Yet, equally significant was the involvement 
of MNCs in the conflict transformation process.  In the absence of state intervention, 
MNCs’ peacebuilding initiatives provided not only the means through which people 
in conflict zones could adjust to conflict but also the platform to build peace and 
reconstruct the DRC. 
 
State deflation or government inertia gives MNCs (and other non-state actors) 
comparative advantage in the public sphere, thus making their activities – whether 
positive or negative – extremely significant.  As powerful economic actors, MNCs 
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exert decisive influence on political and economic dynamics in host environments, 
especially in the LDCs. 
 
• With regard to the fourth (and final) research question (regarding the conclusions that 
MNCs’ roles in the DRC’s public sphere engender regarding the perils and promise of 
corporate peacebuilding especially in the emerging post-conflict epoch), it is 
instructive to note that corporate peacebuilding is a relatively new phenomenon.  
Although an embryonic concept, corporate peacebuilding deepens and shifts the 
frontiers of CSR.  It also emphasises the important contributions that powerful non-
state actors can make towards building and nurturing peace in societies plagued by 
conflicts.  In this way, corporate peacebuilding is of practical and analytical 
significance.  On the practical plane, it complements state and intergovernmental 
capacities in conflict transformation.  At the level of analysis, it presupposes the 
rethinking of the conventional conflict analysis paradigms (which focus essentially on 
warring parties) and the formal governmental peace process frameworks (that 
emphasise the role of state actors).  Such analytical introspection calls for the 
interrogation and understanding of contemporary conflicts through more 
encompassing frameworks that encapsulate the motivations, strategic interests and 
roles of important and powerful non-state actors in conflict and peacebuilding 
processes. 
 
As actors with enormous influence in host environments, MNCs have the 
potentialities to make significant contributions to peace, development and prosperity 
of their host communities and countries.  At this juncture in the concluding remarks, 
the study observes that there is a need to mainstream corporate peacebuilding into 
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MNCs’ activities in conflict zones in order to engender political stability, which is 
necessary for business success in the long-term.  
 
A further conclusion can be drawn with reference to the study’s theoretical framework – the 
stakeholder theory of the corporation.  It is noteworthy that other actors such as MNCs’ home 
and host governments, domestic and foreign armies, rebels, militias, comptoirs, the media, 
local and international NGOs, and the UN – in varying degrees – influence the activities of 
corporate actors in the DRC, and vice versa.  The interactive cluster of actors, based on 
extrapolations from the stakeholder theory and applied to the DRC’s conflict zones, is 
represented diagrammatically thus: 
 




Source: Researcher’s adaptation of the stakeholder theory. 
 
 
































Figure 8.1 above shows that a number of actors in conflict zones influence the behaviour of 
MNCs within conflict zones, and vice versa.  It is instructive to note that the direction and 
level of influence are a function of the objectives of each actor at any specific time.  In 
addition, such objectives may be complementary or mutually exclusive, depending on the 
configuration of actors and the issues at stake.  Whatever the case may be, the seminal point 
is that other actors (state and non-state alike) may influence corporate behaviour as much as 
MNCs may influence these actors.  In other words, the relationship between MNCs and other 
actors in conflict zones is multi-faceted – not unidirectional.   
 
The thesis therefore concludes that an analysis of corporate behaviour in conflict zones 
should take cognisance of the roles and impacts of other actors in producing specific 
outcomes that define the trajectory of conflicts and peacebuilding processes. 
 
A final observation focuses on the study’s interrogation of MNCs’ involvement in the DRC’s 
public sphere – an interrogation which highlights a number of challenges that relate to peace, 
reconstruction and development in Africa’s geographically second largest country.  The study 
has demonstrated that governance deficit, corruption, lack of mining sector reform, lack of 
sub-regional cooperation on natural resource governance issues and the absence of an 
international mechanism to regulate coltan trade pose significant risks to peace and stability 
in the DRC.  Therefore, addressing these systemic challenges is germane to harnessing the 
benefits of natural resource abundance and emplacing peace and development in the country.  
The next section, which rounds off this thesis on MNCs and conflict transformation in the 





Drawing from research findings, and based on the imperative of addressing aforementioned 
systemic challenges, this study makes the following policy recommendations. 
 
8.3.1 The incontrovertible centrality of state restructuring/reconstruction 
As this study notes, the DRC’s current traumas have their roots partly in the country’s 
chequered history.  One of the emerging issues discussed in relation to research findings in 
Chapter Seven is the character of the Congolese state.  The state (like many of its African 
counterparts) is a product of exogeneity – Belgian colonialism – and as such, its capacity to 
engineer autochthonous development was sabotaged by its origins.  It was noted that, as 
presently constituted, the Congolese state is severely encumbered with respect to mobilising 
its natural resource wealth for development.  This author believes that central to ensuring that 
natural resources benefit the country and its people is the restructuring of the state to make it 
people-oriented and developmental.271  A developmental state, ipso facto, will be in a 
position to mitigate some of the contradictions that have fuelled conflicts and sustained 
development pathologies in the DRC.  More importantly, this fundamental restructuring of 
the state will create the ambience for good natural resource governance and resource-driven 
development.  As Adejumobi (2000: 10) argues, such a state should be able to  
facilitate rapid process of capital accumulation and 
industrialisation, while not compromising the goal of social 
welfare for the people.  Such a state must possess two features.  It 
must have relative autonomy, so that it is able to act independently 
                                                            
271 In making this recommendation, this author acknowledges that African states do not have the luxury of 
relatively isolated development and disinterested neighbours, which obtained for many Western states.  Rather, 
most have been forced to operate in a highly conditioned and parasitical global and local environment in which 
they are bit players.  Lacking effective governance and managerial capacity, as compared to other interested 
external actors (Western states and MNCs), they have had to rely on the same hostile and parasitical forces to 
navigate the treacherous global and local terrain around them.  Not surprisingly, their territories become 
susceptible to a range of dysfunctions often authored and nurtured by the same interested external actors whose 
fortunes are more enhanced by a weak state rather than a strong state.  In some ways, this explains the plight of 
many African states such as the DRC. 
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of contending social forces, and also must enjoy legitimacy. The 
latter implies the democratic content of such state.272 
 
8.3.2 The imperative of good political and economic governance 
The DRC’s political landscape has been characterised by “Mobutuism”: maladministration, 
corruption, neopatrimonialism and nepotism.  These “Mobutuist” tendencies have been a 
factor in the mismanagement of the DRC’s natural resources and, perhaps more profoundly, 
have fostered alienation, frustration, aggression and conflicts in the country.  They have been 
responsible for the overall poor political and economic governance in the country that is 
reflected, for instance, in the lack of openness and transparency in the mining sector.  A case, 
which proves the endemic nature of corruption in the mining sector, is instructive.  In the 
early 2000s, the World Bank (working in conjunction with the Congolese government) tried 
to register all concessionary deals in the bid to reform the mining sector in DRC.  However, 
the “World Bank’s mining registry project became so corrupt that it had to be suspended after 
one year, and it did not reopen for another year in an effort to fix the corruption” (Church, 
2005: i. d.).  It was discovered that mining concessions had been granted to companies 
without recourse to established procedures and government officials had connived with 
foreign business to deny the country much needed mineral revenue, prompting the 
description of DR Congo’s mining sector as “a disaster” (Church, 2005: i. d.). 
 
Obviously, corruption in the mining sector has served the interests of a labyrinthine but 
rapacious cartel or network comprising the elite, regional and extra-regional governments and 
MNCs whose overriding objective has been to plunder the DRC’s resources for private gain.  
                                                            
272 Adejumobi’s point about legitimacy is crucial.  Precisely, this feature – legitimacy – is often at the heart of 
many contemporary problems in Africa.  It is often too easy for the state rulers to find themselves falling short 
as forces allied against them use a range of cleavages – ethnicity, religion, and region – to mount separate claims 
for control and authority.  The fires and associated tensions are often stoked by interested external and local 
actors whose aspirations for wealth and/or power can only be achieved (in the short term) in a weak state or 
conflict environment. 
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Endemic corruption has aided and abetted the illicit exploitation of natural resources and 
mineral trafficking which, in turn, have contributed significantly to conflict perpetuation in 
the DRC.  Undoubtedly, poor political and economic governance have underpinned the 
“curse of natural resources” that hangs over the country. 
 
In view of the above, it is recommended that mining sector reform should be anchored firmly 
on good political and economic governance, with strong emphasis on anti-corruption, 
transparency in the extractive industry, and environmental sustainability.  Good political 
governance consists of the promotion of democratic ethos (including popular political 
participation), respect for the rule of law and the sustenance of accountable, responsible and 
responsive effective public institutions, and credible political leadership, all of which have 
been lacking in the DRC.273  Good economic governance includes the implementation of 
credible and predictable economic policies, sound and transparent financial management, and 
effective anti-corruption mechanisms.  These measures will curb corruption, which has 
contributed to the illegal exploitation of natural resources.274  Moreover, a stable and 
predictable political and macro-economic environment in the DRC will ensure the security of 
investment by corporate actors, thereby curtailing illicit corporate behaviour. 
 
Good economic governance should be accompanied by mining sector reform, especially in 
relation to natural resource governance.  At the level of the informal economy, such reform 
should seek to formalise and streamline ASM to ensure that it does not feed into illicit local-
global supply chains for minerals.  A plausible approach is to organise artisanal miners into 
                                                            
273 With regard to this point, there is need to realise that most African states have been incapable of that kind of 
focussed and committed leadership due to distractive and interested forces that are quick to remove non-
compliant leaders (whose policies are aligned with the interests of their citizens). 
274 It is instructive to note that the African Union, through its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 
acknowledges the indispensability of good political and economic governance to national and continental 
development.  However, whether this acknowledgement/rhetoric finds expression in practice remains a moot 
question. 
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co-operatives and for the Ministère des Mines (Ministry of Mines) to register the co-
operatives and their economic partners.  In this way, it will be easy to monitor transactions 
between artisanal miners (that is, co-operatives) and resource traders (comptoirs). 
 
At the level of the formal economy, elements of communitarianism offer an ideal opportunity 
for responsible management of the DRC’s mineral wealth, as they will enhance transparency 
and stakeholder participation in mineral exploration and exploitation as well as in the 
determination of the distribution of mineral revenue.  In addition, communitarianism will 
ensure that corporations are accountable and responsible since it, ab initio, underscores the 
societal roles of corporate actors.  Importantly, it will boost stakeholders’ ability to seek 
redress over corporate actions.  The adoption of the communitarian corporate governance 
framework will contribute towards the creation and sustenance of a people-centred mining 
sector that rectifies current challenges and ultimately stimulates national development. 
 
8.3.3 Building a sub-regional mechanism for combating illicit resource exploitation 
and trafficking 
As this study has shown, illicit natural resource exploitation and mineral trafficking have 
been crucial factors in conflict perpetuation in the DRC.  It can be argued that no other 
variables highlight the resource dimensions of the DRC’s conflicts more than these two.  This 
study also notes that neighbouring countries, primarily Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, had 
facilitated the illegal exploitation and trafficking of DR Congo’s resources.  Neighbouring 
countries were important channels/conduits in the local-global supply chain for minerals 
extracted in the DRC’s conflict zones.  Comptoirs and MNCs had to rely on individuals and 
businesses in these countries to get minerals to international markets.  Therefore, efforts at 
combating illicit mineral-related activities that have sustained conflicts must transcend DR 
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Congo’s national borders.  Such efforts must address the (role of) actors at the sub-regional 
and global levels. 
 
In view of the foregoing, this study recommends the emplacement of a sub-regional 
mechanism (in Africa’s Great Lakes Region and in Central Africa) to combat illicit resource 
exploitation and trafficking.275  Such a mechanism should track the exploitation and 
movement of minerals in addition to the monitoring of the activities of comptoirs and MNCs 
within the sub-region.  A sub-regional body, such as SADC, is most suited to coordinate this 
task, which requires multilateral co-operation amongst states in the sub-region.276  
Interestingly, there is an attempt by states in the sub-region to implement this measure.  A 
sub-regional organisation, the ICGLR, has designed a mineral tracking and certification 
scheme with four components:  
(i) “mine inspections and traceability”, which will help to determine whether minerals 
are “conflict free” or not; 
(ii) “information database”, which is expected to enable inspectors to crosscheck 
information on minerals; 
(iii) “audits”, which will be conducted by independent parties (comprising companies, 
states and NGOs) to determine compliance with the scheme; 
(iv) “independent monitoring”, which will address issues relating to trafficking or 
smuggling, ensuring transparency and imposing sanctions on offenders (Hall and 
Lezhnev, 2013: 1-2).277 
 
                                                            
275 This recommendation is equally applicable in other parts of Africa where the same situations or challenges 
are known to occur, for example, in Nigeria (with regard to oil bunkering), Cameroon and Gabon (timber). 
276 The two main sub-regional groupings in Central Africa that can coordinate such efforts are the International 
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS). 
277 The ICGLR’s mineral tracking and certification scheme focuses specifically on a few core natural resources 
such as cassiterite, coltan, gold and wolframite. 
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This study, while acknowledging that this mechanism is being developed by the ICGLR, 
recommends that the mechanism should have “supranational” attributes in the form of 
provisions that:  
(i) inherently compel member states and corporate actors to comply with such 
provisions; and  
(ii) prescribe sanctions that can be invoked “automatically” in the cases of violations or 
non-compliance.   
 
Without these provisions to give teeth to the mechanism, it will suffer the same fate as other 
ineffectual sub-regional and regional protocols, which remained mere aspirations. 
 
Moreover, in order for the ICGLR’s mechanism to be effective, member states will not only 
have to adopt and ratify the scheme but also demonstrate the necessary political will to 
implement its provisions to the letter.   In addition, an effective sub-regional mechanism to 
combat illicit mineral exploitation and trafficking should be “domesticated”, that is, 
incorporated into national legislations across the sub-region to bolster enforcement at the 
national level.  The proposal here is to have sub-regional tools that function in ways similar 
to protocols that guide member states of the European Union.  Granted, this idea may be 
unattractive or unattainable for sub-regional states in the short or medium term (in view of its 
ramifications for the virtually sacrosanct idea of sovereignty).  Nonetheless, this study 
contends that only this level of commitment to implementing the sub-regional mechanism can 
serve as a bulwark against illicit mineral exploitation and trafficking, which has been a factor 
in the DRC’s conflicts. 
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8.3.4 Crafting an effective international certification scheme to regulate coltan 
exploitation and trade 
The mineral that has had the most decisive impact in terms of conflict perpetuation in the 
DRC is coltan.278  As noted in this study, the local-global supply chain for coltan concealed 
the source of the mineral, thereby inducing and sustaining illicit exploitation and trafficking.  
Another factor that this study isolated as contributing to the imbrication of coltan in the 
DRC’s conflicts is the absence of an international regime to regulate coltan trade.  While 
there exists an international mechanism to regulate the trade in diamonds (that is, the KPCS), 
there is none to regulate coltan.  A number of implications are associated with the absence of 
an international regime on coltan.  For instance, there has been no restraint on corporate 
actors’ involvement in illicit exploitation and trade – activities which are conducted often 
with impunity.  In addition, it has been difficult to establish illegality in the local-global 
supply chain.  Importantly, stakeholders have been deprived the much-needed and clearly 
stipulated index for holding resource-extracting and mineral trading MNCs accountable and 
responsible for illicit activities. 
 
In view of the implications outlined above, this study recommends the creation of an 
international mechanism to regulate coltan trade.  The international regime may be modelled 
after the KPCS with variations to ensure its effectiveness.  Compliance with the mechanism 
should be obligatory for parties involved in coltan production and/or trade.  More 
importantly, the regime should provide for the enforcement of its provisions, especially those 
that relate to transactions in the international market (usually far away from the origins of 
minerals).  A plausible approach towards ensuring compliance and enforcement is to expand 
the role of the International Criminal Police Organization (known as Interpol in popular 
                                                            
278 See Chapter Five. 
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parlance) to handle cases of illicit activities that are beyond national jurisdictions.  While 
conceding that an international regime – in or by itself – does not prevent or eliminate illicit 
behaviour, this study argues that halting impunity and rampant illegality must begin with the 
establishment of clear codes of conduct for actors involved in coltan exploitation and trade.  
Such codes of conduct should not only seek to curb illicit behaviour but also provide a 
roadmap for best practices by corporate actors and other parties involved in the mineral 
sector.  Although this recommendation pertains to coltan (in view of its unique treatment in 
this study), it can be extended to other “conflict minerals”. 
 
8.3.5 Developing a Pan-African regime for regulating corporate behaviour 
As noted in this study, MNCs are powerful economic actors whose activities have decisive 
impacts on host LDCs, especially resource-rich but weak, fragile or conflict-prone countries.  
In Africa, the contexts of state fragility and state deflation make it extremely difficult for host 
governments to regulate corporate behaviour.  As the DRC case study suggests, such contexts 
are characterised by challenges vis-à-vis developing the human capital and 
regulatory/institutional frameworks for regulating MNCs.  Generally, weak mechanisms (or 
absence of mechanisms) create opportunities for inordinate enrichment of MNCs and other 
actors while minimising the gains that affected resource-rich countries derive from natural 
resources and/or foreign investment.   This scenario, which benefits external actors (that is, 
MNCs and their home countries through capital flight) but deepens development pathologies 
in host countries, is commonplace in Africa’s weak and fragile states.  The limited capacity 
of weak and fragile states necessitates a collaborative and concerted effort to assist such 
states to develop and implement appropriate mechanisms to regulate corporate behaviour. 
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Therefore, this study recommends the development of a Pan-African regime for regulating 
corporate behaviour.  This continent-wide instrument, which can be modelled after charters 
developed by the African Union (AU), should map out broad expectations, requirements and 
standards of corporate behaviour while allowing for national variations to cater to country-
specific contexts.279  An “African Charter on Corporate Governance”, which speaks 
specifically to the relationship between MNCs and host countries, should bolster national 
capacities and efforts to not only rein in illicit corporate behaviour but also provide continent-
wide basis for promoting best practices by MNCs.  This recommendation and the possibility 
of its implementation are not farfetched in view of the novel attempt to develop an AU-
sanctioned Africa Mining Vision, which seeks to enhance the benefits that African countries 
derive from natural resources. 
 
This study contends that a Pan-African regime that provides broad parameters for the 
regulation of corporate behaviour can also be mobilised to restrain state and non-state actors 
from supporting MNCs that are involved in illicit activities in resource-rich conflict zones.  
On a positive note, such a regional instrument can not only provide roadmaps for win-win 
relationships between MNCs and host countries, but also popular participation in natural 
resource governance and efficient management of mineral revenues for the benefit of the 
people who are the end of development.  It is likely that such a regional approach will benefit 
resource-rich countries that are plagued by, or recovering from, conflict such as the DRC.  In 
the final analysis, this study’s recommendations suggest that a combination of national, 
                                                            
279 The potency of this recommendation can be explained with reference to the fact that similar arrangements 
have been emplaced at the regional level to assist African countries with governance areas that still pose 
significant challenges.  For instance, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights are instructive in this regard.  It should be stated, however, that 
there are lingering issues and problems regarding national commitments to, or even deviation from, these 
protocols.  Having said that, a Pan-African instrument to regulate corporate behaviour provides an enabling 
context for regional cooperation and multilateral assistance on economic governance issues that states may not 
be able to address effectively on their own. 
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regional and international efforts will ensure that natural resource abundance ceases to be a 
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Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Source: One World – Nations Online (2013: i. d.)
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Appendix 2 





S/N Province Capital  S/N Province Capital 
1 Bandundu Bandundu 7 Kinshasa (city-province) Kinshasa 
2 Bas-Congo Matadi 8 Maniema Kindu 
3 Équateur Mbandaka 9 Nord-Kivu Goma 
4 Kasai-Occidental Kananga 10 Orientale Kisangani 
5 Kasai-Oriental Mbuji-Mayi 11 Sud-Kivu Bukavu 
6 Katanga Lubumbashi  
 
Source: Wikipedia (2013: i. d.).
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Appendix 3 
Natural resource map of the DRC 
 
 
Source: Rekacewicz (2000: i. d.).
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Appendix 4 
Map of the DRC showing natural resource endowment in the eastern region 
 
Source: BBC (2012: i. d.). 
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Appendix 5 
Map of the DRC showing coltan sites in the eastern region 
 




















Source: Al Jazeera English (2011). 
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#1: “Conflict Minerals, Rebels and Child Soldiers in Congo” 




#2: “Grand Theft Congo – DRC” 




#3: “The Real Mobile Phone Wars – DRC” 




#4: “Blood Coltan” 






Local-global supply chain for coltan 
 
Source: OpenOil (2012: i. d.). 
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Appendix 9 
“Key factors in coltan exploration” 
Category of actors Identity Interests 
Armed 
groups/forces 
Armed forces of 
Rwanda and Uganda 
and Congolese 
rebels 
− Exportation of internal crisis. 
− Management of the post-genocide era. 
− State entrepreneurship (state is like any other 
mineral dealer). 
− Finance military campaigns and personal gain 
for high-ranking officers and politicians. 
− Serve the interest of multinational companies. 
− Coercive and dissuasive force for easy 
exploitation of coltan and other minerals. 
− Protection of the mine zones against other 
interested groups (for example, Mai-Mai). 








− Making “good money”. 
− Self-enrichment. 





Coltan diggers and 
other local people 
− Making money. 
− Getting back their lost land. 







− Lucrative deals in the absence of government 
apparatus. 
− Access to strategic minerals to remain 
competitive. 
− Maintaining a presence in both rebel and 
government sides for future deals. 
 

























1  2 




3  4 
1 – Kigumo Health Clinic (South Kivu). 
3 – Kama Bridge in Namoya (Maniema Province). 
 2 – Basketball court (Bagira community, Bukavu). 





5  6 




7  8 
5 – Kibiswa Primary School (South Kivu). 
7 – Reintegration of former child artisanal miners (South 
Kivu). 
 6 – Mapale Institute/High School (Lugushwa, South Kivu). 
8 – Sewing class at Makalanga Women’s Resources Centre 
(South Kivu). 
 
Source: Banro Corporation (2013a: i. d.)  
